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Abstract  
 
The attacks against the United States of America (US) on 11 September 2001 
paved the way for the coming into effect of much counter-terrorism legislation 
across the world. Ethiopia is one of the countries that have introduced new 
legislation on terrorism, which is mainly drawn from the UK and, to a lesser 
extent, from the US.  The aim of this thesis is to comprehensively assess 
Ethiopia's counter-terrorism legislation in light of the experiences of the UK and 
the US in dealing with terrorism. Furthermore, this thesis discusses the 
consequences of ‘copying' Western counter-terrorism legislation into Ethiopian 
culture, drawing particular attention to the need for a proper balance between 
legitimate security interests and the protection of fundamental rights.  
 
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter introduces the significance, 
methodology, limitation, and scope of the thesis. The second chapter discusses 
the development of Ethiopian legal system, human rights and counterterrorism 
measures.  
 
Moving forwards, chapter three seeks to analyse two important factors 
encapsulated within the right to freedom of expression; that is, the content and 
medium of the expression and the identity of the speaker/publisher. The 
relevance of these factors in giving effect to the right to freedom of expression is 
evaluated in light of the need to protect against the incitement and/or 
encouragement of terrorism. The chapter then deepens its critical assessment by 
reviewing the difficulty of implementing these factors in Ethiopia.  
 
Chapter four seeks to widen the debate by exploring the legal regimes governing 
intercept evidence - an issue of great importance in terrorism discourse. The 
chapter critically examines why intercept evidence obtained through a warrant is 
inadmissible in UK courts. Additionally, this chapter compares the position of 
the UK with that of the US, isolating areas of similarities and differences with a 
view to comparing the Ethiopian position on intercept communications.  
 
 v 
 
 
 
Chapter five focuses on the arrest of individuals on suspicion of terrorism and the 
length of pre-charge detention under the three countries selected for this research. 
This chapter will then explore whether there is a need for a watered down version 
of ‘reasonable suspicion' in terrorism cases. This chapter further considers 
Ethiopia's position with regard to the level of knowledge required to execute 
arrests, considering whether Ethiopia could and should reflect on the UK's 
position in attempting to facilitate a greater accordance with fundamental rights 
by shortening the 120 days pre-charge detention currently available to police 
when arresting individuals on suspicion of terrorism.  
 
The final chapter draws on the preceding debate and provides the concluding 
remarks on the thesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 Glossary  
 
ACLU  
ATCSA   
 
BIRW  
CALEA 
 
CBA &LRC  
 
CPJ 
CPS 
DPP  
EATP 
 
ECHRs 
ECPT  
 
ECtHRs 
EHRC  
 
FDRE Constitution  
 
FISA 
 
HRA  
HRW  
 
INA 
Joint Committee on Human Rights  
 Kinjitt 
MCB  
Mckee v CCNI  
 
ICCPR  
 
NDAA 
NIA 1978  
 
NSA  
OSSCA 
 
O’Hara v CCRUC  
 
Parliamentary Minutes  
 
 
 
American Civil Liberties Union Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 
British Irish Rights Watch  
Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act 
Criminal Bar Association and Law 
Reform Committee 
Committee to Protect Journalists 
Crown Service Proclamation  
Director of Public Prosecution 
Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation 
European Human Rights Convention 
European Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism 
European Court of Human Rights  
The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission  
Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Constitution  
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 
Human Rights Act  
Human Rights Watch  
Immigration and Nationality Act 
House of Lords, House of Commons 
Joint Committee on Human Rights  
Opposition Political Party in Ethiopia  
Muslim Council of Britain 
Mckee v Chief Constable for Northern 
Ireland  
International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights  
National Defense Authorization Act 
Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1978   
National Security Agency  
Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime 
Control Act 
O’Hara v Chief Constable for Royal 
Ulster Constabulary  
Parliamentary Minutes on the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, 17 June, 2001  
 
 
 vii 
 
 
 
PACE  
Patriot Act 2001  
 
PTA  
RIPA 
 
SCPO 
Smith Act  
SOCPA 
 
TA  
TFOP  
 
Title III  
 
 
U.S.A.M. 
U.S.C  
 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
Providing Appropriate Tools for 
Intercepting and Obstructing Terrorism   
Prevention of Terrorism Act 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 
Serious Crime Prevention Orders 
The Alien Registration Act of 1940  
Serious Organised Crime and Police 
Act 2005 
Terrorism Act  
Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation 
 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 
 
United States Attorneys' Manual 
Code of Laws of the United States of 
America
VPPA                                                                  Video Privacy Protection Act  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
Table of figures  
 
 
 
Table 2. 1: Editorial opinions in newspapers ............................................................. 102 
Table 2. 2: Articles published based on interviews and polling predictions compiled 
by the opposition parties in the aftermath of the 2005 controversial election. .......... 103 
Table 2. 3: Terrorism cases and the most commonly alleged terrorism offences in 
Ethiopia ...................................................................................................................... 112 
Table 2. 4: Conviction Rates ...................................................................................... 126 
Table 4.1: Reasonable Cause v. Probable Cause in the US………………………...282 
Table 4.2 Arrest of Material witness by nationality ………………………………..316 
Table 4.3: Terrorist Arrests and Probability of being Released Conditionally …….324 
Table 4.4: Length of Pre-charge Detention in Selected Countries …………………330   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
x 
 
Table of contents  
 
Declaration ...................................................................................................................... i 
Certification ................................................................................................................... ii 
Name of Supervisors .................................................................................................... iii 
Name of Examiners ...................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgment .......................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... v 
Glossary ....................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of figures .............................................................................................................. x 
Chapter one:  Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Significant of the Research Project ...……………………………………………..3 
1.2 Methodologies …..………………………………………………………………...4 
1.3 Data Collection.…………………………………………………………………...5 
   1.3.1 Tables of figures on Terrorism Case from Ethiopia ………………………….6 
   1.3.2 Relevant Ethiopian Laws on Terrorism ……………………………………...8 
      1.3.2.1 The Ethiopian Criminal Code 2004 ….…………………………………..8 
      1.3.2.2 The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code………………………………. .10 
      1.3.2.3 The Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 (EATP) .…..11 
      1.3.2.4 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution …..13 
      1.3.2.5 Other legislation …………………………………………………………14 
  1.3.3 Documentaries on terrorism …………………………………………………15 
1.4 Limitations     ……………………………………………………………………16 
1.5 Scope …………………………………………………………………………….17 
1.6 Organisation of this Thesis……………………………………………………… 17 
Chapter two: The Comparative Aspect of the Ethiopian Legal System: From 
Primordial Legal System to Counterterrorism Laws ………………………………...21 
2.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………...21 
2.2 Historical Developments of the Ethiopian Legal System.……………………….24 
2.3 The History of Human Rights in Ethiopia and their Place under the Ethiopian 
Legal System ………………………………………………………………………...30 
2.4 Terrorism and Human Rights: The Question of Balancing National Security and 
Human Rights from an Ethiopian perspective   ……………………………………..39 
   2.4.1 Terrorism in Ethiopian: the Legal Gap and the Need for the EATP ………..47 
      2.4.1.1 Introduction: the Peculiar Features of Terrorism ………………………..47 
     2.4.1.2 Defining Terrorism under Ethiopian Law ……………………………….52 
  2.4.2 The Oromo Liberation Front; Ogaden National Liberation Front, Ginbot 7, 
Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front, etc: Terrorist Organisations or Freedom 
Fighters? …………………………………………………………………………….56 
      2.4.2.1 Oromia Region …………………………………………………………..59 
     2.4.2.2 Amhara Region …………………………………………………………..68 
     2.4.2.3 Somali Region of Ethiopia …………………………………………….....74  
 2.5 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………79 
 
Chapter three: Freedom of Expression and Anti-Terrorism Laws ............................... 82 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 82 
3.2 Freedom of Speech and Constitutional Protection: UK, US, and Ethiopia ........... 83 
3.3 Content and the Medium of an Expression under Article 10 ECHR ..................... 93 
3.3.1 Relevance of medium of communication under domestic laws: US and UK . 99 
3.2.1.1 Non-violent Terrorist Expressions ........................................................... 99 
xi 
 
3.4.1 The relevance of medium of expression under Ethiopian law .................. 104 
3.4.2 Incitement to Terrorism: the Scope between Permitted and non-permitted 
expression under Ethiopian Law ........................................................................ 114 
3.5 Identity and Freedom of Expression .................................................................... 124 
3.5.1 The relevance of identity of a speaker or publisher under Ethiopian law .... 127 
3.6 Membership of a Terrorist Organisation .............................................................. 133 
3.7 Encouragement of Terrorism ............................................................................... 140 
3.8 Would the Glorification of Terrorism be Unconstitutional in the US? ............... 153 
3.9 How does the EATP define the Glorification of Terrorist Acts? How is this 
different from TA 2006?  …………………………………………………………  162 
3.10 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….174 
Chapter Four: Right to Privacy and Anti-Terrorism Laws ........................................ 177 
4.1 Introduction: Covert Investigation and Terrorist Suspects .............................. 177 
4.2 Constitutional Frameworks on Right to Privacy .............................................. 179 
4.2.1 The UK and the US Approaches ................................................................... 179 
4.2.3 An Ethiopian Constitutional Right to Privacy .............................................. 189 
4.3 Interception of Communications...................................................................... 194 
4.3.1 Legal Regimes in the US and UK on Interception ....................................... 194 
4.3.1.1 Interception without Warrant ................................................................. 194 
4.3.1.2 Interception with a Warrant ................................................................... 205 
4.3.1.3 What is an Interception? ........................................................................ 207 
4.3.1.4 Why is Intercept Excluded from Court Proceedings in English Law? .. 217 
4.3.3 The Arguments in favour of lifting the Ban .................................................. 224 
4.3.3.1 Intercept Evidence Would Increase the Conviction of Terrorists .......... 224 
4.3.3.2 Intercept Helps to Reduce Pre-Charge Detention .................................. 226 
4.3.3.3 Intercept Evidence could serve as an Alternative to Control Orders ..... 228 
4.3.2 The US Experience and Section 17 of RIPA ................................................ 230 
4.4.2.1 Disclosing the Contents of an Interception ...................................... 230 
4.4 Challenging Secret Interception is Onerous in the UK and the US for 
Applicants who Challenge Secret Interception .................................................. 236 
4.5 Ethiopia's Legislation on Terrorism and the Interception of Communications
................................................................................................................................ 241 
4.5.1 Some legal backgrounds on Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism Laws on 
Interception of Communication before 2009 ......................................................... 242 
4.5.1.1 The Evidential Value of Intercept Evidence under the Ethiopian Legal 
System: the practice before 2009 ........................................................................... 245 
4.6 Intercept Warrant ......................................................................................... 248 
4.7 How is the Interception of Communications Defined under Ethiopian Law?
............................................................................................................................ 253 
     4.7.1 Probative value of Intercept Evidence under the EATP .......................... 259 
4.8 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………...263 
Chapter Five: The Right to Liberty and Anti-Terrorism Laws .................................. 267 
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 267 
5.2 The Scope of the Right to Liberty in the UK, US and Ethiopia .......................... 267 
5.3 Arrest on Reasonable Suspicion .......................................................................... 275 
5.3.1 Brogan, Fox, O'Hara and Murray: a Watered down Version of Reasonable 
Suspicion? .............................................................................................................. 278 
5.4 Reasonable Suspicion v. Probable Cause ............................................................ 282 
5.5 The Ethiopian Legal System ................................................................................ 288 
5.5.1 Legislative Background in the UK ............................................................... 291 
xii 
 
5.6 Pre-charge Detention: UK .................................................................................... 298 
5.6.1. Contingency Powers as an Alternative to Pre-charge Detention Regime? .. 301 
5.6.2 A Threshold Test as an Alternative to Pre-charge Detention Regime. ......... 307 
5.6.2.1 General background of the Test ............................................................. 307 
5.6.2.2 How effective is the Threshold Test in Replacing Extended Pre-charge 
Detention? .......................................................................................................... 309 
5.7 Length of Pre-charge Detention in the US ........................................................... 315 
5.8 Length of Pre-charge Detention in Ethiopia ........................................................ 323 
   5.8.1 Investigative Remand under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code of 
Ethiopia ...................................................................................................................... 323 
   5.8.2 Investigative Remand for Terrorist Suspects under the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code .......................................................................................................... 326 
5.8.3 Pre-trial Detention (Investigative Remand) under the EATP ....................... 328 
5.9.1 Bailing Terrorist Suspects? ........................................................................... 338 
5.9.2 Holding Charges?.......................................................................................... 344 
5.9.3 Post-charge Questioning? ............................................................................. 347 
5.10 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….364 
6.1 Chapter Six: Conclusion ...................................................................................... 367 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 375 
Appendix A ………………………………………………………………………   435 
Appendix B ………………………………………………………………………   440 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter one:  Introduction  
 
 
It cannot be denied that terrorism poses an unprecedented threat to national 
security, indeed to the very existence of a free and democratic society. The 
horrific events of 9/11 were unimaginable in their devastation. But, if one 
positive could rise from such tragedy, it is that nations across the world awoke to 
the reality of global terrorism. The 9/11 attacks have irreversibly affected Sub-
Saharan African nations. The sweeping approval of counter-terrorism legislation 
across that continent since 9/11 is testament to this fact. However, the 
ramifications emanating from such swift action are only now being realised.  
 
It is not easy to rationalise why so many African countries are adopting counter-
terrorism legislation at break-neck pace, for these countries do not share the same 
public perception of the threat. But, more than that, African legal regimes, 
domestic realities, international norms are different. Indeed, their entire 
constitutional foundation for the legitimate exercise of authority is far less 
developed than that of Western democracies. For some commentators, the push 
to adopt combat terrorism in this part of the world is a result of a carrot and stick 
methodology invoked by the US to force these countries into passing anti-
terrorism regimes.1  
 
Coupled with these factors, the United Nations has initiated a global project to 
combat terrorism, which has involved the implementation of a universal anti-
terrorism framework. As a result, many African countries have ratified or 
acceded to universal instruments against terrorism i.e. UN resolution 1373.2   
 
However, this push to adopt anti-terrorism laws has its own pitfalls. As many 
human rights organisations have pointed out, there is a fear that counter-terrorism 
laws are being used to suffocate political dissent. In its first reaction to the 
                                                 
1       Shinn, D.  (2003). Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview.  xxiii (2) Journal of 
Conflict Studies 79. 
2      Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) [on Threats to International Peace And Security 
Caused By Terrorist Acts], S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001 
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adoption of new anti-terrorism laws in Ethiopia, Amnesty argued that "acts of 
terrorism are vaguely defined and could encompass the legitimate expression of 
political dissent."3  Moreover, Human Rights Watch (HRW) complained that the 
"definition of terrorism includes acts that do not involve violence or injury to 
people, such as property crimes and disruption of public services."4  
 
The response of the Ethiopian government to its detractors has been bluntly 
unequivocal: "...our law on counter terrorism has been directly taken from the 
UK and the US. So what is wrong with copying a law from the most democratic 
countries in the world?"5 However, there is a temptation from some corners of 
the world to dismiss the Ethiopian government's response as too superficial. 
Human rights organisations make a more sinister objection here. They allege that 
there seems to be a move towards using the West's call for international action on 
terrorism as a legitimate excuse for the subversion of human rights standards.         
 
This research acknowledges that Ethiopia is right to adopt legislation on 
terrorism. However, it argues that a law's existence in one country does not 
provide a priori legitimacy for it to be enacted in another country. It also argues 
that, although there are some similarities between the current Ethiopian 
legislation and its Western origins, the governing principles and values which 
underwrite the Western approach to counter-terrorism legislation are 
incompatible with the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
constitutional structure.  
 
This research is original both in terms of its mechanics and content. It seeks to 
use the experiences of the UK and US in enacting, indeed, challenging counter-
terrorism legislation as a template against which to measure the Ethiopian 
position and, if necessary, outline appropriate alternatives that would assist 
                                                 
3      Human Rights Watch (2009). Ethiopia: Anti-Terrorism Proclamation Jeopardizes Freedom of 
Expression., at  http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/ethiopia-new-anti-terrorism-
proclamation-jeopardizes-freedom-expression-  
4       Human Rights Watch (2009). Analysis of Ethiopia's Draft anti-Terrorism Law, at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/84132  
5      The late Prime Minster Zenawi's speech given to parliament in 2009.  
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Ethiopia in its pursuit and promotion of internationally recognized rights. 6 
Moreover, in discussing the influence on Ethiopia of both the UK and US's 
approach to terrorism and human rights, this research  seeks to explore to which 
approach Ethiopia has aligned itself. Such a debate will furnish the subsequence 
discussion of the desirability of following either of the two approaches adopted 
by the UK and US, respectively.  
 
1.1.The Significance of the Research Project  
 
This research intends to materially assist legislative bodies, academics and other 
interested parties in crystallizing the approach of not only of the UK and US, but 
more significantly Ethiopia towards the enduring conundrum facing states across 
the world - the extent to which anti-terrorism legislation and human rights can 
co-exist as equals.  
 
For a government, particularly for the Ethiopian government, which has a track 
record of transferring laws from Western countries no matter how they fit the 
domestic status quo, 7  the research seeks to demonstrate the extent to which 
current anti-terrorism legislation in Ethiopia has negatively impinged on human 
rights while, at the same time, providing an insight into the possible alternatives 
available to address the issues raised. The research intends to demonstrate that 
fighting terrorism is more than adopting a single proclamation.  
 
This research argues that, concomitant with black-letter laws, there needs to be a 
mechanism for balancing principles which guarantee against unnecessary 
interference with basic rights. This research intends, therefore, to address the 
                                                 
6      Ethiopia has ratified and accessed into several international human rights bills. These include, 
inter alia: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on 
Economic, social, and Cultural Rights; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing;  International Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. Besides to the above international conventions, 
Ethiopia has also signed, ratified or accessed the following African conventions:  African [Banjul] 
Charter on Human and People's Rights; Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights; AAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism. 
7      See chapter 2 for further discussion on policy transfer in Ethiopia   
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critical issue of how Ethiopia should balance the need to enhance security against 
protecting civil liberties.  
 
Moreover, since the Ethiopian counter-terrorism legislation was passed only in 
2009, there is a notable shortage in comprehensive research on the Ethiopian 
legal system's approach to counter-terrorism law. There has been a wide variety 
of criticism levelled at the new legislative regime by human rights organisations. 
Unfortunately, such criticism lacks a sufficient level of detail to be of use to 
Ethiopian academics, judges, lawyers and students.  
 
Incidentally, the Ethiopian government also argues that the reports by human 
right organisations are politically motivated and they do not reflect the reality of 
the situation in the country. More broadly, although terrorism has been around 
for quite some time, there would seem to be insufficient literature dealing with 
the impact on third world countries of the changing positions of the UK and US 
towards combating terrorism. Indeed, such is the fast pace at which the two 
countries modify their approach, the lack of an expansive account on the matter 
is understandable. Therefore, it is the aim of this thesis to produce a 
comprehensive and independent perspective that could be used by any person 
who is interested in Ethiopia's approach to terrorism.     
 
1.2. Methodologies 
 
It is not simple to compare legislation from different jurisdictions due to the 
difference in legal regimes, domestic realities, international norms and 
constitutional foundations. Among the issues that need to be addressed in 
comparative legal research are:  "what do we intend to compare? Why have we 
chosen a comparative project? And, perhaps most importantly, what 
methodology do we intend to use?"8 To answer the first question, this research 
compares and contrasts counter-terrorism legislation from the UK, the US, and 
Ethiopia. The reason for this is that the Ethiopian government argues that the 
                                                 
8      Giliker, P. (2006).  The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-
First Century and Methodology of Comparative Law by ÖrÜcÜ, E., reviewed in 55(1) I.C.L.Q. 
243-246  
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Ethiopian anti-terrorism proclamation No. 652/2009 (EATP) is modelled on the 
UK and the US laws.  This answers the second question.       
 
With regard to the third question, this research combines comparative legal 
analysis and qualitative case analysis. 9  It examines anti-terrorism legislation 
from across the legal spectrum by collecting different laws, court decisions and 
other secondary data from a select group of countries. It is doctrinal in nature10 
by virtue of its presentation of legal analysis, comments on court decisions and 
opinion of different legal experts. It also makes a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of how Ethiopia's laws on terrorism compare and contrast to those 
enacted in more experienced countries such as the UK and US. Furthermore, this 
paper critically examines the benefits and/or any loopholes and frailties that 
might exist in the current Ethiopian law against internationally recognized rights.  
 
To this effect, it will collect  counter terrorism laws from the UK and  the US; 
compare them to the Ethiopian counter-terrorism; assess relevant literatures to 
compile in the form of an overview what is currently known and critically 
evaluate the practices experienced to date; examine court rulings on counter 
terrorism measures in Ethiopia, Europe, the UK, and the US; suggests which 
balancing principles  are best for Ethiopia; analyse the positions of legal scholars 
and others and determine which practice is best to modify   Ethiopia's counter-
terrorism law.  
 
1.3.Data collection  
 
The researcher has used data from a variety of sources in Ethiopia, most of which 
originate from the Ethiopian federal courts and the library of the Ethiopian House 
of Representative, but also include other sources such as newspaper articles, 
commentary and documentaries. 
                                                 
9     Dobinson, I. and Johns, F. (2007) Qualitative Legal Research in McConville, M. and Chui, W. 
H. (editors). Research Methods for Law.  (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press), p. 17  (stating 
that "Qualitative legal research is ‘non-numerical and contrasted as such with quantitative 
(numerical) research.")  
10      McConville, M. and Chui, W. H. (2007). Introduction and Overview in McConville, M. and 
Chui, W. H., above, p. 3 (stating that ‘doctrinal research relies extensively on using court 
judgments and statute to explain the law".)  
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A total of three Ethiopian research assistants were required and used for the 
collection of case law on terrorism. 11  Those researchers were charged with 
locating particular cases law relevant to this research. Unfortunately, Ethiopian 
case law on terrorism is not as readily accessible as with case law emanating out 
of the British Legal System, instead being mixed in with other cases such as 
contract, ordinary crimes, etc. The assistant researchers have contributed to the 
successful location of cases that were requested by the principal researcher. 
However, in order to check the authenticity of the cases, the principal researcher 
has personally participated in the collection of the documents. Moreover, the 
usefulness and accuracy of the case law have been counterchecked with other 
sources, such as the case list at the Ethiopian Federal Court registry and reports 
in local newspapers.   
 
Almost all of the primary and secondary sources in this research are written in 
Amharic, the Ethiopian official language.  Accordingly, the absence of English 
language sources has been one of the most difficult tasks while undertaking 
research in Ethiopia.  Indeed, translating these documents into English has 
accounted for a vast amount of time and effort during the research activities. A 
further problem to be mentioned is that annual statistics on terrorism cases and 
incidents are capricious. As a result, the explanation of terrorism cases and the 
context in which a particular law is applied is not readily available.  
 
 
1.1.1. Tables of figures on Terrorism Case from Ethiopia  
 
The FDRE Constitution divides the Ethiopian judiciary into Federal courts and 
State courts, with each having their own jurisdictions.12 According to article 4 of 
the Ethiopian Proclamation No. 25/1996,13 the Ethiopian Federal Courts have 
jurisdiction over criminal matters relating to, inter alia, offences against the 
Constitutional order and/or against the internal security of the state. Article 8 and 
                                                 
11       Two at the Ethiopian Federal High Court and another at the Ethiopian Supreme court. 
12      Articles 79-80 of the FDRE Constitution.  
13      Proclamation No .25/1996  Federal Courts Proclamation 
7 
 
12 of the same proclamation and Article 31 of the Ethiopian Anti-terrorism 
Proclamation (EATP) has tasked the Federal High court to examine terrorism 
cases with the possibility of appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. Therefore, all 
the terrorism cases examined within this thesis have been collected from the two 
Federal courts referred to.   
 
Table 2.3 shows the total number of terrorism cases collected for this research.  
The cases in this table are organised according to the year they were filed at the 
Federal High court. This table analyses the terrorism cases in terms of the types 
of charges, the weapons, if any, used, the organisations linked to the alleged 
offences, and the laws used against the terrorist suspects.      
 
A printed list of terrorism cases obtained from the Federal High Court shows that 
there were a total of 240 cases between 1986 and 2004 Ethiopian Calendar 
(1994-2012 European Calendar).14 However, as shown in table 2.3, only 60 cases 
are available to the public.  The researcher has made several attempts to discover 
why most of the cases are withheld. However, the registry of the Federal High 
court refused to provide any explanation.       
 
The terrorism cases in table 2.3 are further sub-divided into conviction rates in 
tables 2.4 and then again in table 4.3 based on the probability of being released 
conditionally or unconditionally after the initial arrest.  
 
However, not all cases listed in table 2.3 are replicated in tables 2.4 and 4.3. This 
is due to the fact that some information is missing from the records of the court 
cases. For instance, in some cases,15 the court reports show that the defendants 
were released on bail. But the final judgment on those cases are missing and, for 
this reason, the researcher is unable to determine whether these defendants were 
eventually convicted or not.  In other cases, the problem was not determining 
whether the defendants were convicted or not, rather upon conviction the 
                                                 
14      See Appendix B 
15      Public Prosecutor v Yasin Shifa and Mesfin Gebere (25993/2007); Public Prosecutor v 
Birhanu Degu et al. (25845/2007); Public Prosecutor v Tomas Asrat Dosha et, al (26208/1999); 
Public Prosecutor v Eyob Tilahun (27093/2007); Public Prosecutor v Derege Kassa Bekele 
(27536/2007) 
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decisions failed to show the length of the jail term imposed and they are marked 
by a question mark (?) in table 2.4.  
 
Furthermore, in some cases,16 the defendants were charged and convicted but the 
court reports did not show if the defendants had the opportunity to be released 
from police custody on bail or remanded for trial before the final judgment was 
made.    
 
Due to the above problems, the numbers of cases in table 2.417 and table 4.318 are 
less than those in table 2.3.19 
 
1.1.2. Relevant Ethiopian Laws on Terrorism 
 
The Ethiopian Criminal Code and the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code have 
been used as the primary sources of substantive and procedural law on terrorism, 
respectively. However, as will be explained in the subsequent chapters, these 
Codes do not specifically deal with terrorism.  
 
1.1.1.1.The Ethiopian Criminal Code 2004  
 
The 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code20 was revised in 2004 to incorporate the ‘radical 
political, economic and social changes that have taken place in Ethiopia';   ‘to 
properly address crimes born of advances in technology and the complexities of 
modern life such as the hijacking of aircraft, computer crimes and money 
laundering'.21 The 2004 Ethiopian Criminal Code22 is structured in three parts. 
                                                 
16      To mention few examples: Public Prosecutor v Muhammed abatiha, et al 8371 (39/1995 
High court,); Public Prosecutor v Merga  (94/1995) (9598 /appeal file number); Public Prosecutor 
v Dechasaw Abate et al. v (17511/6771/2000); Public Prosecutor v Beyane Ahmed Esmauel 
(17722/2007); Public Prosecutor v Rabyie Mehammed Hassen et al (49303/2008);  Public 
Prosecutor v Merga Negara et al. (34705/2000); Public Prosecutor v Mehammed Junedin Esmael 
and Husni Abdi-Kadir (60083/2009); Public Prosecutor v Wegari Alemu Kasa (60265/2009); 
Public Prosecutor v Shferaw Mokonnen and Ethiopia Aregaw (68104/2009); Public Prosecutor v 
Ezedin Mohammed Abdulseman, et al  (69201/2009); Public Prosecutor v Assemu Mihret and 
Getachew Niguse (89341/2009) 
17      A total of 55 cases  
18      A total of 33 cases  
19      A total of 60 cases  
20      Se chapter two for further discussion on the backgrounds to this code  
21      See preface to the Ethiopian Criminal Code 2004  
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The first part of the code deals with ‘General principles of Criminal Liability'.23 
This part is further divided into two sections: Book I and Book II. Book I24 deals 
with the scope of the criminal law; 25 crime and its commission; 26  and the 
condition of liability to punishment.27 
 
Book II covers ‘criminal punishment and its application'.28 The issues covered in 
this book include the calculation of sentences, punishments applicable to adults 
and young offenders, conditional release before expire of sentence.   
 
Part II is a ‘special' part of the Ethiopian Criminal Code. 29 Unlike the general 
part of the code which deals with principles applicable to more than one crime, 
this part of the Code deals with particular crimes that are defined and categorised 
by reason of their subject matter. This part of the Ethiopian Criminal Code is 
divided into four books: crimes against the state;30crimes against public interest 
or the community; 31 crimes against individuals and the family; 32  and crimes 
against property.33 The Book I of part III is particularly relevant to this thesis. As 
will be discussed, these provisions of the Ethiopian Criminal Code have been 
heavily used against terrorist suspects in the absence of clear laws on terrorism.  
 
The last part of the Code deals with ‘petty offences'.34 A petty offence is defined 
as a minor offence not punishable under the Criminal Code or an offence that 
                                                                                                                                    
22      Came into force as of 9 May, 2005 
23      Articles 1-237 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code  
24      Articles 1-86 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code  
25      Deals with jurisdiction, period of limitation, repealed laws, effects of foreign sentences,  etc.  
26      Deals with place of commission of a crime, cause and effect, degrees in the commission of an 
offence, incitement, etc.  
27      Deals with ordinary responsibility, partial responsibility, Infants and Juvenile Delinquents, 
etc.  
28      Articles 87-237 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code of Ethiopia  
29      Articles 238-733 of the Ethiopian Criminal  
30      Articles 238-374 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (deal with issues such as Crimes against the 
Constitution or the State) 
31      Articles 375-537 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (deal with issues such as breaches of public 
confidence, forgery, falsification of documents)  
32      Articles 538-661 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (deal with homicide, abortion, grave wilful 
injury) 
33      Articles 662-733 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (deal with issues such as Unlawful or 
Unjustifiable Enrichment, fraud, etc.)  
34      Articles 734 and seq. of the Ethiopian Criminal Code 
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infringes regulations issued by administrative authorities.35 We will not go into 
the details of this part of the Code as our concern in this thesis is with the serious 
offences covered in part II of the Code.  
 
1.1.1.2.The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code  
 
The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code sets the general principles of handling 
criminal matters. It was designed to facilitate the enforcement of the Ethiopian 
Penal Code. However, this Code is inadequate for a variety of reasons. We shall 
mention some of those concerns briefly here, with the intention of discussing 
them in further detail later. First, the Code "suffers from being overly brief (only 
224 articles), and therefore from being too sparse, with too many crucial gaps".36 
As a result, filling the gaps by interpretation is made extremely difficult because 
it is hard to extrapolate legislative intent from a body of law which lacks 
cohesiveness.37 These gaps, particularly those that are relevant to terrorist arrests 
and investigation, will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, there 
have been inadequate changes made since its codification in 1961.38 Outdated 
procedures in regard to traditional methods of delivering justice remain part of 
this Code, even though they are not practiced.39  
 
The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, dealing with the jurisdiction of courts, 
police investigation, preliminary inquiry and trial and appeal, is divided into five 
main parts.  The first part deals with the jurisdiction of courts.40 Criminal courts 
are divided into different levels of hierarchy based on the seriousness of the 
crime. However, as discussed above, this part of the Criminal Procedure Code is 
repealed.41 
 
                                                 
35      Article 734 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code 
36      Fisher, S. Z. (1969). Ethiopian Criminal Procedure: A source Book. (Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedures: A Sourcebook (Addis Ababa, HSIU in Association with Oxford University Press)) 
37      Ibid  
38      See chapter two for discussion on the backgrounds to this code. The changes that have been  
made in regard to remand and bail of terrorist suspects will be discussed in chapter five.  
39      For instance, articles  223-224 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code deal with ‘atbia 
dagnia' (translation: local chiefs)  judicial functions of local chiefs   
40      Article 4-7 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code  
41      See discussions above on Articles 79-80 of the FDRE Constitution and the Ethiopian 
Proclamation No 25/1996 
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The second and third parts 42  cover police investigations and preliminary 
inquiries.43 Entitled ‘Setting Justice in Motion,' these parts sets the procedures 
for bringing accusations, requesting summons, making arrests, undertaking 
police investigations, recording confessions, preventing self-incrimination and 
regulating the right to counsel while in police custody. Moreover, they contain 
principles on remand, right to bail, and writ of habeas corpus. However, as will 
be discussed throughout the thesis, there remain a lot of ambiguities on the 
application of these criminal procedures, particularly those that apply to 
surveillance and interception of communications,  the conditions for the 
immediate release of a suspect during a police investigation and length of pre-
charge detention.  
 
The fourth and the fifth parts44 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code deal 
with criminal proceedings during a trial with the possibility of further appeals. 
These procedures set the type of inquisitorial system Ethiopia follows. This will 
be subject to further discussions in chapter two.  
 
 
3.3.3.3.The Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 (EATP)   
 
The Ethiopian government established a committee composed of members from 
the Ethiopian House of Representatives (HOR), the police force, National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS),45 the public prosecution, judges, and 
other high ranking government officials. However, no opposition party members 
and other legal scholars were included in the Committee.  This committee was 
tasked with drafting the EATP and its draft was submitted to the HOR in 2009.46 
The researcher managed to obtain a copy of this report, which is written in 
Amharic, from the HOR library. 47 The HOR accepted the draft without any 
                                                 
42      Articles 8 -93 
43      For further discussion on investigation procedures and preliminary inquiry, see page 65; 
pages 347-3550, and page 362-363  
44      Article 94  et  seq. of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code  
45      See below in this chapter, chapter two and chapter four on the powers of this organ  
46       Entitled ‘Parliamentary Minutes on the Counter-Terrorism Bill, 24 June, 2009' 
(parliamentary minutes from this onwards)  
47      The contents of the parliamentary minutes will be discussed throughout the thesis  
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change and it resulted in the enactment of the EATP, which is the first Ethiopian 
law that specifically addresses terrorism. 
 
The EATP is organised into seven chapters. Part I contains the definitions of 
some terms used in the EATP. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, 
however, this part does not define all the terms in the EATP.  Part II lists 
‘terrorism and related crimes'.  This part criminalises terrorist acts such as 
planning, preparation, and incitement of terrorist act; rendering support to 
terrorism; encouraging terrorism; and participating in a terrorist organisation. 
Chapter three of this thesis will show that the Ethiopian legislature did not give 
any emphasis the effect these vaguely defined terrorist activities might have on 
pure political activities that has nothing to do with terrorism.  
 
Part III consists of ‘preventive and investigative measures', which include 
gathering of information (through interception, covert search, sudden search)48 
and arresting terrorist suspects.49  Part IV further elaborates the probative value 
of evidence gathered under part III of the EATP.  It explains that intelligence 
reports that do no disclose the sources of the information, intercept evidence, 
hearsay, and confession of terrorist suspects are admitted in criminal proceedings.  
 
Part V identifies the HOR as the only organ who has the power to proscribe and 
de-proscribe a terrorist organisation.  It also lists the measures that need to be 
taken following proscription: freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of terrorist 
properties. The problems related with proscribing terrorist organisations in 
Ethiopia are discussed in chapter two. 
 
Part VI contains very brief articles that deal with ‘institutions that follow up 
cases of terrorism'. It identifies the police, the public prosecution, and the NISS 
as the organs empowered to investigate terrorism cases. Moreover, it establishes 
the jurisdiction of the Ethiopian High Court and the Ethiopian Supreme Court 
over terrorist cases.   
 
                                                 
48      Discussed in chapter four  
49      Discussed in chapter five  
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Part VII entertains issues in relation with protection of witnesses, and 
consequences of obstructing terrorist investigation. It sets the procedures when 
and how a court may withhold the names, addresses and identities of witnesses in 
terrorism cases. It also states that any law that contravenes with any part of the 
EATP is inapplicable. We will discuss whether the provisions of the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure, the FDRE constitution and the Ethiopian Criminal Code that 
deal with bail and pre-charge detention period are made inapplicable.       
 
 
3.3.3.4.The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution 
 
The (FDRE) Constitution, which came into force in August 1995, is the supreme 
law of the country. The preamble of the FDRE constitution starts with a 
declaration that reads:  "We the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia".  
As stated under article 8 of the FDRE Constitution, this declaration refers to the 
sources of sovereign political power in the country. Article 8 further states that 
"all sovereign power resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. 
This Constitution is an expression of their sovereignty".   
 
The FDRE constitution contains 106 articles divided into 11 chapters. It provides 
for a federal government which consists of nine regions with their respective 
powers.50  The federal government is responsible for, inter alia, foreign relations, 
national defence, formulating the country's financial, monetary and foreign 
investment policies and strategies.51 The federal government is composed of two 
houses: House of Peoples Representatives (HOR) and the House of Federation 
(HOF).52 The power to legislate federal laws resides with the HOR while the 
HOF is entrusted to interpret the FDRE Constitution.53 Members of the former 
are elected every five years while members of the latter are elected by regional 
states.  
 
                                                 
50      Article 45-49 of the FDRE Constitution  
51      Articles 50-52 of the FDRE Constitution  
52      Articles 53-68 of the FDRE Constitution 
53      See chapter two for further discussion on the power to interpret the Constitution   
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The Constitution establishes the President as the head of state and the prime 
minster as the head of government.  The president, elected by the HOR every six 
years, does not have much political power.  The prime minister, who is 
accountable to the HOR, exercises much of the political power in Ethiopia. Both 
are not directly elected by the people.  
 
The Federal Democratic Republic is composed of nine states ‘delimited on the 
basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people 
concerned'. 54   State powers include, among other things:  formulating and 
executing economic, social, and development policies in their respective regions; 
and enforcing laws that are not exercised by federal government.  
 
Chapter 3 of the FDRE Constitution contains a long list of articles that deal with 
‘fundamental rights and freedoms'.55 These articles are organised into two main 
parts: human rights and democratic rights. The structure and the rationale for this 
division will be further discussed in chapter two.  
 
3.3.3.5.Other legislation 
 
The other Ethiopian legislation discussed in this thesis are the anti-corruption 
offences proclamations 56  and the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation 
(TFOP).57 The anti-corruption offences proclamations are the only specific law 
before the enactment of the EATP in 2009 that deals with the admissibility of 
intercept evidence in criminal proceedings in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the 
TFOP creates offences related to the provision of telecom services, supply of 
communication equipment, duplication of SIM cards, credit cards, subscriber 
identification numbers or data, and interception of communications. The parts of 
these proclamations that deal with interception of communication will be 
discussed in chapter four.  
 
                                                 
54      Article 46 of the FDRE Constitution  
55      Articles 13-44 of the FDRE Constitution  
56      Revised Proclamation To Provide For Special Procedure And Rules Of Evidence On Anti-
Corruption (Proclamation No. 434/2005); see also Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission Establishment (Proclamation No.433/2005) 
57      Proclamation 761/2012 on Telecom Fraud Offences 
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1.1.3. Documentaries on terrorism 
 
Three audio-visual records on terrorism were collected from Ethiopian national 
television.   These documentaries were prepared by the Ethiopian national 
television in collaboration with the National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS).58    
 
The first to be broadcast was a documentary which chronicled the history of free 
press in Ethiopia.59  This documentary recounted free press in Ethiopia in regard 
to policies, politics, and terrorism. It specifically focussed on newspaper articles 
written before and after the 2005 controversial election in Ethiopia. 60   The 
government concluded that these newspaper articles were written to incite and 
encourage people to commit terrorism. 61  The contents of these articles are 
detailed in tables 2.1 and 2.2. As will be discussed in chapter three, this research 
has found little evidence to support the conclusion of the government.  
 
The second and third documentaries contained information on the role of 
opposition parties in spreading terrorist activities in Ethiopia.  Both Akeldama62 
(translation: field of blood) and Yekeshefew YeChelemaw Guzo63 (translation: the 
failed terrorist conspiracies) showed meetings and other activities of some of the 
defendants in the case of Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo cherkose.64 Moreover, 
the documentaries claimed that the NISS placed the defendants (members of 
Ginbot 7 65) under surveillance, recording and spying on every aspect of the 
defendants' lives. These recorded video tapes and voice evidences were used as 
evidence against the defendants.   
 
                                                 
58      Further discussion about the powers of this organisation is provided in chapter two and 
chapter four that deal on interception of communication in Ethiopia  
59      The Birth and Growth of Free Press in Ethiopia (2009) [TV Broadcast] ETV, 13 December 
60      For further discussion on arrests and conviction of terrorists after the 2005 election, see 
chapter two and chapter three  
61      See chapter two and chapter three for further discussion on the case of  Public Prosecutor v 
Hailu Shawul (Engineer), et al (43246/2007)  
62      Akeldama (2011) [TV Broadcast] Ethiopian Television Documentary 
63      Yekeshefew YeChelemaw Guzo (2010) [TV Broadcast] Ethiopian Television Documentary 
64      Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General), et al (81406/2009). See chapter two for 
detail discussion  
65     see chapter two for  discussion on the status of Ginbot 7 as a terrorist or political organisation 
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However, the documentaries did not say anything about whether the NISS had 
obtained a warrant for the interception of the defendants' communications. These 
legal issues form the foundation of this thesis' discussion into the marginalised 
right to privacy in Ethiopia.      
 
1.4.Limitations 
 
This research acknowledges that terrorism is a vast legal topic. It touches 
financial institutions, human rights, religion, and the existence of free and 
democratic society, sovereignty of a country, and regional and international 
relations among nations of the world, to mention but a few.  Therefore, the issues 
covered in this thesis reflect only a limited remit.  
 
The absence of any internationally accepted definition of terrorism and the 
various, differing domestic definitions that exist across the world form further 
hurdles to any research. In addition, Ethiopia is not famed for regularly updating 
its legislation on terrorism. In a similar vein, the sensitive nature of the cases that 
come before the Ethiopian judiciary mean they are not readily accessible to the 
public. Due to the accessibility issues, some of the terrorism cases relevant to this 
research originate from domestic newspaper reporting. A corollary empirical 
issue has been a lack of tangible evidence demonstrating how the current anti-
terrorism regime is used, particularly the extent to which it accords with 
fundamental rights such as right to life and prohibition of torture. 
  
1.5.Scope  
 
Terrorism can be analysed through several mediums: the effect of terrorism on 
civil and political rights and/or social, economic and cultural rights; immigration 
law; humanitarian law; remedies for victims of terrorism; religious extremism; 
sourcing and strategising the combating of terrorism. However, this thesis is 
concerned with the effect of anti-terror laws on freedom of expression, right to 
privacy and right to liberty. By comparing and contrasting legislation from the 
UK, US and Ethiopia, this thesis will present an analysis as to whether Ethiopia's 
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decision to adopt counter-terrorism law has transgressed the above three basic 
rights.  
 
Due to space constraints, this thesis does not deal with the definition of terrorism, 
rendering support to terrorism, participation in a terrorist organisation, 
possessing terrorist materials, preventive detention, control orders, detention, and 
immigration laws. Moreover, the scope of this thesis is restricted to the period 
from arrest to charge. It does not deal with evidence production and other related 
issues at a trial.  
 
1.6.Organisation of this thesis   
 
Chapter two introduces a chapter on the development of the Ethiopian legal 
system. It begins with different argument on policy transfer and then charts how 
the Ethiopian legal system has developed over time by presenting the different 
legal reforms that have taken place over the last 80 years. Moreover, it will have 
a separate section that deals with the problem of terrorism and the absence of 
specific laws that deal with terrorism in Ethiopia.  This section is intended to 
provide the background analysis for the next chapters as to whether the 
enactment of the first of its kind counterterrorism legislation in Ethiopia could be 
justified.  
 
Chapter three assesses the relationship between freedom of expression and 
counter-terrorism laws. It is preferable to begin with such a debate, for it is 
arguably with this right that the complexity of the relationship between terrorism 
and human rights began. It is widely acknowledged that this right is the base 
from which a civil and democratic society flourishes. It is through freedom of 
expression that one can expose any deviations from fundamental human right 
standards, judicial inconsistencies, and government arbitrariness. Most 
importantly, a person's actions and thoughts, when taken alone, could amount to 
suspicion in the eyes of many.  
 
At worst, one's affiliation with a particular group and religious organisation 
could ignite deeper suspicions. Yet, affiliation with a particular group or 
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acting/speaking in a particular way is not ordinarily, in a democracy, grounds for 
suspicion. The bare essentials in some countries such as Ethiopia are that one's 
actions are contrary to the expectations of law enforcing bodies.  Freedom of 
expression is a vehicle of justification in this respect. People have a right to 
express themselves in whatever manner they see so long as such expressions are 
within the boundaries of legal permissibility. Thus, freedom of expression 
demands that the law justify its interference with or limitation on a person's 
expression. It is for these compelling reasons that it is felt appropriate to start 
with a discussion on how terrorism and freedom of expression co-exist.  
 
Chapter three is structured as follows. The first part deals with the constitutional 
arrangement of freedom of expression in the US, UK, and Ethiopia. This is 
followed by an analysis of the determining factors that compose the right to 
freedom of expression. These factors include the forms of the expression, the 
content of a speech, the medium of expression, and the identity and affiliation of 
a speaker, and the circumstances in which the speech is given. Moreover, the 
relevance of these factors will be evaluated in light of the scope of the incitement 
and/or encouragement of terrorism. This chapter expands upon the experience of 
the UK and US in the fight against terrorism by drawing a balance between 
expressions that have and those that have not obtained constitutional protection. 
Moving forwards, this chapter critically examines the difficulty of implementing 
some of those balancing principles in countries such as Ethiopia where 
democracy is in its infancy. 
 
Chapter four discusses terrorism and the right to privacy. In case of terrorism, 
breach of privacy can be cited as the first real contact between the suspected 
terrorist and law enforcing bodies. The moment law enforcing bodies intercept 
correspondences, or stop, search and seize someone's property, there is high risk 
of breaching other fundamental rights.  
 
This chapter, first, discusses the general principles on privacy in the UK, US, and 
Ethiopia. This is followed by a discussion on interception of communications.  
This analysis will cover the legal regimes on interception with an emphasis on 
the definition of interception, the requirements for issuing warrants and 
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warrantless interception. It also covers a legal analysis as to why intercept 
evidence obtained through a warrant is excluded under UK law.  Moreover, it 
deals with the differing understandings and implications stemming from the 
interception of communication in the UK and US. This part compares and 
contrasts the experiences of the US with intercept evidence in criminal 
proceedings governed under section 17 of The Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in the UK.   
 
Furthermore, there is a separate discussion relating to the probative value of 
intercept evidence in terrorism cases in the UK. Some organisations are in favour 
of lifting the ban on intercept evidence in terrorism cases. There are, however, 
competing arguments for and against the use of intercept evidence in criminal 
proceedings. The chapter explains how these organisations differ in their 
reasoning.  The last part deals with the use of intercept evidence in terrorism 
cases under Ethiopian law.    
 
Chapter five begins with general remarks on the constitutional scope of the right 
to liberty. This is followed by critical analysis of the power of arrest on the basis 
of suspicion of terrorism and the length of pre-charge detention in terrorism cases. 
Moreover, this chapter explores whether there is a need for a watered down 
version of the standard of reasonable suspicion in terrorism cases. Furthermore, 
there will be a separate section that explores the quantity and quality of 
information required to effect arrest under Ethiopian law and the length of pre-
charge detention of terrorist suspects in Ethiopia. Though the some legal 
materials on pre-charge detention from the US will be discussed, the focus of this 
section will be on the UK's pre-charge detention and any lessons Ethiopia could 
learn from the British legal system with a view to shortening the 120-days pre-
charge detention of terrorist suspects currently available.  
 
The last chapter provides some concluding remarks and recommendations on 
Ethiopia's counter-terrorism legislation.  
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Chapter two: The Comparative Aspect of the Ethiopian Legal 
System: From Primordial Legal System to Counterterrorism 
Laws 
 
 
1.1.Introduction  
 
A study of the Ethiopian legal system and counterterrorism measures requires 
an examination of the constitutional reform through which the country has gone 
in order to modernise its legal system. In this chapter we shall examine the 
nature of the Ethiopian legal system and the place of human rights within that 
system. Furthermore, we shall analyse terrorism within the context of the 
Ethiopian jurisdiction and, further, the justifications for the adoption of 
counterterrorism measures. However, it is apt first to give a brief account of 
what is called policy transfer.    
 
 
It could be said that countries act like human beings: they learn, send, receive, 
interact, marry and divorce.  The creation of organisations like the UN, the EU, 
NATO and the WHO symbolises the final and highest bond between countries 
who pursue of the same ends. Times gone by have seen instances in which a 
country closes itself off from those around it. However, the race for prosperity 
has led to a globalisation of State relationships. The transformation from a 
closed society to one that is open and receptive to international entities was 
made possible by the formation of organisations such as those mentioned 
above. 66  A study of the interaction between countries, therefore, requires 
clarification of the process through which countries learn or be forced to learn 
from one another, also known as ‘policy transfer'.67 
 
                                                 
66      Siegel, R. L. and Wenberg, L.B (1977). Comparing Public Policies. United States, Soviet  
Union and Europe (Homewood, Dorsey Press), p. 79   
67      Dolowitz, D.  and Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy-Making.  13 (1)  Governance  10 
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‘Policy transfer' involves one country borrowing, the ‘borrower', policy 
initiatives from an acquiescent secondary country, who assumes the role of 
‘lender'. 68  The former acquires from the latter "policy goals, structure and 
content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; 
ideas; attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons."69 This transfer could also 
entail ‘detailed legislation'.70 Additionally, a country could be a both ‘borrower' 
and ‘lender' at separate instances in time and the relationship between the two 
countries could be voluntary (in this case government institutions and officials 
are involved) or coercive (which might involve outside actors). 71  Moreover, 
legal intricacy might also pave the way for professionals to exert influence in the 
policy transfer process.72  
 
Policy transfer is not the only mechanism for a shift in policy. A policy shift 
may also come about where one country has a particular desire to ‘learn' from 
others or, alternatively, in light of one's perception of domestic needs or 
international realties.73  Two of the ways by which a policy shift can occur are 
‘lesson drawing' and ‘policy transfer'. While critics argue that ‘lesson drawing' is 
indistinguishable from ‘policy transfer', 74  the path of ‘lesson drawing' takes 
account of "a prospective description evaluation of whether what is done 
elsewhere could someday become effective here".75. ‘Lesson drawing' neither 
creates ‘a commitment' to implement a particular policy 76 nor, in the main, 
involves a ‘rational choice'. 77  ‘Lesson drawing' has a tendency to bow to 
political factionalism and ‘precedents' within the political landscape rather than 
rationalising what is best in a given situation.78  While both camps, the ‘lesson 
                                                 
68      Ibid    
69      Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (1996). Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy 
Transfer Literature. XLIV Political Studies 349-50 
70      Dolowitz D., et al (1999). Policy Transfer: Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, But Why Red, White And Blue? 52 (2) Parliamentary Affairs 719   
71      Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000), supra note 67, p. 8-10  
72      Dunlop, C. (2009). Policy Transfer As Learning: Capturing Variation In What Diffusion-
Makers Learn From Epistemic Communities. 30(3) Policy Studies 289  
73      Rose, R. (1993). Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. (New Jersey, Chaltham House), p. 27 
74      Dolowitz D., et al (1999)., supra note 70 
75      Rose, R. (1993), supra note 73  
76        Rose, R.  (2004). Learning From Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide (London, 
Routledge), p. 23 
77      Ibid, p.43 
78      Ibid, p. 43  
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drawing' and ‘policy transfer' theorists, may criticise each other, they are also 
each criticised for their shortcomings.79  
 
Another aspect of policy change is where the shift does not necessarily reach the 
threshold of a ‘transfer'. This takes the debate into the issues of ‘policy 
convergence'80 and ‘policy diffusion'.81 The former refers to a tendency to solve 
problems through the collective; in other words, "a convergence of policy goals, 
a coming together of intent to deal with common policy problems."82 A prime 
example is the integration of Europe. 83  Policies are made by transnational 
decision makers and then implemented by domestic jurisdictions.  
 
‘Policy diffusion', on the other hand, does not involve policy ‘emulation' from 
another country but, instead, sees policies developed through a "pattern of 
successive adoptions of a policy innovation".84 This is particularly reflected in 
the transfer of policies between States in federal systems such as the US.85 For 
some, ‘policy diffusion' pertains to "incremental changes in policy with the 
advancement of knowledge and awareness as well as interdependence".86 But 
others dismiss this and argue that "policy diffusion displays punctuated 
dynamics inconsistent with a single process of incremental learning, but instead 
indicates multiple underlying decision-making processes."87    
 
The point is that no matter how the changes occur, whether countries are 
learning or transferring policies, changes do happen. Moreover, while it might 
be conventional to ‘borrow', ‘lend' or ‘learn' in international relations, the 
                                                 
79      Lodge, M. and James, O. (2003). The Limitations of 'Policy Transfer' and 'Lesson Drawing' 
for Public Policy Research. 1 (2) Policy studies review 179 
80      Bennett, C. J. (1991). What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It? 21(2) British 
Journal of Political Science, 215; see also Stone, D. (2001) Learning lessons, policy transfer and 
international diffusion of policy ideas .CSGR Working Paper No. 69/01, at 
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81      Bennett, C. J. (1991), supra note 80, see also Stone, D. (2001) , supra note 80 
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J. (1991), supra note 80, p.218. 
83      Bennett, C. J. (1991), supra note 80, p. 215  
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85      Stone, D. , supra note 80 
86      Stone, D. , supra note 80 
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University Press), p.22 
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effectiveness of the imported legal rules or other ideas is debatable. In law, for 
instance, some argue that transferring a law is nothing new nor is it wrong.88 
These writers base their argument on the assumed success of legal rules of the 
"Roman law and the spread of English Common law".89 Therefore, what is 
important is how, what and which laws to transplant. For some writers, however, 
a legal transplant is "impossible...given that the meaning invested into the 
[transplanted] rule is itself culture-specific". 90   For these writers, the true 
meaning of the transplanted rule would be ‘lost in translation' because the legal 
thinking and the political environment under which a specific law is developed 
does not exist in the receiving country.   
 
In summation, we have seen in brief the competing arguments of policy 
exchanges. Space precludes a detailed discussion of the commentary germane to 
international policy relations. Our concern here is, instead, restricted to the 
identification and examination of how policy changes in Ethiopia have been 
facilitated by Ethiopian decision makers.  As will be shown below, the two most 
common policy change mechanisms in the Ethiopian legal system are ‘policy 
transfer' and ‘lesson drawing'.  
 
2.2 Historical Developments of the Ethiopian Legal System  
 
The development of the Ethiopian legal system, as will be discussed shortly, is 
an indication of how the country has gradually transformed from a primordial 
society governed according to religious and customary laws into a modern State 
governed by laws borrowed from abroad. Different leaders within Ethiopia, 
spanning different political times, have achieved this transformation, by and 
large, through the transplanting of laws from all over the world. Given that the 
primary focus of this thesis is to examine Ethiopian human rights and 
counterterrorism measures, it is apt to provide a brief introduction to the 
Ethiopian legal system in this chapter. Moreover, an attempt will be made to 
                                                 
88      Watson, A. (1978). Comparative Law and Legal Change.  37 Cambridge Law Journal  313; 
see also Watson, A. (1974). Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (USA, 
University of Georgia Press) 
89      Ibid  
90      Legrand, P (1997).  The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants'.  4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. 
L. 111 
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provide a general picture of the legal system in order to understand more 
generally the development, culture, legal thinking and sources of law in 
Ethiopia, and to answer the question whether the Ethiopian legal system is 
comparable to the US and the UK.    
 
Many scholars over the years have attempted to identify and group the legal 
systems of the world. The most notable pair is Zwiegert and Koz, who 
attempted to provide specific ‘legal families' based on certain perspective 
elements. 91  They argued that legal systems can be grouped based on their 
‘styles' rather than based solely on their ‘source of law', ‘ideology and legal 
technique', ‘geography' or ‘substance'. 92  This is due to the fact that "one's 
division of the world into legal families and the inclusion of systems in a 
particular family are vulnerable to alternation by historical development and 
change. So in the theory of legal families much depends on the period of time of 
which one is speaking".93  
 
For Zwiegert and Koz, there are five factors that determine the style of a legal 
system or legal ‘family'.94 The first attribute of a stylistic legal system is ‘its 
historical background and development'.95  Considering this factor, customary 
laws and religious laws, especially in areas of family-related matters, had been 
the primary source of Ethiopian law until the 1950s. 96  Early codification 
attempts of the Ethiopian legal system date back to the 15th century, under the 
rule of Emperor Zara Yaqob. This early attempt to codify the legal system came 
in the form of the Fetha Nagst (the law of the Kings).97 However, the origin of 
the Fetha Nagast is still contentious with some ‘Ethiopian oral tradition' and 
                                                 
91      Zwiegert, K.  and Koz, H. (1998). An Introduction to Comparative Law (third edition). 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford) 
92      Ibid, p. 64-67 
93      Ibid, p.67 
94      Ibid, p. 68 
95      Ibid, p.68 
96       Beckstrom, J. H. (1973). Transplantation of Legal Systems: An Early Report on the 
Reception of Western laws in Ethiopia 21 Am. J. Comp. L 3, p. 570 
97      Tamrat, T. (1972). Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford University Press) 
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writers tracing this method back to the 4th century.98 This code served as a 
source of law until Emperor Hailesellasi introduced the Penal Code of Ethiopia 
and the Emperor Constitution in the early 1930s. According to some writers, the 
1930 Penal Code and the 1931 Emperor Constitution were, in any event, largely 
influenced by the Fetha Nagast.99 However, for other commentators, despite 
these early codification attempts the "law" of Ethiopia was incomplete and 
unsystematic until the 1950s.100 For this reason, the codification process was 
continued by the introduction of the Revised Penal Code of Ethiopia,101 the 
Ethiopian Civil Code, 102  Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, 103  and the 
Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code. 104  This account fits with the analysis of 
Bennett who described the voluntary transfer of policy105 as motivated by a 
desire to put in order the ‘incomplete and unsystematic' law of the country.   
 
The second factor considered by Zwiegert and Koz is ‘the predominant and 
characteristic mode of thought in legal matters'.106 They distinguish between the 
‘German-Romanistic families' that ‘are marked by a tendency to use abstract 
legal norms' and the common law legal system that is characterised by ‘gradual 
development from decision to decision.'107 If this classification is to be followed, 
we might conclude that the Ethiopian legal system bears little resemblance to 
the common law classification. For example, unlike the common law Angelo-
American legal system, the Ethiopian legal system has neither a doctrine of 
stare decisis nor trials by jury. The only exception to the notion of stare decisis 
within the Ethiopian legal system is a decision of the Ethiopian court of 
cassation, which is binding. 108  However, some Ethiopian scholars contend, 
arguably quite accurately, that ‘the Ethiopian legal system is partly French and 
                                                 
98      Damitie, M. (2011). Anthropocentric and Ecocentric Versions of the Ethiopian Legal Regime 
in Burden, P. Exploring Wild Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence. (Adelaide Hyde park 
Press), p.159-165    
99      Tzadwa, P. A. (1968). Fetha Nagast: the Book of the Kings (Addis Ababa, HSUI) 
100      Beckstrom, J. H. (1973), supra note 96 
101      Codified in 1957  
102      Codified in 1960 
103      Codified in 1961 
104      Codified in 1965 
105      Bennett, C. J. (1991), supra note 80, p. 2000   
106      Zwiegert, K.  and Koz, H., supra note 91, p. 68 
107      ibid, p.69 
108      See Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation No.454/2005. 
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partly British, while the dominant legal thinking is American.' 109  Typical 
examples of Anglo-American influence within the Ethiopian legal system are 
the common law institutions of cross-examination, impeachment of witnesses, 
objections and rulings on admissibility of evidence.110 Moreover, the existence 
of evidence rules scattered through the Ethiopian codes mentioned above, 
closely connected in many instances with substantive law provisions, is a style 
very similar to the continental approach. 111  Furthermore, some Ethiopian 
scholars argue whether Ethiopia should adopt the common law method of judge 
made laws.112 In addition, as will be discussed shortly, because the Ethiopian 
legal system is taken from different sources, it is not easy to categorise it as a 
common law or civil law legal system.   
 
The third element identified by Zwiegert and Koz is the existence of certain 
‘distinctive institutions'.113 They identify several legal concepts that are peculiar 
to certain legal systems but are absent in others. One instance given is the 
‘institution of Negotiorum gestio, common to continental systems but so foreign 
to common law.'114 "Negotiorum gestio is the relationship that exists between 
two parties when one manages, without authority, the affairs of the other".115 
There are some provisions within the family law of Ethiopia that incorporates 
Negotiorum gestio. One instance is to be found under article 51 of the Ethiopian 
Family Code which empowers one spouse to manage the affairs of the family 
when the other is absent, away, or incapacitated. Another example given by 
Zwiegert and Koz is the ‘doctrine of consideration in the common law', with 
this concept being absent in Ethiopia.116 Whereas another common law practice 
to mention is the prohibition of antecedents of an accused.  Antecedents of an 
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accused cannot be used in criminal proceedings until after conviction under 
Ethiopian law.117 This is a typical example of common law practice.118 This 
practice is now relaxed in the UK as a result of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003.119 
 
The fourth characteristic element identified by Zwiegert and Koz is ‘the kind of 
legal sources it acknowledges and the way it handles them'.120 Considering this 
factor, the Ethiopian legal system has its origin in traditional law,121 civil law 
(the Franco-German system) and common law (Angelo-American).122 Thus, this 
fourth characteristic is troublesome in the context of Ethiopian sources of law. 
This is due to the fact that the relevant legal codes currently in place within 
Ethiopia were borrowed from countries that follow both the civil law legal 
system and common law legal system.123  
 
For instance, the Ethiopian Civil Code was drafted by a French Professor, Rene 
David,124 whereas the 1957 Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code was drafted by a 
Swiss Professor, Jean Graven, but revised and amended by a British legal 
scholar, Sir Charles Matthew.125 The final version of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code, thus, reflects the influence of both common law and civil law 
legal traditions.126 According to some writers, ‘the overall flavour of the law is 
adversary, but the adversary system often contains fragments of "inquisitorial" 
procedure.' 127  Some examples of adversarial elements in the Ethiopian legal 
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system include a suspect's right to remain silent,128 objections to and rulings on 
the admissibility of evidence,129 the fact that the judge is considered a neutral 
arbiter of facts; a litigant's right to determine the sort of evidence and number of 
witnesses to call 130 and the fact that entering a plea of guilty automatically 
results in the conviction of a suspect. 131  In general, the role of a judge in 
Ethiopia is restricted to listening to a case as presented by prosecution and 
defense. However, if we then note the fact that there is no plea bargaining 
system in Ethiopia we find ‘fragments of "inquisitorial" procedure'.   
 
Therefore, the drastic move from "inquisitorial" procedure into adversarial 
procedure was arguably facilitated by the involvement of Sir Charles Matthew in 
the preparation of the final version of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code".132 For this reason, the kind of legal sources Ethiopia acknowledges and 
the way it handles them, as described by Zwiegert and Koz is, to a large extent, 
adversarial. Moreover, the participation of different foreign legal scholars within 
the development of the Ethiopian legal system is a reflection of how importing 
foreign policy had paved the way for ‘epistemic Communities' 133  to exert 
influence on the choice between adversarial procedure and "inquisitorial" 
procedure.  
      
The last element considered by Zwiegert and Koz is the ‘ideology' of a legal 
system. This refers the influence of ‘religion or political conception on how 
social or economic life should be organised'.134 Religion has played a crucial 
role in the development of Ethiopian law and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
has been the official religion of the country until Emperor Haileselassie was 
deposed by the former dictator Mengustu Haile Mariaum in 1974. 135  As 
discussed above, the Fethaha Neagast was also both a spiritual and secular 
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text.136 However, with the coming in of the socialist party in 1974, the relation 
between the State and the church came to an end. Moreover, the current 
Constitution of Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has 
unambiguous articles on the separation of the State and religion.137 For this 
reason, though religion has played a crucial role before the codification of 
Ethiopian law, its place in the current Ethiopian legal system is less effective. In 
addition, as will be discussed below, the transfer of constitutional principles 
from abroad was to some extent predisposed by the political ideology of the 
then rulers. Therefore, incorporation of policies into the Ethiopian legal system 
did not always necessarily emulate a ‘rational choice'.138                 
 
Having discussed all the elements that are considered relevant to the identity of 
a legal system, it is impossible to draw a definitive conclusion about which 
legal family the Ethiopian legal system belongs to. The creation and 
modernisation of the Ethiopian legal system has had many contributors from a 
variety of different backgrounds. It comes then as no surprise that this system 
includes elements that transcend the traditional classifications of a legal system. 
However, it is not the aim of this chapter to answer such a complex question. 
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that Ethiopia has borrowed 
different laws and practices from different countries to develop its own legal 
system. That trend appears to have continued with the introduction of the first 
counterterrorism legislation in Ethiopian history, the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation 652/2009 (EATP), which is modelled to a large extent on UK 
laws, and to a lesser extent on US laws.  
 
3.3.The History of Human Rights in Ethiopia and their Place Under the 
Ethiopian Legal System  
 
The first written constitution in Ethiopian history was the 1931 Emperor 
Constitution introduced by Emperor Haileselassie. This written constitution was 
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a manifestation of ‘the growing interaction between Ethiopia and Western 
Europe', 139  though the constitution itself was modelled on the Japanese 
Constitution.140  However, the introduction of this constitution was not driven 
by the need to create a system of human rights protection in Ethiopia.  The 
motivation of the Emperor was rather connected with his desire to defend the 
country from any attack by the colonial powers.141 The most significant aspect 
of the 1931 Constitution was that it helped the emperor consolidate his power 
by making him ‘less accessible to the limiting influence of the church and the 
nobility'.142 Thus, the adoption of the 1931 Constitution was in part facilitated 
by what Dolowitz and Marsh considered a ‘voluntary but driven by perceived 
necessity';143 policy transfer as a result of an apparent threat to the emperor's 
authority from domestic and international realties.  
 
The 1931 Constitution had 55 articles that dealt mainly with the power of the 
monarch over the three executive branches of the State and the succession to the 
throne. There were only 7 articles that dealt with the basic right of the ‘subjects' 
of the emperor. These were the right to movement,144 right to liberty,145 right to 
privacy,146 and right to property.147  
 
However, these rights were deficient in many ways. For instance, though article 
23 of the 1931 Constitution incorporated the right to liberty, there did not exist 
any regulations or laws to deal with the naturally occurring rights that flow from 
such basic rights. For instance, the power to arrest (with or without warrant) 
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was not prescribed by law. The right to be brought before a court within a 
certain time limit was not written into law. Similarly, the articles that dealt with 
right to privacy were also hollow in sense that they did not provide the 
necessary procedural safeguards for lawful search or interception of 
communications that would protect privacy.  
 
Furthermore, this early constitution did not contain provisions on right to life, 
prevention from torture, and many other fundamental rights. But the notable 
omission from the 1931 constitution that is relevant for our discussion in 
chapter three is the right to freedom of expression. Moreover, despite these 
early instances of human rights, the emperor was the ‘law' of the land and he 
could override these rights at will as the ‘supreme power rests in the hands of 
the Emperor'.148   
 
Emperor Haileselassie introduced another constitution in 1955. Yet, this 
constitution was no different from the 1931 constitution in that the majority of 
the articles in the 1955 Constitution dealt with the power of the monarch and 
the succession to the throne. Moreover, according to historical accounts, the 
emperor was scarcely concerned with enhancing basic fundamental rights. 
Rather, the primary purpose for revision was to solidify his power ‘against 
mounting pressure for liberalisation'.149   
 
However, the revision also contained some limited elements in terms of the 
fundamental rights enshrined within it. Not only did the 1955 Constitution add 
more substantive human rights, Chapter III also clarified the vague human 
rights articles mentioned in the 1931 constitution. For instance, article 51 of the 
1955 Constitution necessitated the issuance of a warrant by a court before arrest 
and guaranteed right to be brought before a court within 48 hours after arrest. 
Moreover, it specifically dealt with the right to a speedy trial; right of cross-
examination; 150 right to be presumed innocence;151 right not to be deprived of 
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one's liberty, life or property arbitrarily,152 and non-retrospective application of 
criminal offences. 153  Furthermore, unlike the 1931 constitution, the 1955 
constitution also contained noble provisions such as right to equality before the 
law, right to non-discrimination, right to peaceful assembly and right to 
association 154  and right to religious freedom. 155  We can see that the 1955 
constitutional revision contained many of the basic rights that are synonymous 
with modern western human rights documents. 
 
More relevant for this thesis, though, is the provisions of the 1955 Ethiopian 
Constitution on freedom of expression and the rights of the press. 156  The 
constitution declared that there should not be any limit on freedom of expression 
and of the press except in times of national emergency. The 1955 constitution 
was modelled on ‘the U.S. and European constitutions and the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights'. 157  The following provisions were specifically 
taken from the U.S. constitution:158 right to habeas corpus Prohibition on ex post 
facto legislation; freedom of the press and assembly; protection against searches 
and seizures; the right to be confronted with witnesses and assistance in 
obtaining witnesses 
 
However, these rights were arguably superficial in light of further provisions 
within the 1955 Constitution. The monarch was not on an equal footing with his 
‘subjects'; indeed, no one could ‘bring suit against the Emperor'.159 In addition, 
the emperor turned a blind eye to the various violation of fundamental rights 
during his reign.160 Apart from these accounts by foreign scholars and visitors, 
the systemic violation of human rights during the reign of emperor 
Haileselassie was rarely reported and documented domestically. 161  This by 
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itself is an indication of why the mere existence of a progressive constitution 
was insufficient to encourage the ‘subjects' to speak out, write and express their 
feelings, instances of which are considered democratic fundamentals.   
 
The coming into power of the Derg162 regime in 1974 ended the 1955 Emperor 
Constitution. With no constitution in place between 1974 and 1987, the Derg 
regime ruled the country with an iron fist.163 However, due to growing civil 
unrest, the regime was forced to bring in a Constitution, which was based on a 
Marxist ideology,164 Thus, political factors, not ‘rational choice,'165 such as a 
need to introduce fundamental rights, were the main reason behind the 
introduction of the Derg constitution. Some claim that the 1987 Constitution 
was a direct copy of the 1977 Soviet Constitution.166  The Derg constitution had 
given the president unlimited powers and it did not create any institutional 
mechanisms for checks and balances.167  
 
With regard to human rights, the 1987 Derg constitution contained similar 
articles to that of the 1955 Emperor Constitution. However, Ethiopia had 
witnessed a rampant violation of human rights during the Derg regime.168    
 
After the current ruling party169 came to power in 1991, it needed "international 
experience to legitimise its new aims" 170  and did so by designing a new 
constitution based on international instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as 
well as other Western laws.171  
                                                 
162      A military junta led by dictator Mengustu Hailemariaum that came to power in 1974 by 
deposing emperor Haileselassie (1974-1991)   
163      Adejumob,  S. A.  (2007). The History of Ethiopia (USA, Greenwood) 
164      Clapham, C. (1987). The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 3 (2) 
Journal of Communist Studies 192; see also Haile-Selassie, T. (1997). The Ethiopian Revolution, 
1974-1991: From a Monarchical Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy (London, Kegan Paul 
International for the International African Institute), p. 106; see also Heinrich Scholler (2006). 
Ethiopian Constitutional and Legal Development (Germany, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag) 
165      Rose, R.  (2004), supra note 76, p. 43  
166      Ofcansky, T. P. and Berry, L (ditors) (2004). Ethiopia: A Country Study. (USA, Kessinger 
Publishing, LLC), p. 277   
167      Clapham, C. (1987, supra note 164 
168      Ofcansky, T. P. and Berry, L, supra note 166, p. 326 
169      Please see below for a discussion about the current ruling party in Ethiopia  
170      Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (1996) , supra note 69, p. 347 
171      Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, November 1994. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
35 
 
 
Thus, the fourth constitution in Ethiopian history, Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution, was born in 1995. Chapter three of the FDRE 
constitution contains a long list of articles, divided into two parts, devoted to 
human rights: they are ‘human rights' and ‘democratic rights'. The ‘human rights' 
part of the constitution contains right to life, right to security, right to liberty, 
prohibition against inhumane treatment, right of persons arrested, right of 
persons accused, right to privacy, etc. 172  The ‘democratic rights' part of the 
constitution lists rights ranging from the right to freedom of expression, right of 
assembly, demonstration and petition, freedom of movement all the way through 
to environmental rights. 173  However, the drafters of the FDRE constitution 
explain that ‘human rights' are rights that cannot be denied or given by the 
government whereas ‘democratic rights' are rights that could be exercised only 
by citizens. 174  Putting aside the justifications for the distinctions, what is 
important is how the constitutional rights are implemented. 
 
Unlike the previous constitutions, Article 9 of the FDRE constitution declares 
the supremacy of the constitution. Moreover, the FDRE constitution, under 
Article 10, recognises the inviolability and inalienability of human rights. This 
was in direct contrast to the ‘supremacy' of the monarch in the previous 
constitutions.  
 
Furthermore, Article 13 of the FDRE constitution states that the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the constitution are to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human 
Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has signed, 
acceded and ratified many international human rights instruments in this 
regard.175  
 
However, despite its remarkable lists of human rights provisions, some argues 
that the FDRE constitution has failed to clarify some issues. The first problem 
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with the FDRE constitution, according to some scholars, is that the power to 
interpret the basic rights within is given to a political organ, the House of 
Federation (HOF), which is composed of representatives elected by the 
legislative organs of regional governments.176  
 
According to article 53 of the FDRE constitution, the Ethiopian legislature is 
composed of two houses: the House of People's Representatives (HPR) and 
HOF. Members to the HPR are directly elected by the people every five 
years.177 Currently, the government holds 99% of the HPR seats, with just one 
opposition party member. However, article 61 of the FDRE constitution 
provides that members to the HOF could be elected through election or directly 
by regional councils, i.e. by legislative organs of regional governments. At the 
same time, there are no opposition members within the State councils. That 
means representatives to the HOF are directly elected by the party in power. 
This brings the independence of the HOF into question.           
 
Ethiopian constitutional scholars, citing Minutes of the Constitutional 
Assembly,178November 1994, explained that the justification for entrusting the 
HOF with the power to interpret the constitution ‘was a policy choice'.179 They 
explain that:180 
 
the Constitution is considered as the reflection of the ‘free will and consent' of 
the nationalities. It is, in the words of the framers, ‘a political contract' and 
therefore only the authors that are the nationalities should be the ones to be 
vested with the power of interpreting the constitution. To this effect, the House 
of Federation that is composed of the representatives of the various 
nationalities is expressly granted the power to review the constitutionality of 
laws and of course other essential powers as well. 
 
                                                 
176      See Articles 61-62 and articles 82-84 of the FDE Constitution.   
177      Article 54 of the FDRE constitution  
178      the Constitutional Assembly was an organ tasked with drafting the FDRE Constitution  
179      Fiseha, A.  (2005). Federalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues: The Ethiopian 
Experience, 52 (1) Netherlands International Law Review 1 
180      Ibid  
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Thus, because the constitution is a political contract,181 the judiciary is excluded 
from entertaining constitutional disputes. Some Ethiopian scholars argued that 
the decision to take away this important power of interpretation from the 
judiciary has negatively impacted the implementation of human rights in 
Ethiopia.182 
 
Moreover, they argue that the above justification of the Ethiopian government 
to exclude the judiciary from interpreting the constitution is arguably weak 
compared to other countries that have made similar declarations in the preamble 
to their constitutions.  There are many countries with written constitutions that 
specifically declare that their constitutions are based on a political contract. The 
typical example for this is the preamble to the United States constitution which 
states that: 
 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.  
 
Though some dispute that the US constitution is based on the ‘original contract,' 
not a political contract, 183 the political contractual aspect of the US constitution 
was acknowledged by US Supreme Court decisions.184 The judiciary in the US 
is the primary mechanisms for resolving constitutional disputes and interpreting 
the fundamental rights enshrined in the US constitution. This is due to the fact 
                                                 
181      For details on what constitutes a social contract, see  Barker, E, (1969). Social contract : 
essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau. (London, Oxford University Press); see also Morris, C. W. 
(1999). The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (USA, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc); see also Locke, D. et al. (1980). Social Contract: Essays. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press) 
182      Haile, M. (2005). Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor's 
and the "Republic's" Cucullus Non Facit Monachum, 13 (1) Cardozo J. Int'l  & Comp. L. 30 
183     For details see Reid, J.  P. (1995). Constitutional History of the American Revolution 
(Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin Press), p. 18 and seq.  
184      See for example Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 386, 388, 397 (1798). ("The purposes for which men 
enter into society will determine the nature and terms of their social compact".). For detail 
discussions on Calder and other US Supreme court cases, see Lott, T. L. and Pittman, J. P. 
(editors). (2003). A Companion to African-American Philosophy (USA, Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd), p.127 and seq.  
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that "in a constitutional system, the legislature is expected to play an active role 
in formulating policy, and courts are expected to play an active role in 
protecting individual rights".185 One can see how the US judiciary has differed 
in it interpretation of the political contract, as compared with the Ethiopian 
position. 
 
In fact, Ethiopia is not the only country that excludes the judiciary from 
resolving constitutional matters. 186  The concern here is the lack of an 
independent adjudicator in Ethiopia that could strike down legislation that 
erodes the fundamental rights enshrined in the FDRE constitution.  
 
For some, the other problem that hampers the implementation of human rights 
in Ethiopia is lack of independence judiciary. The fact that judges themselves 
are appointed based on their political affiliation and their loyalty to the 
government is also another obstacle. 187  Article 11(1) (d) of the Amended 
Federal Judicial Administration Council Establishment Proclamation 
(Proclamation No. 684/2010) states that the Judicial Administration Council 
could appoint as a person with a legal background as a judge anyone who, 
among other things, is "loyal to the Constitution; confirms in writing that he is 
loyal to the Constitution and has never participated directly or indirectly in 
activities that violate the Constitution."  
 
According to a report commissioned by the World Bank, this loyalty to the 
‘constitution' has a negative connotation.188 Moreover, the composition of the 
Judicial Administration Council is another problematic feature of the Ethiopian 
judiciary. The above report indicated that:189 
 
                                                 
185      See Schulhofer, S. (2013). Oversight of National Security Secrecy in the United States In 
Cole, D., et al (editors). Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law 
(UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited),  p. 22  
186      See for example the case of the Constitutional council of France. For a comparative analysis 
on the Constitutional Council of France and the US Supreme Court, see Davis, M. H. (1986). The 
Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U. S. Supreme Court. 34(1) 
(Winter) the American Journal of Comparative Law 45 
187      See World Bank (2004). Ethiopia Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment, pp. 5-24  
188      Ibid  
189      Ibid  
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Membership of Judicial Administration Commissions at both federal and state 
levels includes several representatives from the legislative branch, although 
judges are in the majority. These entities exercise a great deal of power over the 
judiciary, and objections have been raised to the inclusion of legislative 
members as violating the separation of powers and threatening independence. 
Currently, one of the House members sitting on the Federal Commission is also 
a government minister. The presence of the executive on this Commission was 
argued to have a chilling effect on its ability to act independently.  
 
Due to the above reasons, critics 190  argue that the implementation of the 
comprehensive human rights provisions provided for by the FDRE constitution 
remains as controversial as ever.191  
 
4.4.Terrorism and Human Rights: The Question of Balancing National 
Security and Human Rights from an Ethiopian perspective    
 
"Bush‘s glib aphorism"192 ‘war on terror', has forced countries into showing the 
US that they are not on the side of the terrorists. The response to the US's ‘call 
to arms' vary from the enactment of new counterterrorism legislation to 
adopting UN resolutions.193 However, not all countries ‘immediately responded' 
by enacting new legislation.194  
 
As will be discussed shortly, Ethiopia is one of the countries that has not reacted 
‘immediately'. However, this does not mean that Ethiopia has not played a role 
in the ‘global war' on terrorism. Due to its geographic location, situated in one 
of the most volatile regions in the world, the country is considered an important 
ally for the West in the ‘war on terror', especially for the US and the UK. 
                                                 
190      Mostly international human rights organisations  
191      Regassa, T. (2010). The Making and Legitimacy of the Ethiopian Constitution: Towards 
Bridging the Gap between Constitutional Design and Constitutional Practice 23 (1) Africa Focus 
85 
192      See Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech About Terrorism in a Smart Militant Democracy 80 
Mississipi Law Journal 1395, p.1405 
193      For detail analysis on how countries around the world responded to the US call, see Roach, 
K. (2012). The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press)  
194      Ibid  
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Ethiopia's participation in the global war against terrorism comprises facilitating 
secret detention centres for terrorist suspects;195 providing air bases to the US 
that could be used to strike terrorist suspects and their training facilities in the 
East of Africa;196 detaining terrorist suspects that cause a threat to the West;197 
and waging two costly wars against Somalia.198 Some claimed that this has 
helped the Ethiopian government to evade scrutiny and the West has turned a 
‘blind eye' to various crack-downs on journalists and legitimate political 
organisations.199    
 
The debate on creating a balance between human rights and national security is 
not a new topic in the West.200 As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, 
both the ECtHR and the US Supreme Court have dealt with this issue 
extensively. However, this debate has been in the ascent since the 9/11 attack. 
No wonder that a fair share of the American public seemed willing to sacrifice 
their civil liberties in lieu of security201 and governments have been using this 
public opinion to introduce an array of counter-terrorism measures.202 These 
measures included, inter alia, weakening the prohibition on torture and other 
inhumane treatment of terrorist suspects by some Western governments;203 the 
                                                 
195      Henshaw, A. (2007). Ethiopia Admits Terror Detentions, BBC 10 April  
196      Gordon, M. R. and Mazzetti, M. (2007). U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al-Qaeda. 23 
February, the New York Times; see also Whtilock, C. (2011). U.S. Crones Base in Ethiopia is 
Operational. 27 October, the Washington Post   
197      AP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 2010] UKSC 24;  see also  XX v 
Secretary of the State for the Home Department (SC/61/2007, 2010).  Both AP and XX, 
Ethiopian nationals who had received indefinite leave to remain in the UK, were detained in 
Ethiopia for their links to terrorism. However, none of them had caused any threat to Ethiopia.  
198      Lyman, P.L. (2009). The War on Terrorism in Africa. In Harbeson, J. W. and  Rothschild, D.  
(editors). Africa in World Politics. (USA, Westview Press), p. 276 (stating that "the United States 
gave at least tacit backing and intelligence and material support to an Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia to dislodge a radical Islamic government.") 
199      These sorts of allegations mostly come from human rights organisations  
200      For debates and the US government responses to terrorist attacks before 9/11, see Ball, H.  
(2004). The USA Patriot Act of 2001: (USA, ABC-CLIO), p. 1-25; see also Zedner, L.  (2003). 
Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror. 32 Journal of Law and Society 507    
201      See recent polls conducted by CNN in 2013 that  shows almost 40% of Americans tolerates 
government intrusive measures, at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/05/01/top5.pdf;  
202      Dworkin, R. (2003). Terror and the Attack on Civil Liberties. 50 (17) The New York Review 
of Books 1  
203      For details see the Economist (2007). Terrorism and Civil Liberty: Is Torture Ever Justified, 
20 September 2007 (arguing that: ‘the September 11th attacks have not driven any rich 
democracy to reverse itself and make torture legal. But they have encouraged the bending of 
definitions and the turning of blind eyes'.); see also Donohue, L.K. (2008). The Cost of 
Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 
91-103 (arguing that America's approach to  9/11  terrorist attack was gradually transformed from  
‘initial conservatism' into ‘ a steady erosion of detention and interrogation standards')    
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USA PATRIOT Act and the power it has given to law enforcement organs;204 
and indefinite detention of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay by the 
US. 205 Moreover, the sweeping counter-terrorism measures such as control 
orders and the detention of terrorist suspects introduced via the TA 2000 and 
TA 2006 could be mentioned from the UK.206  
 
Political leaders would like to convince us that it is necessary to forgo our 
human rights for the sake of our security and the security of the state. Thus, they 
argue for a new approach to the issue of human rights/national security.207 But 
legal scholars take political leaders arguments with a pinch of salt.208 Some 
scholars rather argue in favour of introducing ‘administrative' measures and 
‘increased independent review of national security activities' to ‘tougher and 
broader'209 counter-terrorism measures to offset the threat of terrorism.210 These 
‘administrative' measures include, inter alia, preventing ‘access to substances 
                                                 
204      For detail analysis on how the Patriot Act has weakened civil liberties in America, see  Ball, 
H., supra note 200; see also Vervaele, J. A. E. (205) Terrorism and Information Sharing between 
the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities in the US and the Netherlands: Emergency 
Criminal Law? in Hol, A. M.  and Vervaele, J. A. E. (editors) Security and Civil Liberties: The 
Case of Terrorism (Antrwerpen, Intersentia)  p. 131 and seq. (Arguing that the USA Patriot Act 
has ‘expanded regular powers of investigation,' and ‘weakened judicial control'); see also Zedner, 
L. (2009).  Security (Routledge Key Ideas in Criminology Series) 
205      For detailed analysis, see Cole, D. (2013). Legal Affairs: Dreyfus, Guantánamo, and the 
Foundation of the Rule of Law 29 Touro L. Rev. 43-57  
206       For detail analysis on counter-terrorism measures in the UK and their effect on right to 
liberty, see chapter five of this thesis  
207      See a compilation of arguments by well-known politicians in the UK in Dworkin, R. (2006). 
It is Absurd to Calculate Human Rights according to a Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 May the 
Guardian; see also the following book that has compiled extensive arguments in by US 
politicians:  Bordogna-Weeks, M. A. (2008). Justifying an Attack on Civil Liberties: The 2006 
USA Patriot Act Reauthorisation Senate Debates (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 
106- 131   
208      See Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech, supra note 192 (arguing that "When faced with 
terrorism, the state should be "militant" but, state action must recognize that terrorism often 
represents endemic reactions to modernity and late modernity. The "smart militant state" must 
therefore work out forms of militant reaction that become more or less permanent and must adopt 
forms that can be accommodated within fundamental values rather than displacing them even 
during a temporary period of "emergency.": seel also Gearty, C. (2012) Escaping Hobbes: Liberty 
and Security for our Democratic (not Anti-terrorist) Age in E. D. Reed, and Dumper, M. (editors). 
Civil Liberties, National Security and Prospects for Consensus: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Religious Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press); See also Zedner, L.  (2003), 
supra note 200; see also Waldon, J. (2003). Security and Liberty: the Image of Balance. 11 
Journal of Political Philosophy 19; see also Thiel, M (2009), The 'Militant Democracy' Principle 
in Modern Democracies (Aldershot, Ashgate), chapter 13  
209      Roach, K. (2004).  Anti-Terrorism and Militant Democracy: Some Western and Eastern 
Responses.  in Sajo, A. (ed). Militant Democracy. (Utreccht, Eleven International Publishing), p. 
172  
210      See Roach, K. (2006).  Must We Trade Rights for Security? 27 Cardozo law Review 2157     
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and sites that can be used for terrorism.'211 This argument is gaining ground 
even in other social matters unrelated to terrorism.212  
 
The arguments for or against ‘a new level of vigilance'213 between security and 
human rights is just one side of the argument. Finding what we mean by 
‘security' is another related issue that has to be addressed to understand the 
delicate issue of balance214 because "rights and security are far more complex 
than the customary trade-off implies". 215  Accordingly, most arguments on 
security and human rights suffer from a ‘misconstruction' of the term security, 
taking the term to as a ‘pure safety conception' 216  without making a clear 
distinction between national security and human security.217 ‘Human security', 
‘though slippery by design', 218  is a concept that encompasses, inter alia, 
"personal security (e.g. physical safety from such things as torture, war, 
criminal attacks, domestic violence, etc.) and political security (e.g. enjoyment 
of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression)".219    
 
National security, on the other hand, could be construed to mean State security 
that primarily aims to protect a State as an institution and, as such, this narrow 
meaning of national security has arguably nothing to do with human rights.220  
 
This narrow definition finds its way into the domestic legislation of some 
countries. For instance, while national security is not clearly defined, the 1989 
Security Services Act, as amended by the 1996 Security Services Act221, in the 
                                                 
211      Ibid  
212      See the announcement by Google to introduce a new technology that wipes child porn sites 
to prevent child abuse. See Barrett, D. (2013). Google Builds New System to Eradicate Child 
Porn Images, Daily Telegraph 15 June     
213      Lord Justice Sedley, S. (2013). Terrorism and Security: Back to the future? In Cole, D., et al 
supra note 185,  p.13 
214      Waldron, J. (2006). Safety and Security. 85 (2) Nebraska Law Review  455  
215      Donohue, L.K (2008)., supra note 203, p. 29 
216      Waldron, J. (2006)., supra note 214, pp.456, 461 
217      Ibid, pp. 459-461 
218      Paris, R. (2001). Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? 26(2) International Security 
88 
219      United Nations development Programme (1994). Human Development Report (New York, 
Oxford University Press) as cited in Paris, R. (2001), supra note 218, p. 89-91  
220      Waldron, J. (2006), supra note 214 
221      For details, see Fenwick, H.  (2002). Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London, Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd), p 651-654 
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UK, authorises the Security Services to act in the name of ‘national security' if 
there are "threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of 
agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means ..."222  
 
The above definition does not seem to have a broader implication as it is 
concerned with "a risk to the security of the state."223 However, this narrow 
interpretation of ‘national security' has been re-strategised in the UK as result of 
the ‘the National Security Strategy' 224  and the ‘Counter-Terrorism Strategy' 
(CONTEST).225  
 
Therefore, while there might be competing alternatives to the definition of 
national security,226 the term can have a broader definition so as to imply not 
only the interest of the State as an institution, but also human security, national 
interests and the ability of a State to avert any threat including terrorism because 
‘definitions of insecurity and threat can no longer only be conceived at the level 
of the state and in the relationship between states'.227  
 
                                                 
222      Section 1(2) of the Security Service Act 1989 
223    See Walker, C. (1992). The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law. (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press), p. 6-7; see also Fenwick, H.  (2002), supra note 221, p. 652; see also   Mcghee, 
D. (2012) Building a Consensus on ‘National Security' in Britain: Terrorism, Human Rights and 
‘Core Values' in E. D. Reed, and  Dumper, M. (editors). Civil Liberties, National Security and 
Prospects for Consensus: Legal, philosophical, and religious perspectives (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press) p.155  
224      Cabinet Office (2008). The National security Strategy of the United Kingdom (cm 7291, 
London); see also Cabinet office (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: the National 
Security Strategy (cm 7953, London). For detail discussion, see Mghee, D, supra note 223, p.129 
and seq.; see also Roach, K. (2012), supra note 193, pp. 303 and seq. (analyses  the UK's 
"correction in favour of Liberty) ; see also Walker, C. (2011). Terrorism and the Law.  (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press), pp.7 and seq.  
225     Home office (2009). Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare The United Kingdom's Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism. (cm 7547, London).  For details discussion on CONTEST, see Roach, K 
(2012), supra note 193, p. 303 and seq.; see also Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 7 and seq. 
(arguing that "the ultimate test of success or failure of strategies against terrorism is the 
maintenance of public support while at the same time respecting the fundamental values on 
which legitimacy and consensus cohere".) 
226     Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. 67 (4) Political Science 
Quarterly 481 
227     Mghee, D, supra note 223, p.129 
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Moreover, the inference of national security in broader terms has been accepted 
by some regional organisations in Africa.228 They accept the fact that ‘security, 
development and democratisation are interdependent and mutually reinforce each 
other. A broad human security approach is more apt to tackle current threats 
characterised by trans-border crime, terrorist activities and an internationalisation 
of agents of insecurity'.229 Similar declaration could be found under the Council 
of Europe Guidelines, 230  which states that ‘‘it is not only possible, but also 
absolutely necessary, to fight terrorism while respecting human rights, the rule of 
law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law''. The derogation test 
of international instruments such as the ICCPR231 and regional instruments such 
as the ECHR232 also set substantive and procedural requirements on suspending 
rights under exceptional circumstances. These requirements help scrutinising 
whether the suspension of rights is strictly required and proportional,233 which in 
effect help keeping the balance between addressing national security threats and 
promoting human security. Other balancing tests on freedom of expression, right 
to privacy and right to liberty will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
However, there are certain crucial points that need clarification when we talk of 
balancing human rights and national security from an Ethiopian perspective. 
The question of balance in Ethiopia does not work in the same political 
environment as in the UK and in the US.     
 
First, Ethiopia is a ‘developmental state'. 234  National security in a 
developmental state such as Ethiopia is primarily driven by economic factors.235 
Ethiopia's Policy and Strategy on Foreign Affairs and National Security 
                                                 
228      Genève Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2010). Integrating 
Human Security into National Security Polices in North-West Africa. Rabat, Morrocco, 23-24 
November  
229      Ibid; see also UN Commission on Human Security (2003). Human security now: protecting 
and empowering people. (New York: Commission on Human Security). (ISBN 0-9741108-0-9) 
230      Council of Europe (2002). Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
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231      See for instance, Article 4 of the ICCPR 
232      See article 15 of the ECHR 
233      See for example A and others v United Kingdom (Application no. 3455/05).  
234      UNDP (2012). Democratization in a Developmental State: the Case of Ethiopia, Issues, 
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235     Ibid; see also Worku, I. (2011). Evaluating the Beginning of Developmental State in Ethiopia: 
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Publishing)  
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(FANSPS) specifically states that "national security policy must first ensure 
national existence or survival. Ensuring national security means protecting the 
population from strife, war and disintegration."236 But it says little on human 
rights. Therefore, issues of promoting human rights in such a political 
environment are implicitly relegated to a secondary place.237  
 
Second, there are some reports that appear to implicate the Ethiopian 
government in State sponsored terrorism. 238  According to one report from 
Wikileaks, the three successive bombs that went off in 2006 in the capital Addis 
Ababa were planted by the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS).239 But it has to be stressed that there is nothing conclusive evidence that 
directly link the government to those incidents.  Moreover, as will be discussed 
in chapter 4, the NISS is arguably given some controversial powers to 
investigate terrorist suspects and intercept communications. 240 These powers 
have the potential to infringe some fundamental rights241 Therefore, in Ethiopia 
the NISS is, on the one hand, a legitimate government institution that aims to 
protect the country from terrorist attack but, on the other hand, its powers have 
yet to be clearly defined. These facts could tilte the balance towards augmenting 
the security of the party in power with little concern to human rights.  The UN 
has come to realise this paradox in such political environments.242  
 
Fourth, creating a balance between national security and human rights has been 
intensifying in the West since 9/11. However, there is a gap in literature on how 
third world countries such as Ethiopia are jumping into the fray to catch up with 
the West without giving much thought to the debate. It has to be a positive that 
Ethiopia has enacted the EATP and that the EATP is modelled on countries 
                                                 
236      Ministry of Information Press and Audiovisual Department (2009). Ethiopia's Policy and 
Strategy on Foreign Affairs and National Security (FANSPS). 10 November, Addis Ababa, p.7 
237      Fentaw, A. (2009). A Critigue of the National Security Policy: Towards ‘Human Security' in 
Ethiopia. 21 (11) Horn of Africa Bulletin; see also Thirvengadam, A. and Hessenbon, G. T. 
(2012). Constitutionalism and Impoverishment: A complex Dynamic in Rosenfeld, M. and Sajo, 
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University Press), p. 157 
238      Jalata, A. (2005). State Terrorism and Globalisation: the Case of Ethiopia and Sudan. 
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239      Cable 06ADDISABABA2708, Ethiopia: Recent Bombings Blamed on  Oromos 
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241      Right to privacy will be discussed in chapter 4  
242      UN Commission on Human Security (2003), supra note 229, p. 23  
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such as the UK and the US who have a wealth of experience on counter-
terrorism legislation. However, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the 
design of some provisions of the EATP has the potential to erode the very rights 
recognised by the FDERE constitution.  
 
Finally, the FDRE constitution lacks some essential principles such 
‘proportionality'. This test has different meanings within different contexts. In 
general proportionality test will be met if the means is not more than the 
objective.243 There are also arguments in the US as to how ‘proportionality' 
should be defined within the ambit of the US Constitution.244 
 
In the absence of proportionality principle, the issue of balance between the 
need to fight terrorism and the need to promote human rights will be based on 
an ‘open ended' balancing of measures that have little effect to addressing the 
main concern.245  
 
Therefore, the question of balance from an Ethiopian perspective has to be seen 
in light of the above political environment.  
           
1.1.1. Terrorism in  Ethiopian: the Legal Gap and the Need for the  EATP  
1.1.1.1.Introduction: the Peculiar Features of Terrorism  
 
This section is only intended to provide a cursory overview of the definition of 
terrorism as the concept that has no settled definition in international level. As 
will be discussed below, there are also plenty of proposals and counter-proposals. 
Despite several attempts to define the concept in the past, the diverging views of 
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sovereign States at the UN have made it hard to reach a consensus.246 There are 
more than a dozen UN legal instruments on terrorism. 247  But none of them 
specifically defines terrorism. Some argue that "the most powerful States, who in 
most cases dictate the intentional agenda, have found greater benefit in not 
defining terrorism, since this provides them with more freedom in drafting their 
policies."248 The problematic nature of terrorism is not restricted to the absence 
of a definition. But the argument goes further, concerning at what point terrorist 
acts constitute crimes under international criminal law.249  So far, only three 
types of terrorist acts are given the status of international crimes: aircraft 
hijacking, threat and use of force against international protected persons and 
taking of civilian hostages.250 
 
There are countless scholarly approaches and arguments on how terrorism should 
be defined.251 However, a definition could perhaps be found by reference to the 
seriousness of the terrorist acts, the targets and motives of terrorist attacks.252 
The next sections will analyse the relevance of these elements in the definition of 
terrorism.   
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252      For a comprehensive list of authors that forge a definition based on motive, targets, and the 
level of violence, see Vallis, R, et al. Disciplinary Approaches to Terrorism: A Survey. Defence 
and Security Applications Research Centre (DSA), Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra 
(unpublished)  
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The first factor, not necessarily in terms of relevance but for the sake of 
convenience, that needs consideration in the definition of terrorism, is the 
motives behind a specific terrorist attack. The relevance of motive in establishing 
criminal liability, though it is often considered at the sentencing stage, is a new 
phenomenon.253 Although "references to purposes and especially to motives have 
been challenged,"254 it is argued that motive provides the mechanism through 
which regular criminals are distinguished from terrorists. According to this 
aphorism, the degree to which an act is classed as terrorism, as distinct from 
criminal enterprise, rests on the motives. 255  In both cases, there is criminal 
culpability based on intent. The motive is the main reason why terrorism is 
treated differently from other sorts of crimes.256  
 
However, although essential as the distinguishing feature, the requirement of 
motive creates the paradoxical position that counter-terrorism legislation is vague. 
Such a requirement necessitates the identification of a plethora of differing 
motives so as not to unnecessarily restrict the scope of those acts that fall under 
the definition of terrorism. The motives frequently mentioned in most counter-
terrorism legislation include political motive, ideological motive, racial motive, 
religious motive, etc. 257 The definition of terrorism based on motives is also 
recognised under section 1 TA 2000. This Act defined terrorism as:  "the use or 
threat of serious violence…designed to influence the government or an 
international organisation or to intimidate the public"; and is committed for 
"…the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause".258 
As will be shown below, the EATP is no exception on this point.  
 
                                                 
253      Binder, G. (2002). The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent.  6(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1-
94 
254      For details, see Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 38  
255      Saul, B (2006). The Curious Element of Motives in Definitions of Terrorism: Essential 
Ingredients-or Criminalising Thoughts? Law and Liberty in the War on Terror. Sydney Law 
School Research Paper , no. 08/123, 28-38 
256      Ibid  
257      See Schmid, A. P. and  Jongman, A. J.  (2005), supra note 251 
258      For further discussion, see discussions on R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 in chapter three on  how 
the UK Supreme Court has attempted to  demarcate the scope of section 1 TA 2000; for a detail 
discussion on the definition of terrorism under TA 2000, see also Stone, R. (2006). Police Powers 
and Human Rights in the Context of Terrorism. 48 (4) Managerial Law 384. 
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 Yet, finding the scope of these motives is not easy; too restrictive an approach 
risks rendering the definition ineffective; too expansive one risks including 
offences that can be best dealt with under criminal laws. The paradox becomes 
apparent when one envisages removing this requirement. Yet if it were to be, it 
will be difficult to identify conventional crimes from terrorism. For instance,  
 
Like terrorists, criminals use violence as a means to attaining a specific end. 
However, while the violent act itself may be similar -- kidnapping, shooting, 
arson, for example -- the purpose or motivation clearly is not. Whether the 
criminal employs violence as a means to obtain money, to acquire material 
goods, or to kill or injure a specific victim for pay, he is acting primarily for 
selfish, personal motivations (usually material gain).259 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the prosecution face the task of proving the 
criminal intent and that the said act is committed in furtherance of a defined 
motive. If the latter is not proved, then the act will be an ordinary crime. But 
some also argue that "the inclusion of motive does not in practice make proof of 
terrorist offences much more arduous." 260    The latter argument could be 
supported by the practice in the US that the definition of terrorism under the 
Patriot Act 261  "does not require proof of political or religious motives." 262 
However, we have also need to note that the Patriot Act is not the only legal 
document in the US that defines terrorism.263 For instance, title 22, Chapter 38 of 
the United States Code denies terrorism as "…premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national 
groups or clandestine agents".  
 
                                                 
259      Hoffman, B. supra note 251, p. 36  
260      See Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 38   
261      It defines domestic terrorism as "activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that 
are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
U.S." 
262      Roach, K. (2004), supra note 209, p.178 
263      For further details, see Hoffman, B., supra note 251, pp. 30-32 
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The other factor that needs consideration is the seriousness of the violence. Some 
argue that only very ‘serious violence' should be dealt with by anti-terrorism 
laws.264 But how serious is serious? It is stated that seriousness is defined by the 
use of weapons of mass destruction and the ‘extent of the damage'.265 Some also 
argue that serious violence during a ‘riot' under some exceptional 
circumstances266 and ‘ethnic conflict, religious conflict, and class warfare' could 
be included within the definition of terrorism. 267  
 
This definition, however, is further qualified by the exclusion of ‘guerrilla 
warfare' and ‘lunatic assassination,'268 and war.269 Some argue that:270  
 
Terrorism is often confused or equated with, or treated as synonymous with, 
guerrilla warfare. This is not entirely surprising, since guerrillas often employ 
the same tactics (assassination, kidnapping, bombings of public gathering-places, 
hostage-taking, etc.) for the same purposes (to intimidate or coerce, thereby 
affecting behaviour through the arousal of fear) as terrorists.  
 
However, they argue that ‘guerrilla warfare', unlike terrorism, "refer to a 
numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, 
attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory (even if only 
ephemerally during daylight hours)" 271  As will be discussed below, this 
confusion over terrorism and ‘guerrilla warfare' is particularly evident in Ethiopia.  
 
In the case of ‘lunatic assassinations', the fact that the perpetrator knows the 
victims of the assassination and the effect of such crime is ‘anger not terror' and 
reduces the chance of treating it under terrorism laws.272  
 
                                                 
264      Saul, B. (2008). Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press; 
Malik, O. (2000). Enough of the Definition of Terrorism.  (USA, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs), p. 38-60 
265      Malik, O, supra note 264, p. 60 
266      Ibid  
267      Ibid  
268     Hoffman, B., supra note 251, p. 35-38  
269      Malik, O, supra note 264 
270      Hoffman, B., supra note 251, p.35  
271      Ibid  
272      Schmid, A. P. and  Jongman, A. J.  (2005), supra note 251, p 13 
51 
 
The third factor is the target of terrorist attacks. Terrorists most often target 
innocent civilians as a means of influencing a government or other entity. The 
aim is "either to immobilise the target of terror in order to produce disorientation 
and/or compliance or to mobilise secondary targets of demand (e.g. a 
government) or targets of attention (public opinion)".273  Influencing the ‘targets 
of terror', meaning the victims, is not the primary goal of the attack. The attack is 
calculated to send a message to the ‘targets of demand' and change public 
attitude in the ‘targets of attention'.274  
 
A question, therefore, arises as to how terrorists select the targets.  The attacks 
and the tactics used are constantly modified based on various factors such as the 
availability of publicity; 275  causing prevalent uncertainty and exposing the 
limitation of the political systems;276 the high degree of suspicion in the attack 
and the magnitude of the attack; 277 and the ‘ability to repeat' the attacks. 278 
However, not all of these factors are necessarily part of every attack. The 
political game plan and the intended results determine the nature of the factors.279 
Whatever tactics they choose, "terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot 
of people listening and not a lot of people dead".280 
 
To conclude, terrorism could arguably be defined by reference to the above 
elements. This approach, however, is not to be taken for granted. As some have 
pointed out, there are several pertinent countervailing considerations 
appertaining to each of these elements.281 For instance, some authors suggest six 
                                                 
273      Ibid, p.2 
274      Ibid  
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278       Cordesman, A. H.  (2002). Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Defending the U.S. Home Land (USA, Greenwood Publishing Group), p.35 
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elements that need to be taken into consideration if terrorism is to be defined at 
international level: "the mens rea aspect; the purpose of the act; the 
characterisation of the act itself; the target of the act; the perpetrators; the scope 
of the definition in time or place, and whether any exception or justification 
could applicable."282 Yet, other commentators have proposed between five and 
eight elements in their definitions. 283 The very fact that many commentators 
differ on the relevant factors pertinent to any potential international definition of 
terrorism is, at the very least, proof that consensus is absent on the precise 
parameters of what constitutes terrorism. Thus, if scholarly works fundamentally 
differ on the constituent parts of an international definition of terrorism, one 
holds little hope that States will find harmony, not least because of the competing 
political factionalism that assumes prominence when we speak of States 
interactions.  
 
1.1.1.2.Defining Terrorism under Ethiopian Law  
 
We have seen above that defining terrorism remains as controversial as ever on 
an international level. For this reason, different States have come up with their 
own definitions tailored to suit their domestic needs.284 However, the study of 
terrorism has been a similarly daunting task for Ethiopia. Until 2009, Ethiopia's 
legal regime contained not one law specifically designed to deal with terrorism.  
 
The preamble to the EATP recognises this problem by stating that "...it has 
become necessary to legislate adequate legal provisions since the laws presently 
in force in the country are not sufficient to prevent and control terrorism."  In the 
absence of clear legal provisions, the judiciary had been relying on the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code and the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. The current 
Ethiopian government has dragged its feet on the issue of counterterrorism 
legislation, though it has ratified the Organisation of the African Union 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers 
                                                 
282      Ginkel, B. V. (2008), supra note 248, p. 472  
283      Schmid, A. P. and  Jongman, A. J.  (2005), supra note 251, p. 6-8  
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Convention)285 in 2003 and Ethiopia was one of the countries that acceded UN 
resolution 1373, which obliges states to adjust their national laws in relation to 
terrorism.286  
 
The Algiers Convention obliges ratifying countries to "review their national 
laws and establish criminal offences for terrorist acts..."287 Moreover, Article 4(2) 
of the Algiers Convention obliges States to "adopt any legitimate measures 
aimed at preventing and combating terrorist acts". According to Article 9(4) of 
the FDRE constitution, "all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an 
integral part of the law of the land." Thus, the Algiers Convention could have 
been used as a legal basis to create a definition of terrorism within Ethiopia.288 
However, despite the ratification of the Algiers Convention in 2003, the 
Ethiopian judiciary has made no reference to the Algiers Convention in any of 
the Ethiopian terrorism cases to date. 289  The failure to apply the Algiers 
Convention could be attributed to the lack of knowledge of international 
instruments by Ethiopian judges.290        
 
For some commentators, the definition embodied in the Algiers Convention is 
‘long, complex, and confusing'.291 For instance, Article 1(3)(a)(iii) of the Algiers 
Convention  defines terrorist acts as ‘any act which is a violation of criminal laws 
                                                 
285      The Organisation of the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism1999.  It was adopted on 14 June 1999 in Algiers and came into force on  6 December 
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287      Article 2(a) of the Algiers Convention  
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(iii) Create general insurrection in a State. 
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, 
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291      Shinn, D. H. (2005).  ‘Domestic or International Terrorism? A Dysfunctional Dialogue' 
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of a State party …" This is a vague reference which does not make a distinction 
between criminal acts and terrorist acts that might "… endanger the life, physical 
integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death…"  The above article 
also defines terrorism as any act that "create general insurrection in a State".292 
But this definition is problematic as it seems to criminalise any peaceful 
movement that might cause temporary civil disobedience or a revolt against 
dictatorial regimes such as the Arab Spring.  
 
The condemnation of the Algiers Convention is not limited to the definition of 
terrorism but also extends to ‘the protected targets' as defined under the Algiers 
Convention, which are similarly described as ‘very wide and ill-defined'.293  
 
More significantly, Article 3(2) of the Algiers Convention includes a very long 
list of non-exhaustive motives and declares that "political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable 
defence against a terrorist act." This, in turn, has opened the door for the 
signatories to make these motives part of domestic definitions. Many domestic 
definitions in Africa,294 with the exception of a few countries,295 include more 
than one motive in their definition, ranging from broad concepts based on 
philosophical and ideological motives, to specific motives that refer to political 
and religious imperatives.  
 
There is also a marked difference between the Algiers Convention and some 
domestic definitions. The Algiers Convention, under Article 3, states that: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in 
accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-
                                                 
292      Article 1 (3(a)(iii) of the Algiers Convention 
293      Saul, B. (2008), supra note 264, p. 158. 
294      See for instance, Article 3 of the EATP; section 7(2) of Ugandan Anti-terrorism Act 2002;  
section  2(1) Of  Zambian  anti-terrorism Act 2007;  section 2 art 2(2) of Rwandan Counter 
Terrorism Act 2008; section  1(c) of Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Bill 2003; section 1 (1)(xxv(c) of 
South African  No. 33/2004: Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and 
Related Activities Act, 2004; sec 2(2) of Gahanna Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 
295      Se for instance, Counter-terrorism legislation of  Zimbabwe (Public Order and Security Act 
1/2002); Tanzania (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002); and Gambia (Anti-terrorism Act 
{amended} 2008) omit motives from the definition of Terrorism  
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determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, 
aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist 
acts. 
 
The Algiers Convention in this aspect is similar to other regional instruments 
that make specific exception to armed struggle. For instance, the European 
Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism makes exception to 
«actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed 
by international humanitarian law».296 
 
Some African countries have specifically excluded liberation movements from 
the definition of terrorism.297 The EATP, on the other hand, is silent on the 
extent to which it could impact on national and liberation movements. Though 
article 3 of the EATP298 outlaws terrorist acts perpetrated to advance political, 
religious or ideological causes, it does not seem to recognise use of force by 
some liberation or self-determination movements. This is indirect contrast to 
Article 3 of the Algiers Convention and Article 9(4) of the FDRE Constitution, 
which recognises the direct application of international instruments ratified by 
Ethiopia.  
 
There are some rebel movements in Ethiopia some with a secessionist agenda 
and others who have the primary objective of overthrowing the government by 
force. One particular defect with Article 3 of the Algiers Convention is the 
absence of a definition of the ambiguous wording within the overall definition; 
terms like ‘occupation', ‘aggression' and ‘domination by foreign forces' are all 
                                                 
296      See Council of the European Union (2002). Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA). Luxembourg, Council of the European Union 
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from 15 years to life or with death. 
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inherently broad. Some Ethiopian organisations, to be discussed below, use the 
same terminology as exist within Article 3 of the Algiers Convention to justify 
their armed struggle against the Ethiopian government. Therefore, analysing the 
profile of each organisation based on their location; examining historical and 
geographical facts about some regions in Ethiopia, and scrutinising the terrorism 
charges brought against these organisations is crucial to understanding the 
problem of terrorism in Ethiopia. Moreover, our discussion on the terrorism 
cases brought against these organisations will show that the enactment of the 
EATP is, albeit with its legal defects, justified.  
 
1.1.2. The Oromo Liberation Front; Ogaden National Liberation Front, Ginbot 
7, Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front, etc: Terrorist Organisations or 
Freedom Fighters?  
 
We have seen above that there are unsettled questions relating to the elements 
necessary to define terrorism and the status of terrorism under international 
criminal law, and this lack of clarity is prevalent too within Ethiopia. We shall 
now examine one of the perennial dichotomies that exist within the terrorism 
debate: one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. 
 
Perspective is important when trying to understand elusive concepts such as 
‘human rights activists', ‘rebels', ‘freedom fighters', ‘pro-democracy activists' 
and ‘terrorists'. The ‘Arab spring' has taught us many lessons about how 
journalists, opponents and supporters of dictatorial regimes in Northern Africa 
and the Middle East interpret these concepts. The on-going Syrian crisis is a 
pertinent example in this respect. For Western and Gulf States, those who lead 
the opposition against President Assad are termed ‘rebels' and ‘freedom fighters'. 
Yet, President Assad himself, as leader of the Syrian regime, has on numerous 
occasions referred to the opposition as ‘terrorists' who seek the destruction of 
Syria.    
 
This false dichotomy is nothing new in the study of terrorism. Whether the ‘use 
of force' against oppressive regimes is justified has been a contentious issue for 
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decades.299 For instance, the African National Congress and its leaders, together 
with Nelson Mandela, was ‘embarrassingly' on the US terror watch list until 
2008.300 Moreover, oppressive regimes would cynically label their opponents as 
‘terrorists'.301 For instance, Libya, under former strong man Kaddafi, "persuaded 
others to adopt its moral viewpoint"302 in rendering ‘'terrorist' suspects.303  
 
‘Ethno-nationalist' terrorism is another issue within the broader context of 
terrorism. Though the motives, the violence, and the targets might not be 
significantly different, it is said that "unlike other terrorists, ethnic terrorists 
focus on forging a distinct ethnic identity and fostering ethnic mobilisation".304 
This form of terrorism is also characterised by ‘territorial claims and armed 
struggle' with the aim of ‘breaking the will of the State'. 305 The IRA306 and 
ETA307 are typical examples from the West. 
 
Furthermore, Ethno-nationalist terrorism "...has been the most successful, in 
terms of soliciting acceptance and legitimacy from international actors outside 
the conflict".308 The reception of this form of terrorism is a manifestation of how 
most African and Asian countries have used ‘ethno-nationalist' terrorism to 
liberate themselves from colonial powers.309  
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Studying terrorism in Ethiopia, therefore, requires an understanding of its 
history, ethnic composition, and the geographical location of the country. 
Though a detailed study is beyond the scope of this thesis, the history of 
Ethiopia tells us that military power has been the only way to form a leading 
movement. From Emperor Tewodros II, 310  to Emperor Minilik I, 311  who is 
credited with establishing modern Ethiopia by suppressing tribal leaders; to 
Mengistu-Hailemariam, who unleashed a reign of terror during the Ethiopian 
civil war between 1974-1991,312 to the late prime minister Meles Zenawi, who 
led a coalition of rebels, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) against Mengistu-Hailemariam, they all used war as a means to secure 
power. Throughout its modern history, no Ethiopian leader has come to power 
through democratic means. Yet, these leaders once called themselves ‘rebels', 
and did not consider themselves terrorists. But they used the word Wenbedes (an 
Amharic word for terrorists) against their enemies. 
 
The most powerful coalition partner of the current ruling party, the Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is the Tigray People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF). As the name indicates, the TPLF was born out of the 
need for national self-determination.313 Thus, according to one of its founding 
members, the TPLF "utilized class and ethno nationalist ideologies to mobilize 
Tigrayans until it ousted the Mengistu government." 314 Some argue that the 
EPRDF has been the dominant political force since 1991 through "a deft 
combination of armed force and political guile"315. However, the organisations, 
to be discussed below, claim that establishing a free democracy and liberty has 
been the ultimate goal for most Ethiopians in the last 30 years. They accused the 
EPRDF of systemic repression, widespread human rights violation, corruption, 
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and of concentrating power within a few elite circles. For them, the only way to 
reverse the current status quo is through a military struggle.     
 
Our discussion below will show that ethno-nationalism is the basis for most of 
the currently labelled Wenbedes organisations. To understand the paradox of 
terrorism in Ethiopia, we will first discuss the profile of each Wenbedes 
organisation based on the region they claim to represent. According to article 47 
of the FDRE Constitution, there are nine States with their own regional powers 
and administrative governments.316 The regions of interest to us in regard to 
terrorism are the States of Oromia, Amhara, and the Somali regional State of 
Ethiopia. As can be seen from tables 2.3 and 2.5, most of the terrorism charges 
were brought against organisations or individuals from these regions. Our 
discussion relating to these organisations and the analysis of the terrorism cases 
against them will help us identify the problem of nationalist terrorism in 
Ethiopia.  
 
1.1.1.3.Oromia Region 
 
Our discussion will start with the Wenbedes organisations that are predominately 
active in the Oromia region. The Oromo tribe is the largest ethnic group in 
Ethiopia both in terms of population size and the geographical location they 
occupy. According to a recent census, this tribe alone constitutes 37% of the 
overall Ethiopian population of 84 million.317 The Oromo tribe predominately 
lives in the Western, Eastern and South Western part of Ethiopia.   
 
There have been conflicting historical accounts concerning both the origins of 
the Oromo tribe and the true annexation of the area occupied by them into 
Ethiopia.318 Leaving the issue of their origin to historians, there has been rising 
grievances amongst some members of the Oromo tribes that, despite constituting 
the majority of the population, they have never been treated fairly within the 
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Ethiopian political and economic system.319 This has led to the formation of two 
sections within the same tribe: "those who have totally rejected Ethiopian 
identity and those who have not rejected Ethiopian identity…the former are 
struggling for the formation of an independent state of Oromia, while the latter 
seek self-determination for Oromia within Ethiopia."320  
 
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and little-known organisations like the 
Front for the Independence of Oromia (FIO) and the Islamic Front for Liberation 
of Oromia (IFLO), have become flagship organisations for ‘those who have 
totally rejected Ethiopian identity'. The common goal for these organisations is 
to break the Oromia region from Ethiopia.  The OLF, for instance, claims 
that:321  
 
The root cause of political problems in Ethiopia is national oppression by the 
Ethiopian empire state and refusal by the state to respect the rights of oppressed 
peoples to self-determination. The current Ethiopian regime has recognized in 
its constitution the right of self-determination with serious limitations imposed 
on the exercise of the right. The aspiration of the people to regain the 
fundamental freedom, which was snatched from them by brutal conquest, is 
supported by the principle enshrined in the UN Charter and related 
international instruments. 
 
The OLF was part of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia that overthrew 
former dictator Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991. However, in 1992, the OLF fell 
out with the current ruling party, EPRDF, and "was ordered to leave when its 
leaders withdrew from participation in the 1992 elections".322  Thus, some claim 
that the OLF was forced out and it has "spearheaded the construction of Oromo 
                                                 
319      Keller, E. J. (1995). The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo and its Implication for Politics in 
Ethiopia. 33(4) The Journal of Modern African Studies 621-34  
320      Hassen, M. (1996). The Development of Oromo Nationalism. In Baxter, P.T.W. et al 
(editors). Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries. (USA, the Red 
Sea Press, Inc), p.71 
321      See OLF Major Policies at http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/OLFPolicies.htm 
322      Joireman, S. F. (1997) Opposition Politics and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: We Will Go Down 
Together. 35 (3) The Journal of Modern African Studies 387   
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nationalism and, as a liberation front, fought different Ethiopian regimes."323 For 
the OLF and its sympathisers, any struggle waged against ‘the Ethiopian empire 
state' is not a terrorist act, but rather justified under international law, including 
Article 3 of the Algiers Convention. The fact that many of the prominent leaders 
of the OLF have received political asylum in the West324could also arguably be 
interpreted as a tacit approval of OLF causes by the West.325 
 
The Ethiopian government blame the OLF for several attacks that targeted 
civilians, foreigners, and private and government instillations. For instance, in 
2002, the OLF was blamed for the bomb attacks against the Tigray Hotel in the 
Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. There were at least five killings and thirty-eight 
injuries.  However, the OLF denied responsibility and released a statement 
declaring that:326 
 
The Executive Council of the Oromo Liberation Front [OLF] clearly stated its 
policy on terrorism, condemning any and all acts of terror against peaceful 
civilians. In the statement, we warned the international community and all 
peoples in Ethiopia that the regime in Addis Ababa was desperately trying to 
jump on the anti-terrorism bandwagon to use it as a political ticket to stay in 
power, to deceive the international community and to blackmail opposition 
forces that are struggling for legitimate causes ... 
 
In another instance, the government blamed the OLF for a bomb blast in 
Bishoftu, Oromia in May 2004. 327 The bomb killed one and wounded three 
students. But the OLF did not assume responsibility. There are also other 
                                                 
323      Adigna, F. (2010). Making Use of Kin Beyond the International Border. In Feyissa, D. and 
Höhne, M. V. (editors). Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa. (UK, 
James Currey) , p. 52  
324      For instance, former Ethiopian Army Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu,  Taha Tuko, and 
Amin Jundi live in the US while other leaders live in Germany.    
325      In a secret meeting with a former US Ambassador,  the Head of the Ethiopian National 
Intelligence and Security Services  (NISS) complained about ‘the visit to European Capitals and 
Washington of ONLF senior leaders and said they met with staffers in the U.S. Vice President's 
office'. For details of the meeting, see Guardian (2010). US Embassy Cables: Ethiopian 
Intelligence Chief Gives Rare Interview, 8 December  
326      BBC Monitoring (2002). Ethiopia: Oromo Rebel Group Condemns Addis Ababa Hotel 
Bombing, 18 September  
327        Rubin, B. M. and Rubin, J.C. (2008).  Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. (New York, 
M.E. Sharpe), p. 170  
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instances of claims and counter-claims by both the Ethiopian government and 
the OLF.328 The OLF seems to take responsibility only where the attack is on a 
government installation or military target.329 Nonetheless, as far as the Ethiopian 
government is concerned, the OLF is a terrorist organisation and as a result, it 
was one of the proscribed organisations as of June 2011.330 Article 25 of the 
EATP states that: 
 
The House of Peoples' Representatives shall have the power, upon submission 
by the government, to proscribe and de-proscribe an organization as a terrorist 
organization. 2/ Any organization shall be proscribed as a terrorist organization 
if it directly or indirectly: a) commits acts of terrorism; b) prepares to commit 
acts of terrorism; c) supports or encourages terrorism; or d) is otherwise 
involved in terrorism. 
 
 
However, Proscribing ‘terrorist' organisations, such as the OLF, is symbolic as it 
was a banned organisation since 1991. The fact that the government decided to 
proscribe the OLF in 2011 does not change its status. As indicated in tables 2.3 
and 2.5, joining the OLF has been a crime since 1991. Article 25(2) of the EATP 
is the legal tool to proscribe a terrorist organisation in Ethiopia. This article is 
similar to section 3(5) of TA 2000 in terms of actus reus required to proscribe an 
organisation. 331  But Article 25 (2) does not have the "subjective tests" 332 
stipulated under Section 3 (4) of the TA 2000, which states that "the Secretary of 
State may exercise his power under subsection (3)(a) in respect of an 
organisation only if he believes that it is concerned in terrorism". 
                                                 
328      For instance, Public Prosecutor v kemal Sheh Muhhamed (51539/2009). In this case, the 
Ethiopian government blamed the OLF for several bomb explosions on Diredawa-Djibouti train 
line. But the OLF and the defendant denied responsibility for the attacks.     
329      IRIN Africa (2002). ETHIOPIA: OLF Claims Responsibility for Bomb Blast, 26 June; for 
details on the explosion of bombs on Ethio-Djibouti Railway, see Public Prosecutor v Ayub 
Ahmed  et al (4281 /2002) 
330      The five organisations proscribed in June 2011 are: Al-Qaeda; Al-shaba; OLF; ONLF and 
Ginbot 7. This chapter will discuss in detail the last three organisations on the list.  
331        For detail discussions on proscription of terrorism organisations in the UK, see Alexander, 
Y and Renner, E. H. (2003).  UK's Legal Responses to Terrorism (London, Cavendish Publishing 
Limited), p. 90 and seq.; see also Walker, C. (2011), supra  note, pp. 342 and seq.; see also 
Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech, supra note 192, p. 1407 and seq.    
332      See Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech, supra note 192, p. 1410; see also Walker, C. (2011), 
supra note 224, pp. 341 and seq.  
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Another difference between the EATP and TA 2000 relates to the organ that has 
the power to proscribe a terrorist organisation. It might be argued that 
proscribing an organisation through an elected parliament instead of a branch of 
a government, as it is the case in the UK which "applies a steadfastly executive 
approach"333, will ensure that political organisation with nonviolent agenda will 
not be targeted. However, this argument works only if there is a real 
representation of all parties with varying views in parliament. Moreover, Unlike 
TA 2000 334  , the EATP does not provide any procedure for appeal against 
proscription. In the UK, the Secretary of the State is "not required to satisfy a 
court that an organisation is concerned in terrorism".335   However, "a proscribed 
organisation may subsequently seek to discharge the burden of persuading The 
Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC) that her decision was 
flawed on public law grounds".336  On the other hand, the construction of Article 
25(1) of the EATP suggests that the government has absolute discretion to 
‘proscribe or de-proscribe' an organisation without any possibility for appeal. 
  
As could be seen from tables 2.3 and 2.5, the majority of terrorism cases in 
Ethiopia were brought against suspected members of the OLF.  The allegation of 
inciting civil war is the most common charge followed by the allegation of 
membership to a terrorist organisation and providing material support to terrorist 
organisations. Analysis of some of these terrorism cases shows that the targets of 
the attacks or attempted attacks were high ranking government officials337 and 
                                                 
333      For further details, see Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 349 
334        For further details, see Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, pp. 348-352  
335      Anderson, D (2012). The Terrorism Acts in 2011: Report of the Independent Reviewer on 
the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 And Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, para. 4.22  
336      Ibid  
337      Public Prosecutor v Murad Hashim Omar (61656/2008); Public Prosecutor v Hailu Tesima 
Daba et al (36268/2007); Public Prosecutor v Chane Yalew Belihu Tula et al (59989/2008) 
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other personnel (soldiers or police officers);338 government instillations;339 and 
civilians.340 However, most of the court cases do not show the intended targets.  
 
Moreover, some cases were legally deficient in many ways. The first problem 
relates to insufficient evidence adduced against the defendants during the trial.  
In one case the public prosecutor presented twenty-six witnesses against 
defendants who were charged with rising civil war.341 However, the testimony 
of the witnesses can be argued to be likely to be unreliable given that most of 
them were in police custody during the commission of the alleged crime for 
which the defendants are charged, with some witnesses even alleging that they 
were beaten by the police to coerce their testimony against the defendants.  
 
In some cases, the public prosecutor had two witnesses, unlike the above case, 
against alleged members of OLF.342 The defendants were charged with violating 
Article 240(3) (membership in an organisation that participates in armed 
rebellion) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code. One of the prosecution witnesses 
failed to appear before the court during the trial. According to Article 144(1) of 
the Ethiopian Procedure Code, the "deposition of a witness taken at a 
preliminary inquiry may be read and put in evidence  before a High Court where 
the witness is dead or insane, not be able to attend the trial or is absent from the 
empire". However, the court admitted the deposition and convicted the 
defendant, despite the fact that the police did not provide as a reason for the 
absence of the witness one of the permissible reasons stated in the above article. 
In another case, a witness testimony given to the police was read to the judge 
during the trial.343 The court admitted the evidence without questioning why the 
police failed to call the witness in person during the trial. These practices 
                                                 
338     Public Prosecutor v.  Bira Mega, et al (60086/2008); Public Prosecutor v Tsegaye Korcho 
(27720/2007); Public Prosecutor v Beyan Ahmed Esmael, supra note 16; Public Prosecutor v 
Abdisa Afa Gari (50798/2008) 
339      Public Prosecutor v kemal Sheh Muhhamed, supra note 328 
340      Public Prosecutor v Ahmed Nur Yosuf Abdilahi (8191/2003); Public Prosecutor v abuya 
ekuber Abong et al (37041/2004); Public Prosecutor v Dechasa Abate Lema (1025/2000); Public 
Prosecutor v Rabi Hussien et al (238/1998) 
341      Public Prosecutor v Rabi Hussen et al (238/1998) 
342      Public prosecutor v Elias Gibril Boru and Mohamed shawal Amhmed (40783/2008) 
343      Public Prosecutor v Abdela Efa, supra note  
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contradict article 20(4) of the FDRE constitution, which guarantees the rights of 
persons accused to "examine witnesses testifying against them".   
 
The court in most of these cases accepted the police designations to the effect 
that the suspects were members of the OLF at face value. Even article 240(3) of 
the Ethiopian Criminal Code, which deals with membership of organisations that 
support armed rebellion, is unhelpful on this point in light of the fact that it does 
not set the standard required to prove membership. Unless the act is one of ‘a 
lone wolf',344 the failure by the prosecution to prove membership to a specific 
terrorist organisation will have the effect of treating the act as criminal rather 
than terrorist. However, the Ethiopian courts did not place much emphasis on the 
allegation of membership.      
In another case, the court challenged the prosecution, stating that they did not 
produce sufficient evidence to support their allegation of the suspect's 
membership in OLF.345 However, even in that case, the court did not elaborate 
the standard required to prove membership in a terrorist organisation. As will be 
discussed in chapter three with regard to the UK;  
 
...the Crown must lead evidence that satisfies the magistrate or jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt either that the defendant is a member of the proscribed 
organisation or that he professes - in the sense of claiming to other people and in 
a manner that is capable of belief - that he belongs to the organisation346 
The Ethiopian courts were also apathetic to allegations of torture and cruel 
treatment while individuals were in police custody. Defendants alleged that they 
were beaten up, forced to sign pre-prepared confession documents, and held 
incommunicado.347 Though this research does not have the evidence to support 
                                                 
344      For details on ‘alone wolf' terrorism, see   Spaaij, R.  Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: 
Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention. (Melbourne, Springer); see also   Michael, G. 
(2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (USA, Vanderbilt University 
Press)  
345      Public Prosecutor v Debela Waqjira Gemelal  and Sheferaw Hinsermu Yigezu (33101/2007)  
346      Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions  [2004] UKHL 43, para 65 
347      Public Prosecutor v Ahmed kemal Abdela  (41449/2006); Public Prosecutor v Abdela Efa 
supra note;  Public Prosecutor v Abas Hussein and kasim Mohammed (6000/2008); Public 
Prosecutor v Dechasa Abate Lema, supra note 340; Public Prosecutor v Rabi Hussien, supra note 
340 
66 
 
the defendants' position, it was unfortunate of the courts not to scrutinise their 
complaints.     
 
Furthermore, in another particular case, the court summoned more than a dozen 
witnesses against alleged members of OLF.348 But, the judgement was short in 
its reasoning, despite the fact that it was one of the most highly publicised 
terrorism cases against alleged OLF members both in terms of the number of 
arrests (62) and the alleged terrorist acts (various explosions around the capital 
Addis Ababa, and other cities such as Harar and Dire Dawa).  As a reader, the 
absence of detail reasoning begs the question how courts reach their conclusions 
on membership in each case.  
 
Another observation to mention arising out of the terrorism cases against alleged 
members of OLF is the length of detention they were held between their first 
arrest and the charge. 349  We will discuss in chapter 5 if the EATP, which 
provides 4 months pre-charge detention, could be construed positively for 
setting a maximum period.  
 
Another organisation claiming to represent the Oromia tribe is the Front for the 
Independence of Oromia (FIO). However, little is known about this organisation 
and, as indicated in table 2.3, there is only one documented court case brought 
against seven alleged members of the FIO, with the pertinent charges including 
inciting civil war, storing terrorist materials, preparation, and membership to a 
proscribed organisation.350 The court convicted six out of the seven suspects in 
this case. What is interesting about this court case is the court in this case 
basically based its decision on testimony of witnesses who alleged that the 
suspects were members the FIO. But, and rather absurdly, the FIO was not a 
proscribed organisation at the time the case was brought against the suspects. 
Incidentally, there was no legal basis for the proscription of an organisation 
when the case was brought up in 2008. Even with the coming into effect of the 
EATP in 2009, the FIO still remained unproscribed. Apart from this case, there 
                                                 
348     See Public Prosecutor v Rabi Hussien, et al, supra note 340; see also  Public Prosecutor v 
Murad Hashim Omar, supra note 337 
349      See chapter five for further discussion  
350      Public Prosecutor v Rabyie Mehammed Hassen, supra note 16 
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is no documented attack that has been credited to this organisation. Therefore, 
the status of the FIO remains controversial.    
 
A third organisation that espouses the Oromo cause is the Islamic Front for 
Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). Founded in 1985, the IFLO is considered an 
offshoot of the OLF.351 Similar to OLF, the IFLO had joined the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia that toppled Mengistu Hailemariam, but later pulled out 
from the 1992 Ethiopian general election due the ‘arrest of candidates and many 
kinds of irregularities in the preparation of the election'.352 Thus, the goal of this 
organisation was gradually transformed from a peaceful movement into an 
armed rebellion.  
 
However, as indicated in table 2.3 and table 2.5, there is only one documented 
case against the IFLO that alleges acts of terrorism.353 The Public prosecutor 
accused two alleged members of the IFLO of inciting an armed uprising and 
civil war, 354 violation of the right of freedom of movement,355 and aggravated 
robbery.356 One of the alleged members of the IFLO was condemned to spend 
the rest of his life behind bars and while the other was sentenced to death. Yet, 
this case shows us that there were no fatalities, no attacks against civilians, 
government or private institutions. At the same time, the IFLO was not and is 
still not a proscribed organisation. For this reason, it is not clear why the case 
was initially brought as one of terrorism cases.    
 
Despite the insistence on the part of the Ethiopian government that it only 
prosecutes terrorists, some accused of the Ethiopian government bringing 
politically motivated charges. Human rights organisations and opposition parties 
                                                 
351      Haile, B. (2011). Profile: Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), 6 February    
Dehai Newspaper   
352      Shongolo, A. A (2012). The Impact of War on Ethnic and Religious Identification in 
Southern Ethiopia in the Early 1990s. in Schlee, G. and  Shongolo, A. A. Islam and Ethnicity in 
Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia. (UK, James Currey), p. 160  
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mentioned the case of Tesfahun Chemda and other co-defendants 357  . The 
government charged 15 defendants with an attempted coup, armed robberies, 
funding the OLF, and an attempt to split the Oromia from Ethiopia.  The 
defendants in this case include well-known Oromo businessmen and politicians 
such Bekele Jirata, General Secretary of the Oromo Federal Democratic 
Movement, which participated in one of the main opposition alliances in the 
2010 Ethiopian  general election. He shortly fled the country after he was 
initially released on bail and was given 12 years jail term in absentia.      
 
Moreover, despite claims by the organisations discussed above that they are 
committed to the liberation of the Oromo from Ethiopian ‘colonialism', recent 
developments suggest a shift in political direction on the part of the OLF.  In 
2012, the OLF dropped its core demand of secessionism and, instead, announced 
that "...the new OLF political programme will accept the new federal democratic 
republic of Ethiopia and will work for the betterment of all of its citizens, 
neighbouring countries and international communities."358 However, this move 
does not renounce an armed struggle against the Ethiopian government.    
 
1.1.1.4.Amhara Region  
The Amhara tribe is the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. A recent census 
indicates that this ethnic group comprises approximately 20 % of the 
population. 359  Unlike the Oromo, the Amhara ethnic group had been the 
dominant political and economic force throughout the history of Ethiopia.360 
This dominance ended with the coming into power of the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (composed of an alliance of rebels 
led by the late prime minster Meles Zenawi) in 1991.361 There are several parties 
                                                 
357 Public Prosecutor v Tesfahun Chemeda Gurmesa et al (public prosecutor file no 5-
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358      Gellaw, A. (2012). Ethiopia: OLF Drops Secession, Embraces Ethiopian unity, ESAT  
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(Chicago, University of Chicago Press), pp. 72 and seq.  
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based in the Amhara region but our discussion in this thesis will be limited to 
those frequently accused of committing terrorist acts.    
 
Our discussion will begin with Kingit (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) and 
Ginbot 7.  Kingit was formed by the coalition of the four main political parties in 
2005.362 During the 2005 general election, Kingit won 109 out of the 527 seats 
available in the House of People's Representative. 363  Moreover, it also won 
many seats in the administrative district of Addis Ababa and many seats in the 
regional assemblies. However, Kingit was split into two groups: those who 
boycotted parliamentary and regional seats due to election irregularities and 
those who were willing to take their seats despite their complaints. The first 
group, led by Dr. Birhanu Nega, who was later to be sentenced to death in 
absentia,364 called upon their supporters to take to the streets. Many people lost 
their lives during demonstrations that took place in different parts of the country 
between the 8th of June and 2nd of October, 2005 and the government squarely 
blamed the opposition for the ensuing violence that claimed innocent lives and 
destroyed properties. 
 
This was followed by a wave of arrests of ‘up to 30,000 political prisoners'.365 
The public prosecutor filled terrorism charges against leaders of the opposition 
who denounced the election results, with most of them condemned to spending 
the rest of their life in prison. 366  Similar cases were brought against other 
people.367  
 
The charges against the senior opposition leaders stated that the individuals 
incited people to overthrow the government and the constitutional order using 
                                                 
362       Ethiopian Democratic League, All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), Medhin Party and 
Rainbow Ethiopia. 
363       See Ethiopian National Election Board (2005). Final Result of the 2005 elections, 5 
September. See also  Carter Centre ( 2009). Observing the 2005 Ethiopian National Elections. 
Carter Centre Final Report (Atlanta, the Carter Centre); EUROPEAN Union (2005). Ethiopian  
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Prosecutor v Yasin Shifa and Mesfin Gebere, supra note 15;  Public Prosecutor v Birhanu Degu, 
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force by organising a series of ‘protests'368 that took place between the 8 June 
and 2 October 2005. They called for civil disobedience, sit-ins, general strikes, 
hunger strikes, and for boycotting of government affiliated institutions. 369 
Moreover, the charge sheets stated that the leaders made speeches and 
distributed materials through newspapers that encouraged people to follow the 
examples of the Orange Revolution (Ukraine, 2004). In granting harsh sentences 
against the defendants, the Ethiopian High Court found that due to their reckless 
disregard for the constitutional order and security of the country, they caused the 
loss of lives and destruction of properties. However, due to a concerted effort by 
a committee of wise men,370 most senior leaders of the opposition were pardoned 
by the Ethiopian government.371    
 
Some leaders, led by Birhanu Nega, used this opportunity to flee the country. 
They founded a political party called Ginbot 7 while in exile in the US. 372  
Ginbot 7 declares that their "struggle for freedom and democracy is born out of 
the ashes of the brutal repression that followed the May 15, 2005 election"373 
and their goal is "to create the conditions where power is obtained through the 
expressed will of the people in a peaceful, legal and democratic manner thereby 
making the current dictatorship the last in Ethiopia's history".374  
 
However, the government seemed to find evidence that implicate the 
involvement of these people in terrorist activities and it brought terrorist charges 
against many politicians, Birhanu Nega.375 The second terrorism case against the 
opposition leaders alleged, inter alia, that the defendants participated in setting 
up terrorist organisations (Ginbot 7); recruited members and raised financial aid 
                                                 
368      See the above cases for details  
369      Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul, supra note 61 
370      Composed of well-known figures such as Ephraim Isaac,  an Ethiopian origin who is the 
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for terrorist groups; prepared terrorist plans to assassinate government officials 
and disrupt the constitutional order.376  
 
However, this case was marred by controversy from the moment the suspects 
were arrested. At first, the government announced on national TV that the 
suspects were the main instigators of a failed coup d'etat against the Ethiopian 
government. But, the government later retracted the claim by stating that "[t]he 
intention of these people was not to conduct coup d'etats. We're not implicating 
them (in) coup d' etats. We know this desperado group was intending to 
assassinate people and demolish public utilities and that was intended to attack, 
the attack was intended on the government."377 
 
Most of the alleged members and supporters of Ginbot 7 received jail terms 
ranging from 15 years to life while five defendants including the founder of 
Ginbot 7 were sentenced to death in absentia.378  
 
Finally, in June 2011, the government announced that Ginbot 7 is a proscribed 
terrorist organisation. As indicated from the analysis above, this announcement 
lacks substantive effect given that Ginbot 7 was already in terrorist activities by 
the government before the announcement.      
 
Another alleged terrorist organisation in the Amhara region is the Ethiopian 
People's Patriotic Front (EPPF). Set up in 1988, the primary objective of the 
EPPF is "...to bring an end to the TPLF tyranny and oppression through armed 
struggle and bring about unity, justice, democracy, and equality to the Ethiopian 
people."379 Although the EPPF advocates principles such as equality, unity and 
democracy, the means by which it seeks to achieve those ends appears far from 
analogous to those same principles. Indeed, the group has engaged several times 
in open military confrontation with the Ethiopian government.380 Moreover, the 
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Ethiopian government has alleged that this organisation is supported and funded 
by its arch-enemy381 the Eritrean government.382 
 
As indicated in table 2.3 and table 2.5, there were five terrorism cases brought 
against alleged members or supporters of the EPPF. In one case a defendant was 
charged with seeking membership to the EPPF and distributing 600 pamphlets 
with pro-terrorism agenda383 and in another case two defendants were charged 
with downloading terrorist messages from an EPPF website.384   
 
However, the charges in both cases were dismissed by the Ethiopian Federal 
High court on the basis of a lack of adequate evidence to support the case 
against the defendants. The reasoning of the Court in the second case is 
particularly relevant here. The defendants did not deny the allegation that they 
downloaded materials related to the EPPF. However, they argued that the 
materials were publically available for anyone to download. The court accepted 
their argument stating that there was no law in Ethiopia that criminalises 
downloading materials that are publically available. Most importantly, the court 
held that the materials they downloaded contained nothing that incites terrorism. 
    
However in the other cases, the defendants were found guilty of being a member 
of the EPPF; 385  soliciting support for EPPF; 386  and for the possession of 
communication materials intended to be transferred to EPPF.387 Apart from the 
cases of Assemu Mihret and Getachew Niguse, where their 25 years ‘rigorous 
imprisonment'388 was based on their confession, the evidence presented by the 
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387      Public Prosecutor v Mubarek Admasu (56118/2008) 
388      Article 108: Rigorous imprisonment is a sentence applicable only to crimes of a very grave 
nature committed by criminals who are particularly dangerous to society. Besides providing for 
the punishment and for the rehabilitation of the criminal, this sentence is intended also to provide 
for a strict confinement of the criminal and for special protection to society. Without prejudice to 
conditional release, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment is normally for a period of one to 
twenty-five years but where it is expressly so laid down by law it may be for life.  
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public prosecutor in all other cases was stained with allegations of torture and 
other inhumane treatment by the police.         
 
To conclude, unlike the organisation discussed in relation to the Oromia region, 
the organisations that are from the Amhara region are not motivated by 
secessionism. Their armed struggled is controversially centred on political and 
human rights issues rather than secessionism. 
   
1.1.1.5.Somali Region of Ethiopia  
 
Bordering the lawless country of Somalia, the Somali region, with a population 
size of around 5% of the population 389 is one of the most volatile areas in 
Ethiopia.  There has been several cross border wars between Ethiopia and the 
neighbouring country of Somalia.390 As discussed in the previous sections, the 
aim of the two recent wars was to "dislodge a radical Islamic government"391 
that posed a threat both to the interests of the US and Ethiopia. Moreover, the 
question of the identity of the Somalis who live in Ogaden, a South-eastern area 
of the Somali regional State of Ethiopia, has been a controversial matter since 
the era of colonialism.392 Ethiopia asserted sovereignty over Ogaden in 1948 
through a series of agreements with Italy and the U.K. 393  Since then, 
secessionisms, tribal wars over pastoral lands and border conflicts with Somalia 
have made this region one of the most dangerous places to live in Ethiopia.394 
 
Separatist conflicts, led by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), have 
posed grave concern for Ethiopia since the group's establishment in 1984. As 
separatists, the ONLF claims that:395  
                                                 
389      Source: 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia 
390      1960-1964; 1977-1978; 1988-2000; and 2006-2009  
391      Lyman, P.L., supra note 198  
392      Negash, S. (2008).  Colonial Legacy, State Intervention and Secessionism: Paradoxical 
National Identities of the Ogaden and the Ishaq. In Zewde, B. (editor). Society, State, and Identity 
in African History. (Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies), pp. 275 and seq.  
393      Ibid  
394      Ibid  
395      ONLF. Political objectives, at http://onlf.org/?page_id=14 
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... their movement is to obtain the right of self-determination, rather than a 
struggle aimed at realizing the identity of a nationality. This is because Ogaden 
has never been historically or politically part of Ethiopia ...It is moreover based 
on the charter of the United Nations and its resolutions, which call for the 
elimination of colonialism and on the declaration of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1960; and on the sixth principle supplemented to the United 
Nations Charter regarding the elimination of colonialism. 
 
The ONLF claims that it only targets government institutions and soldiers,396 
though it has also been implicated in some atrocities that target ordinary civilians 
and foreigners. The recent attack, killing nine Chinese miners and sixty-five 
Ethiopian employees of a Chinese-owned oil exploration company in the Ogaden 
was later claimed by ONLF as an act of their organisation.397 However, in many 
other attacks in the region that targeted civilians, the ONLF did not claim 
responsibility. For example, in May 2007, 16 civilians were killed in a hand 
grenade attack in the Somali region. 398 But, the ONLF denied responsibility 
stating that ‘they do not target civilians'.  
 
Despite the claim by the Ethiopian government that a "2007 offensive" by the 
Ethiopian military has "effectively ended the ONLF's military capability" and 
"the ONLF bandit group is on the run,"399 it decided to proscribe the ONLF in 
2011, along with Ginbot 7 and the OLF. However, documented terrorist cases 
against ONLF sympathisers, members, or supporters are very rare. This research 
has only managed to get hold of one case.400 In this case, the defendant was 
charged with crimes of armed uprising against the State in violation of articles 
238(2)401 and 241402 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code by seeking membership to 
                                                 
396      Shabelle Media Network (2008). Ethiopia: Ogadeni Media Claims Rebels Have Killed At 
Least 33 Ethiopian Soldiers Since Late June, 10 July; see also Sudan Tribune (2006). Ogaden 
Rebels Destroy Ethiopian Military Convoy En route to Somalia, 24 December; see also Voice of 
America (2009). Ogaden Rebels Say 626 Ethiopian Troops Killed in Clashes, 18 December  
397      China Daily (2007). 9 Chinese workers killed in Ethiopia, 24 April  
398      Associated Press (2007). 16 killed in Attacks in Eastern Ethiopia, 28 May  
399      See Voice of America (2009), supra note 396 
400      Public Prosecutor v Abdi Shafi (60184/2008) 
401      Article 238 deals with Crimes Against the Constitution or the State 
402      Article 241 deals with Attack on the Political or Territorial Integrity of the State 
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ONLF; taking military training in Eritrea; conspiring to overthrow the 
government; and organising rebellion against the constitutional order.  
 
However, the defendant denied the charges and alleged that he was compelled to 
confess during an interrogation by the police. He called in five witnesses for his 
defence. Two of the witnesses, who were detained with him at the time for 
crimes unrelated to the case, testified that the interrogating officers kept the 
defendant naked during this procedure as well as inflicting acts of torture. They 
also said the defendant was unable to bear the interrogation. The other three 
witnesses testified that the defendant was a peaceful person with no connection 
to any terrorist organisations. However, the court rejected the testimonies and 
instead chose to validate the statements made in the police interrogation. Yet, 
there is no substantive reasoning within the courts report of the case that justifies 
or explains why the court concluded that the defence witness's testimonies were 
‘unreliable'. 
 
To conclude, in a similar fashion to the OLF, the ONLF appeared to soften its 
steadfast demand for secessionism. In 2010, a breakaway faction of the ONLF 
signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government.403 This was followed 
by the release of several members of the ONLF from jail.404 This development, 
however, seemed to be contradicted by the Ethiopian government's decision to 
proscribe the ONLF in 2011.  Then in 2012, the ONLF announced that it was 
holding negotiations with the Ethiopian government over reviving peace talks 
aimed at ending the old armed rebellion.405  
 
Al-ittihad Al-Islamia (AlAl) is another organisation that aims at forming an 
Islamic caliphate State in the horn of Africa by breaking away the Somali region 
of Ethiopia and unifying it with Somalia. 406  However, AlAl is not strictly 
                                                 
403      AFP (2010). Ethiopia Signs Peace Agreement with Rebel Faction, 12 October, Addis Ababa   
404      M. A. Roble, (2010). Ethiopia Releases Rebel Prisoners, 18 october, AfricaNews reporter in 
Nairobi, Kenya 
405      ONLF Press Release (2012). Peace talks between Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the 
Ethiopian Government Held in Kenya,  8 September  
406      Schmid , A. P. (2011). Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and concepts Relating to 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. in Schmid , A. P. (editor). The Routledge Handbook of 
Terrorism Research (Oxon, Routledge),  p. 600  
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speaking an organisation based in Ethiopia. It is an organisation based in Somalia 
that engaged in cross-border conflicts with Ethiopia and which has also been 
implicated in some attacks inside Ethiopia. 407 Moreover, unlike all the other 
organisations discussed above, AlAl harbours an extremist Islamist ideology and 
is thought to have connections with Al-Qaeda and Al-Shaba.408 This is also the 
only organisation with an ‘Ethiopian link' to be both placed on the US terrorist 
watch list409 and be proscribed under TA 2000.410  
 
Because of the terrorist nature of AlAl is a well-documented fact, 411  our 
discussion below will focus on the terrorism cases against alleged members of 
AlAl. 
 
The first complex terrorism case that the Ethiopian judiciary had to face was the 
case of Muhamed Mahemmed Farah. 412  In 1998, 17 individuals comprising 
alleged members of AlAl, Ethiopians and non-Ethiopians, were arrested for an 
attempted assassination on the former transport and communications minister of 
Ethiopia, Dr. Abdulmejid Hussien. Together with this, the defendants were also 
charged with causing the deaths of several people connected with explosions in 
several hotels in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa (Ghion Hotel, Wabi-Shebelle 
hotel, Dire-Dawa Ras hotel). The prosecution used several provisions of the old 
Ethiopian penal code that dealt with homicide, 413inciting armed rebellion, 414 
participating in armed rebellion,415 causing  injury to persons and properties.416 
However, the court was of the opinion that there was no need to bring various 
charges against the defendants.  It ordered the prosecution to include all the 
                                                 
407      See below a discussion on the case of Public prosecutor v Muhamed Mahemmed Farah et al 
(123/1998)  
408      See UN Security Council (2011). Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions1267 
(1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities 
(QE.A.2.01. AL-ITIHAAD AL-ISLAMIYA / AIAI)), 7 April  
409       United States Department of State (2006). Foreign Terrorist Organisations: Country 
Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 28 April  
410      Horne, A and Douse, D. (2013). The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed Organisations, 
(SN/HA/00815), 7 January  
411      For details, see  UN Security Council (2011), supra note 408  
412      Public Prosecutor v Muhamed Mahemmed Farah , supra note 407 
413      Article 522 of the old Ethiopian penal code  
414      Article 252 of the Old Ethiopian penal code  
415      Article 32 of the Old Ethiopian penal code  
416      Article 63 of the Old Ethiopian penal code  
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charges under the same article that is violation of article 252 of the old Ethiopian 
Penal Code. This article states that: 
(1) Whosoever raises, or attempts to raise:(a) a revolt, mutiny or armed rebellion 
against the Emperor, the State or the constitutional authorities; or (b) civil war, 
by arming citizens or inhabitants or by inciting them to take up arms against one 
another, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five years to life, or, in 
cases of exceptional gravity, with death. (2) Whosoever of his own free will takes 
part in such a movement is punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding 
fifteen years. 
As can be deduced from the above paragraph, there is nothing that relates this 
article to the suspected terrorist acts committed by the defendants. It could be 
argued that the above article may be appropriate against AlAl and its members 
considering fact that the purpose of this organisation is to separate Somali 
through armed revolt. However, the facts of the case and the applicable law 
appeared to be unrelated. The problem of the judiciary and the prosecution to 
find the appropriate applicable law against alleged terrorists was not confined to 
this case. This problem was evident in all cases discussed in this thesis. 
 
In all the cases discussed so far, it is evident that the Ethiopian public prosecutor 
has a tendency to rely on articles 240, 241, and 256(b) of the Ethiopian Criminal 
code and Article 252 of the old Ethiopian Penal code. However, these provisions 
do not deal with terrorism; they deal, rather, with crimes against engaging in 
armed uprising or civil war and attacks against the political integrity of the State, 
respectively. It is well documented that the justifying the use of force within the 
international community can only be done within a very limited ambit, still less 
when attempting to advance political ends.417  
 
This has been one of the stumbling blocks when attempting to obtain consensus 
on an international definition of terrorism. However, the point that needs to be 
made in respect of the Ethiopian cases discussed above is that the discussion of 
terrorism and terrorist organisations have been a confused subject due lack of a 
                                                 
417      Cassese, A. (1995), supra note 299 
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clear law on this area. Thus, there appears to be evidential disparity between the 
definition of a terrorist organisation in Ethiopia and the conduct of the group so 
labelled.  
        
5.5.Conclusion 
 
From the above discussion we can conclude that there are three sorts of terrorist 
organisation in Ethiopia: nationalists, Islamists and political parties that oppose 
the policy of the ruling party. Therefore, any study of the problem of terrorism 
has to be seen through these categorisations. However, this classification is 
challenged by some who would suggest that those with a separatist agenda are 
‘traditional internal enemies' 418  of the Ethiopian government due to their 
‘political and irregular military opposition'.419  
 
Moreover, the organisations discussed in this thesis are not the only 
organisations that are considered ‘terrorists' in Ethiopia. There are also others 
who assume responsibility for recent attacks against the Ethiopian government, 
civilians and foreign tourists. For instance, an organisation known as Afar 
Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) abducted five Britons and 
eight Ethiopians in March, 2007. However, "Ethiopia dismissed ARDUF's claim 
of responsibility for the action and put the blame on Eritrea." 420  Again, in 
January 2012, ARDUF assumed responsibility for the killing of European 
tourists in the Afar region of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government again 
dismissed their claims and blamed Eritrea for the attack stating that "[i]t is 
already clear that the attack was carried out with the direct involvement of the 
Eritrean Government". 421  However, the UN Security Council "...found no 
evidence of direct Eritrean involvement in the operation".422Apart from these 
two incidents, this research has found no evidence of other terrorism charges 
                                                 
418      See XX v Secretary of the State for the Home Department, supra note 197, para. 19  
419      Ibid, para 13  
420      FAST International (2007). Ethiopia: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation.  Switzerland: 
Country team; Ethiopia, March to April , 2007   
421      CBS News (2012). Ethiopia Terrorist Attack Leaves 5 Tourists Dead, 18 January 
422      UN Security Council (2012). Letter dated 11 July 2012 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia 
and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2012/545), p.5 
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being filed against ARDUF.  Though these two incidents could be qualified 
terrorist attacks, the Ethiopian government rather pointed the finger at Eritrea.  
 
Another fact that needs to be considered in this thesis is that Ethiopian 
demography is predominately composed of Christians (43%) followed by 
Muslims (33 %).423 However, religious extremism, apart from the case of AlAl 
whose threat to Ethiopia's security has been insignificant for some time,424 is not 
a concern for Ethiopia. Despite the existence of a few incidents of religiously 
motivated violence among both followers, "Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
generally respected each other's religious observances and tolerated 
intermarriage and conversion".425 Moreover, despite the recent reports of Al-
Qaeda linked arrests, 426 the terrorism cases discussed above do not show "a 
growing Islamist threat to the security of Ethiopia and its inhabitants".427 This 
research did not find evidence of religiously motivated terrorist attacks.428  
 
Finally, we have criticised the absence of a clear legal regime on terrorism as 
one of the problematic features of studying terrorism cases in Ethiopia. For this 
reason, the enactment of the EATP could be justified on this premis. The EATP, 
which was basically modelled on UK and US laws, might solve the legal lacuna. 
But as will be seen in the subsequent chapters, it is riddled with defects. The 
purpose of the next chapters is, therefore, to assess the experience of the US and 
the UK and finds some alternatives that could help amending the EATP.      
 
 
                                                 
423      Source: 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia 
424     Chazan, D. (2002). Who Are Al-Ittihad?, 30 November BBC   
425      US Department of State (2011). Ethiopia Executive Summary, at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192923.pdf  
426      Note that there were three reports of arrests of Al-Qaeda linked suspects (one in 2012 and 
two in 2013. However the details of these arrests have never been disclosed.  For the details of 
reports, see The Africa Report (2012). Ethiopia Arrests Suspected Al-Qaeda Militants, 6 
February; see also Sudan Tribune (2013). Ethiopia Arrests Four Al-Qaeda Allied Suspects, 16 
March 
427      See XX v Secretary of the State for the Home Department , supra note 197, para.19  
428      A further research on this area might be necessary in the future 
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Chapter three: Freedom of Expression and Anti-Terrorism Laws 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Freedom of expression, as an important right in any country, is the first meeting 
point between anti-terror laws and protected rights. The forms of expression are 
various and the implications are different. 429 Recognizing the right by passing a 
piece of legislation is one thing. Striking the balance between protected and non-
protected expressions, and legitimate national security interests is quite another. 
It is a conundrum the answer to which is in large part found beyond the 
constitution detail. It requires interpretation of different interests and the 
evaluating of different circumstances.  
 
Have the courts in the UK and US developed comprehensive guidelines that 
enable them to tackle any problems related to protected and non-protected 
expressions? Or do they leave the answer open-ended for a case-by-case analysis?  
 
Answering the substance of these two apparently differing questions will help in 
finding a proper balance between terrorism and freedom of expression. There are 
countries that follow in the footsteps of the West and change their legal positions 
depending on the prevailing ‘weather' in the latter. The focus of this chapter is, 
thus, a comparative analysis of the UK and US anti-terror regimes and one of the 
‘weather affected' countries, Ethiopia. This requires us to gain an insight into 
these countries' anti-terrorism laws and the domestic courts' balancing of the 
relevant principles at play. Moreover, we must also understand the approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights towards freedom of expression, for it is a 
major factor shaping the UK perspective.  
 
Chapter three is structured as follows. The first part deals with the constitutional 
arrangement of freedom of expression in the US, UK, and Ethiopia. This is 
followed by an analysis of the determining factors that compose the right to 
                                                 
429  Sottiaux, S. (2008). Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights: the ECHR and the US 
Constitution (Portland, OR , Hart Publishing),  p.67.  
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freedom of expression. These factors include the forms of the expression, the 
content of a speech, the medium of expression, and the identity and affiliation of 
a speaker, and the circumstances in which the speech is given. Moreover, the 
relevance of these factors will be evaluated in light of the scope of the incitement 
and/or encouragement of terrorism. This chapter expands upon the experience of 
the UK and US in the fight against terrorism by drawing a balance between 
expressions that have and those that have not obtained constitutional protection. 
Moving forwards, this chapter critically examines the difficulty of implementing 
some of those balancing principles in countries such as Ethiopia where 
democracy is in its infancy. 
3.2 Freedom of Speech and Constitutional Protection: UK, US, and Ethiopia  
 
The UK does not have a written constitution, and has only relatively recently 
adopted a written code of rights, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This does 
not mean to suggest that fundamental rights are less protected in the UK. Statues, 
common law, conventions, and EU laws filled the gap left by the absence of a 
written code of rights pre-1998. The European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) becomes instrumental in domestic cases as the result of the 1998 HRA. 
Even before the adoption of the above Act, UK citizens were given the green 
light to bring legal action before the ECtHR and the ECtHR had the opportunity 
to entertain individual complaints dating back to the Golder v United Kingdom 
case.430  
 
The construction of Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees right to freedom 
of expression, is not absolute. As one of the cornerstones of any democratic 
society,431 a restriction on freedom of expression under 10(2) of the ECHR could 
be justified if it is ‘prescribed by law', pursues legitimate aims, and is necessary 
in a democratic society.  In accordance with Handyside v UK, any "interferences 
entail a violation of Article 10 if they do not fall within one of the exceptions 
provided for in paragraph 2 (art. 10-2)".432 Therefore, Article 10 "is applicable 
                                                 
430      Golder v UK [1975] 1 EHRR 524 
431      Handyside v the UK, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24., para. 49  
432      ibid., para 43   
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not only to ‘information' or ‘ideas' that are favorably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population".433 
 
Though the ECtHR acknowledged that member states have a ‘margin of 
appreciation'434 in laying down restrictions in their domestic laws, it stressed that 
interferences ‘prescribed by law' must be ‘adequately accessible' and sufficiently 
clear. 435  However, "the level of precision required of domestic legislation - 
which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality - depends to a 
considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is 
designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed".436  
 
In respect of the second requirement of Article 10(2), i.e. pursuing legitimate 
aims, the ECtHR evaluates "whether the reasons given by the national authorities 
to justify the actual measures of ‘interference' they take are relevant and 
sufficient".437 Article 10(2) contains an array of legitimate aims that could be 
taken into account by the member states. These are interferences: 
 
 …in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR438 and the construction of Article 10(2) 
show that the fact that a certain restriction is ‘prescribed by law' and has a 
legitimate aim does not mean that national authorities are discharged of their 
obligation not to interfere with freedom of expression arbitrarily.  
                                                 
433      Ibid, para. 49  
434      Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990, Series A no. 178 
435      See Sunday Times v UK (No. 1) judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, para. 49; 
see also Herczegfalvy v Austria, 24 September 1992, Series A no. 244; see also   Hashman and 
Harrup v UK [GC], no. 25594/94, ECHR 1999-VIII 
436      Rekvényi v Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III), para. 34   
437      See for example, Handyside v  UK, supra note 431, para. 50  
438      Ibid, para. 47  
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Therefore, the third requirement under Article 10(2), i.e. ‘necessary in a 
democratic society', must be satisfied, which "implies the existence of a pressing 
social need". 439  This requirement is a limit on the ‘domestic margin of 
appreciation'; it gives the ECtHR a power of ‘supervision' over the "the aim of 
the measure challenged and its "necessity". It covers not only the basic 
legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent 
court.440     
 
In contrast, the construction of the First Amendment of the US Constitution is 
absolute. This Amendment reads as follow: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances 
 
However, while textually appearing as an absolute right, the First Amendment is 
not absolute by virtue of judicial amendment. The US Supreme Court adopted 
various means of limiting the apparently absolute right to freedom of expression 
under the first amendment.  
 
For example, in Patterson v Colorado,441 the US Supreme Court applied the ‘bad 
tendency test' by stating that the First Amendment was primarily occupied with 
preventing prior restraints, not subsequent punishment for ‘speeches that may be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare'. Accordingly, a speech is gauged "by the 
tendency of its effects. Speech tending to cause good effects enjoyed 
constitutional protection; but speech tending to cause bad effects - those that 
                                                 
439      Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, para. 52  
440      Handyside v the UK, supra note 431, para. 49  
441      Patterson v Colorado - 205 U.S. 454 (1907).; the same test was applied in Whitney v 
California 274 U.S. 357 (1927) and  Abrams v Unted states 250 U.S. 616 (1919) 
84 
 
threatened the order or morality of a community or the security of society - did 
not". 442   
  
However, in Schenck v United States,443 the Supreme Court devised another test 
and held that speech can be abridged under certain circumstances, such as war. 
This, in effect, upheld the 1917 Espionage Act. The court applied the ‘clear and 
present danger' test in this case, which became controversial for years to come.444 
According to this test, "the question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent".445 However, this test was later abandoned and replaced by other 
tests.  
 
The test that followed was defined by the ‘incitement to imminent lawless 
action'. 446  In a retreat from earlier tests, 447  which appeared to punish ‘mere 
advocacy of violence,' the US Supreme Court held that "...a statute which, by its 
own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on 
pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the 
described type of action...falls within the condemnation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments".448 The above test is composed of three parts: "1) the 
speaker subjectively intended incitement 2) in context, the words used were 
likely to produce imminent, lawless action and 3) the words used by the speaker 
objectively encouraged and urged incitement."449  
 
                                                 
442       Eastland, T. (2000). Freedom of Expression in the Supreme Court: The Defining Cases (US, 
Rowman & Littlefiled Publishers, INC), p. 1  
443      Schenck v United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
444      For further commentaries, see Cole, D. (1986) Agon at Agora: Creative Misreading in the 
First Amendment Tradition 95 The Yale Law Journal 857;   see also Strauss, D.A. (2003) 
Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution in Bollinger, L. C. and Stone, G. R. 
(Editors). Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press), pp.47-50; see also Barnum ,D. G. (2006). The Clear and Present Danger Test in Anglo-
American and European Law, 7 San Diego Int'l L.J  263. 
445      Schenck v United States, supra note 443, para.249 
446      Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
447      See Whitney v California , supra note 441 
448      Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446, para. 449  
449       Harr, J. S., et al (2011). Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System. 5th ed. (US, 
Cengage Learning) , p. 142  
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In another twist to the scope of the First Amendment, as will be discussed in 
further later in this chapter, the US Supreme Court in Holder v Humanitarian 
Law Project ‘appeared to retreat dramatically'450  from previous tests by holding 
that it is possible to restrict "speech on the basis of its content."451  Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project deviated from the incitement test of Brandenburg v 
Ohio by punishing purely political advocacy in relation to foreign terrorist 
groups. This has prompted some to argue that this case "...has potentially grave 
repercussions. Most immediately, nongovernmental organizations working to 
resolve conflict or to provide humanitarian assistance may well be unable to 
operate where designated ‘terrorist organizations' are involved".452  
 
Incidentally, these are not the only tests applied by the US Supreme Court in 
regard to the scope of the First Amendment. Further tests include the 
‘balancing' 453  and ‘Redeeming social value' 454  tests. As discussed above, 
however, these different tests have been modified over the years and in some 
instances have been by-passed altogether without due consideration.455  
 
In Ethiopia, however, interpretation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
FDRE Constitution is beyond the reach of the Ethiopia courts. As discussed in 
chapter two, instead the power to interpret constitutional rights is given to the 
House of Federation, the legislative branch of the Ethiopian government. That 
means Ethiopian courts are not the primary dispute-settling organs in areas 
related to constitutional matters.  Therefore, Ethiopian rights discourse is not 
fortunate enough to have the benefit of judicial scrutiny.  
 
                                                 
450      Cole, D.  (2012). The First Amendment's Borders: The Place of Holder v Humanitarian Law 
Project in First Amendment Doctrine. 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 147-177 
451      Holder v Humanitarian Law Project 130 S. Ct. 2705 - Supreme Court 2010, para. 22 
452      Cole, D.  (2012), The First Amendment's Borders, supra note 455, p. 149  
453     see Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781 (1989) (the Supreme court balanced the 
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was within its legal boundaries to regulate ‘the volume of amplified music at the bandshell so the 
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306 US 109 (1959) 
454      Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (primarily in obscenity cases) 
455       For further discussion, see Brennan, W. J.  The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn 
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 11  
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Article 29 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) 
provides protection to freedom of expression. This article adopts a similar format 
in its protection of that right as is seen in Article 10 ECHR by declaring that 
"everyone has the right to freedom of expression without interference."456 Unlike 
10 ECHR and the First Amendment, Article 29 of FDRE Constitution further 
acknowledges that the medium of expression can be "… in writing, in print, in 
the form of an art, or through any medium … of choice."457 This is a direct 
replica of Article 19 (1-2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).  
 
Reading the first five sub-articles of Article 29, the FDRE Constitution gives the 
impression that the right is absolute. However, sub-articles 6-7 provide for a 
situation where the right can be circumscribed.  
 
Similar to Article 10 but unlike the First Amendment, the FDRE constitution 
specifically declared that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute. 
However, there are fundamental differences in how the scope of the right is 
defined. Article 29(6) states that "the content or the effect of the point expressed" 
should not be the sole reason for imposing a limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression. It seems that this idea was adopted from the US Supreme Court's 
early court decisions and reflects an old argument in America of the "balancing 
test."458 The main issue in the US case of Barenblatt v United States was whether 
the US government can enact legislation that restricts the First Amendment if the 
interest of the government overrides a person's exercise of the right. The US 
Supreme Court affirmed the argument in the positive. Moreover, as discussed, 
the Supreme Court has also accepted the regulation of   ‘speech on the basis of its 
content.459 
 
Nevertheless, the FDRE constitution seems to suggest that the Ethiopian 
government is devoid of such power if it attempts to restrict speech based on its 
                                                 
456      Article 29(2) of the FDRE Constitution.  
457      Article 29(5) of the FDRE Constitution. 
458      Barenblatt v United States, supra note 453 
459      Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451, para. 22 
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"content or the views expressed."460 However, as will be seen461, the practice 
suggests otherwise.   
 
Though the idea under Article 29 (6) of the FDRE constitution is borrowed from 
early US Supreme Court decisions, 462  the construction of the above Article 
makes it apparently impossible to impose any limitation based on the content of 
the expressed views. Imposing general restrictions, as in the spirit of the First 
Amendment, is not the same as prohibiting the legislature from enacting a law 
that restricts an expression that has an adverse effect on constitutionally 
protected rights. The US balancing test - ‘content' based limitation - was devised 
by the courts as the First Amendment is constructed in general terms. However, 
the FDRE Constitution specifically adopted the same limitation.    
 
The second paragraph of Article 29(6) further proclaims that a limitation is only 
possible if the "expressed view injures human dignity; infringes honour and 
reputation; abuses the well-being of the youth;" or contains "propaganda for 
war." Some of these limitations are borrowed from the ICCPR, whereas the rest 
are novel to the FDRE constitution.  
 
A major difference between Article 29 of the FDRE constitution and Article 10 
of the ECHR is the absence of some of the three test criteria devised by the 
ECtHR, which complements the functioning of Article 10.463 The only criterion 
mentioned under Article 29(6) is limitation "through laws which are guided by 
the principle that freedom of expression and information cannot be limited on 
account of the content or effect of the point of view expressed". Moreover, the 
FDRE constitution failed to envisage the most obvious element of limiting the 
                                                 
460      This Ethiopian position seemed to be in line with the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in 
Barenblatt v United States, supra note 453, para.141-153 (Justice Black disagreed with the 
Supreme Court's conclusion that "First Amendment freedoms must be abridged in order to 
"preserve" our country"). 
461      See furthr discussions in this chapter 
462      In addition to Barenblatt v United States, supra note 453,  see also,  for example, Texas v 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) ( held that a government "may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"). 
463      Prescribed by law, legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society; see , Handyside v  
UK, supra note 431; see also Sunday Times v  UK (No.1), supra note 435 
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right: national security, protection of public order, health and/or morals. These 
are enshrined in both the ICCPR464 and Article 10 ECHR.  
 
However, although some of the three test criteria devised by the ECtHR are 
absent in the FDRE constitution, it could be argued that their implementation in 
the Ethiopian legal system is possible by virtue of Article 13 (2) of the FDRE 
constitution, which states that: 
 
The fundamental rights and freedoms specified in this Chapter shall be 
interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and 
International instruments adopted by Ethiopia.  
 
Consequently, the protection and promotion of the human rights as guaranteed in 
the FDRE constitution have to be considered in light of the international 
standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
conventions ratified by Ethiopia. Otherwise stated, any human rights instrument 
ratified by Ethiopia, thus, becomes not only part and parcel of the domestic laws 
of Ethiopia, but also guiding principles for the interpretation of the rights 
guaranteed by the FDRE constitution. Thus, once adopted, they are applicable in 
the same manner as any law enacted by the Ethiopian parliament.  
 
 
Some of the international human rights instruments Ethiopia adopted include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCP);465 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights466 and the African (Banjul) 
Charter on Human and People's Rights.467 Article 9 (4) of the FDRE constitution 
declares that "...international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part 
of the law of the land."  
 
                                                 
464      Article 19(3) of ICCPR.  
465      Accessed on 11 June 1993 
466      Accessed on 11 June 1993  
467      Ratified on 15 June 1998 
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Consequently, Article 19 of the ICCPR becomes crucial in the interpretation of 
Article 29 of the FDRE constitution.  Article 19 of the ICCPR espouses that 
limitations on freedom of expression must be ‘provided by law'. This 
requirement "...would be interpreted as it has in the context of other ICCPR 
guarantees, i.e. that the limitation must be sufficiently delineated in a State's 
law."468 A ‘law' in this sense could refer to "formal legislation or an equivalent 
unwritten norm or common law" but it excludes "administrative provisions or 
vague statutory authorisation."469    
 
Moreover, Article 19 of the ICCPR requires that a limitation on freedom of 
expression would be complied with if it is justified by one of the legitimate aims 
provided under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-article 3, i.e. "...for respect of 
the rights or reputations of others; for the protection of national security or public 
order (order public), or public health or morals". One of the legitimate aims 
relevant to this thesis is national security. As discussed, the FDRE constitution 
does not stipulate national security as one of the legitimate aims for interfering 
with the right to freedom of expression. However, this deficiency in the FDRE 
constitution could be supplemented by the ICCPR; national security under the 
ICCPR covers "...only serious cases of political or military threats to the entire 
nation."470 Examples that warrant a mention are "publication of a direct call to 
violent overthrow of the government in an atmosphere of political unrest or 
propaganda for war."471 It would not be far from the fact to suggest that terrorist 
acts could be included in this category.  
 
The third test promoted by Article 19 of the ICCPR is that the restriction must be 
‘necessary' to accomplish a lawful purpose. As the UN Human Rights 
Committee held: 
 
                                                 
468     For further discussion, see Joseph, S., et al (2005).  The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 525; 
see also Nowak, M. (2005). U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. 2nd 
edition. (N P Engel Pub), p. 447; see also Gauthier v. Canada, Communication No 633/1995, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (5 May 1999), para 13.5.   
469      Nowak, M. (2005), supra note 468, p. 460  
470      Nowak, M. (2005), supra note 468, p. 463-4 
471      Ibid  
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This requirement of necessity implies an element of proportionality. The scope of 
the restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be proportional to the 
value which the restriction serves to protect. It must not exceed that needed to 
protect that value. As the Committee stated in its General Comment 10, the 
restriction must not put the very right itself in jeopardy.472  
 
However, Article 19 of the ICCPR "...lacks a reference to necessity in a 
democratic society".473  For this reason, "...the relevant criterion for evaluating 
the necessity of interference is thus not the principle of democracy but rather 
whether it was proportional in the given case." 474  Thus, consideration of 
‘proportionality in a given case' is particularly relevant in Ethiopia where 
democratic principles are yet to materialise.475  
 
Despite some difference in the construction of Article 19 of the ICCPR, the three 
criteria discussed above are more or less similar to those applied by the ECtHR 
in regard to Article 10 ECHR. For that reason, interference with the right to 
freedom of expression in Ethiopia could be evaluated based on the above tests.  
 
However, the realisation of freedom of expression in Ethiopia is beset with many 
obstacles. A factor that facilitated "a downward spiral for freedom of expression 
in Ethiopia"476 is the ever increasing mistrust between the government and its 
opponents. There are many opposition blogs and websites based in the West that 
are dedicated 24/7 to criticising the Ethiopian government's handling of political 
crisis's in Ethiopia.477 They are established by journalists and opponents of the 
                                                 
472     Faurisson v France, Communication (550/1993 , U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993(1996),para. 8. For further discussion see Joseph, S., et al (2005), supra 
note 468; see also Nowak, M. (2005), supra note 468, p. 447  
473      Nowak, M. (2005), supra note 468, p. 460 
474      Ibid  
475       Tesfaye, A. (2002).  Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The Struggle for Democracy 
in Ethiopia (Maryland, University Press America)  
476      Kaiser, K.  (2012). A Downward Spiral for Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia. June 1, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
477      To mention some: http://www.ethioguardian.com/news.php ; http://ethiopiazare.com/ ; 
http://www.tadias.com/ ; WWW.ethiopianreview.com; http://addisnegeronline.com/; 
www.awurambatimes.com; www.addisvoice.com; www.ethiopiafreedom.com; 
http://www.zehabesha.com/; http://www.maledatimes.com/ http://www.abugidainfo.com/; 
http://ecadforum.com/;  
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government who fled the country after the 2005 controversial election. This tit-
for-tat has spurred the government to block access to these websites.478 
 
Some reports also allege that "the continuing abuse of anti-terrorism legislation 
to curb freedom of expression in Ethiopia"479 has reached a critical point.480 
 
The question that we need to answer in this chapter is, therefore, whether the 
enactment of the EATP creates a balance between the right to freedom of 
expression and the need to ensure the safety and security of Ethiopian inhabitants 
from terrorism.  
3.3 Content and the Medium of an Expression under Article 10 ECHR 
 
The ECtHR takes several factors into consideration in creating a balance between 
permitted expressions and expressions that fall outside the ambit of Article 10 
ECHR. Some of these factors include the medium of expressions such as books, 
newspapers, leaflets, periodicals and the identity of the speaker/publisher 
(whether they are members or supporters of terrorism organisations or just 
politicians or journalists). Our discussion below will try to attempt to find out the 
relevance of these factors in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
 
The starting point for this discussion is a string of ECtHR cases beginning with 
Arslan v Turkey481. Mr. Arslan published a book entitled "History in Mourning, 
33 bullets". It was alleged that his book disseminated separatist propaganda by 
describing "the Turkish nation as barbarous", and maintaining "that the Kurds 
were the victims of constant oppression, if not genocide, and glorified the acts of 
                                                 
478   Reporters without Borders (2012). Ethiopia: Government Steps Up Control of News and 
Information, 7 June  
479     Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights (2012). Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
(A/HRC/20/17), p. 6 
480 We will discuss some cases later in this chapter 
481     Arslan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23462/94, 8 July 1999. 
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insurgents in south-east Turkey."482 Extracts from his book to demonstrate the 
allegation include the following483: 
 
...it has become axiomatic among [the Turks] that, as the saying has it, ‘A Turk's 
only friend is another Turk'. ... Several groups, such as the Bulgarians, the 
Greeks and the Arabs, have won their freedom from this barbarous 
administration. Only the Kurds remain. Both Turks and Kurds are at a loss to 
know what to do about this situation. A Turk from Turkistan denies the Turk who 
lives in Kurdistan. A Kurd may neither give his father's forename to his son nor 
choose his name. 
 
The relevant courts found him to have disseminated separatist propaganda and he 
was sentenced to imprisonment. He brought his case before the ECtHR. The 
ECtHR applied a three-limb-test to determine whether there was a violation of 
the applicant's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. It was 
found that there was a sufficient legal basis for his conviction and taking the 
security situation at that time into account, the conviction pursued a legitimate 
purpose. However, as to the test of ‘necessity in a democratic society,' it was 
stated that is up to the ECtHR to determine whether the interference in issue was 
"proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued" and whether the reasons adduced 
by the national authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient." 484  The 
ECtHR has accepted that some of the specific extracts in the book, such as the  
 
joyful news of the day when they would tear down the fortress of violence of 
Turkish chauvinism, do not amount to "neutral" descriptions of historical facts 
and that through his book the applicant intended to criticise the action of the 
Turkish authorities in the south-east of the country and to encourage the 
population concerned to oppose it.485  
 
In the opinion of the ECtHR expressions that encourage resistance the Turkish 
nation at a time where Turkey was facing serious instability as a result of 
                                                 
482      Ibid, para 10 
483      Ibid, para.10. 
484      Ibid, para.44 
485      Ibid, para.45 
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domestic problems due to the Gulf War could be a relevant factor in determining 
the proportionality of the measures taken.486 
 
At the same time, the ECtHR tried to balance the content of the expression with 
the medium used. It affirmed that it is possible to show leniency if the 
expressions were merely communicated via books, literary works, and not the 
mass media.487 The ECtHR was similar in its approach in subsequent cases.488  
 
Arslan is not the only case that dealt with potential for incitement of violence via 
the publication of books in Turkey. The case of Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v 
Turkey489; and Önal v Turkey490 could be mentioned here. However, unlike in 
Arslan, the ECtHR did not focus on the medium of expression in these cases.  
 
Though the ECtHR consistently applied the three test criteria in its rulings, the 
focus of the ECtHR in these cases, unlike in Arslan and other cases, was on the 
potential impact of the contents of the publications. For instance, in Başkaya and 
Okçuoğlu v Turkey, the focus of the ECtHR was on “...the content of the 
impugned statements and the context in which they were made." 491  And it 
concluded that, "...the views expressed in the book could not be said to incite to 
violence; nor could they be construed as liable to incite to violence".492 
 
 In a similar manner, an interesting decision of the ECtHR is the Handyside v UK 
case.493 The case is among the most important of its kind. It lays down the three 
                                                 
486      Ibid, para.47. 
487      Ibid, para.48. 
488      See for example, Sürek v Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV. (Dissenting 
with the court, Casadevall and Greve held that the court was inconsistent in its attempt to create 
exceptions to Article 10 of the Convention rights); see also Polat v. Turkey [GC], no. 23500/94,  
8 July 1999 (the ECtHR held that "applicant is a private individual and that he made his views 
public by means of a literary work rather than through the mass media, a fact which limited their 
potential impact on "national security", public "order" and "territorial integrity" to a substantial 
degree".); see also Jersild v. Denmark (Application no. 15890/89, 23 September 1994), Telegraaf 
Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. v. Netherlands (Appl. No. 39315/06,22  November 
2012). 
489      Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, ECHR  
1999-IV 
490      Önal v. Turkey, nos. 41445/04 and 41453/04, 2 October 2012 
 
491      Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, supra note 489, para. 61 
492      Ibid, para. 64 
493      Handyside v  UK, supra note 431 
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limb test connected to Article 10 ECHR. The dispute centred on the content of an 
expression. Moreover, the medium used was similarly a book. Unlike the above 
cases, however, "The Little Red Schoolbook" had nothing to do with an 
expression that incites, encourages, or endorses violence. The focus was on the 
sexual nature of the book. The ECtHR held that the UK did not breach Article 10 
when a British court ordered the seizure and destruction of the books.   
 
 In Handyside v UK, the focus was entirely on the content of the book. There was 
no discussion of the identity of the writer or about the medium of communication. 
With regard to obscene materials, the same position was taken in other cases.494 
The same is true with regard to the use of films displaying negative images of 
religious doctrines495.   
 
Another case worth considering in regard to the publication of books that might 
incite separatist agenda is the case of Ekin Association v. France.496 In the same 
manner as Arslan v Turkey, the applicants in Ekin Association published a book 
("Euskadi at war") (Euskadi en Guerre) detailing the Basque Country conflicts. 
Although the book was in circulation in other countries, the French government 
banned the circulation of the book in France on the ground that "...the circulation 
in France of this book, which promotes separatism and vindicates recourse to 
violence, is likely to constitute a threat to public order."497 However, before the 
case even reached the ECtHR, the French Supreme Court upheld the applicants 
claim stating that the ministerial decree that banned the book was in breach of 
Article 10 ECHR as "...the content of this publication does not provide sufficient 
legal justification for the serious infringement of press freedom embodied in the 
impugned decision."498 The ECtHR also found in favour of the applicants.499.  
 
                                                 
494      Müller and others v Switzerland, 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133. 
495      Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A. 
496      Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, ECHR 2001-VIII 
497      Ibid, para. 13 
498      Ibid, para. 19 
499      Ibid, para. Para. 64 
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However, the dissenters in Karatas500 , as discussed below, has pointed out that 
the ECtHR seems to drift away from appreciating the merits of the content of the 
communication by introducing external factors such as the medium of 
communication  that have nothing to do with the contents of the expression.  
 
In his anthology of poems entitled ‘the song of the rebellion, Dersim' Mr. Karatas 
"invited" his fellow Kurds to "freedom" and to "die" and, to wage "a secret 
rebellion." The relevant domestic courts found him guilty of disseminating 
separatist propaganda. The Commission stated that "some parts of the applicants 
poem glorified armed rebellion against the Turkish State and martyrdom in that 
fight." 501  Thus, the Commission agreed with the assessment of the national 
authorities. Though the ECtHR agreed with the conclusion of the national court 
on the general impact of the expressions which can be "construed as inciting 
readers to hatred, revolt and the use of violence," it found a violation of Article 
10 ECHR because "the medium used by the applicant was poetry, a form of 
artistic expression that appeals to only a minority of readers."502 
 
The same conclusion was reached in Okçuoğlu v. Turkey503 and Sürek v. Turkey 
(No. 4).504 The ECtHR in Okçuoğlu held that “comments hostile in tone” would 
be tolerated under Article 10 ECHR if they are “...published in a periodical 
whose circulation was low, thereby significantly reducing their potential impact 
on "national security", "public order" or "territorial integrity."505 And, in Sürek, 
the ECtHR ruled that the publication of an article that has an "overall literary and 
metaphorical tone" does not amount to incitement to terrorism, though it 
"contained hard-hitting criticism" of the Turkish authorities such as the statement 
that "the real terrorist is the Republic of Turkey".506  
 
                                                 
500   Karatas v Turkey [GC], no. 23168/94, ECHR 1999-IV (see joint dissenting opinion of Joint 
concurring opinion of judges Palm, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Greve). 
501      Ibid, para.47 
502      Ibid, para.49 
503      Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], no. 24246/94, 8 July 1999 
504      Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4)[GC], no. 24762/94, 8 July 1999 
505      Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, supra note 503, para. 48 
506      Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4), supra note 504, para. 58 
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The ECtHR further considered the medium of expression in its analysis of a 
newspaper interview in Zana v Turkey:507 an interview in a monthly review in 
Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey;508 a live TV debate in Gündüz v. Turkey509 and 
distribution of leaflets in Féret v Belgium.510 However, the latter two cases dealt 
with hate speech, not with incitement to violence/terrorism. But even in hate 
speech cases, the ECtHR considers the medium of expression. As confirmed in 
Féret v Belgium, "...the Court attaches particular importance to the medium and 
the context in which the offending were released."511  
 
The more relevant cases for this thesis in regard to expressions that incite 
terrorism are the case of Zana v Turkey and Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey. In the 
interview, Zana was quoted as saying “I support the PKK national liberation 
movement; on the other hand, I am not in favour of massacres. Anyone can make 
mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by mistake." 512  These 
expressions do not incite any violence nor do they encourage any kind of 
resistance unlike the expressions that were used in Arslan v Turkey and Karatas 
v Tureky.  
 
Moreover, the message in the Zana was less explicit because it did not endorse 
any violence nor did it invite people to commit any violence. But Arslan's and 
Karatas's expressions were more direct and with more likelihood of producing 
violence. But the medium of expression, in the words of the ECtHR, made them 
unlikely to have the intended effect.  
 
The main reasoning of the ECtHR in Arslan v Turkey was concerned with the 
contents of the expression, and to a lesser extent the medium used thereof. 
However, in Arslan v Turkey and Karatas v Turkey the ECtHR stated that, 
although the expressions in both cases were violent in nature, the fact that they 
were not published through the ‘mass media' limited their general impact.  
                                                 
507      Zana v Turkey, 25 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII.; see also  
Sürek v. Turkey (no. 2)[GC], no. 24122/94, 8 July 1999 
508      Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey [GC], nos. 25067/94 and 25068/94, ECHR 1999-IV 
509      Gündüz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 59745/00, ECHR 2003-XI 
510      Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, 16 July 2009 
511      Ibid, para. 76 
512      Zana v Turkey, supra note 507, para.12. 
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In conclusion, thought the ECtHR considers the medium of expression as a factor 
in its decisions, the focus of the court in creating the balance between permitted 
and none-permitted expression is primarily linked to the content and impact of 
expressions that incite violence or terrorism.  
3.3.1 Relevance of medium of communication under domestic laws: US and UK   
 
The forms of expression can be generally categorized into those that do and do 
not involve physical violence.513They can also be further divided into speech, 
writing, artistic works, broadcasting, and conduct.514 The analysis in this part of 
the thesis will be restricted to various forms of non-violent expressions. Space 
constraint does not allow discussing expressions that involve physical violence. 
 
As it is used here, the term non-violent expression refers to those expressions that, 
although directly or indirectly incite, encourage, support, or provoke violence, do 
so implicitly without reference to physical harm.  
3.2.1.1 Non-violent Terrorist Expressions 
 
Incitement to terrorism is not the same as incitement to violence. Of course, there 
are various forms of violent acts that would not fall within the definition of 
terrorism.515 At international level, the ICCPR516 and some UN resolutions517 
broadly condemn any incitement to violence. However, they lack a specific 
definition of the latter; particularly the term is intermingled with incitement to 
terrorism. Some authors suggest that the ‘Rwandan Media Trial' case could be 
used as a standard to define incitement.518 As this author stated, the analogical 
                                                 
513    Sottiaux, S., supra note 429, p.67.   
514     Henkin, K. (1986). Foreword: On Drawing Lines. 82 Harvard law Review 63; see also 
Arslan v. Turkey, supra note 481; see also Karatas v Turkey, supra note 500. 
515      Saul, B. (2008), supra note 264; see also Walker, C. (1992), supra note 223, pp. 6-10. 
516      Article 20(2) of the ICCPR 
517      See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/46/51 (1991): Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism; see also UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) [on Threats 
to International Peace and Security], 14 September 2005, S/RES/1624 (2005). 
518     Davis, S. W. Incitement to Terrorism in Media Coverage: Solutions to Al-jazeera after the 
Rwandan Media Trial. 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 749. 
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application of the principles employed by the Nuremberg trial is in line with 
some US Supreme Court cases.519      
 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights520 has accepted the three-test 
requirement followed by the ECtHR.521 It further gave unreserved support to the 
definition of incitement to terrorism provided by the Council of European 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Warsaw 16. v. 2005) (ECPT). 
According to Article 5 of the ECPT, incitement to terrorism is defined by a three-
fold criterion, namely; communication with the public, intent and probability of 
causing a danger.522  
 
The explanatory notes to the ECPT provide a broad definition of public 
communication. The Convention states, inter alia, that public communication 
could be: 
  
...printed publications or speeches delivered at places accessible to others, the 
use of mass media or electronic facilities, in particular the Internet, which 
provides for the dissemination of messages by e-mail or for possibilities such as 
the exchange of materials in chat rooms, newsgroups or discussion fora.523 
 
The first segment of the above definition, i.e. "printed publications or speeches 
delivered at places accessible to the public" is particularly relevant here as it 
differs from the ECtHR position in Arslan v Turkey and other cases. This part of 
the definition disregards the consideration as to whether a particular expression 
that incites terrorism is in newspapers or in books or literally works.  
 
The second element needs no further explanation as the explanatory notes state 
that "the exact meaning of "intentionally" is left to national law."524 With regard 
                                                 
519   See for instance, Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
520      Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008). Human Rights, 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32. ISSN 1014-5567, para. 35. 
521      See for example, Sunday Times v UK (no. 1), 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30. 
522      Article 5(1) 
523      Council of Europe (2005).  Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism .CETS No. 196, para. 104. 
524    Ibid, para. 85.    
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to the third element, the explanatory notes to the ECPT stated that Article 5 
covers non-causative speech.525 What is important is whether the speech causes 
potential danger, not its link to actual danger.  
In the UK, Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) has specifically outlawed direct incitement 
to terrorism.526 However, TA differs from the precedent of the ECtHR, as it does 
not refer to the medium of communication. A literal interpretation of TA appears 
to suggest that the UK legislature has distanced itself from the consideration of 
the medium of expression as employed by the ECtHR. Even in earlier 
legislation527, such distinctions were absent. Moreover, contrary to the position 
of the ECtHR, many common law decisions that dealt with incitement to 
violence/terrorism did not pay attention to the medium of communication.528 The 
common law contains some criteria of evaluating incitement to an offence i.e. a 
person is guilty of incitement to commit an offence or offences if:  
a. s/he incites another to do or cause to be done an act or acts which, if done, 
will involve the commission of an offence or offences by the other; and  
b. s/he intends or believes that the other, if he acts as incited, shall or will do so 
with the fault required for the offence.529 
The content of an expression is evaluated by reference to these elements. None of 
these elements refers to the medium of expression.  The Crown prosecution 
Service (CPS) guidance defines violent extremism as:   
the demonstration of unacceptable behaviour by using any means or medium to 
express views which foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of 
particular beliefs; seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; foment other serious 
                                                 
525      Ibid, p.34. 
526      See sections 59-61TA 2000 for incitement overseas. 
527      Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act (Conspiracy and Incitement Act 1996); Section 4 of 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861; Section 19 of Misuse of Drug Act 1971 
528      See House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales (2003). 
Religious Offences in England and Wales: First Report of session 2002-2003 (HL Paper 95-I). 
London, TSO, para. 70; see also R v Higgins [1801] 2 East 5; R v Fitzmaurice [1983] 2 WLR 
227; R v Krause (1902) 18 LTR 238; Invicta Plastic LTD v Clare (1976) Crim LR 131. 
529     See R v Claydon [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 20. 
100 
 
criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or foster 
hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.530 
The above definition does not consider the medium of expression as it 
specifically states that violent extremism could be communicated "by using any 
means or medium to express views which foment, justify or glorify terrorist …"   
 
Unlike the UK courts, the US courts, as discussed in the previous sections, have 
managed to identify several competing principles in the determination of what 
constitutes violent nature in speech. The position of the US courts is not as 
consistent as the UK courts. This is partially due to the absence of consensus on 
the definition of these principles. This is not to say that the principles are vague. 
The problem rather rests on the absence of a general definition of each doctrine.  
 
Legal scholars have spent years trying to define ‘clear and present danger,' the 
‘bad tendency tests', the ‘incitement to imminent lawless action test,' and the 
‘categorical and balancing test.' They have yet to reach agreement on the exact 
scope of these doctrines. Some doctrines have been ignored, modified, or 
abandoned over time.531 In contrast, the UK's criteria of evaluating incitement to 
an offence are relatively easy to understand.  
 
Irrespective of the various principles it tried to employ, the US Supreme Court 
has never shifted the balance from the content-effect approach in its analysis of 
the medium of expression.532 To the extent of the knowledge of this research, no 
Supreme Court case has found a breach of the First Amendment based on the 
medium of expression. As some authors have alluded to,533 the arguments in the 
                                                 
530      Crown Prosecution Service. Prosecution Policy and Guidance: Violent Extremism and 
Related Criminal Offences, at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html 
531      For instance, see Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 ( in "Whitney v California … the 
court upheld a statute on the ground that, without more, "advocating" violent means to effect 
political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may 
outlaw it. But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 at 507 (1951). These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.") 
532      Sottiaux, S supra note 429. 
533      Barnum , D. G., supra note 444 and  Brennan, W. J.  , supra note 455 
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US are instead dominated by the various competing principles the US Supreme 
Court employed at different times to analyse the content of a speech and its 
potential effect. 
 
 However, under exceptional circumstances, the US Supreme Court has also 
deferred the full protection of the First Amendment. This is especially true in 
commercial speeches such as adverts.534 While defining speeches that fall into 
the category of commercial speeches as those that "propose a commercial 
transaction,"535 the US Supreme Court held that the First Amendment "...affords 
a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression."536  Other exceptions to the First Amendment based on the medium 
of expression include radio and Television broadcasts. 537 However, even this 
regulation of speech via radio and Television is limited to an expression that is 
detrimental to the well-being of children, such as the broadcast of indecent 
materials.538 
 
However,  from ‘bad tendency test'539 to the latest decisions such as Holder v 
Humanitarian Project Law 540 that regulates ‘pure political speech' in regard to 
foreign terrorist organisations, the Supreme Court  has never taken into account 
whether these expressions are communicated via literary works, books, or artistic 
works to determine that  they incite violence.         
 
3.4.1 The relevance of medium of expression under Ethiopian law  
  
                                                 
534  For further details, see Brody, S. G. and   Johnson, B. E. H. (2004).  Advertising and 
Commercial Speech: A First Amendment Guide. 2nd edition. (New York, Practising Law Institute) 
535      Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989), 
para. 482 
536      United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), para. 426; see also Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1976) 
537      See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also 
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 
538      For further discussion see Cohen, H. (2009). Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to 
the First Amendment. CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of 
Congress (Congressional Research Service7-5700), 16 October , pp. 23-25 
539      Patterson v Colorado  , supra note 441 
540      Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451 
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Several court cases deal with incitement to terrorism in Ethiopia. As can be 
inferred from table 2.3 below, incitement to terrorism is the most commonly 
mentioned offence. However, there is a fundamental problem associated with 
these cases. Defining the content of an expression based on the medium of 
communication in similar manner to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR could give 
more protection to artists or journalists or publishers in countries such as 
Ethiopia  
 
The positive effect of the ECtHR position on the following newspapers is a good 
example why the medium of expression could be relevant in the analysis of 
expressions that do not necessarily incite terrorism.  
 
The following is translations of articles in newspapers published during the 2005 
general election in Ethiopia.  
 
Table 2. 1: Editorial Opinions in Newspapers  
 
Abay February, 2005 It is a sin to be ruled by bandits, but it is 
liberating to revolt against them. We have to 
express our frustration. If a soldier comes 
and frightens you, you should push forward 
not backward. If you do not accept this plea, 
you are Ethiopia's number one enemy. There 
is no redemption without blood 
Tobia February, 2005 The unfair election  has began 
Ethop February, 2005 Not only public violence, but there could 
also be war. Members of the ruling party 
should free themselves by stopping to 
follow few individuals. They should stop 
living only to fill their belly  like  animals 
Tobia November 2004 The election is to coincide with war 
Reporter April,  2005 The election may be unfair. 
Abay January, 2005 Lets come together and get rid of this 
government 
Abay January, 2005 Ethiopian revolutionary front or Eritrean 
Revolutionary Front? If EPRDF wins this 
election, not only will all the hopes and 
developments be buried, but we will also be 
under Eritrean colony. Thus, individual 
electorate should know that the choice is 
between freedom and slavery 
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Tobia November, 2005 Published an artistic expression which 
displays a gun standing next to a big ballot 
box with a title "stop blaming the darkness 
by lighting two candles at a time" 
Abay April , 2005 As the election is approaching, the attack is 
intensifying 
Abay February  2005 Before this country is disintegrated and 
disappeared from the world map, let's come 
together and make history. Otherwise, the 
blame rests on this generation. 
Abay February , 2005 Published 10 declarations that should be 
followed by the public. Declaration number 
six stated, "we can shorten the life of the 
ruling party by identifying members, 
supporters, and the spies." 
Ethiop February, 2005 One that experienced a burning fire should 
not play with it again. EPRDF and the 
election board are the same. 
Ethiop January, 2005 the election is coming fast and the election 
board is in disarray 
Abay February, 2005 A power lost in election should be retaken 
back by revolution. 
Freedom September, 2005 Dear Ethiopians, you should expect a call 
for public revolt. The public should rise to 
uncover the conspiracy that is targeting the 
country. My freedom should not be taken 
away. Governing the people at a gun point 
should be stopped now. 
 
 
 
Table 2. 2: Articles Published based on Interviews and Polling Predictions 
Compiled by the Opposition Parties in the Aftermath of the 2005 
Controversial Election. 
 
Freedom May, 2005 We will take action. We have got 201 
parliamentary seats so far. 
Freedom May, 2005 Election board has ruled itself out of the 
election process.  We have got around 314 
seats.  This is enough to administer Addis 
Ababa and Amhara region 
Minilik, April, 20005 Kingit won 95% of the votes disclosed so 
far. 
Finch, April 2005 Confirmed results: EPRDF 162; opposition 
parties 240. 
Ethop, May , 2005 The opposition parties need only 38 seats to 
establish a government 
Freedom, May, 2005 Agazi Brigade is moving towards the 
capital. The public should expect a call. 
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Addis Zena, July , 2005 Leaders! Pull the trigger and we will follow 
you. It is time to flood the streets with a 
revolution. You should be a shield and we 
will be the spear. EPRDF should hand over 
power. 
Freedom, June , 2005 If the public turns into fire, the government 
should be the petrol 
Freedom, June , 2005 War has broken out. We have overcome 
government soldiers. 
Minilike, September , 2005 Industrial public protest; bumper strike, 
delay production, absenting from work 
place, leaving your job voluntarily. 
Addis Neger, 2009 Welaita is embracing itself for a green 
starvation 
Tobia, 2006 There is no fertile ground for investment in 
Ethiopia 
Raja, August , 2008 New fears of famine in Ethiopia. A ticking 
bomb 
Reporter, 2009 Expensive dam faces landslide within one 
year of its inauguration 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated above, some of the expressions in the newspapers are, in terms of 
their content, the same as the series of cases that came after Arslan v Turkey. The 
only detail on which they differ from Arslan v Turkey is the medium of 
expression used. If content is to be taken as the main criteria, then some of the 
articles appear to incite violence. Only some of the articles contained a specific 
or general call to violence. As it has been demonstrated by the ECtHR,541 the 
common law542, and the US cases543, it is insignificant whether the intended 
incitement to violence is expressed or implied. On the other hand, some of them 
                                                 
541      See Hogefeld v Germany, no. 35402/97, 20 January 2000; see also Council of the European 
Union (2002). Council Frame Work Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA). Luxembourg, Council of the European Union; see also Council of Europe 
(2005). Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Warsaw, 16.V.2005). 
Strasbourg : Council of Europe; see also UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1624 
(2005) [on Threats to International Peace and Security], 14 September 2005, S/RES/1624 (2005). 
542      Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare, supra note 528; see also Hansard HC Deb Vol. 676  Col. 452 (5 
Dec 2005)  ("the difference between direct and indirect incitement depends not on  intent-both 
require the same intent. The difference seems to lie in the strength of language used by the 
potential defendant.") 
543      Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
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fall into either the category of ‘mere incitement' (advocacy) 544   or ‘creating 
discontent or dissatisfaction.'545  
 
Though the US courts have yet to define what direct or indirect incitement is, a 
call to overthrow the government by force is one of the non-protected 
expressions on both sides of the Atlantic. 546  
 
Closer scrutiny of the above Ethiopian newspaper articles show that most of 
them would likely be grouped into, to borrow the words of the US Supreme 
Court, expressions that ‘create discontent or dissatisfaction' 547  rather than 
categorized as inciting violence.  
 
For instance, some of the commentary 548  merely criticises the Ethiopian 
government for failing to handle the country properly. This is an opinion readily 
and rightly available in any democracy. Moreover, the articles urged the people 
to come together and resist any government attempt to stifle the opposition and 
riddle the election results. In US or the ECtHR terminology, they can be 
construed as motivating the people to "... believe in something"549 or inform 
about "matters of a general public interest, respectively."550   
 
The Reporter 551  and Tobia 552  particularly announce that the election will be 
rigged. As a result, the intended effect is likely to cause readers to lose trust in 
the election process and election board.  
 
                                                 
544      Ibid  
545      See Arslan v Turkey, supra note 481, para.44; see also Yates v United States 354 U.S. 298 
(1957) (it was held a speech that ‘‘...  urge to believe in something' is not punishable.") 
546      For the United States, see Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Whitney v 
California , supra note 441, and Yates v United States, supra note 545.  For ECtHR, see Ceylan v 
Turkey (no. 2), no. 46454/99, 11 October 2005; see also Incal v Turkey, 9 June 1998, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV 
547      Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
548      Abay,  January 21, 2005; Tobia, 2006; Raja, August 16, 2008; Addis Neger, 2009 
549      Yates v United States, supra note 545 
550      Thorgeirson v Iceland, 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239; Fressoz and Roire v France [GC], no. 
29183/95, ECHR 1999-I. 
551      Reporter, April 2  2005. 
552      Tobia,  February 1 2005. 
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By contrast, other newspapers553 had predicted that the opposition parties won 
the election. The effect seen here balances out the argument: people started to 
believe that the ruling party lost the election. This is democracy at work. If the 
standard of the US and ECtHR is to be taken, then there would be no criminal 
liability in these instances as they do not incite violence or terrorism.  
 
Other articles554, in contrast, contained elements that could be seen to amount to 
a direct or indirect call to overthrow the government, wage war or incite public 
violence.  
 
The article in Abay555, for example, begins with an implicit call on the public to 
strike. It did not call for war, violence, or terrorist activities. Instead, it is a 
general call to the public to express their ‘frustration' through the means of a 
strike. However, expressing one's ‘frustration' does not necessarily imply 
violence. The contention arises during the third, fourth, and fifth sentences, in 
which the Article explicitly calls for the resistance by force of any government 
attempts to stifle the ‘frustration'. These sentences could tenuously be seen as an 
attempt by the newspaper to draw attention to a matter of legitimate public 
concern. 556  It would be disingenuous to interpret them as a general call to 
overthrow the Ethiopian government; it does not assume the tone of a "radical 
political view."557 Perhaps, the best way to explain the article is as a call to resist 
any "government enforcement of a law," as they seen to merely encourage "the 
use of force or a law violation"558 and as such are unlikely to cause "imminent 
lawless action."559 The lack of imminence owes itself to the qualification within 
the calls that force is dependent on State attempts to quash what the Article sees 
as a legitimate right of protest; in effect, force is advocated as a policy of last 
resort. 
 
                                                 
553     Ethop, May 17, 2005; Minilik, April 19, 20005; Finch, April, 2005; Freedom May 25, 2005   
554      Abay, February 5, 2005; Abay, January 28, 2005; Abay, February 12, 2005; Freedom June 
16, 2005; Ethop February 23 2005; Tobia November 2004; Tobia November 2000 
555      Abay February 5, 2005. 
556      Wingrove v the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1996-V. 
557       See Gitlow v New York, supra note 546;  see also Whitney v California , supra note 441 
558      Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
559      Ibid 
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The content of other articles560 were different, however. Not only did the articles 
advocate the use of violence, they also (directly or indirectly) used expressions 
that could be construed as an attempt to incite the use of force to overthrow the 
government. By contrast with the previous articles, they are not reactive in their 
tone; they advocate proactive action. This crucial distinction is what determines 
these articles as outside the remit of legitimate expression. 
 
The article in Tobia561 needs special analysis. As in Arslan, the case concerned 
the use of artistic expression as the means by which the applicant gave effect to 
his right to freedom of expression. This article published an artistic expression 
which displays a gun standing next to a big ballot box with a title "stop blaming 
the darkness by lighting two candles at a time". The article in Tobia raised the 
possibility of using both a peaceful and a violent means of protest.  
 
However, contrary to the mediums used in Arslan v Turkey and Karatas v 
Turkey, the artistic expressions in the Tobia example were published in a 
national newspaper. According to ECtHR precedent, therefore, they would be 
tantamount to direct incitement to violence, as they were disseminated to the 
public via the mass media. If the position of the ECtHR is to be taken at face 
value, it arguably makes for a dangerous scenario as the focus would shift from 
the contents of the articles to whether they are published via the mass media. 
This is especially true for countries that do not provide a forum in which parties 
can challenge decisions of domestic courts by regional courts such as the ECtHR 
or independent supreme courts such as the US one. However, the when the 
ECHR was making distinction into mass media and artistic works or books, the 
intention was to give more protection to people who are not "representatives of 
organisations which resort to violence against the State."562  
 
Therefore, the ECtHR precedent should be interpreted positively in order to 
avoid prosecuting every piece of work that appears in a mass media.    
 
                                                 
560      Freedom June 16, 2005. 
561      Tobia Nov, 2005; Abay February 12, 2005; Freedom June 16, 2005. 
562      Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, supra note 508 
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After the 2005 general election in Ethiopia, many allege that the Ethiopian 
government imposed a blanket criminalisation of all newspaper articles that 
advocate violence. They base their argument on the journalists who wrote the 
news articles listed in tables 2.1 and 2.2 above and were tried and convicted.  
One case that is often mentioned is the 2006 terrorism charge against senior 
opposition political leaders and several journalists.563 Although all of them were 
charged with several offences, the following charges could be mentioned here: 
 
Violating Article 238(1) and 241of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (committing an 
act of violence, threats, conspiracy to overthrows, modifies or suspends the 
Federal or State Constitution); violating Articles 247 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Code (destroying, sabotaging, or putting out of action any enterprise, 
installation or position, any means of production, trade or transport or any 
works, establishments, depots, armaments or resources of a military nature or 
intended for the defence of the country); violating Article 269 (a) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code (Organising, ordering or engaging in: killing, bodily 
harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of the group, 
in any way whatsoever or causing them to disappear).  
    
The evidence against the journalists was composed of news reports listed in the 
above tables and other evidences.  The Court ruled that the prosecutor's evidence 
proved prima facie that the articles written by the journalists during and after the 
2005 general election incited violence, terrorism and resulted in the death of 
several people. 
 
As discussed in this chapter, though the FDRE constitution does not stipulate that 
a restriction on freedom of expression could be imposed only if it is necessary 
and proportionate, we have shown that this requirement could be applicable in 
Ethiopia by virtue of Article 13 (2) and Article 9 (4) of the FDRE constitution, 
which gives weight to international documents ratified by Ethiopia. Therefore, a 
limitation on freedom of expression and the press is lawful under Ethiopian law 
                                                 
563   See Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul (Engineer), supra note 61; see also another case against 
the same political leaders and journalists at Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo, supra note 64; ;see 
also chapter two for  discussions on Kinjit and Ginbot 7 
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only if it is provided by law, legitimate, and necessary.  However, the charges 
against the journalists as stated above are vague because they do not distinguish 
between peaceful expression and terrorist expression. Moreover, the applicable 
laws against them dealt with violence against the state or the constitutional order. 
But the journalists are tried for inciting and committing terrorist acts. The 
conviction of the defendants for inciting terrorist acts is problematic in light of 
their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 26 of the FDRE 
Constitution because their conviction was not ‘proscribed by law'. This is due to 
the fact that the charges against the journalists do not have adequately precise 
definition, consequently undermining the principle of legitimacy, which 
necessitates that criminal law is formulated clearly and precisely to allow 
individuals to know what constitutes a crime.564  
 
It could be argued that the government had a legitimate aim to contain the 
violence that was spreading throughout the country after the announcement of 
the general election. Many people lost their lives during demonstrations that took 
place in different parts of the country between the 8th of June and 2nd of October, 
2005. Thus, abridging freedom of expression during compelling circumstances 
and in accordance with specific laws is justified. 565 But as discussed in this 
chapter, Article 29 of the FDRE Constitution does not contain national security 
or maintaining public order as compelling circumstances. However, we have 
argued that these circumstances could be applied in Ethiopia via Article 19 of the 
ICCPR.   
 
A further argument could be made based on the provisions of the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code. According to Article 24(1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code, "In 
all cases where the commission of a crime requires the achievement of a given 
result, the crime shall not be deemed to have been committed unless the result 
achieved is the consequence of the act or omission with which the accused 
person is charged."  But some of the newspaper articles did not incite violence or 
                                                 
564   Sunday Times v UK (no. 1), supra note, para. 435 
565      See for instance,   Leroy v. France, no. 36109/03, 2 October 2008 (the ECtHR in this cases 
upheld the conviction of a French cartoonist for publishing a cartoon depicting the terrorist attack 
in the US. The ECtHR was convinced that the publication of the drawings two days after the 9/11 
attack mounts to giving "moral" support to the terrorists.) 
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terrorism despite the ruling of the Ethiopian High Court that the newspaper 
articles had "cause and effect" relationship with the violence that ensued 
following the election.566  But it undermines democracy to prosecute journalists 
for encouraging people to "express their frustration" against the Ethiopian 
government 567 ; or informing the electorate that the "election board is in 
disarray";568 or predicting the results of the election569.   
 
The third test to consider is whether the measures taken were necessary and 
proportionate. 570  Punishing journalists 571  for writing newspaper articles that 
criticise the government and reflecting the views of the opposition parties is 
disproportional "to the value which the restriction serves to protect"572.  The 
decisions of the Ethiopian High court to impose fines and ban the publishing 
companies of the newspapers were also disproportionate. Moreover, it is also 
against the spirit of the FDRE Constitution, which prohibits restricting freedom 
of the press based on the "content or the views expressed."573  
 
Though the journalists were later released on pardon together with the opposition 
leaders as a result of the concerned effort of the committee of wise men, 574human 
rights organisations take the view that this trial has set a bad precedent in relation 
to press freedom in Ethiopia as the same journalists and political leaders were 
later convicted for inciting terrorism.575 Since the above trial, some argue that it 
has become an ‘Ethiopian reality'576 for journalists to flee the country in search 
of safety.  All of the newspapers listed in the above tables are now defunct. Some 
                                                 
566      Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul (Engineer), supra note 61 
567      Abay Feb, 2005 
568      Ethiop January , 2005; Freedom May, 2005 
569      Freedom May 11, 2005; Minilik, April 19, 20005; Finch, April 2005; Ethop, May 17, 2005 
570      See Faurisson v. France, supra note 472, para. 8; see also Vogt v. Germany, supra note 439, 
para. 52; see also Joseph, S., et al (2005), supra note 468; see also Nowak, M. (2005), supra note 
468, p. 447 
571      A decision against the newspaper editors of Hadar, Ethiop, Tobia, Freedom, Minilik, Finch, 
Addis Zena, Tobia, and Raja 
572      See Faurisson v. France, supra note 472, para. 8 
573      Article 29(6) of the FDRE Constitution 
574      See chapter two for further discussion 
575      Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo, supra note 64; see also for further discussion on some of 
the journalists at Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, et al, infra note 763  ; Public Prosecutor v Andualem,  
infra  note 763  
576      Tadesse, K.  (2012). Press in exile: An Ethiopian reality, 16 April, Capital Newspaper 
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international organisations has arguably placed Ethiopia amongst the worst place 
to live for journalists in the world.577 
 
To allay the above concerns,  it might be better for the government to implement 
a case-by-case analysis policy to adopt the ECtHR jurisprudence that seeks to 
determine the legal liability of expressions based on each articles propensity to 
‘effect' violence, or any other illegality criteria the government deems fit to 
incorporate. Crucially, a case-by-case analysis allows for the consideration for 
potential implications each article will have on its readers, thereby allowing for 
greater democracy. We must remember that there is a fine line between a 
powerful dissenting opinion, and the promotion of illegal behaviour. A blanket 
approach too readily risks subverting human rights ideals in favour of societal 
security.   
 
Taking the interpretation of the ECtHR in Arslan v Turkey and Karatas v Turkey 
at face value could pave the way for the suppression of political dissent. Indeed, 
a challenge to new legislation is commonly met by African officials with a 
defence identifying its Western roots as giving ipso facto legitimacy and legality. 
The same kind of defence was used when Ethiopia passed its counter-terrorism 
law.  It would be encouraging, however, if the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is 
used positively.  
 
3.4.2 Incitement to Terrorism: the Scope between Permitted and non-permitted 
expression under Ethiopian Law  
 
Under the category of terrorism cases, incitement was the most commonly 
mentioned charge. As can be seen from table 2.3 below, 24 out of 59 court cases 
consisted of allegations concerning direct and indirect incitement to terrorism. 
Unlike the newspaper articles discussed above, where there was clear 
communication between the alleged inciter and the readers of these articles, there 
was no such mass communication in most of the cases in table 2.3.  
                                                 
577 See Committee to Protect Journalists (2013). 456 Journalists Forced Into Exile since 2008. 
Data covers June 1, 2008, through May 31, 2013 
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Table 2. 3578: Terrorism Cases and the Most Commonly Alleged Terrorism Offences in Ethiopia   
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39/1995  Inciting religious violence, civil war, 
arming citizens, illegal organisation, 
disruption of public services, breach 
national security 
No No 252 
94/1995 
 
Adhere to scheme, armed raising, homicide, 
breach of peace 
OLF No 252, 282 
41/1996 Inciting ethnic violence; inciting civil war; 
possession of fire arms; murder  
N firearms 522; 637; 764 
?/1997 Membership, support, material preparation, 
crimes against a foreign state 
Jamaat- al- 
islami 
firearms 273 
274 
522(1) 
123/1998 Membership, organize secret meeting, 
murder,  adhere to terrorist organisation 
scheme, receiving instruction,  
support (advice), training 
Ali-Tad bombs 252(1), 
270(b-d), 
253;271;255 
1025/2000 Membership to terrorist organisation; 
possessing terrorist flag; recruiting and 
taking terrorist training; material 
preparation  
OLF Bombs  241; 252;  
17511/677/2
000 
Espionage, material preparation, burning 
emblements,  
possession, training, recruiting 
OLF bombs 251(1)(a) 
8705/2003 Membership to terrorism organisation; 
inciting murder;  
OLF arms 252, 281 
9832/2003 Armed raising, robbery, membership IFLO guns 252;637;569 
238/1998 Raising civil war, armed rebellion, 
publication, possessing terrorist  
materials, support, membership,  
OLF bomb 252, 254,  
475, 522 
33101/ 
2004 
Membership, organising meeting, 
incitement, espionage, armed raising 
 OLF No 252  
37041/ 
2004 
Inciting attacks on civilians  N Guns  637 ; 538  
36268/ 
2005 
Training, membership, support, armed 
raising, receive instruction,  
 
OLF N 252(1(a) 
 material preparation, possession,  and 
collecting information 
   
                                                 
578     The table only makes a reference to the file numbers. Please see Appendix A for details of 
the cases.   
579      All the articles cited are from the old and the new Criminal Code of Ethiopia as well as the 
EATP 
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37299/ 
2005 
Organize, inciting, plan, murder, robbery, 
membership, breach of peace 
ONLF arms 637;252; 
269;522 
40783/ 
2005 
Possession, endorsing, terror preparation, 
support 
OLF bombs 240(3) 
41449/ 
2006 
Membership, recruit, material preparation, 
receive instruction,  
OLF money, arms 256(b) 
17722/ 
2007 
Inciting civil war and terrorism; inciting 
murder  and ethnic violence  
OLF  252;282 
25845/ 
2007 
 Burning emblem KINJIT stones, fire, 
explosive 
238(1)(a)  
25993/ 
2007 
Participating in a violent protest, and 
conspiracy 
KINJIT stones 238(1)(a) 
26208/ 
2007 
Burning emblem KINJIT stones, fire 238(1)(a) 
26858/ 
2007 
Accomplice in a conspiracy to overthrow 
the government modify the constitution 
KINJIT No 238(1)(a) 
27093/ 
2007 
Accomplice in a conspiracy to overthrow 
the government modify the constitution 
Kinjit  stones 238(1) 
27536/ 
2007 
Accomplice in a conspiracy to overthrow 
the government modify the constitution 
KINJIT No 238(1)a 
27720/ 
2007 
Incitement, robbery, armed raising & civil 
war, organize & lead 
OLF arms, 
munitions 
252(1)(a), 
255(2) 
50798/ 
2008 
Membership, possession, arms traffic, 
material preparation, recruit, support, 
organize 
OLF Storing arms, 
munitions 
  
51539/ 
2008 
Raising armed war,  training , membership OLF bomb 241 
51550/ 
2007 
Membership, supporter, military training, , 
incitement 
      
56118/ 
2007 
Membership, material preparation,  EPPF 
 
knifes, arms 256 
56550/ 
2007 
Collecting information, incitement, revolt & 
mutiny, recruit, support 
participate in material preparation, treason, 
planting bombs, storing 
bombs, receiving instruction,  
espionage, illicit trafficking  
Eritrea  
 
bombs 246;252;242;
256;248; 
346 
29574/ 
2008 
Public provocation, incitement to racial 
hatred 
No No 480(b) 
34705/ 
2008 
Support, incite to terror, adhere to scheme  OLF bombs 269(c) 
49303/ 
2008 
Material possession, civil war, storing, 
material ,preparation, membership 
FIO  arms, bombs 241;240(1) 
256(b) 
59989/ 
2008 
Support, membership, provocation & 
preparation, possession,  crimes against 
public security, recruit, train, incite, 
organize meetings 
OLF bombs, arms 238(1);241;2
58 
6000/2008 Membership, conspiracy, threat, support, 
espionage, recruit, organize, receive  
OLF N 238,241, 
811 
 instruction,  incitement    
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60086/ 
2008 
Membership, conspiracy, to overthrow the 
constitution, recruit, train, support, raising 
war, organizing riot 
OLF bombs 238(1);256(b)
;481 
60184/ 
2008 
Membership, arms raising, military training, 
counterfeit 
ONLF N 238(2);241;3
6(1)(a) 
60575/ 
2008 
Recruit, support, membership, organize, 
incite, material preparation 
EPPF 
 
N 238; 256 
61656/ 
2008 
Training, armed raising, membership, 
inciting war, forgery, unlawful departure, 
lead, recruit, possession 
OLF N 240;241 
243;385 
61663/ 
2008 
Distributing pamphlets EPPF N 240(3) 
62221/ 
2008 
Adhere to scheme, membership, recruit, 
support, possessing, conspiracy, material 
preparation,  
OLF bombs 258(d);238(1)
(b);385(1);39
0 
64246 
/2008 
Membership, mutiny, revolt, recruit, incite, 
organize, armed raising  or civil war, adhere 
to scheme, receiving instruction,  
OLF No 240(1);241;2
56 
69430/ 
2008 
Indirect aid and encouragement,  N N 254(1) 
5-2592/ 
01335/200
9 
Inciting violence against the political or 
territorial integrity of the State; inciting 
armed rising or civil war or terrorism 
N N 241 
58070/ 
2009 
Membership, organize, recruit, and train for 
(guerrilla  
warfare); support (money, documents), 
storing weapons 
OLF arms, 
munitions 
241, 811 
60083/ 
2009 
Membership, threat, conspiracy, violence, 
training, support, traffic in  
arms, possessing materials that incite 
OLF  bombs, arms 238(2);241 
60265/ 
2009 
Membership, training, preparing manifesto, 
seduction, incite publication 
OLF N 238(2), 241  
68104/ 
2009 
Printing, distributing and possessing  terror 
materials, incite, provocation, support, 
encourage, seduction, misuse of public 
property 
EPPF  
 
N 257(a);244(1)
; 677(1)  
69201/ 
2009 
Publishing false rumours to cause 
discontent and dissatisfaction among some 
religious followers; inciting violence and 
hatred  
N N ? 
71000/ 
2009 
Provoking and inciting ethnic violence; 
murder; robbery;  
 Arms,  269(a);494(2)
; 683(c); 
77113/ 
2009 
Joining a terrorist organisation; 
participating in training provided by a 
terrorist organisation;  
OLF  241, 
81406/ 
2009 
Establishing a terrorist organisation; 
preparing terrorist plan; disrupting the 
constitutional order; recruiting soldiers for 
terrorism;  violating territorial integrity of 
Ginbot 7  238;240(1);2
47, 256, 
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the state;  
89341/ 
2009 
Inciting civil war, taking military training, 
conspiring to kill public officials 
 
EPPF Arms, 
munitions, 
money  
240, 256 
89647/ 
2010 
Membership to terrorist organisation OLF  N 257 
112198/ 
2011 
‘Rendering Support to Terrorism;  
‘Participation in a Terrorist Organisation;  
Violation of Political or Territorial 
Sovereignty 
ONLF N Articles 5 and 
7 of the 
EATP and 
article 242 of 
the Ethiopian 
Criminal 
Code   
?/2011 Planning, Preparation, Conspiracy, 
Incitement and Attempt of Terrorist  
Act'; Participation in a Terrorist- 
Organisation'; 
Possessing and dealing with the Proceeds of 
a Terrorist Act; Money Laundering and 
Aiding; 
Rendering Support to Terrorism  
Ginbot 7 N Articles 3, 4, 
5, 7, and 9 of 
the EATP 
and article 
648 of the 
Ethiopian 
criminal 
Code 
?/ 
2011  
Causing a person's death or serious bodily 
injury; creating serious risk to the safety or 
health of the public or section of the public; 
Planning, Preparation, Conspiracy, 
Incitement and; Attempt of Terrorist Act; 
Encouragement of Terrorism; High 
Treason; Espionage; Participation in a 
Terrorist Organisation;  Rendering Support 
to Terrorism 
Ginbot 7 N Articles 3, 4, 
5, 6, and 7 of 
the EATP 
and articles 
248 (b) and 
251 (1)(a) of 
the Ethiopian 
Criminal 
Code 
?/ 
2011  
Attacking the Political or territorial integrity 
of the State; material preparation for 
Subversive; Provocation and Preparation  
OLF  Articles 241, 
256, and 257 
o f the 
Ethiopian 
Criminal 
Code 
?/ 
2011  
Attacking the Political or territorial integrity 
of the State 
OLF  241 of the 
Ethiopian 
criminal 
Code 
?/ 
2011  
Attacking the Political or territorial integrity 
of the State; material preparation for 
Subversive; Provocation and Preparation 
OLF   
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As shown in table 2.3, the allegations of incitement range from raising war and 
armed rebellion, to creating discontent and dissatisfaction, destroying the unity 
and overthrow of the constitution, to causing religious and ethnic violence, 
murder, breach of peace, racial hatred, and terrorism. But how many of them 
were likely to cause or have caused real danger to national security? And how is 
the scope of freedom of expression and violent expressions balanced in Ethiopia? 
Is mere advocacy of violence punishable?  
 
Before the enactment of the EATP, the motives for violence were not one of the 
definitional elements of violence in Ethiopia. Incitement to terrorism and 
incitement to other serious offence were defined under the same heading. 
However, there are fundamental differences between the two forms of violence. 
Accordingly, terrorism could be defined by the three-fold criterion, namely; the 
targets, the seriousness of the violence, and the motives. 580But the definition of 
incitement provided under Article 36 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code does not 
require either the motives or the targets to be considered. It simply states that  
 
Whoever intentionally induces another person whether by persuasion, promises, 
money, gifts, and threats or otherwise to commit a crime shall be regarded as 
guilty of having incited the commission of the crime 
 
A similar definition of incitement is provided under Article 2(6) of the EATP 
which states that ‘"incitement means to induce another person by persuasion, 
promises, money, gifts, threats or otherwise to commit an act of terrorism even if 
the incited offence is not attempted." However, unlike the Ethiopia Criminal 
Code, the EATP under Article 3 contains the elements necessary to define 
                                                 
580      Saul, B. (2008), supra note 264 
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terrorism, namely;  the motives (advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause); targets (civilians, natural resource, environment, historical or cultural 
heritages, etc); and serious offences (destabilizing or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional or, economic or social institutions of the country, etc)  
 
For the above reasons, not all the acts mentioned in table 2.3 are acts of terrorism 
as they do not contain one or two of the above elements. However, in Ethiopia, 
there seems to be an issue with the identification of acts that fall, on the one hand, 
within the Ethiopian definition of terrorism and, on the other hand, acts of mere 
serious violence. The issue being that all acts of serious violence are categorized 
as terrorism. If that is the case, there would not have been a need for a separate 
law to deal with terrorism and the Ethiopian government would be unable to 
justify the need for the EATP. 
 
The most frequently mentioned provision with regard to incitement to terrorism 
is Article 240 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code (Article 252 of the old Penal Code). 
The Article deals with ‘armed rising or civil war.' Among the many unlawful acts 
mentioned under said Article 240 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code, sub-Article (1) 
(b) states that: 
 
... whoever intentionally raises civil war, by arming citizens or inhabitants or by 
inciting them to take up arms against one another, is punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment from ten years to twenty-five years.  
 
This Article is particularly utilised against one organisation, the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), which is frequently accused of inciting and causing 
terrorism. Regardless of the legality of the procedures for proscription, the 
organisation is deemed terrorist. But taking the literal meaning of the above 
Article in the Ethiopian Criminal Code, if an organisation has instigated war and 
raised armed rebellion, the subsequent acts are governed by the rules of war, not 
anti-terrorism laws.  
 
With a corresponding definition of incitement under Article 36 of the same Code 
and Article 2(6) of the EATP, Article 240(2) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code 
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provides a more severe punishment. Accordingly, "where the incitement has 
entailed serious crimes against public security or life, the punishment can be life 
imprisonment or death." Therefore, the Ethiopian Criminal Code provides only 
two options: death or life imprisonment. This is a more rigorous punishment than 
it is provided under Article 3(7) of the EATP, which provides "rigorous 
imprisonment from 15 years to life or with death." The problem here has been 
the fact that the Ethiopian courts do not differentiate between armed raising or 
civil war and inciting terrorism.   
 
A case to emphasize this point is the case of Shiferaw Hinsermu.581 The facts of 
the case were as follows. The defendant, in a newspaper article, criticised the 
regional president of the Oromo region for failing to take into account the 
horrible measures taken by the government against the Oromo tribe. He also 
criticised the government for the brutality being waged against that tribe. He 
further alleged that members of the Oromo tribe are imprisoned, persecuted, 
tortured, and killed without fair trial. Some of the highlights of what the 
defendant was demanding were as follows: 
 
A call for the government to give the Oromo tribe the right to self determination; 
freedom from colonisation by the Ethiopian government; a guarantee to freedom 
of speech; a call for the immediate release of those detained illegally and;  call 
for foreign governments to stop aiding the government.  
 
However, as can be seen, the demands of the defendant appear not to cause any 
threat to national security or territorial integrity of the State. Indeed, they do not 
advocate any form of violence. Taking the standards of the ECtHR as the 
benchmark for assessment here, the comments above were merely a criticism of 
government's handling of political situations.582 Thought the case was dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, it is relevant here as it furthers the argument that the 
medium of expression should not be as relevant as the content of a particular 
expression.  
                                                 
581      Debela Waqjira Gemelal  and Sheferaw Hinsermu Yigezu, supra note 345 
582      Sunday Times v UK (No.1) , supra note 435; see also Lingens v Austria, 8 July 1986, Series 
A no. 103 
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Unlike the US and ECtHR positions, causing discontent or dissatisfaction 
amongst the public or within a specific section of the public is apparently 
punishable in Ethiopia. These allegations are similar to the outdated Sedition Act 
1918. 583In one case, 584  a newspaper editor and the owner were charged for 
causing discontent and dissatisfaction within a religious organisation in an article 
that exposed the dispute between the Ethiopian Islamic Religious organisation 
and Ethiopian Ministry of Education. The prosecution alleged that the content of 
the newspaper was full of lies and based on false rumours. The article, it was 
alleged, incited people to violence and hatred.  
 
The defendants argued that the article was written based on news published on 
the internet. The first defendant was subsequently prosecuted and fined. However, 
in other cases585, the Ethiopian courts were lenient when punishing defendants 
whose articles were based on the media reports of others. In their reasoning, the 
Ethiopian courts surprisingly endorsed the ECtHR demarcation between "factual 
judgment and value judgement." 586  Nevertheless, the Ethiopian courts have 
refrained from delimiting the scope of permitted and non-permitted expressions. 
Despite the inconsistency of the decisions, the content of the expressions was not 
the main reason for quashing the decisions in the above cases. The fact that they 
were written on the basis of external sources made the courts decidedly more 
lenient.  
 
The ambiguity regarding the meaning of incitement to terrorism is not restricted 
to newspapers editors and journalists. It is also common in other cases. This is 
evident from one case in particular in which the defendant was accused and 
convicted of incitement to terrorism for passing a bomb to a suspect who 
remained at large.587 Taking the three elements relevant for the definition of 
terrorist, it is difficult to see how passing a bomb to someone else could be 
                                                 
583     The Sedition Act of 1918 (an Amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917) 
584      Public Prosecutor v Ezedin Mohammed Abdulseman, supra note 16 
585      Public Prosecutor v Arega Welde Kirkos (42277/2007); Public Prosecutor v Stegaye Zeleke 
et al. (43220/2000); Public Prosecutor v Andualem Ayele Legese (40757/2007); Public 
Prosecutor v Amare Aregawi W/Kidane (81380/2002) 
586      See Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway [GC] no. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III 
587      Public Prosecutor v Merga Negara et al., supra note 16 
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considered act of incitement to terrorism. The prosecutor did not establish the 
motives, the targets or the serious nature of the alleged crime. Moreover, the case 
did not give much detail why the defendant was in possession of the bomb. He 
could be in possession of the bomb for other criminal activities or just to sell it. It 
was not also established that the person who remained at large was a terrorist. 
Without proving all these details, the defendant was convicted of inciting 
terrorism. 
 
 In a separate case, 588  a judge attempted the unenviable task of defining 
incitement to terrorism or violence. The defendant, an editor of a newspaper, was 
charged with inciting racial hatred and terrorism. The series of articles, published 
at different times, containing the following messages:  
 
why do we have to be ruled by the Tigrian tribe? Why do we choose silence when 
the tribal ruling system is spreading across the country? The Tigrian tribe is 
robbing the resources of the country. They are inhuman animals. They conspired 
with our enemies and betrayed the country into the hands of our enemies.  
 
The series of articles were entitled "Say no to Judas-Kiss." Article 480(b) of the 
old Ethiopian Criminal Code was the provision cited for the case. The said 
provision reads:  
 
 Whosoever …   by whatever accusation or any other means foment dissension, 
arouses hatred, or stirs up acts of violence or political, racial or religious 
disturbances, is punishable with simple imprisonment or fine. 
 
The judge proposed four requirements for the substantiation of a racial hatred 
allegation and incitement to terrorism. First, the messages must target a particular 
race and should be based on false rumours. Second, it must be proved that the 
messages stirred up dissention and hatred. Third, there should be "objective and 
subjective" criteria to determine whether the messages provoke violence or 
terrorism. But the judge stopped short of explaining the objective and subjective 
                                                 
588      Gurum T/Himanot and Tadious Gantu v Public Prosecutor   (29574/2008) 
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criterion. Fourth, he proposed that there should be an element of causation 
between the violence and the articles on the newspapers. Taking into account 
these factors, the judge in this particular case could not find sufficient evidence 
that the articles had indeed incited terrorism or racial hatred. He rather treated 
them as defaming remarks against a particular race.  
 
He was right to declare that defamatory remarks do not have constitutional 
protection. The ECtHR took the same approach.589 Even in other defamation 
cases, Ethiopian courts did not shy away from imposing hefty penalties for 
defamation.590  
 
Introducing an element of causation in the determination of incitement to 
terrorism was a novel approach. Such position appears to be at odds with that of 
the UK591, US592, and international tribunals593 where causation was disregarded 
from the definition of incitement. No other domestic case considered for this 
research followed the position taken in the above decision.  
 
To conclude, Ethiopian courts do not distinguish between serious violence and 
incitement to terrorism. There is a tendency to treat all violence as terrorism. 
Moreover, despite the existence of a definition of incitement in the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code and the EATP, courts rarely bother to strike the balance between 
protected and non-protected speech.  
 
Finally, the consideration of the medium of expression as devised by the ECtHR 
should not be taken as a standard by countries that transfer Western laws on 
terrorism. This approach could wrongly be applied to punish those articles that 
are published in newspapers, which apparently seem to incite discontent or 
dissatisfaction but which appear not to incite terrorism.     
                                                 
589      Tolstoy Miloslavsky v the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B 
590       Public Prosecutor v Addis Girma Gebre (42473/2008); Public Prosecutor v Mesele 
Mengistu G/selassie ( 35465/2004);  Public Prosecutor v Wesen  Seged G/kidane (27870/2006) 
591 See Crown Prosecution Service. Inchoate Offences, at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/inchoate_offences/#P20_588    
592      See for instance, Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446. (The Supreme court did not consider 
causation as one factor in the definition of incitement to ‘imminent lawless action') 
593      See Davis, S. W., supra note 518 
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3.5 Identity and Freedom of Expression 
 
The connection between the identity of the speaker and the substantive right to 
freedom of expression is explicitly evidenced in the decisions of the ECtHR.  
This is evident from the decision of the ECtHR in Arslan v Turkey 594  and 
subsequent cases. Considering the identity of the person in a speech introduces 
an external factor that may or may not be relevant to the contents of the 
expression.  
 
It is true that whom or what a person believes in makes the difference in 
determining terrorist acts from ordinary crimes. It is arguable that had it not been 
for the religious associations of a person suspected of terrorism, the specific 
nature of the targets of terrorism, and the graveness of terrorist acts, there would 
not have been separate laws for terrorism. A question thus arises as to how the 
identity of the person fits into the First Amendment, Article 10 ECHR and 
Article 29 the FDRE Constitution.  
 
As discussed above, the First Amendment seems to be absolute595 and the later 
two articles provide specific exceptions. Absolute or not, advocating violence 
with a purpose likely to cause risk to national security is not tolerated in these 
pieces of legislation. However, inserting qualifications based on external factors 
such as the identity of the person is not included in the textual format of the right 
to freedom of expression protected in the various documents just mentioned.  
 
Besides the scope of the expression, the ECtHR placed emphasis on the identity 
of the speaker. It was stated that the individuals in some of the cases before the 
ECtHR were ‘private individuals’ whose message could not endanger national 
security, public order and territorial integrity.596 Moreover, the decisions of the 
domestic courts in Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey were also quashed because the 
interviewee expressed his opinion about the situation in Turkey “without 
                                                 
594     see Arslan v Turkey, supra note 481  
595   Sottiaux, S., supra note 429, p. 76-78 (see  the arguments on  the scope of the First 
amendment) 
596      See Karatas v Turkey , supra note 500, para.52 and Arslan v Turkey, supra note 481, 
para.48.; Ceylan v Turkey , supra note 546; see also Castells v Spain, 23 April 1992, Series A no. 
236 
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expressly advocating the PKK’s role in the Kurdish struggle for 
independence”.597 The fact that the interviewee had not associated himself with 
the PKK was considered a relevant factor as the interview itself, which contained 
nothing that incites violence. 598  On the whole, the ECtHR gives special 
protection to journalists, politicians or other ‘private individuals' who are not 
"representatives of organisations which resort to violence against the State".599  
 
The ECtHR consistently held that political expressions by members of a certain 
radical group, instead of political figures, get less protection.600 For instance, in 
Mr. Ceylan described the measures taken by the Turkish government in a 
particular situation. Mr. Ceylan, who was at the time the president of the 
petroleum workers' union, wrote an article in a weekly newspaper. It read as 
follows: "the time has come for workers to speak out. Tomorrow it will be too 
late." 601  The applicant was convicted of "inciting the people to hatred and 
hostility on the basis of race or regional origin"602 at a domestic level. However, 
the ECtHR found against Turkey holding that, although the article was critical of 
the measures taken by the Turkish authorities, it "does not encourage the use of 
violence or armed resistance or insurrection."603 The ECtHR was convinced that 
the contents of the expressions were violent. However, it continued to reason that 
besides the medium of the expressions, the applicants were ‘private individuals' 
that did not have any connection to terrorist organisations.  
 
In another instance, the ECtHR held that "the applicant was an elected politician 
and freedom of expression was especially important for elected public 
representatives."604  
 
                                                 
597      Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, supra note 508, para. 51 
598     Ibid, para. 52; see also see also Jersild v. Denmark, supra note 488 (The ECtHR was found 
violation of Article 10 in the conviction of applicants who were convicted for conducting TV 
interviews without endorsing the views of the interviewees) 
599      Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, supra note 508, para. 54 
600      See Ceylan v Turkey , supra note 546; see also Zana v Turkey, supra note 507 
601      Ceylan v Turkey , supra note 546 
602      Ibid 
603      Ibid 
604     in Jerusalem v Australia, no. 26958/95, ß 43, ECHR 2001-II 
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But a restriction of freedom of expression that aimed at members of a proscribed 
terrorist organisation was found to be compatible with Article 10.605 For instance, 
in Hogefeld v Germany606, the applicant was a member of the Red Army Faction 
(RAF), a left-wing terrorist organisation. The relevant domestic courts refused to 
grant her permission to give an interview to a journalist. The ECtHR considered, 
besides the content of the speech, the applicant's personal history and her 
association with RAF in upholding the decision of the Frankfurt Court of Appeal. 
Moreover, Article 17 ECHR has also been used in cases against radical groups. 
This article prohibits "… any State, group or person … to engage in any activity 
or perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth …" 
 
For instance, in the case of  Hizb ut Tahrir  v Germany,607 the ECtHR upheld the 
decision of German Ministry of the Interior to ban  Hizb ut Tahrir  on the ground 
that the latter was engaged in activities ‘aimed at destroying any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention'608. The ECtHR accepted as a legitimate 
reason to outlaw Hizb ut Tahrir as it openly advocates ‘use of violence as a 
means to achieve its political goals'.609  
 
Considering the above case law of the ECtHR, there appears to be an increased 
likelihood of the ECtHR agreeing with the restrictions placed on individuals' 
freedom of expression by Member States when that individual is associated with 
groups who advocate violence, as opposed to when individuals have no particular 
affiliation, and as such are described as ‘private individuals.' The ECtHR has 
demonstrated this trend especially with cases against Turkey. 610  Convictions 
                                                 
605      Brind v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD 76; see also Halliwell, M. (1991).Judicial 
Review and Broadcasting Freedom: the Route to Europe. 42(3).  N.I.L.Q.   pp. 246; see also 
Jowell, J.(1990). Broadcasting and Terrorism, Human Rights and Proportionality. P.L. Sum.  p. 
149; see also Lewis, C. (1991).The European Convention, Proportionality and the Broadcasting 
Ban. 50 (2).  C.L.J. 211; see also Thompson, B. (1991). Broadcasting and Terrorism in the House 
of Lords. P.L., p. 346 
606      Hogefeld v Germany, supra note 541,  para. 5-8   
607      Hizb ut Tahrir v Germany (App. No. 31098/08, 12 June 2012); see also Kasymakhunov and 
Saybatalov v Russia, App nos 26261105 and 26377/06, 14 March 2013 
608      Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 34932/04, § 45, 6 January 2011) 
609      Hizb ut Tahrir v Germany, supra note 607,  para. 5 
610      Besides the above cases,   see also the following case to understand how the ECtHR focused 
on the identity of the applicants; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey [GC], nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, 
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against some defendants were found to be in breach of Article 10 because they 
were ‘private individuals,' notwithstanding the fact that the content of those 
expressions clearly displayed elements that do not fall under the permitted 
expressions enshrined in 10 ECHR.  
 
In the UK, the identity of a speaker is a factor not extraneous to the analysis of a 
legitimate expression. First, membership of a proscribed organisation is 
illegal. 611  Though membership is most often dealt with under freedom of 
association, it also fits with the current analysis. Second, it is indirectly related to 
the study of providing training for terrorism or other purposes. 612  It is also 
relevant in the examination of the audiences of a speech.613 In R v El-Faisal for 
instance, besides the contents of his speech which incites young Muslims to kill 
the kuffir [non-believers], the UK Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the 
lower court in its consideration the audiences of the speech. These are some of 
the few cases where the identities of the speaker and/or listener were implicitly 
considered. These factors were considered relevant to the analyse of the 
likelihood that certain speeches would lead the intended audiences to commit 
acts of terrorism 
 
3.5.1 The relevance of identity of a speaker or publisher under Ethiopian law 
 
We have seen above how the ECtHR provides special protection to journalists, 
politicians and other private individuals. However, under Ethiopian law, it is 
indistinguishable between individuals affiliated with terrorist groups and others 
that are not affiliated with any organisation.    
   
The conviction rates of Ethiopian court cases are covered in this specific topic. 
Our assessment seeks to show how the identity of a speaker has played a role, if 
                                                                                                                                    
8 July 1999; for case comments on the above cases, see Conviction of Publisher for Breach of 
Anti-Terrorism Laws. 5 E.H.R.L.R 1998,  643 
611     Section 11  TA 2000 
612      R v Sulayman Zain-Ul-Abidin [arrested for "inviting people to receive weapons training 
contrary to section 54(3) (a) (b) TA 2000." The defendant argued that the main reason for the 
charge was that the organisation Islamic Jihad was founded by Muslims] 
613      R v El-Faisal [2004] EWCA Crim 456; R v Abu Hamza [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. 27; R v 
Saleem and others [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 12; R v Rahman (Mizanur) [2008] EWCA Crim 2290 
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any, in the Ethiopian courts' decisions. In most of the cases, the charge sheets 
alleged that the defendants' affiliation with terrorist organisations was taken into 
account in the analysis of whether the defendants were found to have committed 
incitement to terrorism. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian courts did not pay enough 
attention to whether the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support the 
allegations. This begs the question: was this because the identity of the 
defendants genuinely assumed no relevance in the decision to charge of inciting 
terrorism? 
 
To answer this question, it is important to consider the type of charges brought 
against the defendants and the conviction rates thereof. The Ethiopian 
government preferred to use the provisions of the Ethiopian Criminal Code that 
dealt with serious offences when the defendants were alleged to be affiliated with 
a terrorist organisation. As indicated in table 2.3, provisions that dealt with 
incitement to crimes against the constitution, armed forces, attacks on political 
integrity of the territory, provocation and material preparation were frequently 
used. In the majority of the allegations, the affiliation of the defendants' was used 
as a pre-condition for the charges.  
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Conviction Rates614  
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39/1995  35 7 27 13-18  None 
94/1995 
 
1 1 0 25 OLF 
41/1996 4 2 2 10 years to life  None 
                                                 
614  Please see Appendix A for the details of the case. A question mark indicates that there are 
some missing parts from the case. As a result, it is difficult to know the length of the sentences/ 
the final outcome of the appeal . 
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?/1997 3 2 1 25 years to life  Jamaat- al- islami 
123/1998 17 10 7 5 years to death    Ali-Tad 
1025/2000 4 1 ? ? OLF 
17511/677/2000 4 3 1 ?  OLF 
8705/2003 2 2 0 Life, death  OLF 
9832/2003 2 2 0 Life, death   IFLO 
238/1998 62 34 28 7 years to life  OLF 
33101/2004 1 0 1   OLF 
37041/2004 3 3 0 18 to 20 years None  
36268/2005 9 7 2 ?  OLF 
37299/2005 6 6 0 8 to 20 years   ONLF 
40783/2005 2 2 0 6 to 7 years   OLF 
41449/2006 1 1 0 4 years   OLF 
17722/2007 4 4 0 20 years to death    OLF 
27720/2007 1 1 0 ?  OLF 
50798/2008 10 6 4 1 to 5 OLF 
51539/2008 1 1 0 life OLF 
51550/2007 9 4 5 ?  
56118/2007 1 1 0 ?  EPPF 
56550/2007 8 0 8 0  Eritrea  
29574/2008 2 1 1 ?  None  
34705/2008 3 1 2 1 year  OLF 
49303/2008 7 6 1 7 years  FIO 
59989/2008 15 15 0 1 year to 20 years    OLF 
6000/2008 2 2 0 ?  OLF 
60086/2008 8 7 1 8 to 10 years   OLF 
60184/2008 1 1 0 12 years   ONLF 
60575/2008 4 4 0 1 to 2 years   EPPF 
61656/2008 1 1 0 10 years   OLF 
61663/2008 1 1 0 ?  EPPF 
62221/2008 2 2 0 5 to 6 years   OLF 
64246/2008 1 1 0 ?  OLF 
69430/2008 15 15 0 ?  None 
58070/2009 9 3 6 1 to 13 years   OLF 
60083/2009 2 2 0 15 years   OLF 
60265/2009 4 2 2 ?  OLF 
68104/2009 2 2 0 ?  EPPF 
69201/2009 2 2 0 1 to 3 years  None  
71000/2009 127 62 65 5 years to life   
77113/2009 4 4 0 10 years to death  OLF  
81406/2009 46 40 6 10 years to death Ginbot 7 
89341/2009 2 2 0 25 years  EPPF  
89647/2010 10 3 7 5-10 years  OLF 
112198/2011 4 4 0 11-17  OLF 
?/2011 5 5 0  Ginbot 7 
?/2011 24 24 0 18 to life  Ginbot 7 
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?/2011 69 69 0 ? OLF 
?/2011 20 20 0 ? OLF 
?/2011 9 8 1 8 to 13  OLF 
Total  557 409    
      
 
 
 
A breakdown of the cases in table 2.3 shows the total number of cases considered 
for this thesis, and table 2.4 shows that conviction rates were higher in cases 
involving allegations of an affiliation with a terrorist organisation than for other 
serious offences. Out of the 557 defendants, 409 defendants were successfully 
convicted while 148 were acquitted. Charges against 17 defendants were 
terminated for different reasons such as lack of jurisdiction.  
 
From table 2.4, we can see that it was only in seven cases where the public 
prosecution did not allege membership to terrorist organisation.  There were a 
total of 62 defendants in these cases with only 30 defendants being convicted. 
That means the success of terrorist convictions not involving allegation of 
membership to terrorist organisation were 48%. 615 on the other hand, the 
conviction of terrorist suspects in this category accounted for only 7%616of the 
total defendants convicted for being involved in terrorism.  
 
On the other hand, 93%617 of the total conviction rates involve allegation of 
affiliation with terrorist organisations. This implies that the probability of 
convicting defendants for incitement is higher when they are associated with 
organisations/groups that are deemed terrorists. Thus, the evidence allows us to 
conclude that the identity of the speaker does play crucial role in the conviction 
of terrorist suspects for terrorism related cases in Ethiopia.  
 
As seen above, the position of the ECtHR in the Turkish cases of Arslan, Karatas, 
and Zana concerning the identity of the speaker was explicit. The Ethiopian 
courts' position, on the other hand, is arguably moot in view of the fact that they 
refrained from openly discussing the relevance of the identity of the speaker in 
                                                 
615    30/62x100 
616     30/409x100  
617     [409-30]/409x100  
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determining incitement to terrorism. However, taking the data on the conviction 
rates, the identity of the speaker does play crucial role in the conviction of 
incitement to terrorism cases in Ethiopia. 
 
Moreover, after the 2005 Ethiopian election, the government declared that the 
authors of the newspaper articles discussed in table 2.1 and table 2.2 were 
affiliated with terrorist organisations. In a documentary, which was broadcast to 
the public, 618  the authors of the articles were named and shamed, and their 
backgrounds were scrutinized. Despite the publication of the newspapers before 
the election, the Ethiopian government deferred from using these allegations at 
that time. When things spiralled out of control after the 2005 election619, the 
identity of the speaker (or the writer) became a big issue.  
 
This is one reason why this thesis supports the position of the ECtHR, which 
seeks to pay some attention to the identity of the speaker, in imposing speech 
related restrictions. The fear is that resorting to external factors such as the 
identity of the speaker or to their affiliation with a particular organisation is more 
likely to be misused in countries where democracy is in its infancy. Therefore, in 
order to counter-balance this fear, there needs to be special protection to political 
leaders and journalists. As held by the ECtHR: 
 
The limits of acceptable criticism are ... wider as regards a politician as such 
than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater 
degree of tolerance.620 
 
The essence of the argument put forward here is that if we are going to consider 
the identity of the speaker as a determining factor in the conviction of individuals 
                                                 
618      The Birth and Growth of Free Press in Ethiopia (2009) [TV Broadcast] ETV, 13 December. 
619   Lyons, T.  (2005). Ethiopia: Implication of the May 2005 Elections for Future 
Democratization Programs, August 1, 2005 - IFES; Carter Centre ( 2009). Observing the 2005 
Ethiopian National Elections. Carter Centre Final Report (Atlanta, the Carter Centre) ;  European 
Union (2005). Ethiopian  Legislative Elections 2005: European Union Election Observation 
Mission Final Report 
620     Lingens v. Austria, supra note 582   
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charged with incitement to terrorism in Ethiopia, we should understand the 
underlying principle of the ECtHR decision. As discussed both in chapter two 
and in this chapter in regard to the journalists listed in tables 2.1 and 2.2., the 
prosecution of individuals whose affiliation to terrorist organisation is not proved 
contravenes internationally accepted standards on freedom of expression.  
 
In determining the relevance of identity of a speaker or publisher, we could also 
argue that the identity of the audience should be paid as much, if not more, 
attention when consideration is given to the relevance of the identity of the 
speaker. Messages need to be communicated to be known. But, messages need to 
be understood to be effective.621 The likelihood of the audience being impressed 
by the message is as important in the consideration of whether there is an 
intention to incite terrorism, as is consideration of the actual speaker. Arguably, 
the identity of the speaker can be regarded as a superficial consideration, whereas 
the substantive issue of effect is more pertinent to answering whether there is the 
mindset present within a defendant to be confident they were intending to incite 
terrorism. Unless a message gets to the right target and in the right circumstances, 
its effect will be no more significant than dropping a bomb in a designated no 
man's island.  
 
This argument may be counter-balanced by the UK case of Invicta Plastic LTD v 
Clare, where the UK court held that it was irrelevant whether the message had 
influenced the target of the message.622 However, the focus of the UK court here 
was on the content of the expressed views, rather than the identity of the 
addresser. If the identity of the speaker is neutralised in the evaluation of a 
speech, then it makes sense to follow the above case. However, if there is an 
emphasis on identity, it might be appropriate to evaluate the effect of the speech 
on the addressee.  
 
The conclusion is that views expressed via the mass media, books, or artistic 
expressions should be examined based on their effect as held by the ECtHR. 
                                                 
621 R v Abu Hamza, supra note 613 (The argument can be best illustrated by the analysis of the 
speech in the scripts seen in evidence were addressed to young Muslims. Assume that the same 
sort of speech was addressed to university professors.) 
622     Invicta Plastic LTD v Clare, supra note 528  
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There should be no consideration of the medium or the identity of the speaker, 
without such extra factors being relevant also.   
3.6 Membership of a Terrorist Organisation 
 
For some countries, such as the UK, membership of a terrorist organisation on its 
own is a crime. This is part of "the pattern of militant democracy by allowing the 
executive to proscribe specific groups and by making membership and 
association with such outlawed groups illegal"623. But for others, such as the US, 
unless it is accompanied by active participation, membership per se is not a 
crime. Why belonging to a terrorist organisation without there being any 
financial contribution from the member is illegal is a question worth asking.   
 
In the UK, section 11(1) Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 provides that belonging or 
professing to belong to a proscribed organisation is an offence. Besides the 
defences available to the defendant under section 11(2), the burden of proof is on 
the prosecution.624  
 
The law provides further protection to the defendant. First, membership is an 
offence only if it is to a proscribed organisation. This is clarified by section 11(4) 
and schedule 2 TA 2000, which gives a list of proscribed organisations. The first 
step for a prosecutor is, therefore, identifying whether the organisation falls into 
the list of proscribed organisations. Second, in order for prosecution under 
section 11(2) (b) TA 2000 to be successful, there must be participation in the 
activities of the organisation. These activities are explained under section 12 and 
section 15 of TA 2000, which deal with support to a proscribed organisation or 
commission of terrorist acts, respectively. Finally, a time sequence of 
membership and proscription is differentiated under section 11(2) (a). The 
cumulative readings of these sections reveal that belonging to an organisation 
before proscription is not an offence unless it is followed by some sort of 
participation.  
                                                 
623   See Roach, K. (2004), supra note 209, p. 172; See also Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech, 
supra note 192; see also Thiel, M (2009), supra note 208, chapter 13 
624   Walker, C. (2009). Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. 2nd  edition. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press),  p.49-50 
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However, there appears to be a lack of clarity with regard to section 11(1) and (2) 
(b) TA 2000. Section 11(1) appears to suggest that membership on its own merit 
is an offence. But section 11(2) (b) TA 2000 explains that, despite his 
membership, if a defendant does not take part in any activities of the organisation 
after proscription, he will not be criminally liable. Some question arise out of this 
issue: What would happen if a defendant fails to prove non-participation? Will he 
be convicted for membership per se? A related question is: how is a defendant 
supposed to prove non-participation after proscription? What kinds of evidence 
are acceptable?  
 
A case that may be of help in answering these questions is Sheldrake v Director 
of Public Prosecutions. 625  According to Sheldrake v Director of Public 
Prosecution, membership is an offence of its own right with no need to refer to 
section 11(2). Moreover, it was stated that section 11(1) applies to not "only 
members of the proscribed organisation but people who, though not members, 
profess to belong to it."626 Therefore, for the second alternative of section 11(1) 
to apply, the prosecution need not prove membership of the defendant with a 
proscribed organisation. The sort of evidence required to prove membership or 
professing to belong to a proscribed organisation is also clarified in the same 
case:   
 
...the Crown must lead evidence that satisfies the magistrate or jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt either that the defendant is a member of the proscribed 
organisation or that he professes - in the sense of claiming to other people and in 
a manner that is capable of belief - that he belongs to the organisation627 
 
A broader application of section 11(1) is provided further in the case, with Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry taking the view that:   
 
                                                 
625  Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions, supra note 346   
626   Ibid, para.63 
627   Ibid, para 65 
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...section 11(1) is apt to catch people who joined the organisation before it was 
proscribed - at a stage, perhaps, when it was not even a terrorist organisation. It 
could catch someone who joined the organisation without knowing that it was 
proscribed, or when he was an immature youth. And it would cover someone who 
joined the organisation abroad, where it was legal, and came to this country 
without being aware that it was illegal here.628 
 
According to this case, section 11(2) is the exception to section 11(1) because:   
 
it applies after the Crown has established that, at the relevant time, the defendant 
remains a member of the organisation or professes to belong to it and where, 
accordingly, in any other case he would fall to be convicted under section 11(1). 
Exceptionally, in this particular situation the defendant is to be acquitted if he 
proves that he has not taken an active part in any of the activities of the 
organisation while it was proscribed.629 
 
Unlike under UK law, membership of a proscribed organisation is not an offence 
in the US. Moreover, there are not legal or evidential burden to be proved on the 
part of the defendant. Despite early attempts, such as the Smith Act 1940,630 to 
punish both membership per se and any association with organisations that 
advocate violence, the Supreme Court maintained that passive membership or 
professing to belong to a terrorist organisation is not an offence. Scales v United 
States631 and Holder v Humanitarian Law Project 632 exemplify this position.   
 
There are laws that deal with membership to a specific organisation in the US, 
but they are unrelated to a criminal prosecution. They deal with grounds for 
                                                 
628    Ibid, para 67   
629    Ibid, para.68   
630    For detail discussion, see  Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), infra note 640 ; see 
also Ardis, M. W. (editor) (2005) Real ID Act of 2005 and Its Interpretation  (New York, Nova 
Science Publishers); see also Malkin, M.  (2002). Invasion: How America Still Welcomes 
Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores. (USA, Regnery Publishing, 
Inc); see also L'Hommedieu, J.H. (2011). Alien and Sedition Acts. In: Hastedt, G. P. and Guerrie, 
S. W. (eds). Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage. 
( USA, ABC-CLIO)   
631    Scales v United States 355 U.S. 1 (1957)  355 U.S. 1   
632   Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451; see also Cole, D.  (2012). The First 
Amendment's Borders, supra note 450 
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refusing entry into the US for belonging to a terrorist organisation.633 Under 
section 411(iv) of the Patriot Act 2001, several offences are listed under the 
category of ‘engaging in terrorist activities.' However, the case remains that 
membership of a terrorist organisation is not outlawed within the US.634  
 
The Smith Act 1940 and the Internal Security Act 1950 were at the centre of the 
controversy in Scales v United States. The former Act prohibits membership and 
knowingly and intentionally engaging in activities of an organisation which 
advocates the overthrow of a government by force, while the latter Act permits 
membership per se. The US Supreme Court followed two criteria. Therefore, it 
had to be proved that:  
 
1) the organisation advocated overthrow of a government and 2) petitioner was 
an "active" member of the Party, and not merely "a nominal, passive, inactive or 
purely technical" member, with knowledge of the Party's illegal advocacy.635  
 
The US Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Scales since he knowingly and 
intentionally engaged in the activities of the Communist Party of the United 
States. Therefore, he was not convicted per se of membership.  The sorts of 
activities prohibited in the US are illustrated under 18 USC § 2339B (commonly 
known as the Material Support Statute).636 This statute will be discussed shortly 
in the next section. 
 
One difference between the UK and US, found in the reasoning of Lord Rodger 
in Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecution, discussed above, is that under 
section 11(1) TA 2000 it is not relevant to the question of membership whether 
the suspect is an active member. Moreover, under the TA 2000, it is a 
requirement that the organisation be proscribed. Therefore, "proscription serves 
the purpose of short-circuiting the process of proof-the link is to the organisation 
                                                 
633    See INA: Act 212 - General Classes of Aliens Ineligible to Receive VISAS and Ineligible to 
for Admission; Waivers of Inadmissibility 
634   Scales v United States, supra note 631    
635     Ibid, paras. 222-224 
636      For detail discussion, see also Doyle, C. (2010). Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 
18 U. S. C. 2339A and 2339B. Congressional Research Service. July 19 
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rather than to specific activities."637 While in Scales v United States, it was held 
that it is a pre-condition that the organisation supported violent activities and that 
it is a designated terrorist organization. In the US, therefore, the link is both to 
the activities, and to the organisation. This is similar to the position of the UK.  
Another difference between Scales v United States and Sheldrake v Director of 
Public Prosecution is that it is a requirement in the former that the defendant 
must know the illegal activity of the concerned organisation, which is not the 
case with the latter. However, in both cases, active membership is prohibited 
outright.  
 
Scales v United States was affirmed relatively recently in Holder v Humanitarian 
Law Project.638 The US Supreme Court, here, stated that "section 2339 (B) does 
not criminalize mere membership in a designated foreign terrorist organisation. It 
instead prohibits providing "material support" to such a group."639 This supports 
the argument that the US does not outright prohibit passive membership.  
 
The EATP that deals with the same issue is framed differently. As it is stated, 
some articles of the EATP appeared to be directly taken from the UK. However, 
the way the EATP is framed is fundamentally different from its original UK 
source. The relevant provision that deals with membership is Article 7 of the 
EATP. Similar to the UK law, passive membership is treated as an offence on its 
own merit. 
 
However, the following are the basic differences between the UK and EATP. 
First, membership is not specifically differentiated from other manners of 
participation.  Article 7 EATP simply states that:  
 
Whosever ... becomes a member or participates in any capacity for the purpose 
of a terrorist organisation or committing a terrorist act, on the basis of his level 
of participation, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 5 to 10 years. 
 
                                                 
637    Walker, C. (2009), supra note 624, p.48   
638     Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451; see also Doyle, C. (2010), supra note 
636  
639      Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451, para.2718 
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Second, the above Article prohibits membership to both proscribed organisations 
and organisations that are not proscribed, but participate in terrorist activities. 
Thus, the EATP does not make any distinction between membership before or 
after proscription. Furthermore, one can be prosecuted for mere membership, 
even though the organisation is not proscribed. Third, there are striking 
differences on the severity of the penalty imposed. Both impose a maximum 10 
years imprisonment. However, the sentence in EATP is rigorous imprisonment. 
Moreover, the Ethiopian law does not provide for summary conviction as appears 
under section 11(3) TA 2000.  
 
Fourth, the construction of the provision on membership under the EATP bears a 
closer resemblance to 411(iv) Patriot Act 2001 than to the TA 2000. Both the 
EATP and the Patriot Act 2001 use broader terms such as ‘participation in a 
terrorist organisation' and ‘engaging in a terrorist activity,' respectively. While 
the UK law more specifically deals with membership. However, the US law is 
more specific in that it prohibits the commission of the enumerated acts, rather 
than the more ambiguous term, membership. Fifth, the omission of a provision 
similar to section 11(2) TA 2000 from the EATP begs the question of whether 
the burden of proving membership is entirely on the prosecution. 
 
The history of the US shows us that there is a certain element of alarm with 
regard to the position of the UK and Ethiopia on prosecuting membership per se. 
When mere membership was made a crime in the US during the Communist era, 
the persecution of political parties and their members were intensified. The main 
targets were communists and socialists.640 There were political out cries until the 
US Supreme Court intervened. 641  From Scales v United States to Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project, the US Supreme Court firmly positioned itself by 
rejecting any attempt by the US government to prosecute membership per se. For 
                                                 
640     See for Whitney v California , supra note 441; see also the Alien Registration Act (the Smith 
Act) U.S. Statutes at Large (76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 670-676) now codified at 18 U.S. C. § 2385 
(2000) was enacted to deal with the American Communist Party. The mere advocacy of violence 
was upheld in Whitney v California , supra note 441. But Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446, 
somehow deviated from Whitney v California and the Supreme Court insisted that it is only 
incitement to violence that is prohibited in the US.   
641     Hall, K. L. (editor) (2002). The Oxford Companion to American Law. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press),  p. 214   
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this reason, the drastic attempts by the US government in prosecuting mere 
membership received short thrift from the US Supreme Court.  
 
The concern of the UK is not related to political parties or people with different 
political opinion. Looking at the organisations proscribed in the UK under the 
TA 2000, they are dominated by international terrorist groups. 642  The 
international threat is thus more of a concern for the UK than a domestic threat. 
The prohibition of membership will be confined to those proscribed 
organisations.  
 
However, in the case of Ethiopia the purpose of the proscription and the method 
of identifying terrorist organisations are arguably not the same. Before the 
enactment of the EATP, there were no laws that prohibited membership of any 
organisation. However, the number of prosecutions for mere membership was the 
second highest next to the allegation of incitement to terrorism before the EATP 
has come into effect. As indicated in table 2.3, the prosecution mentioned 
membership in eighteen of the cases considered in this research. This was before 
the EATP came into force. The only thing the new EATP has done is, therefore, 
to provide a legal ground for the courts.  
 
In conclusion, having a law that punishes mere membership in an organisation is 
not advisable for countries that do not have strong institutional independence. 
Some point that  the EATP could provide a legal excuse to prosecute people who 
join opposition political parties that do not even support any form of violence.643  
3.7 Encouragement of Terrorism  
 
The scope of encouraging or glorifying terrorism is not easy to delimit. The 
controversy stirred up by this offence in the UK was immense. From human 
rights organisations to legal scholars, all agreed that the Terrorism Bill on 
                                                 
642  The Home Office website states that there are 48 proscribed international terrorist 
organisations under TA 2000 compared to 14 organisations in Northern Ireland proscribed under 
previous legislation.   
643    See Amnesty International (2011). Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access 
to Information in Africa- Ethiopia. (AFR 25/009/2011)       
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encouragement of terrorism would have a ‘chilling effect' on freedom of 
expression.644 Garnering support for TA 2006 that includes among other things 
new offences on encouraging terrorism was a bumpy road for the former Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair. Though Tony Blair won the backing of the House of 
Commons, its success was short lived because the House of Lords twice rejected 
the inclusion of ‘glorifying' terrorism as a separate offence before the lords 
dropped their stiff opposition.645 In this section of the thesis we will identify 
some of the arguments against encouraging terrorism. 
 
Much of the ambivalence towards the offences relate to the fact that the 
criminalisation of encouraging or glorifying terrorism is drafted bluntly and is 
vague on details. Moreover, the relevance of the offences when discussed 
alongside the already available options to prosecute terrorists stimulated heated 
discussions. The analysis below identifies these discussions in the UK. Then the 
next section poses a question on whether the offences of encouraging terrorism 
would be unconstitutional in the US. This will be followed by an analysis of the 
problems of the EATP in relation to encouraging terrorism in light of section 1 of 
the TA 2006 and the misuse of Article 6 of the EATP against politicians and 
journalists.   
 
Because the focus of this thesis is on Ethiopian law, we will use the above 
arguments as a basis for supporting the Ethiopian government's decision to enact 
new provisions on encouraging terrorism. However, although the conclusion of 
this thesis is in favour of introducing these offences, we will show in the 
subsequent sections that the Ethiopian law is poorly drafted and implemented.  
 
A) Argument one: 
 
One of the refuting arguments against the need for offence of encouraging 
terrorism as stipulated in TA 2006 is that such an act can already be charged 
                                                 
644   See Submission from different bodies at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2005). Counter-
Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and Related Matters: Third Report of 
Session 2005-06: Vol. 2 Oral and Written Evidence HL Papers 75-II, HC Papers 561-II. London, 
TSO; see also ARTICLE 19 (2005). Statement On the Encouragement of Terrorism: Clause 1 of 
the UK Terrorism    
645   Hansard, HL Deb Vol. 680, col.241 (22 Mar 2006) 
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under existing common law and statutory offences.646 However, the elements 
stipulated for an offence of inciting violence and encouraging terrorism are not 
the same. A comparison to the offence of racial hatred could be made here to 
show the difference between inciting violence and encouraging terrorism. For the 
incitement of racial hatred, the offence can be committed by any means (written, 
oral, conduct) publicly or privately with the intention of "or having regard to all 
circumstances, racial hatred is likely to be stirred thereby."647 The cumulative 
reading of sections 18(2) and 18(4) of the Public Order Act 1986 reveal that 
racially motivated remarks that fall short of communication (publically or 
privately) are not within the ambit of the law. The 1986 Act has been further 
amended to include other offences.648  
 
However, there is striking a difference between the Public Order Act 1986 and 
the offences under TA 2006. In respect of the former, the offence can be 
committed privately or publicly, whereas the offence under the latter Act must 
involve communication to the public.649 As some have pointed out, it is arguably 
that the distinction between public and private communication undermines the 
basic justification for enacting the law:650  
 
they were said to be necessitated by the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism and the government claimed that the … offences were 
necessary because the existing law of incitement failed to catch certain 
categories of speech which encouraged terrorism because that law required a 
degree of explicitness, in terms of the speech constituting encouragement, and a 
degree of specificity in terms of the behaviour which was encouraged. 
 
The argument is then making a distinction into public and private communication 
may unnecessarily shift concerns from the content of the views expressed to the 
                                                 
646    See for instance Hansard, HC Deb Vol.443, col.1673 (16 Mar 2006) (Nick Clegg, MP argued 
that " the arrest of … a number of protesters who used sickening and inflammatory language on 
their placards when demonstrating against the anti-Islamic cartoons published in Denmark shows 
that current laws against incitement appear to be working fairly well …")   
647    Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986   
648     Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
649     Section 1(3) of TA 2006  
650     Hunt, A. (2007). Criminal Prohibitions on Direct and Indirect Encouragement of Terrorism. 
6  Criminal Law Review 441 
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audience at which they are communicated.651 This argument is backed up by 
existing laws such as the 1986 Public Order Act, as amended by the Racial and 
Religious offences Act 2006, which criminalizes both forms of communication.  
 
Therefore, the argument that there is no need for a different  law owing to the 
fact that such offences can be caught by existing laws is arguable fallacious; the 
elements of the offence of encouraging terrorism as discussed below is covered 
in a completely different manner.  
 
There are three sorts of relationship between encouraging terrorism and inciting 
violent actions. This nexus is best shown diagrammatically:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The offence of encouragement, specifically, the glorification of past terrorist acts 
as stipulated in the TA 2006 Act, adds more to the above illustration:  
 
 
                                                 
651      Ibid 
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A speech in the first diagram is closer to the action and it can be a direct cause of 
violent action. But the speech in the second diagram simply glorifies terrorist 
acts which have already been committed.  To use the language of the law, it 
‘praises or celebrates' terrorist acts. 652  The relationships become even more 
remote when recklessness is used as a mens rea. Therefore, the argument that the 
existing laws can cover glorification or indirect encouragement is rather vague. 
As the UK government and others have agreed,653 there was a loophole in the 
law.  
 
R v El-Faisal 654  could be referred as the justification for rejecting 655  the 
provisions under TA 2006 that deal with encouraging terrorism. While a 
plausible argument could be made that he could have been prosecuted under 
terrorism laws,656 El-Faisal was prosecuted and deported for inciting racial hatred. 
Two pieces of legislation were mentioned when justifying why the defendant 
should be convicted; section 4 Offences against the Person Act 1861; section 
18(1) and 21(1) of Public Order Act 1986.657 The following are a selection of the 
speeches given by the defendant on tapes submitted as evidence: 
 
                                                 
652     Section 20(2)   TA 2006   
653     Hansard, HL Deb Vol.676, col.455 (December 5, 2005) 
654     R v El-Faisal, supra note 613  
655    Roach, K. (2012) supra note 193, p. 299; see also ARTICLE 19 (2005). Statement On the 
Encouragement of Terrorism: Clause 1 of the UK Terrorism 
656   Hunt, A. (2007), supra note 650    
657     Section 4  of 1861 Offences Against the Person Act; section 18(1) and 21(1) of Public Order 
Act 1986  
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...the way forward can never be the ballot. The way forward is the bullet...'; ‘we 
spread Islam by the sword and so what, and today we are going to spread  by the 
Kalashnikov and there is nothing you can do about.'; ‘is there any peace treaty 
between us and the Hindus and Indians? No, so you can go to India and if you 
see a Hindu walking down the road, you are allowed to kill him and take his 
money. 
 
The defendant also stated that any Muslim who was killed whilst carrying out 
jihad would become a martyr and go on to paradise. The defendant encouraged 
suicide bombing campaigns and played tape recordings of Osama Bin Laden 
encouraging strikes against Western targets.          
 
The prosecution conceded that "the plain and ordinary meaning to be given to the 
appellant's words was that they were a general encouragement to his listeners to 
carry out acts of terrorism, the violent overthrow of democracy, and 
extermination of non Muslims."658 The conviction of the appellant, which was 
based on a ‘general encouragement' of terrorism, was affirmed on appeal.  
 
Despite the prosecution emphasising that the language used amounted to only a 
general encouragement of terrorism, in truth the evidence of the speeches display 
more of a mixture of messages specifically, directly and indirectly encouraging 
terrorism. For instance, the following sentence is clearly an offence of directly 
encouraging terrorism: "whenever the holy months expire, kill the pagans 
wherever you find them."659 In contrast, it is arguable that the following sentence 
is not an offence in any of the existing legislation or common law rules:  
 
...the jihad of a woman is to bring up her male children with a jihad mentality… 
when you buy toys for your boys you buy tanks and guns … this is the jihad of the 
woman, to bring up her sons with jihad mentality …660  
 
                                                 
658     R v El-Faisal, supra note 613, para. 31  
659     Ibid,  para.24.   
660      Ibid, para.22 
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It is doubtful whether, based on the above statement, the prosecution would have 
succeeded with a charge of inciting violence. However, there is higher 
probability of prosecutorial success under the offences in TA 2006 because the 
above expressions satisfy all the elements of the offences of glorification of 
terrorism (the expressions glorify future terrorist acts as they teach the ‘Jihad of 
women' and the targets in this case, i.e. the women, could also reasonably be 
expected to emulate the message). This is exactly the kind of statement the UK 
government is trying to criminalize under the new law.661   
 
Accordingly, section 1 of the TA 2006 requires either specific intent or 
recklessness for the prosecution of encouraging terrorism. The proposal to 
include glorification of terrorism as a separate offence from encouragement of 
terrorism was also dropped during the parliamentary debates. It is now included 
under sections 1(3) and 2(4) TA 2006.   
 
Moreover, an indication as to how the offences concerning encouraging terrorism 
are going to be applied has become clear in the aftermath of a case in which a 
young Muslim girl, Roshonara Choudry, stabbed an MP,662 for which she was 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Though she was tried under ordinary 
criminal law, her act was a terrorist act as it was committed in furtherance of 
"political and religious reasons".663 
 
Moreover, what has happened after the trial was a clear indication of why the 
offence encouraging terrorism does not necessarily encroach upon freedom of 
expression. Her supporters chanted outside the courtroom the following 
                                                 
661   See Hansard HC DebVol.442 Col. 1437 (15 February 2006); see also the speeches in R v 
Saleem and others, supra note 613 (the speech by Rahman that called for British soldiers to come 
back in body bags could not have been covered under the existing common law incitement); see 
also  Leroy v. France, supra note 565(the ECtHR in this cases upheld the conviction of a French 
cartoonist for publishing a cartoon depicting the terrorist attack in the US. The ECtHR was 
convinced that the publication of the drawings two days after the 9/11 attack mounts to giving 
"moral" support to the terrorists.)    
662    R v Roshonara Choudhry [2010] T20107212   
663     Anderson, D (2012). The Terrorism Acts in 2011 supra note 335, para. 101   
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sentences: "Islam will dominate the world, we Muslims demand the release of all 
Muslims, Stephen Timms [the stabbed MP], go to hell..." 664  
 
These words, though they did not encourage, justify or glorify the stabbing of the 
MP, were expressions that were "controversial, shocking, or offensive."665 But 
none of the people chanting these extreme views were arrested, or threatened 
with arrest other than escorting them from the court to a safe place. However, 
this case is different from another, R v Saleem,666 in which four defendants were 
convicted for offences contrary to section 18(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. In 
this case, a speech by Rahman that called for British soldiers to come back in 
body bags, were far more serious than those used at the demonstration during the 
sentencing of Roshonara Choudry. However, it is arguable that the statements 
made by Rahman were not directly inciting terrorism, but were instead "uttered 
with the intent that they should encourage others to commit terrorist acts."667  
 
Therefore, closer scrutiny of TA 2006 tells us that not all statements that 
encourage, justify or glorify terrorism are in fact curtailed by law. The emphasis 
on the contents and circumstances in which the statements are made provides a 
significant protection to freedom of expression.668 However, during peace time 
and war, words can imply different things. It should not come as a surprise then 
if a government does not show leniency in the interpretation of the law during 
exceptional circumstances. As discussed in the preceding sections, this trend has 
been accepted by the US Supreme Courts669 as the well as the ECtHR in many 
cases against Turkey.  
 
                                                 
664    Seamark, M. (2010). Curse the Judge, Shout Fanatics as Muslim girl who Knifed MP Smiles 
as she Gets Life. Daily Mail, 5 November 
665     Castells v Spain, supra note 596; see also Handyside v the UK, supra note 431     
666   R v Saleem, supra note 613; see also Wildhaber, L. (2001). The Right to Offend, Shock or 
Disturb? Aspects of Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
36 Irish Jurist. 17 
667      See Letter from Charles Clarke, U.K. Home Secretary, to Rt. Hon David Davis MP and 
Mark Oaten MP, Members of the House of Commons (Sept. 15, 2005) 
668      See for instance, Leroy v. France, supra note 565 (the ECtHR in this cases upheld the 
conviction of a French cartoonist for publishing a cartoon depicting the terrorist attack in the US. 
The ECtHR was convinced that the publication of the drawings two days after the 9/11 attack 
mounts to giving "moral" support to the terrorists.) 
669  See for example, Schenck v United States, supra note 443; Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 
446  
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B) Argument two: 
 
The other related argument is whether the offence of encouraging terrorism is 
directed against democratic or non-democratic regimes. While reflecting the 
views of the UN High Commissioner for Human rights,670 some suggest that 
"prosecution of those encouraging terrorism against undemocratic regimes could 
breach a right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR 
and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."671 
This view was also shared by the then Home Secretary, Charles Clark MP.672 As 
with the argument above, the validity of this argument is also doubtful, 
seemingly tolerating the glorification of terrorism within undemocratic regimes. 
This argument is problematic for several reasons. Recent decisions in the UK 
showed that the above argument is not supported.  
 
For instance, in R v F,673 a UK court entirely rejected the appellant's arguments 
by stating that the TA 2000 does not make a distinction between terrorist acts 
directed against a tyrant as opposed to a representative government. The UK 
Supreme Court also affirmed this position in R v Gul.674  The appellant uploaded 
several ‘martyrdom videos' showing attacks by proscribed groups on military 
targets.675  He argued that:676 
 
..force against the military was justified and that those who were fighting the 
Coalition forces were rightly resisting the invasion of their country. He did not 
agree with the targeting of civilians and attacks on civilians. He was therefore 
not encouraging terrorism, but self defence. 
                                                 
670     A letter written by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louse Labour states that 
the definition of encouragement to terrorism "fails to strike a balance between national security 
considerations and the fundamental right of freedom of expression." For details see Arbour, L. 
(2005). Letter to the UK's Permanent Representative to the UN Office and other international 
organisations in Geneva, 28 November 
671   The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) (2005).  Definition of Terrorism in UK Law: 
Memorandum to Lord Carlile's Independent Review of the Definition of Terrorism in UK Law, at 
http://www.quaker.org.uk/definition-terrorism-uk-law ; see also Liberty (2005). Terrorism Bill: 
Liberty's Briefing for Second Reading in the House of Lords, November 2005. 
672   Hansard HC Deb Vol 438 col 324-328 (26 Oct 2005)  
673     R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243; see also section 59 of TA 2000 for incitement to commit acts 
of terrorism overseas 
674   R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 
675   Ibid, para. 6 
676   Ibid, para. 7  
146 
 
 
However, the UK Supreme Court considered the definition of terrorism under 
section one of TA 2000 and held that:677  
 
The definition in s 1 is clear. Those who attacked the military forces of a 
government or the Coalition forces in Afghanistan or Iraq with the requisite 
intention set out in the Act are terrorists. There is nothing in international law 
which either compels or persuades us to read down the clear terms of the 2000 
Act to exempt such persons from the definition in the Act 
 
Unlike some regional definitions of terrorism, such as the Algiers Convention,678 
the TA 2000 does not make an exception for ‘freedom fighters'. If the courts 
were to deviate from the current construction of section 1 TA 2000, they could 
face the more difficult question of applying the same legislation against the 
IRA,679 despite the fact that this threat is diminishing. Thus, the approach of UK 
courts in the above case is perhaps not necessarily to be criticised.   
 
However, the above decisions may prompt some to argue that a failure to 
acknowledge a distinction between, on the one hand, an armed struggle against 
oppressive regimes and, on the other hand, terrorist acts would require the UK 
government "to protect every crazy government in the world."680 Although this 
argument might be plausible, at least theoretically, it is not supported by recent 
practices. To start with, Libyan ‘rebels' managed to topple Col. Kaddafi with the 
help of NATO and other Gulf States. In a stark turn of events, the UK 
government has agreed to compensate some ‘terrorists' who were rendered to 
Libya.681  
 
                                                 
677 Ibid, para. 60      
678    See chapter two for further discussion   
679   For detail analysis on IRA, see Moloney, E. (2007).  Supra note 306; see also Coogan, T. P. 
(2002). The IRA. Supra note 306; see also Shanahan, T. (200), supra note 306; see also Walker, C. 
(2011), supra note 224, pp. 340-344    
680   Walker, C.  (2002). Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. 1st edition. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press),  p.175     
681  Talor, R. N. (2012). Government pays Libyan dissident's family £2.2m over MI6-aided 
rendition, 13 December, Guardian; see also Cobain, I. (2012).  Libyan dissidents launch action 
against UK government over rendition, 28 June, Guardian      
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To add another example:  it is claimed that Syrian ‘rebels' are funded, trained and 
armed by their Gulf backers with the implicit approval of Western counties.682 
Videos showing attacks on Syrian government military installations and other 
institutional targets are awash on the internet. Some of these videos, which praise 
the ‘heroic' attacks, are widely accessible from Western newspapers. 683  But 
neither the UK government nor other western countries are in any mood to bring 
terrorism charges against people who upload these videos.   
 
Moreover, there were few reported terrorism-related arrests against British 
nationals who travelled to Syria. Conceded, some individuals were charged for 
participating in the kidnapping of western journalists or for joining jihadist 
movements in Syria. 684 However, it would be absurd if the UK government 
brought terrorism charges for the sole reason that such individuals have 
supported a war against an oppressive regime. This is due to the fact that there 
are some Syrians living in the UK who openly support the ‘rebels', 685  with 
similar sentiments felt by much of Europe.686 The UK government and other 
western governments are more concerned with the radicalisation of young 
Muslims who travelled to Syria.687    
 
Furthermore, arguments in favour of encouraging terrorism against undemocratic 
regimes raise a complicated issue of finding who is ‘democratic' and who is not. 
Taking the case of Ethiopia, for instance, the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, 
was widely regarded by some Ethiopian Diasporas as a dictator. Some 
international human rights organisations have also branded him a tyrant.688 But, 
for Western allies of the country, such as the UK, the late Ethiopian leader was 
                                                 
682 Bayoumy, Y. and Bakr, A. (2013). Western, Arab states to step up Syrian rebel support, 22 
June, Reuters; see also Oweis, K. Y. (2013).  Large Arms Shipment Reaches Syrian Rebels: 
Opposition, 25 August, Reuters      
683  To mention some: New York Times (2012). The Lions of Tawhid, 20 August; see also 
Guardian (2012). Syrian Rebels 'Down Army Helicopter' In Damascus, 27 August; see also 
Guardian (2013). Syria Rebels Battle to Take Taftanaz Air Base, 3 January    
684    BBC (2013). Brothers Deny Kidnapping Journalists In Syria, 21 June; see also Whitehead, T. (2013).  
Four Men Arrested Under Terror Laws After Kidnap Of Journalist, 10 January, The Daily 
Telegraph   
685    MacFarquhar, N (2013). A Very Busy Man Behind the Syrian Civil War's Casualty Count, 9 
April, New York Times      
686    Bayoumy, Y. and Bakr, A. (2013). supra note 682 
687    Schmit, E. (2013). Worries Mount as Syria Lures West's Muslims, 27 July, New York Times   
688     See for instance, Freedom House (2012). The Unhappy Legacy of Meles Zenawi, 22 August  
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one of the few African intellectuals.689 Therefore, it can be subject to abuse as 
the decision to apply the law could be left to the discretion of the ‘democratic' 
states. The prohibition of speech that incites and encourages terrorism should 
surely be the same for all nations, democratic or undemocratic, if freedom of 
speech is to be realised in its truest sense. It also makes no sense to permit the 
encouragement of terrorism in undemocratic regimes.  
 
We have also explored the absurd dichotomy of ‘terrorists' and ‘freedom fighter' 
in chapter two from an Ethiopian perspective.  For the Ethiopian government, 
Ginbot 7, OLF ONLF, EPPF constitute terrorist organisations.  In a similar 
manner to the appellant in R v Gul, 690 these organisations, particularly OLF 
ONLF, justified attacks against the Ethiopian government as military targets, not 
terrorist attacks. But we have noted in chapter two that most of the leaders of 
these organisations have received political asylum in the West.  Therefore, it 
would be Western hypocrisy at its height to tolerate encouraging terrorism 
against ‘undemocratic' regimes, but condemning similar attacks against their 
citizens or their interests. Terrorists should be punished for committing terrorist 
acts and they should not get away with it for the sole reason that their act was 
directed against some perceived ‘undemocratic' regimes.           
 
To sum up, the criminalisation of indirectly encouraging terrorism, i.e. 
glorification has political, psychological, and legal relevance.  
 
It has a psychological effect because criminalizing, for instance glorification of 
terrorism, has nothing to do with imminent threat to national security. It is 
arguable that the purposes of this sort of offence succeed not only in shunning an 
expression that is unbearable, but which might also indirectly encourage others to 
follow suit. For instance, people do not want to hear words that undermine fallen 
soldiers in a battlefield or make "celebration of despicable terrorist acts".691 It is 
emotionally and physically disturbing, and frankly drives people to agitation.  
 
                                                 
689  The Daily Telegraph (2012). Meles Zenawi Obituaries, 22 August     
690    R v Gul, supra note 674   
691    See the argument of the former Home Secretary Charles Clarke in Letter from Charles Clarke, 
supra note 667; see also Council of Europe (2005). Explanatory Report, supra note 523, para. 95   
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To the receiver of the message, especially young Muslims, on the other hand, it 
sends out a signal that a terrorism in its various manifestations is appropriate; 
‘conduct that should be emulated by [the receivers] in existing circumstances.' 
Preaching to Muslims asking them to become martyrs is neither direct incitement 
nor general encouragement to terrorism. But, it urges, it reminds and it persuades 
those listening to emulate the behaviour of others who might have committed 
suicide atrocities. There is, thus, a danger with this sort of speech because it 
"resonates with the present and guides future action."692 
 
The political aspect of the offence of indirectly encouraging (glorification) 
terrorism becomes particularly important if the speech is prejudiced based on the 
identity of the speaker. A speech should not be given special consideration 
depending on the speaker being a Muslim, or a member of an opposition party.  
 
Finally, the legal relevance of the law is that it fills the gap in the existing law by 
capturing expressions:  
 
which do not amount to direct incitement to perpetrate acts of violence, but 
which are uttered with the intent that they should encourage others to commit 
terrorist acts.693 
 
The above justification was recently upheld in R v Ahmed Faraz. 694  The 
conviction of the defendant under TA 2006 was quashed after the UK Court of 
Appeal ruled that the trial court had improperly told the jury that other convicted 
terrorists possessed the same terrorist materials presented against Ahmed Faraz. 
However, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge was correct to hold that 
the offences under TA 2006 are compatible with Article 10 ECHR.695 This case 
has also underlined the notion that punishing offences that ‘by necessary 
implication'696 encourage terrorism are justified. 
 
                                                 
692   Walker, C. (2011), supra  note 224, p.367    
693   Letter from Charles Clarke, U.K. Home Secretary, to Rt. Hon David Davis MP and Mark 
Oaten MP, Members of the House of Commons (July 15, 2005)   
694   R v Ahmed Faraz [2012] EWCA Crim 2820   
695   Ibid, paras. 54, 57     
696  Ibid, para. 52       
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So far, there have been seven prosecutions based on section 1-2 of TA 2006.697 
The Crown Prosecution Service has achieved a conviction in six698 of the cases. 
The CPS has also listed encouragement of terrorism as a separate form of offence 
thereby supporting the argument for a need for specific legislation on expressions 
that encourage terrorism.699 
 
Finally, punishing expressions that justify or glorify acts of terrorism has the 
legal backing of regional instruments700 such as the European Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism (ECTP),701 as well as international instruments such as 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1624. 702  Article 5 of the ECPT 
criminalises ‘public provocation to commit terrorist offences'. The explanatory 
report to the ECPT states those offences such as Article 5 "...should not be 
considered as terrorist offences…They are criminal offences of a serious nature 
related to terrorist offences."703 
 
Moreover, the UNSCR, in its preamble, condemns "...in the strongest terms the 
incitement of terrorist acts and repudiating attempts at the justification or 
glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts".  
 
3.8 Would the Glorification of Terrorism be Unconstitutional in the US? 
 
                                                 
697     Home office (2012).  Home Office Statistical Bulletin Operation Of Police Powers Under 
The Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes And Stops And Searches 
(HOSB 11/12), at Table 1.03(a)   
698     Ibid, Table 1.11(a)   
699    See Crown Prosecution Service. Prosecution Policy and Guidance: Violent Extremism and 
Related Criminal Offences, at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html   
700   Hansard, HL Deb Vol.676, col.455 (December 5, 2005)    
701      Council of Europe (2005). Council of European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Warsaw 16. v. 2005) 
702  United Nations Security Council (2005). Threats to International Peace and Security 
(S/RES/1624 (2005).   
703   See Council of Europe (2005). Explanatory Report, supra note 523, paras. 77-78; for the 
distinction between Article 4 of ECPT and Section 1 TA, see Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(2007). The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism: First Report of 
session 2006-07, Report together with Formal Minutes and Appendices. (HL Paper 26 HC 247. 
London, TSO), paras. 22-49    
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In the UK, there are arguments both for and against criminal offence of 
encouraging a crime.704 As discussed above, the same is true with the offence of 
encouraging terrorism. It might be tempting to close the argument on 
encouraging terrorism by suggesting that because they would have been 
unconstitutional in the US, so they should assume the same illegitimacy in the 
UK. If this argument is made based on existing laws, then it is true that the US 
does not have a law that criminalises the glorification of terrorism. However, if it 
is made based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment 
rights, then the argument could be more ‘speculative'.705  
 
There are several reasons for above accentuation. First, the Supreme Court was 
inconsistent in its approach to the question of national security and the scope of 
constitutionally protected rights during war and peace times. 706  The various 
principles discussed above, such as the bad tendency test, the clear and present 
test, etc were a result of this. For this reason, it would be difficult to speculate 
that the US Supreme Court would overturn new offences on the issue of 
glorifying terrorism. The circumstances in which the law come into effect, for 
instance in time of war or terrorist attacks similar to 9/11, might convince the 
court not to do so.  
 
Secondly, a comparison of the US laws on terrorism with the UK's is somehow 
misleading. More often than not, the cases cited for comparisons are those that 
dealt with the incitement of violence, not the glorification of terrorism. However, 
as discussed in detail in the previous sections, these two types of violence are not 
the same. Moreover, most of the US cases are related to the offence of 
                                                 
704   See Ormerod, D. and Fortson, R. (2009). Serious Crime Act 2007: the Part 2 Offences.  
Criminal Law Review  No.6 pp. 389-414 (arguing that "It is questionable whether all of these 
tortuously difficult offences in ss.44-46 are even necessary.") See also a counter argument in 
Sullivan, G.R. (2006). Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime.  Crim. L.R. 1047. 
see also Barnum, D. G.  (2006). ,supra note 444(arguing that "There do not appear to be any 
doctrinal impediments to using s.1 of the Terrorism Act to punish  "indirect encouragement" to 
the commission of terrorist acts."); see also Child, J.J., supra note 72    
705  Barnum, D. G., supra note 444 ("Freedom of speech is widely thought to enjoy stricter 
protection in the United States than almost anywhere else in the world. Presumably government 
would be barred from imposing criminal penalties on an open-ended and ill-defined category of 
speech such as "indirect incitement". This conclusion is plausible but speculative. It appears that 
American courts, like British courts, might be prepared to entertain the possibility that indirect 
incitement should qualify as punishable speech.")     
706  Howard, R. D.  et al. (2006). Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations 
(New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies)     
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‘dissemination', not to a ‘statement offence.' These are different sorts of offences 
in the UK.707 The charges in Schenck v United States, for instance, were related 
to: 
 
a conspiracy to circulate among men called and accepted for military services… 
a circular tending to influence them to obstruct the draft, with the intention to 
effect that result…708  
 
Consequently, First Amendment protection was denied as the circulars were 
found encouraging to the commission of subversive activities. The same is true 
with the Masses Publishing Co. v Pattern 709, Gitlow v New York 710, Abrams v 
United States 711 cases where the offences were related to publishing, printing, or 
writing offensive expressions and then disseminating them to the public. These 
allegations would fall under section 2 TA 2006. 
 
The other landmark decisions, on the other hand, were centred on unprotected 
public speeches. Feiner v New York, 712  Dennis v United States 713  and 
Brandenburg v Ohio714 fall under this category. Although the US Supreme Court 
applied the same balancing principles for both ‘statement offenses' and 
‘disseminating offences', a comparison of TA 2006 with the US should be like 
for like as both are two separate offences.  
 
Thirdly, the attempt to mix up the offence of indirectly encouraging terrorism 
and inciting terrorism is another confusing aspect of the comparison. An attempt 
to resort to court cases that deal with the latter by ignoring this difference is not 
helpful. For instance, the issue in the case of Taylor v State of Mississippi was 
the constitutionality of a Mississippi Statute that criminalized a person:  
  
                                                 
707  See section 1 and section 2 of TA 2006. For detail discussion on the difference between 
‘statement offences' and ‘dissemination offences', see Hunt, A. (2007). supra note 650     
708    Schenck v United States, supra note 443   
709     Masses Publishing Co. v Pattern 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)  
710    Gitlow v New York, supra note 546  
711     Abrams v Unted states  , supra note 441 
712     Feiner v New York, 340 US 315 (1951) 
713     Dennis v United States, supra note 531 
714     Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
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...who individually, or as member of any organisation… intentionally preach, 
teach or disseminate any teachings … by any … means or method designated 
and circulated to encourage violence… incite any sort of radical distrust…715   
 
The defendant was "… indicted for orally disseminating teachings designed and 
calculated to encourage disloyalty…" 716  Similar to the construction of the 
glorification clause (in the past or future) in the UK, Taylor condemned the 
sending of boys to battle overseas in the past and in the future. However, the US 
Supreme Court acquitted Taylor, and the other defendants, stating that the views 
expressed were "… their beliefs and opinions concerning domestic measures and 
trends in national and world affairs."717 The content of the Mississippi Statute 
was similar to that of the UK's direct encouragement clause except the former 
requires only criminal intent while the latter requires intent or recklessness. 
Moreover, the former does not make any distinction between private and public 
communications.  
 
Under the current UK TA 2006, therefore, Schenck would have been prosecuted 
under section 2 of the TA 2006 whilst Taylor would have been covered by 
section 1.  
 
However, Schenck's conviction was upheld while Taylor's claim to the First 
Amendment was upheld. Nevertheless, a question is appropriate here: Would 
Taylor be prosecuted if he advised the women not to send their children to war 
instead of general condemnation of the recruitment of men to battlefields? The 
answer would seem to be in the affirmative if we consider the position taken in 
Schenck v United States discussed above and Frohwerk v United States.718 The 
statements made in the anti-draft in Frohwerk were as follows:  
 
...a monumental and inexcusable mistake to send our soldiers to France...; ‘out 
right murder without serving anything practical', ‘few men and compatriots 
                                                 
715  Taylor v State of Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943)     
716     Ibid  
717      Ibid 
718     Frohwerk v United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) 
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might amuse unprecedented fortunes. We sold our honour, our very soul.', ‘we 
say, therefore, cease firing.719  
 
It would appear that this statement presents no obvious dangers. However, the 
conviction of the defendant was upheld because the US Supreme Court believed 
that "a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame." 720  However, the 
expressions used in Frohwerk would not be covered even by the strictest 
glorification clause in the UK because Frohwerk's statements contain nothing 
that ‘praise or celebrate' act of violence.  
 
Another case, where the incitement test was applied is Brandenburg v Ohio.721 A 
look at this case suggests that a speech that falls short of inciting violence is 
protected by the US constitution. The US Supreme Court attempted to balance 
between permissible and non-permissible expressions. It went to the extent of 
overruling earlier cases such as Whitney v California 722 where an early US 
Supreme Court decision upheld a California's Criminal Syndicalism Act that 
criminalize mere ‘advocacy' of violence.   
 
If the Brandenburg v Ohio principle (held that a government cannot punish 
theoretical discussion of overthrow of a government by violence) is taken, the 
TA 2006 that deal with encouragement of terrorism would have been 
unconstitutional in the US. But is merely advocating violence the same as 
glorification of terrorism as appears under section 1 TA 2006? The answer would 
come in the form of negative because section 1 TA 2006, in terms of its 
construction, requires an actus reus that "the individual's statement was likely to 
be understood by those to whom it was published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement to them to engage in specific behaviour."723 But none of this 
requirement was required in Brandenburg v Ohio.    
 
                                                 
719   Ibid 
720   Ibid  
721    Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 
722  Whitney v California , supra note 441     
723 Hunt, A. (2007)., supra note 650      
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A more convincing argument could be drawn from Holder v Humanitarian Law 
Project. 724  This case has stirred much controversy by affirming the Material 
Support Statute (18 USC § 2339B). Holder has overruled, if not, retreated from 
Brandenburg's incitement test.  
 
Holder 725  raises basically a question of how much support one can offer to 
terrorist organisations. The case had been dragging on for twelve years. The 
plaintiffs challenged the Material Support Statute: 
 
... asserting violations of Fifth Amendment due process clause on the ground that 
the statutory terms are impressively vague and a violation of their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association.726  
 
The US Supreme Court rejected this argument. The relevance of the case to this 
research comes from the application of the Material Support Statute to speeches 
that advocate any form of support. As discussed in the preceding sections, 
Brandenburg v Ohio criticised and overruled previous court cases that punished 
speech that merely advocate violence. The US Supreme Court in Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project qualified Brandenburg v Ohio in the following 
respects. 
 
First, the US Supreme Court held that the Material Support Statute does not ban 
speech.  Brandenburg v Ohio was generous in the sense that it went to the extent 
of upholding the advocacy of violence by any group [foreign or domestic], and 
individuals. But, Holder v Humanitarian Law Project deviated from this 
incitement test by punishing purely political advocacy in relation to foreign 
terrorist groups. In other words, the US Supreme Court here criminalised speech 
that has nothing to do with incitement to violence or imminent lawless action.  
 
Second, it distinguished between ‘independent' advocacy and active membership. 
The US Supreme Court stated that ‘independent advocacy' is advocacy not 
                                                 
724 Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 451      
725  Ibid       
726   Ibid  (syllabus)    
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conducted "… under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign … terrorist 
organisation."727 The US Supreme Court held that this kind of advocacy is not 
prohibited. Moreover, the US Supreme Court is of the opinion that mere 
membership, even to proscribed terrorist groups, is not banned. The distinction 
made between various stages of participation is relevant here. One can be a 
member, but one may not take a role in any activity of a group. Independent 
advocacy is considered passive participation and not covered by the Material 
Support Statute. In contrast, one might not be a member, but one can still 
actively participate in the activities of the group, for instance, by contributing 
funds. Moreover, one can be both a member and an active participant. According 
to Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, the Material Support Statute covers both 
of the latter cases.  
 
Third, the US Supreme Court made it clear that there should be a distinction 
between Communist and terrorist organisations. The US Supreme Court stated 
that the scrutiny of and restrictions placed on terrorist organisations will be more 
intense than in the former because of the very purpose for which they exist. 728  
 
 More interesting is the point made by Justice Scalia with regard to the Material 
Support Statute.  He stated that joining an organisation for ‘philosophical 
reasons'729 is not a crime under the US law. Until it is made a crime by a Federal 
or State entity, therefore, there could not be any punishment thereof. His 
statement is an appropriate response to the speculative argument that the UK's 
indirect encouragement of terrorism offence would be unconstitutional in the US. 
In the absence of any Federal law or US Supreme Court decision that deals with 
glorification of terrorism, arguing that the UK law would be unconstitutional is 
fallacious.  
 
For all the reasons discussed above, it is wrong to conclude that the offences 
under TA 2006 in the UK would have been unconstitutional in the US.  
 
                                                 
727 Ibid     
728  See oral argument in Holder  v Humanitarian Law Project [ as argued on February 23, 2010], 
supra note 451     
729    Ibid   
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3.9 How does the EATP define the Glorification of Terrorist Acts? How is 
this different from TA 2006?   
 
Before we embark a discussion on the definition of glorification under the EATP, 
we will first discuss the specific laws on incitement to violence under Ethiopian 
law.  
 
The Ethiopian Criminal Code and the EATP contain provisions that deal with 
incitement. Accordingly, Article 36(1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code provides 
the framework. Incitement is defined as intentional inducement of "another 
person whether by persuasion, promises, money, gifts, and threats or otherwise to 
commit a crime." This definition is similar to common law definition of 
incitement. 730  However, Sub-article two provides that there is no offence of 
incitement to violence if the intended offence is not attempted.  
 
This is in a direct contrast to common law approach which had been in place 
before the coming into force of the Serious Crime Act 2007. This Act replaced 
the common law incitement of violence with offences of encouraging crimes.731 
In R v Higgins,732 for instance, it was held that it is immaterial whether the 
incited act was attempted or not.  
 
                                                 
730  See for example, Race Relations Board v Applin [1975] AC 259, HL ("incite" means to urge 
or spur on by advice, encouragement or persuasions, and not otherwise ... A person may "incite" 
another to do an act by threatening or by pressure, as well as by persuasion."); see also Crown 
Prosecution Service. Prosecution Policy and Guidance, supra note (the CPS lists long list of 
offences that could be categorized under violent form of expression).       
731  See sections 44-46. See also Law Commission (2006).  Report on Inchoate Liability for 
Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No. 300, Cm 6878). London, the Commission; see 
also Child, J.J. (2012). Exploring the Mens Rea Requirements of the Serious Crime Act 2007 
Assisting and Encouraging Offences. 76(3) J. Crim. L.  220-231  ("Considers the complexity of 
the drafting of the Serious Crime Act 2007 Pt 2 offences of encouraging and assisting crime and 
in particular those provisions related to mens rea. Focuses on two categories of offence: (1) belief 
offences, comprising the s.45 and s.46 offences; and (2) the intention offence found in s.44. 
Considers the minimum mens rea requirements of the offences and suggests that they do not 
require belief or intention but are satisfied by mere recklessness and are therefore risk-based 
offences"); see also Ormerod, D. and Fortson, R., supra note 704; see also Sullivan, G.R., supra 
note 704.      
732 R v Higgins, supra note 528      
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Moreover, for a common law incitement to violence, there should be 
communication between the target and the inciter,733 though under exceptional 
circumstances there can be criminal liability even before communication. 734 
However, the Ethiopian Criminal Code is silent on this requirement.  
 
In similar fashion to the case of Brandersburg v Ohio,735 Invicta Plastics Ltd v 
Clare 736 affirmed that there can be indirect as well as direct incitement to a 
specific offence or addressed generally to the public.737 The Ethiopian Criminal 
Code, on the other hand, specifically mentioned that liability arises only in case 
of directly intended incitement, and not through indirect incitement.  
 
However, Article 255 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code contains an exception to 
the general principles stated under Article 36. There can be criminal liability for 
inciting a felony offence even if the incited act is not attempted.738 Moreover, 
specifically, the EATP makes it a crime to incite someone "even if the incited 
offence is not attempted."739  
 
But it remains unclear under Ethiopian law whether there should be 
public/private communication for the law to be triggered. Article 27(2) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal code can be of some help here. According to this article, "a 
mere attempt to instigate is not a crime unless the exception is clearly provided 
by law." As discussed above, Article 255 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code is one 
of the exceptions. Nevertheless, the question is: does liability for attempting to 
                                                 
733  R v Fitzmaurice, supra note 528.     
734   R v Ransford (1874) 13 Cox 9, (1874) 3 LT 488, CCR.    
735  Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 446 (though incitement can be direct or indirect, "a statute 
which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain 
of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. 
Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments").     
736  Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare, supra note 528 (incitement is defined as encouragement, 
persuasion, or a commonad of another t commit a crime).    
737   The ECtHR also supports certain restrictions that directly or indirectly incite violence. See 
Hogefeld v Germany, supra note 541    
738   Note that there is not a definition of attempt under the Ethiopian Criminal Code though 
Article 27(2) of the same Code provided that ‘an attempted crime is always punishable save as it 
is provided by law, and a mere attempt to instigate or assist crime does not come within the 
provisions of the law unless it is expressly provided to the contrary". It is not clear how 
preparation is distinguished from attempt. According to common law cases, attempt and 
preparation are not the same. See R v Robinson (1915) 2 KB 342; R v Widdowson (1986) Crim 
LR 233; See also Criminal Attempts Act 1981 C. 47.     
739   Article 2(7) of the EATP.     
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incite arise in the absence of communication?  Alternatively, does Article 27(2) 
of the Ethiopian Criminal Code simply refer to attempted incitement after 
communication is made or to attempted incitement that is not communicated?740 
According to R v Ransford in the UK,741 the inciter could be legally responsible 
if he attempted to incite, but the attempt was not communicated.  The Ethiopian 
Criminal Code, however, does not give a clue as to how the above provision is to 
be interpreted.  
 
The relevant Article for a discussion on glorification of terrorism is Article 6 of 
the EATP. This Article states that:  
  
Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be 
understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published 
as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the 
commission or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism stipulated under 
Article 3 of this Proclamation is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 
to 20 years. 
 
This is a direct replica of section 1(1) TA 2006.742 This raises a question as to 
whether encouragement to terrorism, more specifically glorifying acts of 
terrorism, is a new offence in Ethiopia. The answer is in the affirmative despite 
the existence of some provisions in the Ethiopian Criminal Code that deal with 
other serious offences.  
 
Article 254 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code is entitled "indirect aid or 
encouragement." According to this article, failing to report or to do one's best to 
prevent attacks on the political or territorial integrity of the State is punishable 
                                                 
740  R v Krause, 66 JP 121, 18 TLR 238; see also R v Higgins, supra note 528   
741  R v Ransford, supra note 734.     
742    For the four main distinctions between Article 5 of The Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism (ECPT) and section 1 of TA 2006,   see Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2007). The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism: First Report of 
session 2006-07, Report together with Formal Minutes and Appendices. HL Paper 26 HC 247. 
London, TSO. The explanatory report to the ECPT also states that offences stated from articles 5 
to 7 "should not be considered as terrorist offences … They are criminal offences of a serious 
nature related to terrorist offences." see Council of Europe (2005). Explanatory Report, supra 
note 523, paras. 77-78   
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from five to ten years rigorous imprisonment. 743 However, this Article has a 
different implication from that of Article 6 of the EATP. While the latter applies 
to ‘statement offences,' the Ethiopian Criminal Code provision applies to actual 
physical attacks, rather than speech. For this reason, it could be said that the 
offences of encouragement to terrorism are new to Ethiopia.  
 
Due to this novelty, it might simply not be a case of criticising Ethiopia for 
enacting a specific provision that deals with encouragement of terrorism because, 
as will be discussed below, incitement to terrorism could not cover the offences 
stipulated under TA 2006. Moreover, the UK government argued that 
criminalizing indirect encouragement has legal backing from the UN.744 More 
importantly, the ECtHR has accepted that anyone who glorifies terrorists attacks 
would be considered giving "moral support for those whom he presumed to be 
the perpetrators" of the attacks.745 Though the Ethiopian legislature did not have 
convincing justifications, having a specific provision that deals with 
encouragement to terrorism is relevant for political, psychological, and legal 
reasons.  
 
While it is true that the provision concerning the encouragement of terrorism is 
taken directly from the UK, the Ethiopian legislature seems unwilling to provide 
a further definition and guidance on how the offences are to be interpreted. First, 
the TA 2006 requires two states of mind with regard to the encouragement of 
terrorism: intent or reckless behaviour. 746 But such requirements are omitted 
from the EATP. Second, TA 2006 has attempted, though vaguely 747 , to 
differentiate between direct or indirect encouragement. In view of that, a 
statement indirectly encourages acts of terrorism if it:748 
 
                                                 
743     Note that the said Article also applies to Articles 242, 244 and 246 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Code that cover offences from espionage to Violation of Territorial or Political Sovereignty. 
743      It makes a reference to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1624 that mentions 
glorifying acts of terrorism. see Hansard HC Deb Vol.442 Col. 1429 (15 February 2006)   
744    It makes a reference to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1624 that mentions 
glorifying acts of terrorism. see Hansard HC Deb Vol.442 Col. 1429 (15 February 2006)     
745   Leroy v. France, supra note 560   
746  For a detail explanation on the actus reus and mens rea requirement, see Walker, C. (2011)., 
supra note 224,  pp. 365-366; see also section 1(2)(b)(I-II) of the same Act     
747 Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224 , p. 368      
748  Section 1(3) TA 2006      
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  (a) Glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or 
generally) of such acts or offences; and 
 
(b) Is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be 
expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that 
should be emulated by them in existing circumstances?  
 
The TA 2006 does not define what a ‘reasonable expectation'749 means in this 
context. The problem with indirect encouragement to terrorism is that the 
impacts of the statements are "measured by reference to its likely understanding 
by members of the Public to whom it is published."750 Therefore: 
 
conviction for a serious criminal offence will turn on inferences drawn by others, 
and that the existence of the offence may have a chilling effect on political speech, 
which is a category of speech that the Strasbourg court has accorded special 
importance.751 
 
Despite these problems, the 2006 Act also provides some useful hints that could 
negate the above concerns. First, the ‘statements' and the group of people 
relevant for the 2006 Act must be determined based on "the contents of the 
statement as a whole; and the circumstances and manner of its publication."752 
The law does not take into account the identity or the affiliation of the publisher. 
Neither is it concerned with whether the public are actually ‘encouraged.'753 Thus, 
the law is identity neutral in the sense that it is immaterial who the publisher or 
the intended targets of the statements are. This is in a direct contrast to the 
                                                 
749   The Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised its concern on the vague requirement of 
reasonableness. See Joint Committee on Human Rights (2005). Counter-terrorism Policy and 
Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and Related Matters: Third Report of session 2005-06: Vol.1 
Report and formal minutes. HL Paper 75-I 2005-06, HC 561-I. London, TSO, para. 28; But see 
also how reasonableness was defined with regard to encouragement of terrorism and the 
subsequent imposition of control orders   in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AL 
[2007] EWHC 1970 (Admin)     
750 Choudhury, T. (2009). The Terrorism Act 2006: Discouraging Terrorism. In   Hare, I. and 
Weinstein, J. (eds.). Extreme Speech and Democracy. (Oxford, Oxford, University Press),  p.470       
751  Hunt, A. (2007). , supra note 650     
752   Section 1(4) of TA 2006     
753  Section 1(5)      
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position of the ECtHR with regard to the relevance of identity of the 
publisher/speaker in the analysis of a speech that incites terrorism.754  
 
Secondly,  
 
...the notion of ‘emulation' ensures that the words uttered should be understood 
as more than rhetorical. Consequently, praise for historical violence ... is not an 
offence, unless the statement can be understood to resonate with the present and 
to guide future action.755   
 
The psychological effect of statements that ‘resonate with the present' will be 
discussed below. No such distinction is provided under Ethiopian law. 
 
Third, the TA 2006 is also different from Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Prevention of Terrorism because the latter takes into account "the nature of 
the author and of the addressee of the message, as well as the context in which 
the offence is committed." 756  This effectively considers the identity of the 
speaker as well as the addressee. But, as discussed above, these elements are 
missing from section 1(4) of the TA 2006.  Article 6 of the EATP, on the other 
hand, does not give any clue at all. As is argued throughout this chapter, taking 
into account the identity of the speaker could have unintended ramifications 
unless special protection is given to people who do not condone violence.     
 
Fourth, TA 2006 provides definitions for ‘statement', ‘public', ‘glorification' and 
‘publish' under section 20.  However, the EATP does not provide any definition 
of these words. For this reason, it is not clear whether the ‘public' element of the 
Ethiopian offence refers to expressions published inside or outside Ethiopia, or 
indeed whether publishing a public statement encompasses electronic, hard copy 
or audio/video visual materials. For the sake of certainty, ‘public' should be 
precisely defined so as to avoid "private conversations."757  Furthermore, though 
the Bill to the EATP defines glorification as any act that "praises or celebrates or 
                                                 
754   See a discussion in the preceding section in this chapter    
755   Walker, C., (2011) supra  note 224, p.367    
756   Council of Europe (2005). Explanatory Report, supra note 523, para. 100    
757  Hansard HL Deb vol. 676 col. 435 (5 December 2005)      
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supports or encourages,"758 the same definition was dropped from the EATP. 
One has to question why the Ethiopian legislature dropped this definition from 
the final version, given that such a definition was supported by the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.759      
 
The most important part of the TA 2006 that was not incorporated into the EATP 
is a defence to a charge of encouraging terrorism.  Under Section 1(6) TA 2006, 
it is stated that a person could challenge any accusation with regard to the 
offence under section 1 and section 2 if the published statements "neither 
expressed his views, nor had his endorsement." This "defence is intended, for 
example, to cover news broadcasters." 760  But there is a qualification to this 
defence; a court may refuse to avail the accused this defence if he fails to comply 
with the notice requirements under section 3 of the TA 2006.  Moreover, the 
defence available under section 1(6) TA 2006 is limited only to recklessly made 
statements.761  
 
The EATP, on the other hand, does not provide similar defences. This has caused 
wide spread confusion among the press 762  and the public. Some allege that 
people are scared of criticising the Ethiopian government or publishing verbatim 
reports made by groups or individuals deemed terrorists by the Ethiopian 
government.763 They have linked some arrests to the ‘Arab spring uprising' that 
brought about the downfall of some of the most notorious dictatorial regimes in 
the Middle-East and North Africa. Some Ethiopian journalists and politicians 
seized the opportunity to write news articles that compare the situation in the 
                                                 
758  Parliamentary minutes, supra note 46, p. 15      
759   See Council of Europe (2005). Explanatory Report, supra note 523, para. 95      
760   Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2006 C.11, section 1(6)     
761    Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 366   
              762  A research by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) indicates that between 2001 and 
2011, the country had the highest number of exiled journalists in the world, see CPJ (2011). 
Journalists in Exile: A Statistical Profile at http://cpj.org/reports/2011/06/journalists-in-exile-
2011-iran-cuba-drive-out-crit.php#totalspast 
763    Public Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, et al (112199/2011); Public Prosecutor v Andualem Arage, e 
al (?/2011) 
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North-Africa and Ethiopia.764 While opposition sympathisers prophesied765 the 
possibility of emulating the ‘Arab Spring', government sympathisers dubbed the 
happening of an ‘Ethiopian Tesedey'766 as a ‘barren hope'767 for the desperate 
opposition. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi once called the revolutionaries 
in the Arab world ‘latecomers to the game'. 768  Although playing down the 
possibility of an ‘Ethiopian Tesedey', some argue that the government 
demonstrably intensified its clamping down on dissent out of a panic that the 
‘Arab Spring' would spread to Ethiopia.  They mention the  case of Elias Kifle;769 
and Andualem Arage770  
 
In the case of Elias Kifle, the defendants were charged with:  
 
Violating Article 3  of the EATP (conspiring to destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional or, economic or social  institutions of the 
country); violating Article 4 of the EATP (planning, preparation, conspiracy, 
incitement and attempt of terrorist Act); violating article 5 of the EATP 
(rendering support to terrorism); violating Article 6 of the EATP 
(Encouragement of Terrorism); violating article 7 of the EATP (participation in 
a terrorist organisation by creating relations with the Eritrean government and 
Ginbot 7, ONLF and OLF); violating Article 9 of the EATP (possessing and 
dealing with the proceeds of a terrorist act). 
 
Elias Kilfe is the publisher and editor of the online news site Ethiopian 
Review.771 He was one of the journalists convicted in 2007 together with senior 
                                                 
764 Nega, E. (2011). As Egypt and Yemen protest, wither Ethiopia's opposition? Ethiomedia, 28 
January; Birara, A. (2011). Ethiopian fascinations with the Arab Spring. Aljazeera Centre for 
Studies, 17 July ; Arage, A. (2011). Ethiopian Awaking and the Arab Spring. Ethiopian Current 
Affairs, 17 September; Gedamu, T. (2011). Republicans on the Throne: A Personal Account of 
Ethiopia's Modernization and Painful Quest for Democracy (USA, Sehai Publishers & 
Distributors)      
765  Mariam, A. G. (2012).  Is the Specter of the Arab Spring Haunting Ethiopia? LBJ School of 
Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, June 4     
766  Tsedey is an Amharic word for spring     
767   Ayalew, F (2013).  "Hope Springs Eternal through….." like Barren-Hope, AIGA FORUM, 11 
July    
768  African Business (2011). Zenawi: 'We're On The Right Track',  10 October     
769  Public Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, et al, supra note 763 
770   Public Prosecutor v Andualem Arage, supra note 763   
771    www.ethiopianreview.com   
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opposition party leaders.772 He fled the country and headed for the US after he 
was released on pardon. The other defendants in the case were journalists 
(Reeyot Alemu and Wubshet Taye); and chairman of the opposition Ethiopian 
National Democratic Party (ENDP) (Zerihun Gebregziabher), and another 
opposition sympathiser (Hirut Kifle).  
 
Before Reyot Alemu was arrested, she had written articles for the now-defunct 
Feteh newspaper criticising the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's project on 
the Nile Dam. She also sent news articles to the Ethiopian Review.  
 
Opposition members and human rights organisations take the view that some of 
crucial evidence against the defendant took the form of news articles, which were 
deemed favourable to the banned organisations such as Ginbot 7, ONLF and 
OLF.773 
 
They are also charged with encouraging people to participate in a movement 
called ‘Beka'! 774 It was alleged that the ‘Beka' movement was intended to 
encourage people to emulate the ‘Arab Spring uprising'. However, their 
sympathisers maintained that the content of the publications were mostly 
concerned with calls for peaceful demonstrations planned to be held on 28 May 
2011. This date marks the 20th anniversary of the coming to power of the current 
ruling party.  
 
For instance, opposition political parties allege that news articles similar to the 
one mentioned below would likely be considered inciting or encouraging 
terrorism under the current Ethiopian law:  
 
"Last month, the newly formed Tinsae Ethiopia Patriots Union has distributed 
"Beka!" (Enough!) pamphlets in Amharic, Oromgna and Tigregna using its 
network throughout Ethiopia."  
                                                 
772 See Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawule (Engineer), supra note 61      
773  Some of the evidence in support of their argument are sketchy      
774   An Amharic word for ‘enough is enough'    
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In a follow up pamphlet two weeks ago, Tinsae Ethiopia called for nationwide 
protests in the month of May, 2011, to remove Meles Zenawi's dictatorship from 
power (read here) 
 
Tinsae Ethiopia has stated that Ethiopians have rejected the Meles regime 
during the 2005 elections, but the regime has taken brutal measures to stay in 
power, while continuing to misrule the country and commit atrocities. 
 
May 2011 will be the Meles regime's 20th anniversary in power. Tinsae Ethiopia 
has called on Ethiopians inside the country and around to rally around the 
slogan "Beka!" (Enough). 
 
Recalling previous attempts by the Meles regime to divert attention from itself by 
inciting ethnic and religious clashes, Tinsae Ethiopia has asked every Ethiopian 
to not fall prey for such scheme and look after the well-being of each other 
regardless of one's religion or ethnic back ground. 
Tinsae Ethiopia has also sent out a message to the armed forces in Ethiopia to 
join the people's demand for change and help bring Meles and his collaborators 
to justice."775 
 
 
However, the Ethiopian High Court accepted that the prosecution had sufficient 
evidence against the defendants. Elias Kifle was sentenced to life in prison in 
absentia while the others received 14 years jail terms.  
 
The other relevant case to be discussed is the case of Andualem Arage, and 23 
defendants. 776  The defendants were charged with planning an Egyptian-style 
revolution in coordination with Ginbot 7, OLF and ONLF by: 
 
 ...using as a cover their constitutional right to freedom of expression and 
association for their terrorist mission and using that as a strateg; disseminated 
                                                 
775  Ethiopian Review (2011). Press Release: Tinsae Ethiopia calls for the end of Meles Zenawi's 
regime, 29 March     
776  Public prosecutor v Andualem Arage, et al , supra note 763           
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calls for terrorist actions; conducted and used others in inciting and mobilizing 
activities; called for chaotic/violent meetings and demonstrations; agreed to 
jointly work on their terrorist mission and strategy with the Eritrean media, 
media in foreign countries set up for terrorist mission as well like ESAT 
television, radio, internet and other information networks and Paltalk for 
terrorist  mobilization.777 
 
The specific charges against the defendants include:  
 
Violating Articles 3 and 4 of the EATP (Planning, Preparation, Conspiracy, 
Incitement and Attempting to causing a person's death or serious bodily injury; 
creating serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of the public; 
committing kidnapping or hostage taking; causing serious damage to property; 
and endangering, seizing or putting under control, or causing serious 
interference or disruption of any public service); violating Article 248 (b) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code (High Treason). 
 
Some of the defendants were amongst the political leaders and journalists who 
were convicted following the 2005 Ethiopian general election.778 However, they 
were released on pardon. For instance, Andualem served as vice chairman of the 
opposition party Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) until he was detained in 
2011. Eskinder Nega, worked as a journalist and political activist before his 
arrest. His publishing company, which run three newspapers (Askual, Menelik 
and Satenaw), was found guilty in 2007 of publishing stories that incite and 
encourage terrorism.779 Before both were arrested in 2011, they wrote several 
articles and released video clips on the similarities between the ‘Arab spring' and 
the current Ethiopian situation.780  
                                                 
777  ibid 
778  For details, see chapter two on the discussion of Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul, supra note 
61    
779  Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul, supra note 61      
780  Nega, E. (2011). As Egypt and Yemen Protest, Wither Ethiopia's Opposition? Ethiomedia, 28 
January; Nega, E. (2011). Ethiopia: Time for Peaceful Change. Ethiomedia, 2 September; Nega, 
E. (2011). Gadhafi's Fall and Meles Zenawi. Ethiomedia, 26 August; Nega, E. (2011). SOS: 
Dissent and Terrorism in Ethiopia. Ethiomedia, 1 July; Nega, E. (2011). Open Letter to PM 
Meles Zenawi. Ethiomedia, 4 March Nega, E. (2011). Debebe Eshetu's Arrest and the New Year, 
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However, their supporters argue that the evidence presented by the public 
prosecutor did not support the claim that the defendants incited and encouraged 
terrorist activities. For instance, one of the articles written by Eskinder reads as 
follow:  
 
…ordinary citizens took the initiative all over North Africa and the Middle East. 
The results made history. They are powerful precedents for the rest of humanity. 
While inspiring words, sober analyses and robust debates are indispensable as 
ever, they will remain exactly no more than mere words unless translated into 
actions. To Ethiopia this means risking the core of a much cherished collective 
vision - peaceful transition to democracy. In the event of prolonged absence of 
peaceful action, an implosion, perhaps violent and no doubt dangerous, is 
unavoidable. Needless to say, the status-quo is increasingly untenable. The time 
to call for peaceful and legal action has arrived in Ethiopia. History cannot be 
postponed indefinitely."781 
 
Another article reads: 
 
The news headlines are invariably dominated by the protests in Egypt, Tunisia 
and Yemen. Egypt in particular is at the core of international suspense. If 
Mubarak is successfully ousted, the protests will most certainly spread to other 
countries. But for many pundits, the surprising restraints of the security services 
also dominate their thoughts. Is what is happening in Egypt and Yemen a slow 
motion replay of what undid Ben Ali in Tunisia - that is, are the Generals 
refusing to fire on unarmed protesters? If so, what implication does this hold for 
Sudan, the next most probable country to which the protests could spread - and if 
Sudan explodes, inexorably, the next country in line, is Ethiopia?782 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Ethiomedia, 9 September; Arage, A. (2011). Ethiopian Awaking and the Arab Spring,  Ethiopian 
Current Affairs, 17 September     
781 Nega, E. (2011). Ethiopia: Time for Peaceful Change, supra note 780      
782 Nega, E. (2011). As Egypt and Yemen protest, supra note 780      
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In his ‘Dissent and Terrorism in Ethiopia' article, Eskiner criticised the Ethiopian 
government for creating a climate of fear" 783  by using the EATP against 
journalists and politicians. He also compares the government's tactic in 2005 and 
2011 in the following paragraph: 
 
Unlike the 2005 treason trials, however, when newspapers were notoriously 
charged, convicted and proscribed as distinct legal entities, the government's 
wrath is more circumspect this time, entangling only journalists, Webeshet Taye 
and Reeyot Alemu, rather than the entire newspapers they work for.  
 
It is true that these articles did not encourage terrorism. There was nothing in 
these articles that invited the reader to resort to terrorism. They were even none-
violent when compared to the content of the articles, artistic works and books 
considered by the ECtHR.   
 
None of the above articles "...promote separatism and…recourse to 
violence...likely to constitute a threat to public order".784  They were just ‘neutral 
descriptions'785 of current events.  
 
Furthermore, there was no need to consider "...the content of the impugned 
statements and the context in which they were made".786 This is due to the fact 
that there was no violence or tension whatsoever in Ethiopia in 2011. Therefore, 
if the government's case were based on the above news articles,  ‘time, place and 
circumstance'787 did not justify the imprisonment of the journalists and political 
leaders discussed above.  Based on the three test criteria788 seen here, it would be 
right to conclude that the conviction of the political leaders and journalists was 
neither proportional to the threat posed nor justified by a legitimate aim.  
However, the Ethiopian government always maintained that it had strong 
                                                 
783  Nega, E. (2011). SOS, supra note 780    
784 Association Ekin v. France, supra note 496, para. 13       
785 Arslan v Turkey, supra note 481, para.45      
786   Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, supra note 489, para. 61   
787   Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (the US Supreme Court held that “regulations of 
the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.") For further discussion, see Cohen, H. (2009), supra note 538    
788  Handyside v  UK, supra note 431     
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evidence linking these individuals to terrorist activities apart from  the above 
news  articles. 
 
As discussed above, the UK government attempted to take into account the 
identity of individuals when it prohibited interviewing a person or persons 
affiliated with proscribed terrorist organisations.789  The ECtHR also upheld a 
decision of a German court that prevents giving media-access to proscribed 
organisations and/or their members.790. However, in some the Ethiopian cases, 
the prosecution failed to show that the defendants were members of any terrorist 
organisations, despite the vague claim by the prosecution that they had links with 
proscribed organisations. This claim also failed and the defendants were not 
prosecuted for it. 
 
Moreover, the EATP could also have a negative effect on academics who, for 
example, seek to ‘explain' the position of proscribed organisations without 
endorsing their views. With the absence of the defence discussed above under the 
EATP, conducting an interview, for instance, with Birhanu Nega791 or anyone 
affiliated with ‘Ginbot 7' would be more likely than not considered as the 
glorification or endorsement of terrorism. With the TA 2006 in place in the UK 
and the position taken by the ECtHR in Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey,792 it is 
unlikely that one would be prosecuted for talking to the Taliban or making a 
documentary about them. 793  Indeed, it would be considered by many as an 
affront to democracy were a news organisation prosecuted for reporting on 
terrorist related matters. 
 
The case of Temesgen Desalegn794 might also be considered here. The defendant, 
who was the founder of the now defunct national newspaper ‘Feteh', was charged 
with contempt of the judiciary for publishing the statements made by a defendant 
                                                 
789  Brind v UK, supra note 605     
790   Hogefeld v Germany , supra note 541    
791   See chapter two for further discussions    
792   Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey, supra note 610   
793   See for instance, a Channel 4 documentary: Dispatches, Pakistan's Taliban Generation (2009) 
[TV Broadcast] Channel 4, 16 March 20.00 hrs.  Making similar documentary about Ginbot 7 
would be impossible under the EATP.       
794  Editor-in-chief of Feteh (Justice) Newspaper     
171 
 
who was charged with terrorism related activities. Temesgen was not even 
"explaining or understanding"795 the defendant's views. But, it was enough for 
the Ethiopian court to impose a fine and a four-month suspended sentence. The 
prosecution in this case could also have resorted to Article 6 of the EATP for 
publishing verbatim statements of the defendant if these statements were in any 
way deemed as encouraging terrorism. The best way to suppress the temptation 
of the prosecution to prosecute under the EATP is, therefore, to provide a 
defence so that a publisher will not be prosecuted for a statement that he does not 
endorse.  
 
Fifth, considering Article 6 of the EATP, it is only concerned with ‘statement 
offences', not with ‘dissemination' offences. The parliamentary minutes do not 
explain why the Ethiopian government picked the former and decided to drop the 
latter offence. Before the coming into effect of the EATP, the Ethiopian 
government had used the Criminal Code to prosecute those who published and 
distributed materials deemed to encourage or incite serious violence. 796  This 
could be the logic behind dropping the ‘dissemination offences.' But the problem 
with resorting to the Ethiopian Criminal Code is that the provisions therein deal 
only with incitement or general encouragement to violence. As discussed, there 
is a big difference between the incitement of terrorism and the encouragement of 
terrorism. Thus, it might be worthwhile reconsidering the EATP before the 
prosecution starts to regularly resort to Article 6 of the EATP for the prosecution 
of both ‘statement offences' and ‘dissemination offences.'  
 
Finally, the EATP stipulates from 10 to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment for 
violating Article 6 of the same legislation. This is too excessive compared to 
section 1(7) TA 2006, which provides "imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 
years or to a fine, or to both." Though the EATP was modelled on the British law, 
the parliamentary minutes do not provide a reason why the punishment for the 
same offences is so severe under Ethiopian law.           
                                                 
795   The Home Secretary made a distinction between encouraging and glorifying on one hand and 
explaining and understanding on the other hand. But that attempt was shot down by the Joint 
Committee. See Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). The Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra note 703,  para. 27-28    
796  See chapter two     
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3.10 Conclusion  
 
The speech related restrictions discussed in this chapter might have changed the 
‘the rules of the game'797 for terrorists in the West. These restrictions can be 
traced back to ‘a British tradition extending from colonial emergency rule'798 or 
they could be considered part of the broad ‘militant' response of western 
democracies. 799  However, these restrictions have brought unintended 
consequences; they have paved for an ‘international invitation to crush 
dissent'.800 They are being transplanted and are generally applied for the wrong 
purposes. 
 
First, it has to be said that the demand for freedom of expression in Ethiopia has 
become ‘a pie in the sky' since 2005.801 Critics of the Ethiopian government held 
that the scale of the protest in 2005 has unnerved the Ethiopian government with 
the consequence that the government has given free rein to security officials to 
arrest and convict under anti-terror laws those who dare to discuss the ‘Green 
Revolution'802 or the ‘Arab Spring'.803 They highlighted  that the evidence linking 
the ‘terrorists' to the crime they are charged - membership of terrorist 
organizations and inciting or encouraging terrorism - has not been proved. 
Moreover, there were no restrictions on the ambit of the cases: ‘terrorist suspects' 
have been charged and convicted using vague laws of terrorism, such as treason, 
outrages against the constitution, violation of the territorial integrity of the 
country, etc.         
 
Additionally, what politicises the issue more is that counter-terrorism measures 
have been specifically used to target political leaders, members of the senior 
                                                 
797 Following the 2005 London Bombing, Tony Blair Famously declared that "Let no one be in 
any doubt, the rules of the game are changing". For details see Jeffery, S. (2005). The Rules of the 
Game Are Changing, 5 August, Guardian      
798  Roach, K, (2012),  supra note 193, p. 299     
799    SaJo, A. (2004), supra note 209; see also Thiel, M (2009), supra note 208; see also Walker, C. 
(2011). Militant Speech, supra note 192   
800      Roach, K, (2012), supra note 193, p. 56 
801  This view is particularly shared by human rights organisations and opposition political parties     
802  See the case of Public Prosecutor v Hailu Shawul, supra note 61     
803   See the case of Public Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, supra note 763  ; see also Public Prosecutor v 
Andualem Arage, supra note  763   
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leadership of political parties and those more reputable or, as the some care to 
call them, ‘dangerous' journalists that hold increased sway within public opinion; 
imprisoning these people serves to disconnect them from the public and drains 
their popularity.  
 
We cannot talk of a balance between freedom of expression and anti-terrorism 
laws in Ethiopian if counter-terrorism measures, both those that are in the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code and the EATP, are used against expressions of political 
dissent. There is little doubt in many people's mind that the sentencing of people 
who emerged as political figures has been largely politically motivated.804    
 
The design of the counter-terrorism  provisions, at least in part, could also further 
contribute to their poor implementation. For example, the failure of the EATP to 
make a distinction between memberships before or after proscription has resulted 
in the prosecution of people for mere per se of membership. Another example, 
this time on the issue of encouraging terrorism, is the EATP's failure to stipulate 
a criminal state of mind; to differentiate between direct and indirect 
encouragement; to provide definitions of different terms used under the EATP; 
or to provide any defenses for those accused of encouraging terrorism. The effect 
of all these flaws is, therefore, stifling political dissent that could be tolerated in a 
democratic system.  
 
Therefore, while supporting Ethiopia's attempt to include provisions in the EATP 
that restrict speech related terrorist expressions, it has to be underlined that the 
EATP requires major amendments before it is applied against terrorist suspects. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter two, Ethiopia has learned a lot from the West 
while trying to modernise its laws. In the same manner, the Ethiopian judiciary 
could benefit from examining the decisions of the ECtHR in order to provide 
more protection to politicians and journalists. These factors would help restore 
the balance between the need to restrict terrorist expressions and allow permitted 
expressions, such as political dissent.      
                                                 
804   See Human Rights Watch (2012). Ethiopia: Terrorism Law Used to Crush Free Speech: Donors Should 
Condemn Verdicts, Demand Legal Reforms, 27 June; see also Kaiser, K (2012), supra note 476; 
see also Kebede, D. (2012).  A ‘Dark Day' For Freedom Of Expression in Ethiopia, 28 June, 
Awramba Times    
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Chapter Four: Right to Privacy and Anti-Terrorism Laws 
 
4.1 Introduction: Covert Investigation and Terrorist Suspects 
 
The right to privacy is directly affected by freedom of expression. One's speech, 
writing, and conduct influence how one's privacy is perceived by law enforcers. 
The unintended or intended consequences of a particular expression on one's 
privacy are particularly visible in the context of the fight against terrorism. Those 
who dare to express their views against the generally accepted societal norms are 
the people most likely to be targeted for search, seizure, interception and 
surveillance of communication.  
 
The challenge for privacy in covert investigations into terrorist suspects is more 
controversial than the values of privacy in the general law of entry, search and 
seizure. For one thing, suspects do not have the opportunity to adapt their 
conduct to on-going investigations due to the covert nature of the investigation. 
The whole process is tailored to the suspect not knowing he is being investigated.  
 
Second, covert investigations reveal intimate details of the suspect's private life. 
Revealing these details arguably undermines the integrity of the suspect. Despite 
the allegedly strict authorisation procedures, there remains little privacy after a 
third party gets access to those details. Third, the completion of the investigation 
and the process of prosecution further complicate the adversarial process. 
Defendants do not get the opportunity to challenge the evidence, the sourcing of 
that evidence, or the process of investigation because it is all conducted under the 
banner of national security. The interest of the public prevails over the right of 
the defence to disclosure. Moreover, in some countries, for instance in the UK, 
the judiciary plays a major role in deciding whether to exclude evidence on the 
basis of it being obtained illegally.805  
 
Fourth, a government's failure to either confirm or deny the existence of an 
ongoing investigation ostensibly contradicts a suspects the right to live in a 
                                                 
805  R v Austin [2009] EWCA Crim 1527, ("court is not obliged to exclude evidence that has been 
unlawfully obtained provided that it does not infringe section 17 of RIPA." ), para. 47     
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peaceful environment without governmental intrusion. As will be shown below, 
bringing a legal challenge against covert investigation is futile, as governments 
are not forced to confirm or deny it.  The arguments used in favour of limiting 
disclosure are numerous; fear of exposing intelligence practices and undermining 
the purpose of covert surveillance, to list a few .806    
 
Another related issue is the question of standing to sue. While there are some 
differences in the UK and US as to how this issue is approached, those who think 
that they have been subjected to illegal interception or surveillance face an uphill 
battle to bring legal action for breach of privacy. The case could be dismissed out 
of hand, as the individual might not have sufficient evidence to support the 
allegation. Furthermore, the claimant has to prove the injury that he suffered as a 
result of the investigation.  In other words, he has to prove that he has a 
legitimate interest in order to request a hearing. This by itself is not an easy task.  
 
The above factors make privacy litigation onerous compared to other 
fundamental rights. The subsequent sections concern with how legal regimes, 
court interpretations, human right organisations and scholars are addressing the 
delicate issue of privacy and national security in terrorism cases.  
 
To this effect this chapter is divided into five parts. The first part discusses the 
general principles on privacy in the UK, US, and Ethiopia. The second covers the 
legal regimes on interception of communication with an emphasis on the 
definition of interception, the requirements for issuing warrants and warrantless 
interception. The third part compares and contrasts the experiences of the US 
with intercept evidence in criminal proceedings governed under section 17 of 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in the UK.   
 
The last part deals with the use of intercept evidence in terrorism cases under 
Ethiopian law.    
                                                 
806  Privy Council (2008).  Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence Report to the Prime 
Minister and the Home Secretary. (Cm 7324). Norwich, TSO, p.17 et seq. (the Chilcot Review 
from this onwards).     
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4.2 Constitutional Frameworks on Right to Privacy 
4.2.1 The UK and the US Approaches 
 
The right to privacy in the UK has its own unique history. It has developed from 
a non-constitutional and indeed non-existent right807 to a fundamental right by 
virtue of the incorporation of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA)808 and the decisions of the ECtHR. For this reason, "the interception of 
communications and the use of data obtained from it interferes with individuals' 
rights protected by Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998."809  
 
Despite the absence of comprehensive law on privacy, English courts have 
recognized 810  and provided some remedies for the violation of privacy. 811 
However, the courts have taken a conservative approach to the development of 
this right, despite the incorporation of the ECHR. For instance, in Wainwright v 
Home Office, the UK Court of Appeal held that "...the 1998 Act could not 
change the rule at common law that there was no tort of invasion of privacy, by 
introducing a retrospective right to privacy." 812 For some commentators, even 
with decisions such as Douglas v Hello,813 "...the law governing the right to 
respect for a private and family life…remains in a considerable degree of 
uncertainty, despite the numerous opportunities the courts have had to develop 
the common law."814 
 
                                                 
807   See Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 ("It is well-known that in English law there is no right 
to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy.")     
808   Harpwood, V.H. (2009). Modern Tort Law. 7th edition. (Oxon, Routledge-Cavendish), p.409       
809  For a detail discussion on Article 8 and interception of communications, see Esen, R. (2012).  
Intercepting Communications "In Accordance with the Law".  76(2) J. Crim. L. 164     
810  See Seipp, D. J. (1983). English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy. 3(3) O.J.L.S. 328      
811  In Kaye v Robertson, supra note 802, for instance, they considered four options (Libel, 
malicious falsehood, trespass to the person, and passing off)  to accommodate the appeal ; in 
Coco v A.N.Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41, courts accepted breach of confidence as a 
cause of action; , see League Against Cruel Sports v Scott [1985] 2 All ER 489 (for tress pass)      
812  Wainwright v Home Office 2001 WL 153539    
813   Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595    
814  Michalos, C. (281).  Image Rights and Privacy: After Douglas v Hello!,  speech given by the 
author at a dinner meeting hosted by The Intellectual Property Lawyers Organisation ("TIPLO") 
at Gray's Inn on June 15, 2005    
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A comprehensive legislative framework on privacy rights has yet to be 
developed. Some efforts in the past have failed to materialize.815 For instance, 
there were attempts to introduce privacy Bills during 1961-1972. 816 One of the 
reasons for that failure was the difficulty of defining the concept of privacy.817 
However, that pretext has attracted criticism from those arguing that defining the 
concept and enacting legislation are two different things.818 Despite the stance of 
the UK Parliament and the judiciary, there is a push for a different approach 
towards the enforcement of privacy rights.819   
 
Article 8 governs the scope of privacy under the ECHR. This article states that:   
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
Article 8 (1) enumerates four different but related rights: private life, family life, 
home and correspondence. However, Article 8 does not define privacy and 
"...there is no accepted definition of privacy." 820  The above article remains 
‘open-ended' 821 although right to privacy is assumed to cover: 
 
                                                 
815 Seipp, D. J., supra note 810, p. 326       
816  Ibid, p. 326     
817  see the Young Committee Report cited at   Seipp, D. J., supra note 810     
818  Ibid     
819   Hudson, A. (2003). Privacy: A Right by Any Other Name. E.H.R.L.R, Supp (Special issue: 
privacy 2003), 73-85 (Supports the introduction of a statutory tort of invasion of privacy to 
overcome the existing confusing and incoherent range of remedies.)    
820  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2009) Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State, Volume 1, 2nd Report of Session 2008-09 (HL Paper 18-I)    
821   Hert, P. D. and Gutwirth, S (2006). Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement: Opacity 
of the Individual and Transparency of the Power. In Claes, E., et al (editors).  Privacy and the 
Criminal Law (Antwerpen-Oxford, Intersentia), p. 90     
179 
 
…the right to live one's own life with a minimum of interference…physical and 
moral integrity, honour and reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light, 
non-revelation of irrelevant and embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of 
private photographs, protection from disclosure of information given or received 
by the individual confidentially. 822   
 
Although ‘further definition is lacking,' 823  the ECtHR has also attempted to 
broaden the scope of Article 8. In X and Y v the Netherlands 824 and Dudgeon v 
the United Kingdom, 825 the ECtHR expands the notion of private life under 
Article 8 to cover the sexual life of an individual.  
 
ECtHR has held that the term private life within Article 8 extends to a person's 
work place.826 Moreover, the ECtHR in Huvig v France827 has recognized the 
protection of private life at home and in business premises. In addition, without 
making a distinction between ‘private life' and ‘public life' the ECtHR in 
Niemietz v Germany held that:  
 
...to deny the protection of Article 8 on the ground that the measure complained 
of related only to professional activities - as the Government suggested should be 
done in the present case - could moreover lead to an inequality of treatment, in 
that such protection would remain available to a person whose professional and 
non-professional activities were so intermingled that there was no means of 
distinguishing between them.828 
 
 
                                                 
822   Council of Europe (1970). Constitutional Assembly, Twenty-First Ordinary Session, 
Resolution 428     
823  Dijk, P. V. et al (2006).Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
4th edition (the Hague, Kluwer Law International), p. 489     
824   S X and Y v the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91     
825  Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45     
826 Halford v the United Kingdom, 25 June 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III      
827   Huvig v France, 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B    
828   Niemietz v Germany, 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, para.29    
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Article 8 (2) provides some qualifications against arbitrary and intrusive 
measures. These are the ‘compelling grounds to justify interference'.829 First, any 
interference must be in accordance with specific laws. In fact, member states, 
such as the UK, previously boosted ‘no law governing the gathering of 
information on the public by the police and the intelligence services',830 and thus 
failed to meet this requirement. In Malone v United Kingdom,831 the absence of a 
law that governs telephone tapping was found to be contrary to Article 8 and, 
therefore, not ‘in accordance with the law'.  However, the existence of a ‘law' is 
not sufficient in itself to be in compliance with Article 8(2). The ‘law' must also 
have some ‘qualities': accessibility and foreseeability.832 In other words, for a 
‘law' to be ‘compatible with the rule of law' it must: 
 
...be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens in general an adequate 
indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public 
authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous 
interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence.833 
 
 
The second ‘compelling' ground is that any inference must be for some widely 
drawn legitimate aim listed under Article 8(2).  In Leander v Sweden, 834  a 
Swedish national's application for a job was turned down on the basis of secret 
police files.  These files were retained to identify an applicant's suitability for 
‘certain posts of importance for national security'.835 The ECtHR accepted that 
"…the requirement of foreseeability in the special context of secret controls of 
staff in sectors affecting national security cannot be the same as in many other 
fields".836  It found no violation of Article 8.  
  
                                                 
829    Fenwick, H . (2007). Civil Liberties and Human Rights. 4ht Edition. (New York, Routledge-
Cavendish), p. 814    
830   Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, p. 183     
831  Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14; see also Starmer, K. (1990). European human 
rights law: The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (London, 
Legal Action Group,), p. 166     
832 Kruslin v France (Series A No 176-B; Application No 11801/85), para. 27       
833 Malone v United Kingdom, Supra note 831, paras. 66-68      
834 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433)      
835  Ibid, para. 26      
836  Ibid, para.51     
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Interference with the privacy of an individual in order to ‘protect the economic 
well-being' of a country was considered in MS v Sweden.837 The ECtHR held 
that the sharing of personal data of the applicant among public institutions had a 
legitimate aim because it was made in order to assess "…whether the applicant 
satisfied the legal conditions for obtaining a benefit which she herself had 
requested."838  
 
The third ‘compelling' requirement under Article 8 (2) is that the interference 
must be ‘necessary in a democratic society'. According to the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, "…interference will be considered necessary in a democratic society 
if it answers a ‘pressing social need' and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued".839  
 
For instance, blanket retention of data for the prevention of disorder or crime was 
found to be disproportional.840 In Matheron v France,841 the applicant was unable 
to intervene in the proceedings in which the order to monitor telephone calls had 
been made. This was considered a violation of Article 8 (2) of the ECHR. 
Availability of ‘effective control' in telephone tapping has been considered an 
element of the test of necessity under Article 8(2) of the Convention in this case. 
The proportionality test might have a different meaning within different contexts. 
In general the proportionality test will be met if the means is not more than the 
objective.842 
 
As in the case of the UK, there is no express constitutional right to privacy in the 
US. The Bill of Rights does not address the right specifically. Unlike the UK, 
however, "the freedoms mentioned in the Bill of Rights are not a complete 
catalogue of American rights."843 There is larger "judicial guardianship"844 of 
                                                 
837   MS v Sweden (1997) 28 EHRR 313, 1997-IV 1437    
838  Ibid, paras. 11-14      
839 Coster v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24876/94, 18 January 2001, para. 104      
840  S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 158     
841    Matheron v France, no. 57752/00, 29 March 2005   
842    For further discussion, See Arai-Takahashi, Y. (2002), supra note 243; see also Blake, N. 
(2002).  Importing Proportionality: Clarification or confusion  EHRLR Issue 1  pp. 19-27; see 
also Blake, C (2012), supra note 243, pp. 111 et seq   
843  Glenn, R. A. (2003). The Right to Privacy: Rights and Liberties under the Law. (California, 
ABC-CLIO, Inc)(acknowledgement)     
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rights that stretches out to other rights beyond the Bill. Moreover, the First, Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments have been interpreted flexibly to give protection 
to privacy.845 Privacy of beliefs, the home, thoughts, the person, possessions, and 
information are amongst the rights impliedly given strong "judicial guardianship". 
Moreover, contrary to the options available to UK courts, the Ninth Amendment 
specifically allows courts to look beyond the Bill so as to restrain and contain the 
US government from unjustified intrusion. This Amendment states that "the 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people."The Ninth Amendment has been the 
basis for the protection of broad range of rights.846 Furthermore, this Amendment 
is expected to be the basis for the controversies regarding the "right to die, 
human cloning, genetic testing, and similar developments" 847  that approach 
American society in the future  
 
More specifically, the Fourth Amendment is frequently mentioned in cases 
involving unlawful invasion of the home, correspondences, and electronic 
communications.848 The Fourth Amendment states that:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.  
 
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment is not as straight forward as it seems. it has 
been noted that"...it is apparent that not only do the police not understand the 
fourth amendment law, but that even the courts, after briefing, argument, and 
calm reflection, cannot agree as to what police behaviour is appropriate in a 
                                                                                                                                    
844   Ibid    
845  Ibid     
846   For instance, see Paul, R. Abramson et al. (2003).  Sexual Rights in America: the Ninth 
Amendment and the Pursuit of Happiness. (New York, New York University Press) ; for right to 
education , see Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)    
847  Menez, J. F and Vile, J. R. (2004). Summaries of Leading Cases on the Constitution. 14th 
edition. (USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc), p. 430      
848    Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)   
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particular case."849 Despite these problems, the Supreme Court has devised some 
principles over the years to protect privacy within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment. The first among many is the exclusionary rule laid down in Weeks 
v United States.850 The police, without securing a court warrant, searched Mr. 
Weeks' house and seized some documents that implicate the defendant in illicit 
lottery trading. These documents were produced as evidence. The Supreme Court 
held that it is against the Fourth Amendment to: 
 
"...retain for the purposes of evidence against the accused his letters and 
correspondence seized in his house during his absence and without his authority 
by a United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest or for the search of 
his premises."851     
 
The case of Nardone v United States, 852 which involves illegally intercepted 
evidence, also further extended the exclusionary rule by holding that derivative 
evidence (the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree') obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment are also inadmissible.  However, the above principle applies only 
against government intrusion. As held in Burdeau v McDowell, 853  the 
exclusionary rule does not apply, for instance, to ‘private investigators' not 
commissioned by the government.854  
 
The US courts have also acknowledged that Fourth Amendment protection is not 
absolute. 855  In Hester v United States 856 a defendant was convicted for 
‘concealing distilled spirits.' The US Supreme Court rejected the defendant's 
                                                 
849  Bradley, C (1985). The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility. 60 
Indiana Law Journal 287       
850  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)     
851   Ibid  
852  Nardone v. United States - 308 U.S. 338 (1939)     
853  Burdeau v. McDowell - 256 U.S. 465 (1921)     
854   For further reading, see Hensley, T. R. and Snook, C. (2006) The Rehnquist Court: Justices, 
Rulings, and Legacy (USA, ABC-CLIO Supreme Court handbooks), p. 162     
855    Girard, J. E.  (2011). Criminalistics: Forensic Science, Crime and Terrorism. 2nd edition. 
(Ontario, Jones & Batten Learning, LLC),   p. 22; see also Kim, Y. (2009). Protecting the U.S. 
Perimeter: Border Searches under the Fourth Amendment, Congressional Research Service 7-
5700 RL 31826; Harr, J. S.  et al. (2011) Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System. 5th 
edition. (California, Wadsworth), p. 230   
856   Hester v United States 265 U.S. 57 (1924)    
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argument that the officers did not have a search or arrest warrant. Mr. Justice 
Holmes stated that  
 
the fact that the examination of the jug took place on land belonging to 
defendant's father did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special 
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment did not extend to the open 
fields.857  
 
Hester was not the only exception to the protections offered under the Fourth 
Amendment. In Chimel v California,858 the US Supreme Court held that in case 
of a lawful arrest, an arresting officer does not need a search warrant to search 
the person as well as the place "within the immediate control of the person 
arrested". The court upheld a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In Minnesota v 
Carter, it was held that "while an overnight guest may have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in someone else's home …, one who is merely present 
with the consent of the householder may not."859  
 
With further discussions to follow in chapter five, the US Supreme Court has 
also accepted deviation from the strictest standard of probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment for minor intrusion of privacy on public places 860  
 
However, despite the existence of constitutional protections and the US Supreme 
Court's strong ‘guardianship' of fundamental rights, privacy concerns have been 
growing since 9/11. The authorisation of ‘illegal'861 executive orders that allow 
the interception of communication and the establishment of other organs that 
intercept communications ‘without oversight'862 were some of the few challenges 
on privacy.   
 
                                                 
857    Ibid , para. 57    
858     Chimel v California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)   
859     Minnesota v Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998) 
860   Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 1968 U.S.; see also Illinois v 
Wardlow 528 U.S. 119120 S. Ct. 673145 L. Ed. 2d 570,2000 U.S.; see also Spinelli v United 
States 1393 U.S. 410, 89S.ct 584, 2 L.Ed 637 (1969); see also Aguilar v Texas 378 U.S. 108 
(1964); see also Brinegar v United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).     
861   Roach, K. (2012), supra note 193, p. 184     
862   Rocha, K., (2012), supra note 193, p. 195     
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From Olmstead v United States 863 to more recent cases such as Al-Haramain 
Islamic Foundation, Inc. v G. W. Bush 864 and ACLU v NSA 865, striking the 
balance between the right to privacy and national security has been a challenge. 
With ‘a long public history of aggressive surveillance'866 by the US executive, 
the US Supreme Court seems to lack consistency in its approach to the delicate 
issues of security and privacy; with the balance swinging back and forth during 
war and peace times.867 Moreover, due to its vast implications, the scope and the 
precise meaning of the privacy remains vague.868  
 
To clarify, the differences between the British and American approaches to 
privacy are summarized as follows: the primary disparity lies in the formulation 
of the Ninth Amendment. Due to the explicit acknowledgment of other rights 
that lay beyond the Bill of Rights, the US Supreme Court and litigants have used 
the Amendments as a shield against unreasonable interference. The ECtHR has 
also attempted to broaden the scope of Article 8.869 However, there is no such 
Charter in the UK for the UK courts to base constitutional protections. The UK 
courts have thus tentatively and rather reluctantly acknowledged the general right 
to privacy under the fragmented common law of remedies.870  
 
Second, there are different perceptions of privacy across each side of the Atlantic. 
For instance, the use of CCTV has stirred wide criticism in the US while the 
same practice has been tolerated in the UK.871 Despite the acceptance of such a 
                                                 
863 Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)      
864     Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v Bush ("Al-Haramain I"), 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 
2007); see also Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v Bush ("Al-Haramain II"),  564 F.Supp.2d 
1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008)  
865   ACLU v NSA, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (U.S. 2008)    
866    Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, p.184   
867    Howard, R. D.  et al. (2006). supra note 706,  p. 404   
868   United States Department of Defense (2004). Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight against 
Terrorism: Report of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee United States Department 
of Justice: USAM 9-27.000 Principles of Federal Prosecution (1980), p. 21    
869  See also the decision of the ECtHR in X and Y v the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no. 
91 and Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, supra note 825. In both cases, the ECtHR expands the 
notion of private life under Article 8 to cover sexual life of an individual     
870  Remedies for breach of confidentiality, defamation, trespass, and nuisance. For details, see 
Hudson, A. (2003)., supra note 819     
871    Beckman, J. (2007). Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-
terrorism. (Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited), p. 82     
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practice in the UK, publication of CCTV images to the public still constitutes a 
potential breach of right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR.872  
 
Third, before the doctrine of misuse of Private information was conceived,873 the 
press had been invading private lives in the name of freedom of speech, with no 
check on this practice owing to a lack of privacy law within the UK.874 Invasion 
of privacy by the media in the US, on the other hand, is a separate cause of 
action.875   
 
Fourth, the UK Parliament has yet to introduce a comprehensive right to privacy. 
The Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 do not provide as 
comprehensive protection as the US Bill of rights because "in this country, unlike 
the United States of America, there is no over-arching, all-embracing cause of 
action for 'invasion of privacy'".876 However, the US Constitution and the US 
courts' willingness to extend the right beyond the Bill of Rights have provided a 
shield against executive zeal.877 Despite the coming into effect of the HRA and 
the suggestion by some commentators that there is a new era of privacy rights 
emerging within the UK,878 English courts have yet to confirm a general right to 
privacy. 
 
Finally, beside the US constitutional principles discussed above, the US has 
statutory provisions that provide protection of privacy in tort law.879 Accordingly, 
the laws provide remedies for ‘public disclosure of private facts', ‘intrusion upon 
seclusion', ‘false light and appropriation'. 880  Though analysis of these 
                                                 
872    Peck v the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, ECHR 2003-I. For details see Fenwick, H.  and  
Kerrigan, K. (2011) .  Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 5th edition. (Oxon, Routledge), pp. 127-
129     
873     This doctrine was developed in Campbell  v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 
874   Michalos, C. (2005), supra note 814   
875      Fenwick, H.  and  Kerrigan, K., supra note 872, p.  297 
876    See Campbell v MGN Limited, supra note 873, para. 11; see also Wainwright v Home Office, 
supra note 812   
877   For a specific tort of privacy in the US, see ‘How U.S. State Law Quietly Leads the Way in 
Privacy Protection,' Special Report Issued by Privacilla, (2002) at 
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Torts_Report.html; for arguments in favour of introducing tort 
of privacy in the UK, see Hudson, A. (2003)., supra note 814    
878   Fenwick, H.  and  Kerrigan, K., supra note 872, p.297     
879   Restatement (Second) of Torts §652 (c) to §652(d) Regarding the Privacy of Torts    
880   For detail discussion on privacy tort, see Solove, D. J. et al. (2006).  Privacy, Information, 
and Technology. (New York, Aspen Publishers), pp. 26 et seq    
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classifications is beyond the scope of this thesis, similar protections are absent in 
the UK.881  
 
4.2.3 An Ethiopian Constitutional Right to Privacy 
 
The right to privacy in Ethiopia is specifically mentioned under Article 26 of the 
FDRE Constitution. However, the FDRE constitution is not the only document 
that deals with privacy. The Ethiopian Civil Code, the Criminal Code, and the 
Criminal Procedure code contain fragmented provisions on the invasion of 
privacy. Article 26 (1-2) of the FDRE constitution states that:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be  
Subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any  
Property under his personal possession.  
2.  Everyone has the right to the inviolability of his notes and correspondence 
including postal letters, and communications made by means of telephone,  
Telecommunications and electronic devices. 
 
 However, this right is not absolute with the exceptions outlined under Article 
26(3), which states that the right could be restricted during "compelling 
circumstances" and "in accordance with specific laws." 
 
Moreover, the third paragraph of Article 26(3) states that the purpose of "the 
interference could be national security, public peace, the prevention of crime, or 
the protection of health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of other."  
 
The first problem with the above Article is that it uses broad concepts such as the 
‘home' without giving any further definition. This term is not defined in the 
FDRE constitution nor is it clarified by subsequent judicial decisions. The 
construction of Article 26(1) seems to suggest that it is mainly concerned with 
                                                 
881  See for instance Wainwright v Home Office, supra note 812 (the court of appeal said that 
there is no tort of invasion of privacy in Common law)     
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physical trespass. In the US and UK882, the privacy of a person is extended to his 
home, vehicles, public and business places. 
  
The FDRE Constitution and the Ethiopian Codes, on the other hand, fall short of 
clarifying the scope of the ‘home.' The cumulative reading of Article 12 
(freedom of residence) and Article 13 (inviolability of domicile) of the Ethiopian 
Civil Code show that physical trespass to the home covers both residence and 
domicile. However, both residence and domicile excludes privacy in one's 
vehicle, work place or public places.  
 
In addition, despite the protection given to the taking of images and photographs 
in public places under Article 27 of the Ethiopian Civil Code, bugging and 
interception of a person's mobile phone in public seemed to have been 
overlooked under Ethiopian law. Moreover, in the absence of a definition of the 
‘home', what would happen if a person owns two properties and one of them is 
being subjected to warrantless search? Which is his ‘home' for the purpose of the 
FDRE constitution? 883  Does the FDRE constitution protect interception of 
communication in work places?884 
 
With regard to the protection of privacy in business places, Article 183 of the 
Ethiopian Civil Code provides for the inviolability of business provided the place 
is the "principal seat of his business and of his interest, with the intention of 
living there permanently." Could this mean that interception of communications 
and correspondence in branch offices as opposed to the ‘principal seat' of a 
business is legal? What does ‘with the intention of living there permanently' 
imply? Judicial progress and legislative guidelines on these ambiguities offer 
little help.  
 
                                                 
882 Halford v the United Kingdom, supra note 826; see also Peck v the United Kingdom, supra 
note 872; see also Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294;  see also sections 27-32 of RIPA        
883   See the decision of the ECtHR in Demades v Turkey, no. 16219/90, 31 July 2003 ("denial of 
access to home amounted breach of Article 8.")    
884    Halford v the United Kingdom, supra note 826   
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The US Supreme Court is of the opinion that there could be breach of privacy 
without physical trespass.885 Physical trespass in the UK has developed under 
tort law, which is different from privacy law. In addition, Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) has identified three sorts of surveillance: 
directed, intrusive, and covert intelligence.886 Directed surveillance, which could 
include bugging or placing listening devices outside a house, does not require 
any physical intrusion. Therefore, breach of privacy can arise from trespass or 
breach of RIPA. 
 
However, the scope of privacy law in Ethiopian is uncertain. For one thing, 
‘search' is not defined in the Ethiopian Civil Code, Criminal Code, or Criminal 
Procedure code. Additionally, use of the word ‘entry' under Article  13 (2)887 of 
the Ethiopian Civil Code and Article 32 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code that deal with searching premises  seem to uphold the legality of directed 
surveillance and other kinds of intrusion  that do not require physical intrusion 
into domestic premises and business places.888  
 
However, if we consider the experience of the US,889 these kinds of practices 
breach privacy in the absence of a relevant warrant. Moreover, the ECtHR held 
that "telephone tapping ... amounted without any doubt to an "interference by a 
public authority" with the exercise of the applicants' right to respect for their 
"correspondence" and their "private life."890  
 
                                                 
885  Katz v United States, supra note 848. Katz overruled Olmstead v United States, supra note 
863 (holding that there could be invasion of privacy without physical trespass if a person has 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy.')  See also Moore, A. D (2010).  Privacy Rights: Moral and 
Legal Foundation. (Pennsylvania,  Pennsylvania State university Press), p. 106       
886   See also sections 27-32 of RIPA; see also Home Office (2010). Covert Surveillance and 
Property Interference: Revised Code of Practice Pursuant to section 71 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (LONDON: TSO); see also Home Office (2010). Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice Pursuant to section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (LONDON: TSO); on the similarities and differences between directed and 
intrusive surveillances, see McKay, S. (2011).  Covert Policing: Law and Practice (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press), p. 71 pp. 143 and seq.    
887  This sub-article states that "no one may enter the domicile of another person against the will 
of such person; neither may a search be effected therein, except in the cases provided by law."     
888  See for instance in the UK, Home Office (2010). Covert Surveillance and Property 
Interference, supra note 886    
889  Katz v United States, supra note 848     
890    Huvig v France, supra note 827, para.25   
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However, Ethiopia does not have any legislation that deals with telephone taping 
without physical intrusion nor is there a clear distinction between private life and 
public life. In the absence of a clear definition of the ‘home' and ‘privacy', it is 
difficult to ascertain how privacy law applies in Ethiopia if there is directed 
surveillance. 
 
As with many other rights, except those that are absolute and non-derogable, the 
FDRE constitution provides the conditions where right to privacy could lawfully 
be set aside. As discussed above, Article 26(3) of the FDRE constitution 
indicates that the right could be restricted where "compelling circumstances 
arise." Furthermore, it identifies a two-tiered test for lawful interference with a 
person's privacy.  
 
First, any interference must be "in accordance with specific laws." If the 
interpretation of the ECtHR is taken as a basis for this definition, this 
requirement is qualified by clear and accessible domestic laws. 891  The 
requirement of ‘specific laws' under the FDRE constitution is tantamount to 
enactment of domestic laws. However, the FDRE constitution is silent as to the 
accessibility and clarity of domestic laws. This requirement is particularly 
relevant with regard to covert investigations. Despite the existence of general 
laws on entry and search, the FDRE constitutional requirement that intrusion into 
one's privacy  must be ‘in accordance with the law' remains obscure, in that there 
are no laws that deal with covert investigations of the directed, intrusive or 
human surveillance kind akin to that seen above in the UK.  
 
The second requirement under the FDRE constitution is that interference should 
be for some legitimate aims. Article 26(3) contains a similar list of legitimate 
aims to that of Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The only justification omitted in the 
former is interference with privacy in "the interest of the economic well being of 
                                                 
891 Starmer, K. (1990). Supra note 831, p. 166; see also Malone v United Kingdom, Supra note 
831; see also Leander v Sweden, supra note 829      
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the country." 892  The wording of the FDRE constitution apparently seems to 
suggest that the listing is exhaustive.  
 
Yet, a major omission from the FDRE constitution is the requirement of 
necessity and proportionality. Despite the clear requirement of interference "in 
accordance with law" and for some legitimate aims under Article 26(3) of the 
FDRE constitution, evaluating legitimate State interference into a person's 
privacy would be difficult in the absence of the necessity and proportionality 
test. 893  In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, an intrusion that is legal and 
legitimate must also be necessary 894 and proportionate. 895 The US version of 
proportionality test896 has been applied in several US Supreme Court cases.897 It 
is also part of the US Constitution.898 Accordingly, the test imports a level of 
scrutiny into the relationship between the means and the ends.899 This is more or 
less similar to the definition of proportionality employed by the ECtHR in MS v 
Sweden.900  
 
Although it is difficult to reach the same conclusion from a reading of Article 
26(3) of the FDRE constitution, a similar approach drawn into the Ethiopia legal 
system would have the effect of discouraging excessive executive zeal.   
 
                                                 
892   To understand the necessity  test of  interference into privacy of an individual in order to 
‘protect economic well-being' of a country, see MS v Sweden (1997) 28 EHRR 313, 1997-IV 
1437    
893   For arguments why it is absolutely crucial to have the principle of proportionality, see  Blake, 
N. (2002)., Supra note 842,  pp. 19-27    
894   Matheron v France, supra note 841     
895   See Arai-Takahashi, Y. (2002), supra note 243; for proportionality debate in the UK, see 
Blake, C (2012), supra note  243    
896   There are current arguments in the United States on how ‘proportionality' should be defined. 
See Christopher, S. (2010). Proportionality, Privacy and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and 
Swire. Minnesota Law Review, Research Paper No. 10-21.  (Arguing that ‘proportionality' should 
be gauged empirically. While others counter argue that it should be gauged normatively); see also 
Brennan, C. R. (2012) Katz Cradle: Holding onto Fourth Amendment Parity in an Age of 
Evolving Electronic Communication. 53 wm. & mary l. Rev. 1797    
897 See Oliver v United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944); see also   Lawson, G.  et al. (2010). The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)      
898 Article 1 of the US Constitution, Section 8, Clause 18      
899  Lawson, G.  et al., supra note 892, p. 175     
900   MS v Sweden, supra note 892    
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4.3 Interception of Communications 
 
4.3.1 Legal Regimes in the US and UK on Interception 
 
Interception has two broad aspects. One covers the contents of the 
communication with the other concerning intercepts that are incidental to the 
content. This section analyses the legal regimes on content interception. 
Moreover, a separate part discusses Ethiopian laws on the same subject matter.  
 
4.3.1.1 Interception without Warrant 
 
There are several legal regimes on interception in the UK.901Moreover, section 
32 of TA 2006 specifically deals with terrorist suspects and their 
communications. TA 2006 made several amendments to RIPA regarding 
duration, authorisation and safeguards on external communications. Article 8 
ECHR is also relevant in case of intercepting communications, particularly if the 
interception breaches privacy.  
 
Identifying the targets, the time and the place of interception, access, disclosure, 
and retention902 are some of the relevant factors surrounding the interception of 
communications. However, the scope of this thesis is restricted to use of intercept 
evidence in court proceedings.  
 
Generally, RIPA is divided into three main parts; interception of communications, 
the acquisition of communication data, and the investigation of electronic data 
protected by encryption.903 The focus of this research will be limited to the first 
part. 
                                                 
901 RIPA 2000; the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 (SI 2000/2699);  Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001; Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCAP) 2005; HRA 
1998, Data Protection Act 1998, and Telecommunications (Data Protection) Privacy Regulation 
1999      
902  See for instance, section 37 et seq. of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 c.9 for ‘Safeguards 
For Certain Surveillance Under RIPA'    
903   Interception of Communications Commissioner (2011). Reports of the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner (HC 496 SG/2012/125), (table I RIPA summary box); see also 
Home Office (2010). Covert Surveillance and Property Interference supra note 886; see also 
Home Office (2010). Covert Human Intelligence Sources, supra note 886; see also Home Office 
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Under RIPA, two types of unauthorised interception are distinguished: 
interception on public communication systems and interception on private 
telephone systems.904 The phone hacking scandal is a good example to mention 
as to why breaching section 1 of RIPA could result in criminal prosecution: 
"What started as a small bush fire…has become a forest fire destroying countless 
reputations (and the NoW itself) in its wake. The few hacked by NI in 2007 
became nearly 6,000 in late 2011".905 This scandal has led to the prosecution of 
some journalists,906 while there are also on-going trials.907  
 
Besides criminal prosecutions, it is also a requirement of Article 13 ECHR that 
there should be an ‘effective' remedy for a violation of any of the fundamental 
rights that emanate from the Convention, including the right to privacy. 908 
Accordingly, under section 65 of RIPA, there is an Independent Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT) with the power to investigate contraventions of RIPA by 
government security services. The IPT is an institution "...different from all 
others in that its concern is with security. For this reason it must remain separate 
from the rest and ought not to have any relationship with other tribunals".909 The 
administrative remedies under section 65 allows individuals whose 
communications have been intercepted in contravention of RIPA to request the 
IPT to investigate the matter. Their complaints criteria include issues relating or 
"...concerning the acquisition, storage and use of information by the intelligence 
                                                                                                                                    
(2007). Code of practice for the acquisition and disclosure of communications data: Pursuant to 
section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (LONDON: TSO); see also Home 
Office (2007). Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Code of Practice Pursuant to 
section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (LONDON: TSO)      
904  Section 1(1) and section 1(2) of RIPA    
905   For further reading, see Keeble, R. L. and Mair, J. (2012).The Phone Hacking Scandal: 
Journalism on Trial. (UK, Arima Publishing)    
906   See for example, R. v Goodman ( Clive) (Unreported, January 26, 2007) (Central Crim Ct) 
; see also Various Claimants v News Group Newspapers Ltd  [2013] EWHC 2119 (Ch); see also 
Various Claimants v News Group Newspapers Ltd] [2012] EWHC 2692; see also Home Affairs 
Committee (2011). Unauthorised Tapping Into or Hacking Of Mobile Communications: 
Thirteenth Report of Session 2010-2012 (HC 907). London: The Stationary Office    
907  See Bingham, J. (2013). Phone Hacking Trial: Three News of the World Journalists Admit 
Hacking, 30 October, the Daily Telegraph; see also Evans, M. (2013). Phone Hacking Trial: 
Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson trial begins, 28 October, the Daily Telegraph     
908  Home Office (1999). Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom: A Consultation 
Paper (Cm.4368) London: Stationery Office    
909    Leggat, A (2001). Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service, Report of the Review of 
Tribunals  (HMSO, London), para. 3.11  
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services of his or her entry in the National Identity Register established under the 
Identity Cards Act 2006".910 If the IPT is satisfied that there is a violation of 
RIPA, it could "...make an order which may quash the interception warrant, 
require the destruction of intercepted material, and/or require the Secretary of 
State to pay compensation".911 
 
In addition, the Interception of communications Commissioner (ICC) is 
empowered, among other things, to ‘keep under review' warrants issued by the 
Secretary of State and compliance with RIPA by government agencies or other 
organisations involved in warranted interception and safe-handling of intercepted 
materials.912 Section 57 (3) RIPA also requires the ICC to assist the IPT as to any 
issue falling to be determined' by it. The ICC could issue ‘red, amber, or green' 
recommendations depending on the degree of non-compliance.913 For instance, 
"…[a]ny red recommendations are of immediate concern as they mainly involve 
serious breaches and/or non-compliance with the Act or Code of Practice which 
could leave the public authority vulnerable to challenge".914 Furthermore, the 
ICC can impose civil sanction for unlawful interception of communications.915 
However, there are some exceptions to the power of the ICC to impose civil 
remedies. For instance, if a criminal offence of intentional unlawful interception 
under section 1(1) is committed, there will be criminal prosecution instead of 
imposing civil remedies. 916    
 
However, RIPA does not distinguish between a terrorist threat and general crime 
control. The standards for both types of interception are similar, although the 
warrant requirement and the duration of interception in the case of national 
security are regulated by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
                                                 
910    House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2009).  Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State , supra note 820,  para. 258    
911   Home Office (1999). Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom (Cm.4368), 
supra note 908, para. 1.9    
912   Section 57 RIPA    
913  Interception of Communications Commissioner (2013). 2012 Annual Reports of the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner (SG/2013/131 HC 571), London, TSO, p. 26    
914   Ibid    
915   Section 2 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Monetary Penalty Notices and Consents 
for Interceptions) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011 No.1340)    
916  Interception of Communications Commissioner. Exercise of Powers under Section 1a And 
Schedule A1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, para. 1.8     
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and TA 2006. Another distinction stipulated under RIPA is interception based on 
the location of the parties to the communication. This is governed by section 8(4) 
and section 2 of RIPA.  
 
RIPA also provides lawful interception with or without warrant. Section 3 
provides for the grounds of lawful interception without warrant; when both or 
either of the parties to the communication gives their consent, and when the 
interception is conducted by service providers. Consent interception could be 
permitted if authorisation for the same effect is obtained. However, service 
providers could lawfully intercept provided such conducted is restricted to the 
‘provision of the service' or ‘enforcement' of a law related to the service.917 
Further guidance on interception by service providers is provided under the 
Telephone Communications (Lawful Business Practices) Interception of 
Communication Regulations 2000 (LBP regulations) (SI 2000/2699). 
 
By virtue of section 17 of RIPA, intercept evidence obtained is excluded from 
legal proceedings. However, section 18 contains several exceptions. One of these 
exceptions is intercept obtained according to section 3 of RIPA. These intercepts 
could be disclosed or produced as evidence.918  Section 3(1) RIPA contains two 
kinds of consent: specific consent of both parties or the reasonable expectation of 
the person conducting the interception without getting specific consent from the 
parties.919  The latter element requires the existence of "reasonable grounds for 
believing that both parties consent."920 However, the UK government conceded 
that the standard of "reasonable grounds for believing" that the parties had 
consented to the interception is contrary to the standards required by EU law.921  
 
However, under section 3(2) RIPA, i.e. single party consent, it only requires the 
consent of one party and authorisation under part II of RIPA. "In these 
                                                 
917 Section 3(3)(b); see also Regina v Sargent [2001] UKHL 54, para.26      
918  Section 18(4)(5) RIPA    
919    Home Office (2010). Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Proposed Amendments 
Affecting Lawful Interception, A Consultation.    
920  Emmerson, B. et al. (editors) (2012).  Human Rights and Criminal Justice. 3rd edition. 
(London, Sweet and Maxwell), p. 327   
921  Ibid      
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circumstances, the definition of ‘surveillance' is extended to include the 
interception of a communication in the course of its transmission."922 Therefore,  
 
it follows that section 3(2) demonstrate that, in the circumstances contemplated 
by that section, interception may, if consented to by one party to the call, be 
authorised by senior police officers. If so authorised, the interception is lawful, 
no offence is committed and section 17 does not render the contents 
inadmissible.923  
 
Once consent is obtained, a question lingers as to the probative value of the 
evidence. If the police played an active role in the process of obtaining illegal 
evidence, the evidence is likely to be thrown out as shown in R v Mason.924 
Another case worth discussing is R v H. 925   The victim in R v H was 
intentionally trapping the suspect in concert with the police. Therefore, the court 
concluded that the victim's consent in this case was not vitiated.  
  
However, it is an established principle in the UK that illegally obtained evidence 
is not automatically excluded from court proceedings.926 The discretion whether 
to consider the intercept is left to the judge. The use of ‘tricks' by the police is 
one of the factors that courts take into account when making a decision under 
section 78 of PACE.927 It is also well established that deceit does not necessary 
lead to exclusion.928 Section 78 of PACE states that:  
 
 in any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
                                                 
922 Colvin, M. and Cooper J. (2009). Human Rights in the Investigation and Prosecution of 
Crime.( Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 60      
923   R v Hardy & Hardy [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 30, para.39    
924   R v Mason (1987) 3 All AR 481 (In this case, both the defendant and his solicitor were 
deceived by police. But it was a confession obtained by deception not interception.)    
925   R v H [1987] Crim LR 47    
926    R v Leatham (1861). 8 Cox CC 498 ("it matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it 
would be admissible in evidence."); see also R v Khan [1996] 3 WLR 162; R v Latif [1996] 1 
WLR 104   
927    Stone, R. (1995). Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act: Practice And Principles  3 Web JCL     
928   Ibid; see also Richardson, P. J.   (2007). Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice. 
(Sweet & Maxwell), p. 1505; see also Murphy, P. and Badour, L.  (2010). International Criminal 
Law and Common Law Rules of Evidence. In Karim A. A. Khan, et al. Principles of Evidence in 
International Criminal Justice. (New York, Oxford University Press)    
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regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit 
it. 
 
Furthermore, recent court cases in the UK such as R v Hammond929 upheld the 
legality of ‘participant monitoring,' where one party to a telephone call records 
the conversations on the other end of the telephone.930 
 
However, a problem may arise due to the absence of a definition of consent in 
RIPA. The UK government conceded that consent should be defined in line with 
Article 5(1) of the E-Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) and Article 2(h) 
of the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC). 931  Consent under 
Article 2(h) of the EU Data Protection Directive is defined as "any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies 
his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed."  
 
Accordingly, Article 7 the EU Data Protection Directive provides ‘unambiguous 
consent' for processing of personal data and Article 8 of the same directive 
requires ‘explicit consent' for processing of special categories of data such as 
data that divulge " racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life." 
 
US law on lawful interception without a warrant is governed by federal and State 
laws. The federal law only requires the consent of one party932 while the standard 
                                                 
929  R v Hammond [2002] EWCA Crim 1243     
930    Ibid; the same conclusion is reached in R v Hardy and Hardy [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 30.  For 
some commentators, however, "the judgments in R v Hammond and R v Hardy are confusing. 
Both judgments appear to miss the distinction between a situation where an interception has 
occurred but has lawful authority by virtue of section 3(2)». See Colvin, M. and Cooper J., supra 
note 922, p.57     
931   Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000:  2000 c. 23 Explanatory Notes   
932    See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c),  and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)    
198 
 
varies across states.933 Accordingly, the Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III)934 states that:  
 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law 
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a 
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception.935 
 
There are ‘specific authorisations and reporting procedures' 936  for use of 
consensual interception.  
 
In a similar fashion to RIPA, Title III provides lawful interception by service 
providers.937 The protection provided under Title III is specific, covering not 
only service providers but also their agents, employees, and officers. RIPA, on 
the other hand, is not clear on whether the same sort of specification is implied 
within section 3. Moreover, similar to the RIPA requirement of reasonable 
expectation, Title III requires either specific or implied consent in case of one-
party consent.938  
 
However, consent is required only where the contents of the communication are 
intercepted, as Title III does not prohibit the US government from getting access 
to non-content communications. Non-content communications are instead 
regulated by another Statute. 939   In the UK, non-content communication is 
regulated by section 8(4) of RIPA. Similar to the Pen/Trap Statute,940 the said 
                                                 
933   For instance, Arizona is a "one-party" state, ARS 13-3005.A (1) (2); Pennsylvania requires 
the consent of all parties. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Sec. 5704(4); see American Legal Guide on 
Telephone Recordings at http://www.callcorder.com/phone-recording-law-america.htm#The US 
Federal Law    
934  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. _ 2510 et seq.) 
[(Public Law 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, June 19, 1968 [H.R. 5037.] (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.)     
935   18 U.S.C. §.2511 (2)(c)    
936    See United State Secret Service Directives System : Chapter II Consensual interceptions, 
08/06/2009    
937   18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i),      
938   18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (c); see also United States v Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir.)   
cited at Exceptions to the Prohibitions-Consensual Law Enforcement Interceptions US Attorneys 
Criminal Resource Manual 1054    
939   18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. - (Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices; Exceptions)     
940    A court order is required Under 18 USC § 3121(A) oF The Pen Register Statute; For detail 
discussions on the Pen/Trap Statute, see also  Becker, M. (1999). The Electronic 
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section does not require the consent of either party for non-content 
communications.  
 
Title III is not the only federal law that regulates the interception of 
communications in the US. The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) is relevant here. 941 However unlike other federal 
laws on interception, CALEA "...was not intended to expand law enforcement's 
authority to conduct electronic surveillance."942 
 
CALEA, rather, requires a "telecommunications carrier" 943  to assist in the 
interception of communications for law enforcement purposes.944 The scope of 
interception under CALEA extends both to content and non-content 
communications. 945  Moreover, US government agencies may or may not be 
required to have a prior court authorisation in order to have electronic 
communications intercepted.  This is due to the drafting of CALEA, which states 
‘a court order or other lawful authorization'946 is required to conduct the above 
activities.  
 
There are some controversies in regard to the reach of a ‘telecommunications 
carrier'. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an organ empowered 
to regulate communications,947 has ruled that a ‘telecommunications carrier' does 
                                                                                                                                    
Communications Privacy Act. In: Paglin, M. D. et al. The Communications Act: A Legislative 
History of the Major Amendments, 1934-1996. (Maryland, Pike & Fischer, Inc); see also Smith, 
C. S. and Hung, L. C.  (2010). the Patriot Act: Issues and Controversies. (Charles C Thomas-
Publisher, LTD), p. 33   
941     Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, codified at 47 USC 1001-1010  
942    Figliola, P. M. (2007). Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL30677, 8 June    
943  Under 47 U.S.C. 1001 (8) (a), a   "telecommunications carrier" is defined as "a person or 
entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a 
common carrier for hire.     
944  See 47 U.S.C. 1002      
945  See  47 U.S.C. 1001(2):  dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, 
destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by 
means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier    
946  See 47 U.S.C. 1002     
947        
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not include providers of internet services, private mobile networks, pay-booth 
telephones.948  
 
However, a recent move by US federal agencies to have the scope of CALEA 
expanded has stirred controversy.949 US federal agencies argue that "...the FBI 
and other government agencies are facing a potentially widening gap between 
our legal authority to intercept electronic communications pursuant to court order 
and our practical ability to actually intercept those communications."950  
 
The scope of CALEA has been limited only to telephone systems until 2005 
when the FCC ruled that a limited number of "...facilities-based broadband 
Internet access service providers and VoIP providers that offer services that use 
the public switched telephone network..."951 are subjected to the requirement of 
CALEA. However, this ruling did not include communications over the Internet. 
Therefore, US agencies argue that expanding the scope to include new 
communications systems over the Internet such as Vontage telephony, which 
turns any computer with Internet access into a telephone,952 would help lessen 
the gap. Their proposal specifically includes placing some wiretapping tools on 
computers or phones. This is different from the requirement of CALEA where 
‘communications are aggregated or controlled' by the service provider. 953 
Opponents of this move argue that placing wiretapping software on computers or 
phones would compromise the security of users by allowing criminals to breach 
their communications.954  
   
The controversy surrounding CALEA is not the only problem that poses a grave 
concern on privacy in the US. Warrantless Interception under the Foreign 
                                                 
948   FCC (1999). Second Report and Order, in the matter of Communications Assistance for Law 
enforcement Act, CC Docket No. 97-213, FCC 99-229; see also Perritt, H. H. (2001). Law and 
the Information Superhighway (New York, Aspen Law and Business), p. 196     
949      Addida, B., et al  (2013). CALEA II: Risk of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints. Center for 
Democracy & Technology, 17 May 
950     Caproni, V. (2011).  Statement before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 17 February  
951  Figliola, P. M., supra note 942     
952   Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011).  Going Dark: Law Enforcement Problems In Lawful 
Surveillance, 29 June At Http://Info.Publicintelligence.Net/Fbi-Goingdark.Pdf    
953    Addida, B., supra note 949    
954    Addida, B., supra note 949   
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Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),955 and the ever expanding power 
of the National Security Agency's (NSA) warrantless surveillance also deserve 
some discussion.  
 
FISA deals with four different issues: Electronic Surveillance, 956  physical 
searches,957 Pen registers and trap & trace devices, 958 and accessing business 
records.959  
 
However, in light of the scope of this thesis, our focus will be limited to the 
interception of electronic communications, which is defined as "...the 
acquisition…of the contents of any wire or radio communication."960 
 
FISA is mainly concerned with the interception of communication of foreign 
powers, and their agents.961 The Patriot Act 2001 has expanded the targets of 
FISA by including ‘a group engaged in international terrorism' that are not 
connected to any foreign powers. Moreover, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)962 further expanded FISA to be applicable to 
‘lone wolf' terrorists i.e. "...surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in 
international terrorism without requiring evidence linking those persons to an 
identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization."963  
 
There are two procedures for intercepting communications under FISA: 
warrantless interception and warranted interception.  With discussions on 
warranted interception to be followed, warrantless interception under FISA is 
                                                 
955  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801and Seq. (Pub.L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. Ch. 36)     
956   50 U.S.C. Chapter 36, Subchapter I - Electronic Surveillance   
957  50 U.S.C.  Chapter 36, Subchapter Ii - Physical Searches     
958   50 U.S.C.  Chapter 36, Subchapter Iii - Pen Registers And Trap And Trace Devices For 
Foreign Intelligence Purposes   
959   50 U.S.C.  Chapter 36, Subchapter Iv - Access To Certain Business Records For Foreign 
Intelligence Purposes    
960     See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (f)  
961    See 50 U.S.C. § 1801   
962    See Section 6001(a) of the IRTPA   
963   For further discussion see, Liu, E. C. (2011). Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015. Congressional Research Service, CRS 
Report for Congress (7-5700)     
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executed for a year through the authorisation of the President.964 However, this 
warrantless interception does not apply to international terrorism or to 
circumstances where one of the participants is a US citizen.965 
 
However, the amendment of FISA in 2008 has blurred the legal limitations that 
exclude US citizens from FISA's warrantless interception. Although the FISA 
Amendment Act 2008966 does not allow the targeting of US citizens, applicants 
in the case of Clapper 967  argued that the fact that this amendment allows 
interception without identifying the targets or satisfying the probable cause test 
of the fourth amendment is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although 
the case was dismissed for lack of standing to sue,968 it is considered one of the 
instances in the US where challenges to blanket authorisation of surveillance has 
been ‘foundered'969 due to the reluctance of the US courts to rein in the executive.   
 
Moreover, the 9/11 terrorist attack was partly attributed to the failure of the 
National security Agency (NSA) to "...connect the dots of information available 
to the intelligence community." 970  For this reason, President Bush used his 
executive powers as stipulated under FISA 971  to develop the ‘Terrorist 
Surveillance Program'.972 This program gave more powers to the NSA in order to 
fight terrorism. Without requiring a court order, the NSA could use this program 
to intercept a communication provided that "...one party to the communication is 
                                                 
964   50 USC § 1802 - Electronic surveillance authorization without court order; certification by 
Attorney General; reports to Congressional committees; transmittal under seal; duties and 
compensation of communication common carrier; applications; jurisdiction    
965 Ibid, 50 USC § 1802 (a)      
966   Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 6304, enacted 
2008-07-10    
967 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 132 S. Ct. 2431       
968   A further discussion on standing to sue will be followed    
969 Richards, N.M. (2013). The Dangers of Surveillance. 126 (7) Har. L. Rev. 1934      
970  Federation of American Scientists (2013). The National Security Agency: Missions, 
Authorities, Oversight and Partnerships, 9 August, at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/nsa-story.pdf      
971  See 50 U.S.C. § 1802, 1809      
972  For detail discussions, see   Fine, G. A. (2009).  Unclassified Report on the President's 
Surveillance Program: Prepared by the Office of Inspectors General of the Department of 
Defence, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National security agency and 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (Report No. 2009-003-AS)     
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outside the US and where there are reasonable grounds to believe that either 
party is a member of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organisation." 973  
 
Once revealed by the New York Times, 974  supporters of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program argued that it "...does not involve an arbitrary intrusion 
into personal privacy..." 975  and it "...has proven so important to protecting 
America".976 However, under pressure from Congress, warrantless interception 
under the program appeared to be abandoned in 2007. 977  However, recent 
revelations by the fugitive whistle-blower, Edward Snowden, have exposed the 
ever expanding power of the NSA to intercept communications with or without 
court oversight. In a series of documents leaked to the Guardian, the US and UK 
have been shown to be involved in secret programs aimed at the mass collection 
of anyone's communications "...regardless of whether they are suspected of any 
wrongdoing."978  
 
4.3.1.2 Interception with a Warrant  
 
In the UK, the Secretary of State has the power to issue intercept warrants.979 
However, all US warrants on interception are authorised by a court,980 except for 
warrantless interceptions under FISA.981There are four grounds982 for issuing an 
                                                 
973   Alexander, Y. and  Kraft, M (2008). Evolution of U. S. Counterterrorism Policy. (USA, 
Praeger Security International), p. 590; see also Cummins, S. J. (2006). Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law. (Washington, International Law Institute), p. 364     
974   United States Congress (2007). United States Congressional Serial Set, Serial No. 15017, 
Senate Reports Nos. 356-369, United States Congressional Serial Set (Serial Number 15017)    
975   Cummins, S. J. (2006)., supra note 973    
976   Alexander, Y. and  Kraft, M (2008), supra note 973, p. 590     
977    United States Congress (2007). supra note 974   
978    For instance, see Greenwald, G. (2013). NSA Collecting Phone Records Of Millions Of 
Verizon Customers Daily, 6 June, Guardian; see also   MacAskill, E., et al (2013). GCHQ 
intercepted Foreign Politicians' Communications at G20 Summits, 17 June Guardian; see also 
Gellman, B.  and DeLong, M.  (2013). First Direct Evidence Of Illegal Surveillance Found by the 
FISA Court, 15 August, Washington Post; see also Gellmann, B. (2013). NSA Broke Privacy 
Rules Thousands of Times per Year, Audit Finds, 16 August, Washington Post; see also BBC 
(2013). K GCHQ ‘can Spy on Smartphones,' 8 September   
979  Section 5 of RIPA     
980   See 18 U.S.C. § 3121 ; 18 USC § 2516 ; 50 USC § 1804 - Applications For Court Orders 
(FISA)    
981 The Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) 1984 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 551 ("a cable 
operator shall provide notice in the form of a separate, written statement to such subscriber which 
clearly and conspicuously informs the subscriber of nature of personally identifiable information, 
frequency and purpose of any disclosure, etc."), and Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) 1988 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710) ("wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records.") These 
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intercept warrant in the UK, with there being two983 types of interception warrant. 
Those authorised to apply for a warrant are specified under section 6 of RIPA. 
Moreover, the purposes of an external warrant under section 8(4) are similar to 
those under FISA,984 though the requirements and the application procedures are 
different. One difference under FISA, for instance, is that there could be 
warrantless interception of communication by the executive provided "there is no 
substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any 
communication to which a United States person is a party." 985  No such 
requirement is stated under RIPA.  
 
The four grounds for issuing an interception warrant under section 5(3) of RIPA 
are ‘national security', ‘preventing or detecting serious crimes', ‘safeguarding 
economic well-being' of the UK, and ‘giving effect to an international mutual 
assistance agreement'. The Code of Practice on interception of communications 
states that an intercept warrant is not to be issued by the Secretary of the State 
unless a ‘direct link between the economic well-being of the United Kingdom 
and state security is … established".986 It further states that ‘state security' and 
‘national security' do not have significant difference in meaning.987  
 
But, the grounds for issuing interception warrant in the US are regulated by 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)988 and the Patriot Act 
2001. 989  Accordingly, the issuance of an interception warrant by a court is 
                                                                                                                                    
statutes deal   with warrantless interception outside the scope of FISA; for detail discussions, see 
also Chemerinsky, E. and Levenson, L. L.  (2008). Criminal Procedure. (US, Aspen Publishers 
Inc),  pp. 282-289       
982  See section 5(2) and section 5(3) of RIPA     
983   These could be domestic interception regulated by section 5 and external interception 
regulated by section 8(4)  of RIPA    
984   See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (electronic surveillance authorization without court order)    
985    See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1)(B)   
986   Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice: Pursuant To Section 
71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. London, TSO, p. 16   
987   Ibid    
988 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (as amended by CALEA (1994) (codified at 
18 USC § 2510, and the PATRIOT Act (2001)). This 1986 statue also amended Title III (also 
called the Wire Tape Act). Title III, as will be discussed in detail, provides definitions for 
different term such as ‘wire communications', ‘oral communication', ‘intercept', etc. Accordingly, 
‘intercept' is defined as ‘the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or 
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.'      
989  This Act amends Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act 1968 (title III or 
Wire Tape Act)     
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dependent upon the fact that the applicant has shown probable cause that "an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular 
offence listed in 18 U.S.C §2516 18."990 These grounds contain very specific 
offences such as murder, kidnapping, espionage, treason, etc., 991 whereas the 
RIPA mentions very broad lists. Moreover, the period of a warrant is 30 days 
under the above US Acts. However, it is 6 months under section 9(6) (b) of RIPA.  
 
Furthermore, Title III outlines specific guidance that should be followed in the 
case of intercept warrants. Accordingly, orders:992  
 
 Must be issued by a judge; must have a specified time limit;  the applicant must 
show probable cause; extension of orders must be on probable cause; must be 
accompanied by judicial supervision in their execution; normal investigative 
procedures have been exhausted. 
 
As will be discussed in Katz v United States below, the absence of any of these 
elements is enough for the US courts to dismiss a criminal prosecution. Apart 
from the requirement of ‘relevant period' under section 9(6)(b) and exhausting 
normal investigative procedures under Section 5 and section 7(2)(a),993 most of 
these requirements under Title III are absent under RIPA, particularly the 
showing of probable cause and judicial supervision in the execution of 
interception warrant.  
 
4.3.1.3 What is an Interception? 
 
As discussed, there are significant differences between the UK and US positions 
on the legal requirements of interception. The same is true with the definition of 
interception. Defining the concept is a pre-condition of whether the legal 
requirements are satisfied.994 Under section 2(2) and 2(3) RIPA, interception of 
                                                 
990 18 U.S.C § 2518 (3)(a)      
991   18 U.S.C§ 2516   
992    18 U.S.C § 2518 (3)(a) 
993    Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice, supra note 986, p. 
17     
994     Ormerod, D. and McKay, S. (2004). Telephone Intercepts and Their Admissibility. Criminal 
law Review 15-38    
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communication is defined as the ‘interference', ‘modification' or ‘monitoring' of 
communication to reveal its contents by persons other than the participants.  
 
Section 2(5) RIPA excludes interception of non-content communications. These 
exclusions are further explained under section 2(9). This non-content data merely 
identifies the person, the location, the apparatus, and signals, but does not reveal 
what has been said or written.  
 
The Secretary of State could issue a warrant to intercept the contents of the 
interception only on the grounds specified under section 5(2-3). While one of the 
grounds, national security, is not clearly defined, the national security interest 
specified under this section could be triggered if there are "threats from 
espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers 
and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy 
by political, industrial or violent means ..."995  
 
By the same token, there is a statutory definition for serious crimes. 996 
Furthermore, detecting crime is referred to as the identification of a suspect, the 
purpose and the circumstances of a crime.997 Moreover, other possible means of 
obtaining the evidence must be exhausted before the Secretary of State 
personally issues the warrant.998 Furthermore, the intercept warrant must identify 
a person or premises as the target, and additional factors that specify addresses, 
apparatus, etc.999  
 
However, the controversy on how, when, and where interception is said to take 
place is not settled by the law. The words ‘interference', ‘modifies', and 
‘monitors', within section 2(2) of RIPA  are very broad terms which are not 
defined by the relevant Act. As a result, they have stirred a fierce legal battle, as 
                                                 
995   Section 1(2) of the Security Service Act 1989  
996     Section 81(3)(a) or 81(3)(b) RIPA; see also  Kennedy v the United Kingdom, no. 
26839/05,18 May 2010, para.34; see also schedule 1 of Serious Crime Act 2007; see also Serious 
Crime Prevention Orders (SCPO) Guidance, Serious Crime Act 2007 - Sections 1 - 41 and 
Schedules 1 and 2, section 9 et seq. For a definition of seriousness of a crime, see also AH 
(Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012]  EWCA Civ 395    
997   Section 81(5) RIPA; see also  Kennedy v UK, supra note 996, para.35    
998   Section 5 and section 7(2) (a) RIPA; see also Kennedy v UK, supra note 996, para. 36 and 38    
999   Section 8 RIPA; see also Kennedy v UK, supra note 996,  para. 40     
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indicated by the cases discussed below. What is interesting in these cases is how 
the UK courts have tried to balance privacy concerns by looking into the issues 
raised by the litigants.    
 
In R v Effik 1000 , the appellants were convicted for conspiracy to supply 
‘controlled drugs' based on intercept evidence. However, their conviction would 
have been unlikely had it not been for the intercept evidence. The prosecution 
and the appellant differed on what amounts to interference with public 
communications. The appellant argued that intercept evidence is inadmissible 
according to sections 1 and 9 of the Interception of Communication Act 1985 
(ICA). However, at trial the UK court dismissed their argument and held that a 
privately run system is not covered by the alleged Act. The case went all the way 
to the House of Lords, which held that "the evidence of the telephone 
conversation was a material contributory factor in the appellant's 
convictions." 1001  Moreover, it was evident that a warrant was not issued to 
intercept the conversations. The House of Lords focused on what constitutes 
‘telephone apparatus' and what is meant by being ‘connected' to answer the 
controversy surrounding the distinction between public and private 
communications.  
 
However, for all the lengthy analysis, Lord Oliver agreed with the trial judge that 
the cordless telephone was not part of public communications despite the fact 
that it was connected to a BT line.1002 He concluded that  
 
what was actually intercepted by the police radio receiver consisted of the 
impulses transmitted between the base unit and the hand set, both of which 
formed part of a telecommunication system ... but formed no part of public 
telecommunication systems run by BT.1003  
 
                                                 
1000   R v Effik (Godwin Eno) [1994] 99 Cr. App. R. 312     
1001   Ibid, para.313    
1002   Ibid,  para. 317    
1003   Ibid    
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His Lordship dissected section 1(1) of ICA and focused on interception "in the 
course of transmission ... by means of public telecommunication."1004  
 
He reasoned that an offence under section (1) ICA occurs if there is interception 
‘in the course of transmission' not during its transmission.1005 Moreover, he held 
that the phrase "by means of' for the purpose of the criminal offence occurs when 
the impulses pass through the public system."1006 In all of his Lordship's analysis, 
there was no mention of concern for privacy rights. He was merely concerned 
with whether the purpose of the prohibition of intercepting public 
communication system is tailored to the ultimate aims. The aims, paraphrased 
from his reasoning, were that of: 1007  protecting the systems; allowing 
interception under exceptional circumstances (national security); and restricting 
the material to a particular purpose (investigation, not criminal proceedings). 
 
His Lordship was firmly of the opinion that privacy concerns are not the primary 
reasons for the prohibition contained within the ICA. Therefore, a privately run 
system is not covered under the legislation.1008  
 
The decision in Effik as to what constitutes interception in the UK was affirmed 
in subsequent cases such as R v Smart and Beard1009, R v E1010, and R v Allsopp 
and others.1011 
 
In R v Smart and Beard, one of the defendants, Mr. Beard, raised several grounds 
against his conviction for conspiracy to supply controlled drugs. One of the 
grounds 1012  required clarification of whether the interception of his 
communications by the authorities consisted of unlawful interception within the 
meaning of section 9(1) ICA 1985. The court in this case referred to Effik to find 
out whether the telephone conversation of the appellant should have been 
                                                 
1004  Ibid     
1005   Ibid    
1006     Ibid 
1007   Ibid, para. 319   
1008    Ibid,  para. 320   
1009    R v Smart and Beard [2002] EWCA cim 772   
1010   R v E [2004] EWCA 1243     
1011   R v Allsopp and others [2005] EWCA Crim 703    
1012   R v Smart and Beard, supra note 1009, para. 64    
209 
 
inadmissible. The Court of Appeal held that because "...the listening device 
simply heard and recorded what Harris said into his phone. There was thus no 
interception of an electrical impulse or signal passing through the public 
telecommunication system."1013 
 
The facts in R v E were similar to the above case where, in the same manner as 
Smart and Beard, the police placed a listening device in E's car. The fruit from 
the intercept material was accepted by the trial judge. However, the appellant 
argued that this should have been inadmissible because the interception was 
obtained in contravention of RIPA. The Court of Appeal accepted that the 
complainant has a right to expect some degree of privacy in his car unless there 
is lawful authorisation to place a device in his car.1014      
 
However, The Court of Appeal has also attempted to answer the crucial point: 
when is interception said to occur for the purpose of section 2 of RIPA? Unlike 
in Effik, the contents of the conversations in R v E were picked up as they were 
spoken into the mobile. Thus, the intercept material in this case did not involve 
"...the use of electrical or electromagnetic energy."1015 Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal held that there was no interception within the meaning of RIPA. 
Moreover, it was held that despite the legislative instruments at issue in Effik, i.e. 
ICA 1985 and in R v E, i.e. RIPA, the question of when interception is said to 
occur remains the same. . 1016   
 
The case of R v Allsopp and others1017 is different from the above cases, in that 
the appellants did not use any communications, private or public - "It was a face-
to-face communication".1018  The court in this case made extensive reference to 
the cases discussed above to reach the conclusion that orally transmitted 
communication is not covered under RIPA.1019  This conclusion does not appear 
to be plausible for some commentators as it, among other things, disregards 
                                                 
1013 Ibid, para. 68       
1014    R v E, supra note 1010, paras. 9-10    
1015   Ibid, paras. 21-22     
1016   Ibid, para. 25     
1017   R v Allsopp and others, supra note 1011    
1018  Ibid, para. 36      
1019    Ibid, paras. 20-23   
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section 2 (8) RIPA which describes interception as "any case in which any of the 
contents of the communication, while being transmitted, are diverted or 
recorded".1020 
 
Several questions remain unanswered. Why did the UK court focus on the 
distinction between private and public systems? Does such a distinction make a 
difference with regard to the actual contents of the conversations? The reasoning 
could be attributed to the particularly long-standing position that the aim of the 
law on interception is promoting public confidence in using public systems, not 
protecting privacy.  
 
A cursory look at the explanatory notes to RIPA seems to provide two differing 
liabilities depending on whether the interception is on public systems or private 
systems. Accordingly, the consequence of interfering with public systems entails 
criminal liability while interference with private systems entails civil liability if 
the interception is conducted by the system controller or with his express or 
implied consent.1021 The only instance where interference with private systems 
entails criminal liability is if the systems are attached to a public system.1022  
 
Accordingly, "an entirely self-standing system… such as a secure office intranet 
does not fall within the definition."1023 However, the explanatory notes to RIPA 
do not provide reasons as to why the legislature opted for two types of liability, 
and thus preferring to distinguish between public and private systems. It is not 
clear what public interest is served by such distinctions. The explanatory notes 
do, however, seem to contradict a statement made by the former Home Secretary 
Jack Straw, in which he stated that RIPA: 
 
... is not confined to any particular communications handling system; covert 
monitoring of private messages sent through telephone networks, e-mail systems, 
                                                 
1020      For a detail criticism of the case, please see Mckay, S. (2011), supra note 886, pp. 82-84 
1021      Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Explanatory Notes 
1022     Ibid; see also section 1(2) of RIPA  
1023    Ibid   
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pager communications or other wireless transmissions are all examples of 
interception.1024  
 
Despite the apparent clarity of the above statements, some commentators remain 
of the belief that the definition of interception under RIPA is opaque.1025 For this 
reason, they argue that the concerns raised in Halford v UK, 1026  .i.e. the 
recommendation by the ECtHR to ‘regulate the interception of private networks,' 
seem to be unsolved.1027 
 
In the US, the controversy on the scope of interception in the course of a 
communication's transmission is approached rather differently. For instance, 
Title III1028   defines interception as an "aural or other acquisition of the contents 
of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device."  
 
Moreover, the ‘content' of the interception under Title III is also defined as "... 
any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication."1029 The definition of ‘content' in the US is thus different from 
the UK because the latter makes a distinction between content and non-content 
interception. As discussed above, the US also has separate legislation that 
governs non-content interceptions.1030 But the former does not recognize such 
distinction, with the definition of ‘content' in the US covering any information 
recording particular interception. Similar to the current RIPA prohibitions, Title 
III also prohibits unlawful and intentional interception and disclosure of any 
communications.1031   
 
                                                 
1024 Home Office (1999). Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom(Cm.4368), 
supra note 908      
1025  Ormerod, D. and McKay, S. (2004), supra note 994     
1026  Halford v the United Kingdom, supra note 826     
1027  See Ormerod, D. and McKay, S. (2004), supra note 994; see also Mckay, S. (2011), supra 
note 886, p. 78     
1028   18 USC § 2510 (4)    
1029  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (8)     
1030   18 USC § 3121 et seq.     
1031  See 18 USC § 2511 (1); See also Goldestein et al. v US 316 U.S. 114 (62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 
1312), para. 118      
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The focus in the US is not, therefore, on whether the interception is on 
private/public systems1032 or content/non-content interception but whether there 
is intrusion into private lives and reasonable expectations of privacy. The only 
instance where privacy is taken into account in the UK is "...where the subject of 
the interception…reasonably assumes a high degree of privacy, or where 
confidential information is involved."1033 However, as held in R v MCE,1034 even 
the standard of ‘high degree of privacy' does not mean that these materials could 
not be intercepted. Apart from these instances where privileged materials are 
involved, RIPA does not stipulate1035 the same standards as those established in 
the following US case laws. 
 
A comparison of the case law on both sides of the Atlantic is worth looking into. 
The facts that gave raise to Katz v United States1036 were similar to R v Effik. In 
R v Effik, the police placed a device on an adjoining house in order to pick up 
the sound waves transmitted from a cordless handset in the target house. In Katz 
v United States, Federal agents placed similar devices on a telephone booth for 
the same purpose as in R v Effik. In both cases, there was no physical intrusion. 
In R v Effik, the UK courts attached great significance to the distinction between 
public and private communication systems, while failing to look at whether the 
defendant had reasonable expectations of privacy. Whereas, in Katz v United 
States, the US court did not follow similar justifications. In Katz v United States, 
it was stated that "the governments activities in electronically listening to and 
recording … words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied on while 
using a telephone booth and thus considered a ‘search and seizure' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."1037  
 
                                                 
1032  See for example Elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 Offenses at US Attorneys Criminal Resource 
Manual 1052      
1033  Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice, supra note 986, p. 
11 -13     
1034    R V MCE [2009] 2 WLR 782   
1035    See for instance Mckay, S. (2011), supra note 886, p.78 (stating that RIPA "has fundamental 
flaws; it is both confusing and fails to meet its basic and self-avowed objective to protect the 
privacy of the individual from highly intrusive state activity".)   
1036   Katz v United States, supra note 848    
1037  Ibid, paras. 350-353     
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Moreover, according to Shubert v Metrophone,1038 it was stated that both cellular 
and wireless telephone systems are protected under Title III. The justification of 
the US courts is based on what an individual expects to be shielded outside 
interference. Contrarily, R v Effik was not concerned with the point of privacy.  
 
Another similarity between Katz v United States and R v Effik is that the 
interceptions in both cases were conducted without proper authorisation. 
However, R v Effik did not pay attention to the absence of proper authorisation 
in light of the legal position that illegally obtained intercept evidence is not 
automatically excluded under common law. In the US, however, unlawfully 
obtained evidence is inadmissible, without qualification.1039  
 
Moreover, in Katz v United States, despite the argument of the US government 
that there was probable cause that a criminal activity was afoot; interception was 
limited to ‘the specific purpose' and the fact that the interceptors "took greater 
care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself,"1040 the US 
Supreme Court held that all these safeguards were not properly scrutinized "both 
before and after by a neutral court." 1041 As a result, the US Supreme Court 
quashed the conviction.  
 
The case of Goldman v United States 1042 has also attempted to answer the 
question as to what consists of interception. Accordingly, it was held that 
"divulgence of a person's telephone conversation overheard as it was spoken into 
the telephone receiver, does not violate §605 of the Federal Communications 
Act."1043 In the same token, the case of United States v Yee Ping Jong held that 
"a mere recording of the conversations at one end of the line by one of the 
                                                 
1038  Shubert v Metrophone, Inc 898 F. 2d 401, 404-405 [CA3 1990],  para. 1     
1039  Nardone v United States - 308 U.S. 338 (1939 ("evidence procured by tapping wires in 
violation of the Communications Act of 1934 is inadmissible.") Note that the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 regulates interstate and foreign commerce communications ; see  
Goldestein v US, supra note 1031     
1040 Katz v United States, supra note 848, at 354       
1041  Ibid, at 357      
1042  Goldman v United States - 316 U.S. 129 (1942)     
1043   Ibid, para.  133; the Federal Communications Act of 1934 regulates interstate and foreign 
commerce communications. But §605 of the same Act regulates unauthorized disclosure of radio 
or telephone communications      
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participants"1044 did not amount to the interception of communications. This is 
the same as the position taken in R v Hammond, which held that:  
 
... the telephone calls were recorded by the persons to whom the calls were made, 
and subject to any statutory guidance as to the meaning of the word 
'interception', we would have thought that if a recording of a telephone call is to 
be regarded as an interception, it can only be so regarded when the recording is 
not made by either the maker of the call or the receiver of it, but by a third 
party.1045 
 
Hammond was criticised by some commentators because the UK court has 
concluded that:  
 
no interception occurred on such facts because no third party was "involved" 
and one party (the officer) had consented to the recording. On examination, 
these overlapping bases for this conclusion do not support such a narrow 
interpretation of "interception".1046  
  
However, the position taken in Hammond is the same with that of Yee Ping Jong 
in the US.  
 
As a general rule, it is not classed as interception in the US if interception takes 
place "at or near … the end of the telephone line" or at "locality of the consenting 
party" or "by a recording device attached to or in proximity to the 
instrument."1047 This is similar to the UK position, which held that interception 
conducted when one is "speaking into a mobile phone is not interception within 
section 2(2) of RIPA."1048 But in R v Effik, it was not the words spoken to the 
receiver that were intercepted. The conversations rather passed through the 
handset and were on their way to the base unit. The UK courts were of the 
opinion that sections 1 and 9 ICA did not protect signals. Whereas, Goldman v 
                                                 
1044   United States v Yee Ping Jong, 26 FSupp 69    
1045  R. v Hammond , supra note  929     
1046   Ormerod, D. and McKay, S. (2004), supra note 994   
1047  U.S. v Yee Ping Jong, supra note 1044, para. 122      
1048    See R v E, supra note 1010; see also R v Smart and Beard, supra note 1009 (speaking into a 
phone is not interception within section 1(1) of the 1985 Act )   
215 
 
United States held that signals are protected as far as there is interception 
"between the points of origin and reception of such transmission including all 
instruments, facilities, apparatus and services."1049  
 
To conclude, the above cases highlight the difference in the approach of British 
and US courts on privacy concerns in case of interception.   
 
4.3.1.4 Why is Intercept Excluded from Court Proceedings in English Law? 
 
With the exception the disclosure of intercepts in camera,1050 a target could not 
force the UK government to disclose or produce intercept material. On the other 
hand, if the police could not secure a conviction by means other than intercept 
evidence, they have to release a suspect, unless they suspect the individual of 
terrorism. Here, it has been said that the suspect could be "detained without 
charge under control orders or by improper use of immigration laws." 1051 
Improper use of immigration laws or the legitimacy of the new Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Suffice to say, here, that each is controversial.  
 
At the same time, English courts can consider "material intercepted in a foreign 
country under that country's law;1052 a telephone conversation recorded with the 
consent of one of the participants; or a telephone conversation recorded by a 
hidden microphone not connected to the telephone."1053  
 
But intercept evidence obtained through a warrant issued by the Secretary of the 
State is excluded from court proceeding in the UK despite the contrary claim that 
                                                 
1049 Goldman v United States, supra note 1042      
1050   See section 18 of RIPA (such as illegal interception proceedings, and control orders under 
the PTA 2005).; see also the Chilcot Review, supra note 806, para.20    
1051  Democratic Audit (2007). Evidence for Change: Lifting the Ban on Intercept Evidence in 
Court, 1 March        
1052 See the case of In re Hilali (Respondent) (application for a writ of Habeas Corpus) [2008] 
UKHL 3 (Mr. Hilali was extradited from the UK to Spain based on solely mobile phone intercept 
and  voice identification evidence ); see also Regina v P [2002] 1 A.C. 146 (intercept evidence 
obtained in accordance with the law of a foreign country admissible in the UK); see also 
Rozenberg, J.  (2009). Whitehall Needs to Re-examine How Best to Use Intercept Evidence. Law 
Gazzete, 17 September      
1053 The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, para.22    
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RIPA was introduced to bring domestic legislation in line with ECHR.1054 This 
justification lacks validity when privacy rights are violated for national security 
reasons and when the breach remains behind the scenes without becoming 
available for scrutiny by the courts due to the prohibition under section 17 of 
RIPA.1055  
 
In addition, by virtue of the Birkett Report,1056 the non-disclosure of intercept 
evidence obtained under a warrant to "private individuals, private bodies, or 
domestic tribunal" became a continuously upheld principle in English law.  
 
The Birkett Report was a response to The Marrinan Case, where a barrister was 
disbarred for obstructing justice based on intercepts released by the then Home 
secretary, Viscount Tenby MP. This disclosure was condemned in the strongest 
possible fashion by the Birkett Report, which stated that: 
  
the power given to the Secretary of State to issue a warrant to intercept 
communications, whether by letter or by telegram or by telephone, is a power of 
such importance and consequence that it should be most rigorously confined to 
the purposes which convinced the Home Secretary that it was right to issue the 
warrant in the first place.1057 
 
The Report's publication reaffirmed previously held position that intercept 
evidence should be confined to the very purpose it was obtained. The purpose 
was "the prevention and detection of serious crime and for the preservation of the 
safety of the State." 1058  The Report, however, did not explain the potential 
                                                 
1054  Ibid     
1055   Akdeniz, Y. et al. (2001). Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (1): 
BigBrother.gov.uk: State surveillance in the age of information and rights Crim.L.R. 73 
 (arguing that RIPA provides ‘limited judicial oversight')      
1056   Great Britain (1957). Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors Appointed to Inquire 
into the Interception of Communications, (Cmnd.283) London: HMSO; see also Home Office 
(1980).  The Interception of Communications in Great Britain. (Cmnd. 7873). London, HMSO; 
Diplock, W. J. K. (1981).  The Interception of Communications in Great Britain. (Cmnd 8191) 
London: HMSO    
1057   Great Britain (1957). Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors, supra note 1056, para. 
100 
1058  Ibid, para.8    
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consequences for the intelligence community if intercept were to be adduced as 
evidence in criminal proceedings.  
 
The Report listed three requirements for issuance of a warrant:1059 1) There must 
be a national security interest; 2) The intercept must be restricted to discharging 
the duty of the Secretary of State; 3) Interception is to be used as a last resort. 
These requirements are the same as the grounds mentioned under section 5(3) of 
RIPA.  
 
There is wide support for the use of intercept evidence in criminal 
proceedings,1060 but more dispute regarding the use in terrorism prosecutions. 
For instance, Lord Carlile did not accept the argument that intercept evidence is 
appropriate in terrorism trials.   However, Lord Lloyd of Berwick holds opposing 
opinion. 1061  
 
The latest report on the admissibility of intercept, the Chilcot Review,1062 could 
be considered here to highlight the opposing arguments on intercept evidence. 
Despite the particularly positive perspective in which Sir John Chilcot viewed 
the use of intercept evidence in terrorism cases and serious crime cases, the then 
Labour government decided against  implementing the recommendations because 
a committee set up to undertake mock trials with the recommendations having 
been implemented advised against the bringing those recommendations into law.  
 
The Chilcot Review issued some pre-conditions for the disclosure of intercepts. 
These are ‘operational risks' that need to be addressed before any change is made 
to the current regime on interception:1063 An analysis of each of these ‘risks' 
                                                 
1059 Ibid   
1060  JUSTICE (2006).  Intercept Evidence: Lifting the Ban, 1 October; see also Human Rights 
Watch (2009). Letter to the UK Parliament on Control Orders; see also HWR (2007). Hearts and 
Minds Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom Counterterrorism Policy.  pp. 13-
15; see also Joint Response of the Law Reform Committee of the General Council Of The Bar 
And the Criminal Bar Association To The Home Office Consultation On Proposals For The 
Counter Terror Bill, 2007; see also Equality and Human Rights Commission (2010). Equality and 
Human Rights Commission submission: Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers     
1061   For details, see Horne, A. (2011). The Use of Intercept Evidence in Terrorism Cases, 
Commons Standard Note SN/HA/5249    
1062  The Chilcot Review, supra note 806      
1063   The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, chapter IV     
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follows below.  The first legal risk considered by the Chilcot Review is the 
impact of lifting the ban on Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR. The Report 
stated that allowing intercept evidence could bring ‘operational and 
organisational risks.'1064  
 
This test basically revolves around the issue of ‘inequality of arms' in criminal 
proceedings where the ban is lifted.1065 The conclusion that could be taken from 
them is that the prosecution and the defense are prohibited from mentioning or 
relying on intercept evidence except for the ‘tightly drawn' 1066  exceptional 
circumstances covered under section 18 RIPA. At the same time, if the 
prosecution has decided to use intercept evidence, then "…fairness demands that 
the defendant must be given the opportunity to challenge the use and admission 
in evidence of the material."1067 Moreover, the UK government has accepted1068 
that the decision over what to retain or destroy for the purpose of prosecution 
might raise the question of fairness as seen in Natunen v Finland.1069 The ECtHR 
in this case found that the partial retention of intercept materials, which only 
incriminates the applicant, was in violation of article 6 ECHR.   
 
But there are different circumstances where intercept is already in use in the 
UK.1070 These include intercept obtained with the consent of one party; intercept 
recorded by a covert listening device rather than the direct intercept from the 
telecommunication network; and communication made to or from one prison or a 
secure mental health facility.1071 Moreover, In R v P,1072  the House of Lords 
criticised the over-cautious approach of the UK government to the secrecy of 
interception in circumstances where secrecy is not the primary concern. 
                                                 
1064    The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, paras. 62-64     
1065    The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, paras. 62-64; see also R v Austin, supra note 805, para. 
47   
1066   Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice, supra note 986, 
p.33   
1067   R v Austin, supra note 805, para. 47    
1068  Home Office (2009). Intercept as Evidence: A Report (Cm 7760). London: Stationery Office , 
para.10-12   
1069  Natunen v Finland (application no. 21022/04)     
1070   JUSTICE (2006).  Intercept Evidence: Lifting the Ban, 1 October,  p.42    
1071  For interception from prison, see R v Ian Huntley [2005] EWHC 2083 (QB)      
1072  R v P [2000] All ER (D) 2260     
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Furthermore, the ECtHR in Schenk v Switzerland 1073 and in Chinoy v United 
Kingdom1074 also held in favour of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings. 
The argument is that if these sorts of intercept are already allowed, it is hard to 
envisage why the UK courts cannot be entrusted with the task of balancing 
security interests in case of intercept obtained through a warrant.  
 
Second, besides the above risks on Articles 6 and 8 ECHR, the UK government 
stated that disclosing intercept evidence would compromise the techniques used 
by and the work of the intelligence community.1075 The Chilcot Review further 
highlighted this risk by stating that: 
 
Any disclosure of interception capabilities could have a profound impact on 
national security, by encouraging a wide range of targets (not only criminals but 
also terrorists and other individuals of intelligence value) to change their 
behaviour in ways that would make them more difficult to investigate in the 
future.1076 
 
However, it is claimed that if intercept evidence is used to detect serious crimes 
such as terrorism, the justification against the use of intercept evidence in 
criminal proceedings for national security reasons is less convincing.1077 This 
argument is based on the fact that suspected terrorists and criminals are already 
aware of interception capabilities; that interception capabilities could be 
protected by public immunity principles; 1078 and that there is no evidence to 
                                                 
1073   Cf Schenk v Switzerland (App. No. 10862/84)     
1074    Chinoy v United Kingdom (App. No. 15199/89)   
1075 Home Office (2009). Intercept as Evidence (Cm 7760), supra note 1068, para.21; see also 
Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner for 2005-06, HC 315 (19 Feb 2007). 
London, TSO; see also evidence from the ACPO at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). 
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 Days, Intercept and Post-Charge Questioning: 
Nineteenth Report of session 2006-07 HL 157/HC 394. London, TSO, Oral Evidence 12 March, 
Ev. 1, Q3      
1076   The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, para.65      
1077   JUSTICE (2006).  Intercept Evidence: Lifting the Ban, 1 October; see also Liberty (2007). 
Liberty's Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights:  "Relaxing the Ban on the 
Admissibility of Intercept Evidence," February        
1078   Section 3(6) and the Code of Practice under Part 2 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996: for detail discussions on public immunity in the UK, see Walker, C. and 
Roberson, G. Public Immunity and Criminal Justice in Walker, C. and Starmer, K. (1999). 
Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error. (New York, Oxford University Press), pp. 
170-79; see also R v H [2004] 2 AC 134     
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show that public interest principles have failed to protect interception capabilities 
in other common law jurisdictions.1079  
 
The above argument could be supported from the decision reached in Rowe and 
Davis v UK. In this case, the ECtHR indicated that a government is not under an 
obligation to disclose sensitive information where such practice reveals, among 
other things, "secret police methods of investigation."1080 The same conclusion 
was reached in R v H.1081  
 
The third risk considered by the Chilcot review is the UK government's ability to 
cope with technology changes if the ban on intercept is lifted. It stated that "the 
advent of new technology will require wide-ranging and very expensive changes 
to the UK's interception systems". 1082 However, this has been criticised as a 
‘worn-out' and ‘a lightweight argument'.1083 For instance, the laws on "internet 
gambling, data protection and RIPA itself" are driven by an advancement of 
technology.1084 Therefore, the same advancement in communication technology 
could be covered by expanding the existing laws.  Therefore, the UK government 
has either to amend the existing legal regimes or risk the wrath of the ECtHR as 
demonstrated by Malone v UK.1085 
 
Fourth, the government accepted the Chilcot Review position that to allow 
intercept evidence would weaken the trust and confidence of service providers, 
                                                 
1079 See Oral evidence from the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald QC and 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). Intercept and Post-Charge 
Questioning, supra note 1075, 12 March, Ev. 1, Q10      
1080    Rowe and Davis v UK [2000] 30 ECH, para. 61   
1081    R v H, supra note 1078; for further discussion, see McKay, S. (2006). Public Interest 
Immunity after Edwards and Lewis v United Kingdom and R v C and R v H and the Role of 
Special Advocate.  Covert Policing Review 110-124; see also Harfield, C. and Harfield, K. (2012) 
Covert Investigation: Blackstone's' Practical Policing. 3rd edition. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press), p. 195 and seq.   
1082     The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, para.123   
1083   See the testimony of former Assistant Commissioner, Andy Hayman at Home Affairs 
Committee (2006). Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of session 2005-06, (HC 910-II). 
London: Stationery Office, Q 224    
1084   Liberty (2007). Liberty's Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights:  "Relaxing the 
Ban on the Admissibility of Intercept Evidence," February        
1085   Malone v United Kingdom, Supra note 831 (absence of a law that governs telephone tapping 
found to be contrary to Article 8 and therefore not ‘in accordance with the law.'). See also Tapper, 
C. (2007). Cross and Tapper on Evidence. 11th edition. (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 226 
see also  McKay, S. (2011), supra note 886, p. 71 (stating that the precursor for the Interception 
of Communications Act 1985 was the decision  of the ECtHR in Malone)     
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inter-agency relations and international relations.1086 Unlike the concerns related 
to national security, the question here is whether revealing the source would 
endanger future cooperation. The UK government's concern is protecting the 
interests of third party sources. The Chilcot Review explained that there is much 
uncertainty from the service providers with regard to the introduction of intercept 
evidence. However, the report did not indicate that service providers would stop 
cooperating if intercept evidence is used in criminal proceedings.  
 
Generally, the over-cautious approach of the UK government, being careful not 
to offend CSPs, inter-agency cooperation and foreign governments is flawed for 
the following reasons.  
 
First, RIPA is mandatory 1087  in the sense that it obliges CSPs to "provide 
assistance in giving effect to an interception … or a reasonable intercept 
capability".1088 The CSPs have to comply with the law once a warrant is issued. 
According to section 11(7) of RIPA, the penalty for refusal to cooperate with a 
warrant is two years imprisonment and/or fine. Considering the severe legal 
consequences, it would be less convincing to argue that CSPs would back away 
from cooperating voluntarily though the government might use the evidence they 
intercept in criminal proceedings. More importantly, however, ‘service providers 
do not have an objection in principle to the use of intercept as evidence'.1089 
 
Second, the fear that international cooperation would be damaged is also grossly 
misguided because prosecuting terrorists based on shared intercept is in the 
interest of all countries involved. As discussed above, intercept evidence 
obtained from abroad is already in use in the UK. The UK government does not 
offer a shred of evidence to support its case that sharing intercept evidence with 
foreign governments is based on the understanding that it would not be used in 
criminal proceedings. A country that uses intercept evidence in domestic courts 
is thus unlikely to oppose the same practice in the UK.  
                                                 
1086   Home office (2009). Intercept as Evidence (Cm 7760), supra note 1068, paras. 17, 21     
1087 See section 11(4), sections 12 and et seq of RIPA     
1088  Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice, supra note 986, p. 9      
1089  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). Intercept and Post-Charge Questioning, supra note 
1075, para. 158      
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Moreover, what ‘international cooperation' means also remains a divisive issue in 
any event. It is unlikely that other countries would back down from cooperating 
when they use the same evidence to convict terrorists. As mentioned above, the 
UK is the only country that prohibits the fruits of interception in criminal 
proceedings. The question is, then, which country would object if the UK relaxes 
the ban?  
 
For all the above reasons, the effect of lifting the ban on third parties that 
cooperate with the UK government is negligible.   
 
4.3.3 The Arguments in favour of lifting the Ban  
 
It is not only the UK government that has failed to provide good arguments to 
rebuff the wide support for using intercept communication in court. As well, 
some of the arguments of proponents in favour of the use of intercept evidence 
are also flawed. These flaws are summarised below.  
   
4.3.3.1 Intercept Evidence Would Increase the Conviction of Terrorists 
 
An argument could be made on whether lifting the ban on intercept would 
increase in the number of convictions.1090But this raises some serious questions: 
how exactly would it increase conviction? It is valid argument to say that that 
lifting the ban ‘may assist … greatly in the prosecution of terrorists'.1091 There is 
also no doubt that relaxing the ban could be ‘a key tool to prosecute serious and 
                                                 
1090 Human Rights Watch (2009). Letter to the UK Parliament on Control Orders; see also Human 
Rights Watch (2007). Hearts and Minds Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom 
Counterterrorism Policy.  pp. 13-15; see also Joint Response of the Law Reform Committee of 
the General Council Of The Bar And the Criminal Bar Association To The Home Office 
Consultation On Proposals For The Counter Terror Bill, 2007; see also Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (2010). Equality and Human Rights Commission submission: Review of 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers     
1091  See oral evidence from John Murphy, Deputy Chief Constable of Merseyside Police and 
ACPO's lead on intercept at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). Intercept and Post-Charge 
Questioning, 12 March, Ev 1, Q3, supra note 1075; see also Letter from Sir Ian Blair, former 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis , 2 February 2007, Ev 49      
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organised crime and terrorism' 1092  and it may also ‘likely support some 
prosecutions'. 1093  But to argue that intercept evidence would increase the 
conviction rate is completely a different argument that requires solid evidence. 
There are different factors that affect the conviction process.  
First, not all terrorist cases involve electronic or telephone communication. There 
is a need to analyse the percentage of terrorism cases that involve interception of 
communications. This data should be compared to overall terrorist cases. Unless 
such statistical analysis is produced, the argument remains vague.  
 
Second, there is a difference in the rate of terrorist convictions. In the UK, there 
were 1,963 arrests between 2001 and 2010. 1094 However, the conviction rate 
varies from year to year. For instance, there was an 82% conviction rate in 
2008/9 1095 compared to the 60% conviction rate between 2001 and 2008.1096 
Moreover, the conviction rate reached a peak at 86% in 2005/2006 while it 
dropped to 59% and 55% in 2006/07 and 2007/08, respectively.1097  
 
These statistical disparities show that intercept evidence cannot be the single 
factor determining the rate of convictions. For instance, Lord Carlile has 
criticised the argument that the admissibility of intercepts would be a ‘silver 
bullet' for the problems connected with control orders and conviction of terrorism 
suspects.1098 He has also examined Operation Pathway, which looked into the 
arrest of 12 Pakistani terrorist suspects, and concluded that "a change in the law 
would have made no difference in this case, in the sense of assisting either the 
                                                 
1092   See the opinion of the former Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, at Dyer, C. (2006). Courts 
Set to Admit Wiretap Evidence, 21 September, the Guardian; see also his view at Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2007). Intercept and Post-Charge Questioning, Oral evidence, 26 
June, Q247, supra note 1075    
1093   Home Office (2009). Intercept as Evidence (Cm 7760), supra note 1068, para. 8    
1094   Home Office (2011). Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops and Searches, (HOSB 15/11). United 
Kingdom, 2011     
1095   Ibid,  table 1.4   
1096   Home Office (2009). Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes: Great Britain, 11 
September 2001 to 31 March 2008. Home Office statistical bulletin, 04/09, London: Home Office, 
para.16.      
1097  Ibid, at table A     
1098 Carlile, A. (2009). Operation Pathway: Report following Review. London, Home office, para. 
98      
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prosecution or the suspects."1099 Moreover, the then Assistant Commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police, Andy Hayman, gave a qualified support by stating that 
lifting the ban may be useful  ‘in a selected number of cases, not just for 
terrorism but also for serious crime'.1100 This further shows that it has yet to be 
seen how the introduction of intercept evidence would change the conviction rate. 
A further analysis is needed to determine how many of the acquittals were due to 
the blanket prohibition. Without that analysis, the argument remains 
unconvincing.  
 
The conviction rate of terrorist suspects in the US with or without the use of 
intercept evidence shows a different picture. The average conviction rate 
between 2001 and 2010 in the US was 87%,1101 which is higher than the data 
between 2001 and 2010 in the UK. However, the lower rate of conviction for 
terrorist offences in the UK cannot be solely attributable to the ban on intercept 
evidence. Indeed, it may be one of the factors. But it is unacceptable to assume 
that the rate would have been higher or equivalent to the US had it not been for 
the ban.  
 
One reason for a higher rate of arrest and lower rate of conviction under TA 2000 
is that "the police may have been far quicker to make use of powers of arrest 
under the Act than was necessary."1102 The TA 2000 gave the police extensive 
powers to arrest and to detain terrorism suspects. However, the powers failed to 
net many convictions. This has nothing to do with the legal prohibition on 
interception of communications. It rather shows the flaws of the hasty decision to 
prevent rather than to prosecute terrorist suspects.  
 
Finally, the ban on intercept might not hinder the conviction of terrorist suspects 
as the UK government could get round this ban.1103  
                                                 
1099  Ibid, para. 96     
1100   See Home Affairs Committee (2006). Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of session 
2005-06, (HC 910-I). London: Stationery Office, Q 224    
1101  New York University of law (2011). Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 - 
September 11, 2011      
1102  Mattison Public Relations (2010). Ten Years of the Terrorism Act 2000, at 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/about-us/press-
releases/Ten%20years%20of%20the%20Terrorism%20Act%202000.pdf      
1103 Rozenberg, J.  (2009). , supra note 1052      
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4.3.3.2 Intercept Helps to Reduce Pre-Charge Detention  
 
This is the second argument offered in support of using intercept in a court. But it 
begs the question whether allowing intercept evidence would actually shorten 
pre-charge detention.  
 
This is based on the wrong argument that the UK's pre-charge detention is longer 
than any other democratic country.1104 As will be discussed in chapter five, this 
argument might not necessarily be true. There are situations in the US where 
investigative agents could hold a suspect longer than that the period for pre-
charge detention in the UK.1105 These measures are available in the US on the top 
of the use of intercept material. Therefore, the argument that lifting the ban on 
intercept evidence in the UK could serve as an alternative to pre-charge detention 
is weak in the sense that a shorter period of detention in the US is not necessarily 
attributable to the use of intercept material.  The length a suspect might be held 
depends on the complexity of the case, not whether a country is using or 
prohibiting communication materials.  
 
More reassuring, however, is that the legislation that permits extended periods of 
detention in the UK is rarely used. UK government's statistics for the period 
between 2001 and 2008 show that the time from arrest to charge were well below 
the maximum period allowed by the law. The report indicates that "46% of those 
arrested under section 41 were held for under one day and 66% for under two 
days. 42% of those charges were charged within 2 days and 80% of those 
released were released within 2 days."1106 The same trend continues in recent 
reports.1107 This further complicates the attempt to use intercept evidence as an 
                                                 
1104  Liberty (2010). Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention Comparative Law Study,  at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/reports/comparative-law-study-2010-pre-charge-
detention.pdf     
1105    See chapter five for discussions on material witness statute, detention under the USA 
PATRIOT Act and other alternative measures; see also Stigall, D. E. (2009). Counterterrorism 
and the Comparative Law of Investigative Detention. ( USA: Cambria Press), p.166; see also 
Turnbull, J.H (2007). Recent Legislative Questions and Internal Security Policy. 170 crim.law. 5  
1106  Home Office (2009).  Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes , supra note 1096, 
para.12     
1107 Home Office (2011). Operation of Police Powers (HOSB 15/11), supra note 1094      
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alternative to pre-charge detention when the latter practice is not in fact working 
oppressively as many had thought. However, there is an argument to be had 
about the democratic legitimacy of having such laws on the books considering 
such laws are argued by some to be too excessive.   
 
4.3.3.3 Intercept Evidence could serve as an Alternative to Control Orders 
 
A discussion into control orders, or the now newly (re)formulated TPIM 
regime1108, is beyond the scope of this thesis.1109 Suffice to say that the TPIM 
regime, as it is known, is seen by some to pose one of the greatest threats to the 
credibility to the UK's justice system, in particular due process, arguably placing 
that system one step back into the ancient history of oppressive summary 
justice.1110 However, this section will instead attempt to show that control/TPIM 
orders are not necessarily related to the ban on intercept evidence.  
 
It is true that the main reason for the introduction of control orders in 2005 was 
to avoid revealing evidence gathered via secret intelligence. 1111 However, an 
interesting empirical perspective would first want to know how much of the 
evidence gathered for use against control order detainees is drawn from the fruits 
of interception. The data shows that there were 52 control orders between 2005 
and 2011.1112  
 
But, it would seem that not all of them were based on intercept material. For 
instance, one defendant claimed that he was subjected to control orders because 
he ‘met' a certain extremist, 1113  whereas some were placed under the order 
                                                 
1108 See Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (2011 Chapter 23)      
1109   For a detail discussion on control orders, see Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, pp.  301-327; 
see also Walker, C. (2010). The Threat of Terrorism and the Fate of Control Orders. Public Law 
4-17; see also Forster, S. (2010). Control Orders: Borders to the Freedom of Movement or 
Moving the Borders of Freedom? In: Wade, M. and Maljevic, A. (eds.). A War on Terror? The 
European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and  Human Rights Implications. (New York, 
Springer), p. 349    
1110   BBC (2013). Labour Questions Tpims as Terror Suspect Absconds. 1 January at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20882357       
1111 BBC (2011). Q&A: Control orders, at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12108075       
1112  Anderson, D. (2012). Control Orders In 2011:  Final Report of the Independent Reviewer on 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, para. 3.13     
1113 BBC (2011). Q&A,  supra note 1111      
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because "they wished to travel abroad for terrorist purposes."1114 The nature of 
the circumstances in which these controlees were placed under a control order, 
merely meeting a suspect or wishing to travel abroad, would appear to suggest 
that intercept evidence played no part in the decision to subject these people to 
control orders. The reasoning seems rather more superficial, possibility based on 
the potential for a threat to arise out of those circumstances.  
 
Thus, even if intercept evidence is allowed, control orders based on non-
intercepted materials would continue to exist. These include orders based on the 
"transcript of audio bags, tips from important informants, or information from 
other intelligence agencies." 1115  The RIPA provisions that deal with direct 
interception do not bar these kinds of evidence.  
 
An important decision of the House of Lords on control orders is worth 
mentioning here. 1116 The House held that if a person is subjected to control 
orders, he must be given sufficient information to answer the allegations against 
him to satisfy Article 5(4) and Article 6 ECHR. This means that the UK 
government cannot hide behind a veil of secrecy when imposing control 
orders.1117 Furthermore, the cases cautioned against using RIPA prohibitions on 
intercept evidence as an excuse for failing to provide sufficient information to a 
controlee.       
 
Second, the main purpose of a control order is prevention, not prosecution.1118 In 
the same manner, RIPA does not prevent the use of intercept evidence to prevent 
terrorist activities. What is prohibited is use of the same material in legal 
proceedings. Thus, removing the ban would not necessarily lead to the removal 
of control orders.1119 The Chilcot Review also admitted that it has "not seen any 
                                                 
1114  Anderson, D. (2012). Control Orders in 2011, supra note 1112, para. 3.18     
1115 Ibid       
1116  Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Others [2009] UKHL 28 (AF & Others) ; 
see also the decision of the ECtHR in A. and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, 
ECHR 2009     
1117  See also Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 [2008] 
AC1 AC400 ((secret evidence cannot be used to impose control orders)     
1118     Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224 , p. 302   
1119  Carlile, A. (2008). Third Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. London, Home Office     
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evidence that the introduction of intercept as evidence would enable prosecutions 
in cases currently dealt with through Control Orders." 1120  This further 
undermines the argument that lifting the ban on intercept could reduce the need 
for control orders.  
 
Fourth, as discussed in the previous sections in this chapter, intercept evidence is 
neither prohibited nor restricted in the US. However, Obama announced a new 
Executive Order that would enable the US government to detain Guantanamo 
prisoners indefinitely without a trial.1121  
 
Although the application of control orders and this particular Executive order are 
different, the justifications and implications are the same. A control order is in 
place because the UK government does not have sufficient evidence to either 
prosecute or deport suspects, but feels it has sufficient evidence to ground fears 
that such individuals pose a threat to the UK. The same could be said with that of 
the above Executive Order.  
 
To conclude, neither the use of intercept evidence nor removing the control order 
regime could allay the fears of compromising intelligence techniques. This is due 
the fact that secret intelligence is more than just the interception of 
communications and, further, that control orders are not primarily built upon 
intercept evidence. 
 
4.3.2 The US Experience and Section 17 of RIPA 
 
Critics argue that "section 17 of RIPA ensures that the United Kingdom 
interception regime remains unique in Europe and virtually alone in the 
world."1122 This is due to the several prohibitions on intercepted communications 
stipulated under section 17 of RIPA. What follows is comparison of these 
prohibitions against the US federal laws. 
                                                 
1120    The Chilcot Review, supra note 806, para. 210    
1121 See chapter five for further discussion on the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects in the 
US        
1122  See Ashworth, A. and Macdonald, A.  (2012). Human Rights and Criminal Justice. 3rd 
edition. (London, Sweet and Maxwell), p.328     
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1.1.1.1.Disclosing the Contents of an Interception 
 
In the US, intercepted communication could be disclosed or used in a court 
provided that:1123  
 
The interception is made without a warrant in case of emergency and an 
application for a warrant is made within 48 hours; the parties receive a copy of 
the court order under which the interception was authorized not less than 10 
days before the trial; the interception is not contrary to 18 U.S.C §25151124; The 
interception is made with a court warrant upon probable cause.  
 
Moreover, intercept evidence obtained under FISA1125 is also admissible if1126 
the attorney general permitted disclosure of such material; if the aggrieved 
person is notified in advance; if the person is given the right to challenge the 
legality of the evidence; and if there is a review in camera by a court to 
determine the effect of disclosure on national security. However, FISA does not 
deal with content or direct interception of communications as with section 17(1) 
of RIPA. Its aim is restricted to electronic surveillance.   
 
Section 17 of RIPA, on the other hand, does not prohibit the use of direct, 
intrusive, or covert surveillance in criminal proceedings.1127 Thus, comparisons 
                                                 
1123  See 18 U.S.C. §2518(7); 18 U.S.C. §2518 (9); 18 U.S.C. §2518(3) cited in Stevens, G. M. 
and Doyle, C.  (2008). Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing 
Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 98-327 
1123     18 U.S.C §2515 sets the general rule that illegally obtained intercept is not admissible in any 
trial     
1124 18 U.S.C §2515 sets the general rule that illegally obtained intercept is not admissible in any 
trial      
1125 For the difference between interception under title III and FISA, see Comparison of 
Electronic Surveillance Under Title III and FISA, available at 
https://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/020919fiscrbriefchart.pdf ; see also TITLE III and FISA 
at 
http://www.gusjsolomoninnofcourt.org/Documents/Meeting%20Documents/2007%20April%20I
nn%20of%20Court%20Materials%20Part%202.pdf      
1126   50 U.S.C 36 § 1806; see also Smith, R. E.  (2002). Compilation of State and Federal Privacy 
Laws (Privacy Journal), p.85    
1127  Home Office (2010). Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, supra note 886; see also 
Home Office (2010). Covert Human Intelligence Sources, supra note 886     
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of electronic surveillance in both countries do not help much in the controversy 
surrounding the use of intercept evidence in English courts.  
 
18 U.S.C §2518(8) provides strict procedures to be followed during and after 
interception. Consequently, 18 U.S.C §2518(8) declares that:  
 
The contents of an interception should be reduced to a record form; the recorded 
material should not be tampered with; it should be submitted to a judge after the 
expiry of the order and the judge should seal and determine the custody of the 
evidence; the intercept shall be kept for ten years except with an order for its 
destruction; duplication is not possible except for investigative purposes. 
 
A court plays a crucial role both before and after authorisation of interception 
order. A judge will not issue intercept order unless the four requirements 
discussed above are satisfied. There is also ex post supervision of the warrants 
because "the court may require progress reports at such intervals as it considers 
appropriate"1128 and the intercept material is required to be handed to the judge. 
The judge can then rule on issues such as the custody of evidence by denying the 
government the right to get hold of it.  
 
There are two types of prohibition under section 17(1) (a) RIPA; direct and 
indirect prohibitions.1129 Revealing what has been spoken over the phone, the 
participants, their numbers, the location, the time, the means of communication, 
etc., all fall under direct prohibition. These refer to both content and non-content 
prohibitions. On the other hand, there cannot be any disclosure of any suggestion 
that reveals, for instance, the existence of intercept warrant. These are 
categorised under indirect prohibitions.1130  
 
 
                                                 
1128 18 U.S.C. §2518(6); see also  Stevens, G. M. and Doyle, C., supra note 1123, p.37     
1129  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000:  2000 c. 23 Explanatory Notes, para.137     
1130  Ibid,  para.137     
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In the US, Title III1131 on the other hand states that a person is in violation of the 
provisions within if he "intentionally discloses ... the contents of any wire, oral, 
or electronic communications, knowingly or having reason to believe that the 
information was obtained ... in violation of the Act." Moreover, "actual 
involvement in the illegal interception is not necessary in order to establish a 
violation of that statute."1132 This is due to the fact that the person disclosing the 
intercept must have the knowledge or in the absence of specific knowledge, 
‘reasonable belief' as to the means by which the intercept was acquired.1133 The 
question is, therefore, did you have the necessary knowledge or reasonable belief 
that your actions were contrary to Title III even if you were the one who 
intercepted the communication? If the answer is no, then no violation despite the 
fact that you actually participated in the illegal interception and you disclosed the 
material thereof. 
 
While the prohibition under section 17 of RIPA is all but absolute, subject only 
to section 18, the US counterpart is not. For one thing, what is prohibited under 
Title III is intentional disclosure of illegally obtained intercept material. 1134 
Therefore, to the degree that it is legally obtained, disclosure is not barred except 
in specific circumstances such as protected materials under the ‘State Secrets 
Privilege.' 1135  Such grounds of withholding sensitive information are also 
specified in the UK.1136 However, RIPA does not make any exception between 
legal and illegal interception, though it does contain some provisions on offences 
for unauthorised disclosure.1137  
 
                                                 
1131 Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c); see also Bartnicki v Vopper (99-1687) 2001.3d 109      
1132   Bartnicki v Vopper, above, para 18   
1133   Besides Bartnick, see also Pereira v United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954)    
1134 Besides the above section of Title III, see also 18 U.S.C. §2515, §2511(1) (c) and §2511(1) (d)      
1135   United States v Reynolds - 345 U.S. 1 (1953); See also Edward, C. L. (2009). The State 
Secrets Privilege and Other Limits on Litigation Involving Classified Information. CRS Report 
for Congress, 7-5700; R40603. 28 May    
1136 See Walker, C. and Roberson, G., supra note 1078, ; see also  Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996, the Code of Practice  Part 6; see also Kennedy v UK, supra note 996; 
Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, 1 July 2008     
1137  See Section 19 RIPA et seq.      
232 
 
Another difference is that Title III prohibits interception of oral 
communications1138 provided there is the reasonable expectation of privacy.1139 
RIPA contains no corresponding presumption.1140  
 
As held in Bartnicki, Title III is content neutral because it "protects the privacy 
of wire (electronic) and oral communications" and it:  
 
does not distinguish based on the contents of the intercepted conversations nor is 
it justified by reference to the contents of those conversations. Rather the 
communications at issue are singled by virtue of the fact that they were illegally 
intercepted ... by virtue of the source rather that than subject matter.1141  
 
Though neither RIPA nor its predecessor declared such purpose explicitly, R v 
Effik 1142  reached a similar conclusion by declaring that the purpose of the 
communication Act in the UK was to enhance public confidence in using public 
systems. Thus, the content of an interception is not the primary reason for the 
prohibition of intercept evidence. But unlike R v Effik, the US strongly 
emphasises privacy interests in communication systems due to the fact that "the 
fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling 
effect on private speech."1143 But, the prohibition under RIPA is not primarily 
driven by privacy concerns. The concern for privacy is outweighed by the need 
to protect the secrecy of the interception itself.1144 
 
The above analysis on US law may lead to the conclusion that allowing intercept 
evidence in terrorist cases by following similar procedures under RIPA would 
not be as complicated as the UK government is trying to portray. In the UK, it is 
argued that allowing intercept evidence in a terrorism trial is not viable as the 
                                                 
1138  18U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)     
1139  See People v Blehm. 623 p. 2d 411, 44 colo. App. 472      
1140   R v Allsopp and others, supra note 1011    
1141  S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968)  cited in  Bartnicki v Vopper, supra note 
1131     
1142  R v Effik, supra note 1000     
1143  Bartnicki v Vopper, supra note 1131, para 532    
1144  Ormerod, D. and McKay, S. (2004), supra note 994 (argued that RIPA failed to provide 
adequate safeguards to protect privacy); see also Gibson, P. (2009). Review of Intercepted 
Intelligence in Relation to Omagh Bombing of 15 August 1998     
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interception of communication for investigation purposes requires "only 
transcribing contents that appear significant" while interception for criminal 
proceedings require "hundreds of calls to be transcribed ... translated, stored, and 
indexed .... and officials say costs could run into billions of pounds."1145 There 
are some flaws with this argument.  
 
First, the US experience shows that even the interception of evidence for 
investigation purpose has to be stored, transcribed and indexed. According to 
Title 18 U.S.C. §2518(8) (a), there is an obligation on the part of the authorised 
authority to store the material. This material is to be kept for ten years unless the 
ordering judge gives permission for its destruction. This obligation does not take 
into account whether the material is for investigation or prosecution.  Therefore, 
the information has to be stored, transcribed, and indexed irrespective of its 
relevance for prosecution.  
 
Second, before 9/11, FISA was limited to the gathering of intelligence evidence 
despite the absence of a provision that disallows use of the same material in 
criminal matters.1146 A milestone case in the US is the Re Sealed case.1147 The 
FISA court barred the US government from using intelligence gathered for 
investigative purposes in criminal proceedings. This was due to the traditional 
stand of the FISA court before FISA amendment. Consequently, "the court 
apparently believes it could approve applications for electronic surveillance only 
if the government's objective is not primarily directed toward criminal 
prosecution ..."1148 This had been hindering the smooth sharing of information 
between law enforcement organs and intelligence agents. 1149  However, the 
appellate court reversed the decision of the FISA court, holding that there is no 
restriction on "government's use ... [of] intelligence information ... in a criminal 
                                                 
1145 BBC (2009). Using Intercept Evidence in Court 'Not Yet Viable', at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8405109.stm     
1146    In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d717 (2002)   
1147  Ibid     
1148   Ibid, para.10     
1149  Zabel, R. B.  and Benjamin, J. J. (2008).  In Pursuit of Justice Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in 
the Federal Courts: A White Paper, p.81; see also Seamon, R. H. and Gardner, W. D. (2005). The 
Patriot Act and the Wall between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 320 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y  28    
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prosecution."1150 Moreover, the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 also amended FISA so 
that "information sharing between law enforcement and foreign intelligence 
authorities" would be made easier.1151 The relaxation of FISA has resulted in an 
increase in "prosecuting international terrorism cases in the post-9/11 era."1152  
 
To conclude, the demise of prohibition on intercept evidence under FISA did not 
bring any compromise of intelligence techniques, which the UK government is 
using an excuse against lifting the ban on intercept. The fear of the UK 
government that relaxing the ban would substantially increase litigation against 
government agencies is, thus, meritless. Much to the disappointment of some 
senior personnel such as Guy Mansfield QC, 1153  Lord Lloyd, 1154 Anthony 
Arlidge QC,1155 and others, the UK government refused to break its traditional 
stand on intercept evidence. 
 
4.4 Challenging Secret Interception is Onerous in the UK and the US for 
Applicants who Challenge Secret Interception  
 
RIPA is not only rigid on the use of the contents of interception, as well section 
17 prohibits disclosing existence of secret interception subject to the limited 
exceptions under section 18.  
 
The problem with intercept regimes is that a suspect could be detained, subjected 
to control orders, charged and prosecuted based on intercept materials. 1156 
However, a suspect could not defend his rights if he finds out the existence of a 
secret interception. He has to overcome the hurdle of the neither confirm nor 
deny policy.  
                                                 
1150  Re Sealed Case, supra note 1146, para47     
1151  Zabel, R. B.  and Benjamin, J. J., supra note 1149     
1152  Ibid     
1153  See Dyer, C. (2005). Turn the Tap on: the Government's Case for Banning Phone Bug 
Evidence in Court Looks Increasingly Fragile. 22 February, the Guardian 
1153   See House of Lords (2007). Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) 
Bill 2006-07 HL Bill 11 06-07     
1154  See House of Lords (2007). Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill 
2006-07 HL Bill 11 06-07      
1155  See Dyer, C. (2005), supra note 1153    
1156   See Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, pp.70-71 (stating that "exculpatory materials cannot 
reach the attention of the defence." and "intercepting agency retains a veto over prosecutorial 
usage so that interception remains the ultimate property of the intelligence services.")    
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Unlike the UK, there is no statute in the US that prevents challenges to legality of 
intercept evidence. As argued in ACLU v NSA,1157 interception of telephone and 
email communications without a warrant violates the Fourth & Fifth 
Amendments, together with other Federal Acts. The problem with secret 
interception, however, is that plaintiffs have to establish that they have standing 
to sue. As seen in ACLU v NSA, the US Supreme Court accepted that the 
NSA 1158  wiretaps without warrants on international telephone and emails in 
which at least one of the parties is reasonably suspected of al-Qaeda ties. But the 
US Supreme Court also stated that:  
 
the plaintiffs do not ... produce any evidence that any of their own 
communications have ever been interrupted. Instead they asserted a mere belief, 
they contend is reasonable and ... a well-founded belief.1159  
 
The plaintiffs insisted that they suffered personal injury as a result of several 
factors: the existence of NSA per se, leading to the fear that their 
communications would be intercepted, to the point where their clients refused to 
communicate with legal counsel on the basis of the latter. 1160 The US Supreme 
Court conceded that there could be actual or anticipated injury (but they must be 
imminent and concrete).1161 However, the US Supreme Court reasoned out that 
the mere existence of a regime that allows secret interception is not enough to 
establish standing to sue.1162 This is due to the fact that "all wiretaps are secret; 
neither the plaintiffs nor their overseas contacts would know ... whether their 
communications were being tapped."1163   
 
Similar legal challenges were raised in Al-Haramain v G.W. Bush. 1164  But, 
unlike in ACLU v NSA, the plaintiff's argument in Al-Haramain v G.W. Bush 
                                                 
1157  ACLU v NSA, supra note 865     
1158    Ibid,  p. 6    
1159    Ibid   
1160    Ibid   
1161    Ibid, p.8   
1162   Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1 - 1972 cited in ACLU v NSA, supra note 865    
1163   ACLU v NSA, supra note 865,  p.22    
1164   Al-Haramain v Bush, supra note 864    
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was not based on a "well founded belief" or on a speculation that their 
communications would be intercepted. Their communications were in fact 
intercepted and the organisation was proscribed based on that information. 
Moreover, the justifications reached in ACLU v NSA -  interception is secret and 
the parties could not know if they were a target of secret interception - did not 
apply in Al-Haramain v G.W. Bush by virtue of that fact that what was 
intercepted had been ‘inadvertently' disclosed to the plaintiff. This should have 
enabled them to overcome the challenge of standing to sue. However, what 
appeared to be a straightforward case took a twist and raised complex legal 
issues.  
 
The US government moved to dismiss the case based on ‘State Secrets Privilege', 
which according to United States v Reynolds 1165  gives courts the power to 
exclude sensitive evidence from proceedings that could undermine national 
security. This is similar to the ‘Public Interest Immunity' in the UK.1166 The 
district court of California declined the US government's motion stating that "the 
suit itself was not precluded by the states privilege, although the privilege 
protected the Sealed Document."1167 In addition:  
 
…because the government has not officially confirmed or denied whether 
plaintiffs were subject to surveillance, even if plaintiffs know they were, this 
information remains secret. Furthermore, while plaintiffs know the contents of 
the [Sealed] Document, it too remains secret.1168  
 
The US courts also reasoned that there could be no danger to national security if 
knowledge of the information is limited to those already inadvertently 
disclosed.1169  Therefore, the district court was convinced that plaintiffs had the 
                                                 
1165  United States v Reynolds, supra note 1135; for detail discussion on Federal Rule of Evidence 
501 see also Edward, C. L. (2009), supra note 1135 ("The state secrets privilege is a judiciary 
created evidentiary privilege that allows the government to resist court-ordered disclosure of 
information during litigation, if there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure would harm the 
national security of the United States.")     
1166  For detail discussions on ‘Public Immunity Interest' in the UK, see Walker, C. and Roberson, 
G., supra note 1078     
1167  Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v Obama, No. 07-0109 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 31, para. 7     
1168  Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v Bush ("Al-Haramain I"), supra note 864, para.  1223    
1169  Ibid, p. 17     
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standing to sue on the basis of what is already disclosed to them: "the burden was 
then on the government to squarely affirm or deny those charges."1170  
 
Al-Haramain v G.W. Bush was a landmark case not on the basis of its challenge 
to the existence of a secret intercept regime that threatens privacy. But, rather, as 
a case that overcame the challenges of ‘State Secrets Privileges' to establish 
standing to sue on behalf of a plaintiff. 
 
Two similar cases occurred in the UK.1171 In a similar manner to ACLU v NSA, 
applicants in Liberty & Others v UK alleged that the existence of a regime that 
allows secret interception is against Article 8 ECHR. Although ACLU V NSA 
relied upon, inter alia, the First and Fourth Amendment, the applicants in Liberty 
& others v UK did not have such wide options. While the secret interception in 
ACLU V NSA was grounded on the warrantless interception of the 
communications of people who have a connection with international terrorist 
organisations, the interception in Liberty & others v UK was done through a 
warrant regardless of the nature of the organisations. Unlike ACLU V NSA, the 
ECtHR held that:  
 
...the mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret 
monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to 
whom the legislation may be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom 
of communication between users of the telecommunications services and thereby 
amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise of the applicants' rights 
under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually taken against them.1172  
 
The ECtHR acknowledge an interference, which, in ECHR parlance, gives 
standing to sue. It should be recalled that ACLU V NSA was dismissed because 
the mere existence of a regime that allows secret interception was found 
insufficient to establish standing to sue. However, the ECtHR instead chose to 
accept the essence of this argument as a basis for instituting a case. 
                                                 
1170  United States v Alter 482 F2d (9th Cir. 1973) at 1027 cited in Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 
Inc. v Obama, No. 07-0109 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 31, 2010), para.  23    
1171 Liberty and Others v UK, supra note 1136; Kennedy v UK, supra note 996      
1172  Liberty and others v UK, supra note 1136, para 56     
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Moreover, both cases were concerned with external interception as opposed to 
domestic interception. Striking the right balance between national security and 
privacy seems to sit better in the ECtHR position, which allows a case to stand 
without establishing an actual personal injury, which is completely rejected by 
the appellate court in ACLU V NSA. The ECtHR, at least, gives an opportunity 
for the grievance to be aired. However, the ECtHR did not take the same position 
in Kennedy v UK.1173  
 
Kennedy v UK is different from both ACLU V NSA and Liberty & others v UK 
in the sense that the latter cases base their argument on a general existence of a 
regime that allows secret interception. Moreover, Kennedy v UK was a dispute 
on domestic interception. Kennedy v UK is also different from Al-Haramain v 
G.W. Bush because Kennedy did not have concrete evidence to show that his 
communication was in fact intercepted. Kennedy relied on ‘a reasonable 
likelihood' that interception had taken place on his communications due to his 
fierce campaign against injustice after his release from prison. The applicant 
argued that the interference with his communications led to the collapse of his 
business. In addition, he argued that "the mere existence of RIPA was sufficient 
to show interference."1174  
 
Contrary to ACLU V NSA, which supported secret interception by the NSA 
against persons who are suspected to have a connection with al-Qaeda, the 
ECtHR in Kennedy v UK held that:  
 
… an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be a victim of a violation 
by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret 
measures without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to 
them.1175  
 
                                                 
1173  Kennedy v UK, supra note 996    
1174 Ibid, para. 107      
1175  Kennedy v UK, supra note 996, para. 34     
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The ECtHR also stressed that an applicant has to show "a reasonable 
likelihood"1176 that the measures were applied to him because the mere existence 
of secret interception is deemed insufficient to show in itself a violation of a 
person's privacy. The ECtHR, however, rejected the applicant's claim that he had 
shown ‘a reasonable likelihood' saying that: 
 
the applicant has alleged that the fact that calls were not put through to him and 
that he received hoax calls demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that his 
communications are being intercepted. The Court disagrees that such allegations 
are sufficient to support the applicant's contention that his communications have 
been intercepted. Accordingly, it concludes that the applicant has failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that there was actual interception in his 
case.1177 
 
The trouble is that the ECtHR did not outline guidelines that help determine the 
standard of ‘reasonable likelihood.' A related problem is whether the ‘reasonable 
likelihood' standard of the ECtHR covers past and prospective interceptions. In 
ACLU V NSA and Al-Haramain v G.W. Bush, it was stated that victim status 
includes both past and future interceptions. But the European standard does not 
seem to imply prospective interceptions because an applicant has to ‘demonstrate 
a reasonable likelihood that there was actual interception in his case.'1178  
 
To conclude, both the UK and the US governments stick to a policy of ‘neither 
confirm nor deny' to answer any attempt by applicants to have the contents of 
interception disclosed and as a shield against allegations of privacy violations. 
However, unlike the Title III in the US, RIPA allows neither the use of intercept 
in criminal proceedings nor permits a challenge to the existence of a warrant or a 
secret interception. As indicated above, the US position is that if an applicant has 
standing to sue, "the burden was then on the government to squarely affirm or 
deny those charges."1179 Such kinds of burdens are improbable under section 17 
                                                 
1176   Ibid, para. 122   
1177 Ibid , para 126      
1178  Ibid     
1179  United States v Alter, supra note 1170    
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of RIPA because the said section does not allow a discussion on the existence of 
an intercept warrant. 
 
4.5 Ethiopia's Legislation on Terrorism and the Interception of 
Communications  
 
It is often the case that countries will have legislation that is regarded as vague 
and complex. In similarly frequent fashion a country uses general laws to fill in 
the gaps left by the absence of specific laws relating to a particular topic. The 
Ethiopian law on terrorism could be categorised in either of the above cases with 
respect to the law that governs the interception of communications. Until 
2005,1180 Ethiopia had no specific laws governing the circumstances under which 
a communication could be intercepted and used as evidence before a court of 
law. As discussed above, the UK and the US have different legislation that deal 
with the issue at hand. Ethiopia has been relying on the general laws of search 
and seizure to execute the interception of communications. The following 
sections will highlight the practices before the coming into effect of the EATP. 
The discussions will be limited to the provisions that deal with the interception of 
communications and the probative value of intercept evidence in terrorism cases.    
 
4.5.1 Some legal backgrounds on Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism Laws on 
Interception of Communication before 2009  
 
The probative value of interception evidence in criminal proceedings has 
remained vague for a long period of time. Under the Ethiopian Draft Evidence 
Law, evidence has been defined simply as an "oral admission, judicial notice or 
presumption of law which proves or disapproves any wrong doing."1181 If this 
definition is interpreted narrowly, it does not seem to include intercept evidence. 
However, as will be discussed below, this has not precluded the prosecution from 
relying on intercept evidence in criminal proceedings.  
 
                                                 
1180  That is until the anti-corruption offences proclamations discussed below are enacted     
1181   Ethiopian Draft Evidence Code: Preliminary and Relevance of Facts : Interception, Section 3      
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As will be shown shortly, long before the coming in to force of the Ethiopian 
Anti-Terrorism proclamation (EATP) in 2009, the prosecution had succeeded in 
prosecuting terrorist suspects based on telephonic or electronic communications, 
despite there not being any legal basis for using intercept evidence.  
 
The Ethiopian Civil Code, the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code and various other pieces of insignificant legislation contain the 
provisions on privacy that apply to Ethiopia. However, protection of privacy in 
Ethiopia is inconsistent and sporadic, to say the least. For instance, Articles 27-
28 of the Ethiopian Civil Code prohibit unauthorised publications of a person's 
images. But the Civil Code does not contain a single article on unauthorised 
access of a person's telephone or other electronic communications.  
 
Another instance to mention is the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. Articles 
22-39 of this code set the general standards on police investigation. However, 
none of these articles deal with police powers on interception of communications. 
For instance, Article 32 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code deals with 
search and seizure. It states that: 
 
 Any investigating police officer or member of the police may make searches or 
seizures in accordance with the provisions which follow: (I) No arrested person 
shall be searched except where it is reasonably suspected that he has about his 
person any articles which may be material as evidence in respect of the offence 
with which he is accused or is suspected to have committed.  (2) No premises 
may be searched unless the police officer or member of the police is in 
possession of a search warrant 
 
The title of this article, searches and seizures, seems to suggest, although 
‘seizures' is no where defined in the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code or in the 
FDRE constitution, that ‘seizure' has limited scope i.e. it applies to the seizure of 
the ‘articles which may be material as evidence'. Whether this definition 
encompasses ‘seizure' of intercept evidence remains unclear. There is no judicial 
precedence on the issue, which could be of any help or guidance.  
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Moreover, as will be shown below, the Ethiopian judiciary has been willing to 
admit intercept evidence in criminal proceedings. However, the admittance of 
this evidence by the judiciary has been conducted without any attempt to define 
‘search' under Article 32 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code.  This 
practice raises some important questions: does ‘search' under the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code include interception of communication? Could Article 
32 be used to issue an intercept warrant?  These are some of unanswered 
questions in Ethiopian law. The case laws discussed in this thesis has never 
attempted to provide a definite answer on the scope of Article 32. It is not only 
the absence of definitions of ‘search' and ‘seizure' that make it difficult to answer 
these questions. The failure of the judiciary to admit intercept evidence without 
ever challenging the prosecution as to how they were obtained has undermined 
the right to privacy under Article 26 of the FDRE Constitution. 
  
Article 606 (1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code also deserves some attention. 
This article, entitled Violation of the Privacy of Correspondence or 
Consignments, prohibits unauthorised access to "...a business or private closed or 
open letter, envelope or correspondence, or electronic, telegram, telephone or 
telecommunication correspondence." However, this article only lays the general 
rules on unlawful access to any communications. It does not specifically deal 
with situations where lawfully obtained communications could be produced as 
evidence before a court of law. Moreover, it does not specify who could 
authorise the lawful interception of communication nor does it define what 
interception of communication means.   
 
The only specific law before the enactment of the EATP in 2009 that clearly 
deals with the relevance of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings in Ethiopia 
is  the ‘Revised Proclamation to Provide for Special Procedure and Rules of 
Evidence on Anti-Corruption'.1182 Article 46 of this proclamation states that:  
 
                                                 
1182 Revised Proclamation (Proclamation No. 434/2005) , supra note 56      
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1. Where it is necessary for the investigation of corruption offences, the head of 
the appropriate organ may order the interception of correspondence by 
telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices as well as by postal letters. 
2. Where it is necessary, evidence gathered through video camera, sound 
recorder, and similar electronic devices may be produced as evidence. 
3. An order given in accordance with sub-article of this Article shall indicate the 
offence which gives rise to the interception, and the duration of the interception, 
and, if it is a telephone or telecommunication, the link to be intercepted. Unless 
the head of the appropriate organ decides otherwise, the duration of the 
interception may not exceed four months.  
 
Unlike the Ethiopian Codes discussed above, there are three positive things that 
could be discussed in regard to the above article. First, the above article clearly 
states that intercept evidence, including telephone or other communications, 
could be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. Second, although it does not 
identify the ‘appropriate organ' that can authorise interception of 
communications, Article 73 (2) of the Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Establishment1183 identifies the Federal Ethics and Anti-
corruption Commission (FEAC) as an ‘appropriate organ' who can authorise the 
interception of communications in respect of corruption offences. Third, it puts a 
limit on the duration of interception, i.e. a maximum of four months unless 
otherwise extended by the ‘the head of the appropriate organ'. 
 
However, there are still flaws with this proclamation. First, it does not require a 
court warrant. As discussed in the previous sections in this chapter, article 26 of 
the FDRE constitution guarantees the right to the inviolability of one's 
correspondence including postal letters, and communications made by means of 
telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices. Without the necessary 
supervision from the judiciary, it must be questioned how a proper check can be 
conducted on the possibility of abuse of the power by the executive. Second, it 
does not define what constitutes the interception of communications. Thirdly, 
and most importantly, the scope of this proclamation is limited to corruption 
                                                 
1183 Revised Federal Ethics (Proclamation No.433/2005) , supra note 56      
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offences. This leaves a big gap in the Ethiopian legal system with regard to the 
probative value of intercept evidence in other criminal proceedings, including 
terrorist crimes.  
 
4.5.1.1 The Evidential Value of Intercept Evidence under the Ethiopian Legal 
System: the practice before 2009 
 
Despite there being many terrorism cases shown in table 2.3,  the following six 
terrorism cases are the only  instances which indicate how the courts and the 
prosecution have been relying on intercept evidence before the EATP came into 
force.1184 In Tesfahunegn Chemed et al. v Public Prosecutor,1185 16 defendants 
were charged for alleged crimes against the political or territorial integrity of the 
State, inciting armed rising or civil war or terrorism. Part of the evidence 
produced by the prosecutor consisted of email communications between the 
defendants. Their emails and the content of their communications were revealed 
to the court. But, there was no indication as to how the evidence were gathered, 
who authorised them or whether they were the result of direct interception of 
communication or evidence retrieved later on. The court did not challenge the 
prosecution as to how it managed to gather the evidence. 
 
In Public Prosecutor v Birga Merga Buli et al., 1186  eight defendants were 
successfully prosecuted for crimes against the FDRE Constitution and the State 
based on intercepted email communications. In Samuel Goitom et al. v Public 
prosecutor, 1187  the alleged crimes include inciting terrorist attack against the 
State, espionage, and high treason. The prosecution produced the contents of 
satellite mobile communications between the defendants. Unlike the case of 
Birga Merga Bulir, all defendants in Samuel Goitom, et al. v Public prosecutor 
were acquitted by the court. However, the court did not place much emphasis on 
the intercepted evidence relied on by the prosecutor. The focus of the trial court 
                                                 
1184 How the EATP has been used after 2009 will be further discussed in the subsequent sections 
in this chapter      
1185  Public Prosecutor v Tesfahunegn Chemed et al.  (public prosecutor file no 5-2592/ 
01335/2008)      
1186  Public Prosecutor v Bira Merga Buli et al. (60086/2008)    
1187  Public Prosecutor  v Samual Goitom et al.  (56550/2007)     
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was on the reliability of confessions given to the police. It has sidelined the 
intercept evidence, which could have been instrumental in the prosecution.  
 
In a case against Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General) et al. v Public prosecutor,1188 
46 defendants were charged with terrorism. The prosecution produced different 
sorts of evidence which included evidence obtained through surveillance, 
confessions, and oral testimonies. A meeting chaired by one of the defendants 
was bugged and the same evidence was produced before the court. Furthermore, 
telephone communications made between the defendants and their overseas 
contacts were used against the defendants. Some of the evidence obtained 
comprised communications which were directly intercepted and others which 
were obtained from the Ethiopian Telecommunication Service. As discussed in 
chapter two and chapter three, this was one of the most controversial terrorism 
cases because most of the alleged terrorists were leaders or members of different 
political parties and journalists who fell out with the ruling party after the much 
criticised 2005 Ethiopian General Election.  
 
In Public Prosecutor v Rabyie Mohamed Hasen et al.  and Public Prosecutor v 
Wegari Alemu Kass 1189  the email communications of the defendants were 
intercepted and used as evidence against them.  As shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4, 
six out of the seven defendants in the first case were charged and convicted for 
possessing and storing terrorist materials, inciting civil war, participating in the 
preparation of terrorist activities and seeking membership in terrorist 
organisations. The prosecution alleged that the defendants used their email to 
recruit terrorists and spread terrorist propaganda. These email communications 
were printed out and adduced as evidence before the court. The defendants 
denied that the email addresses belong to them.  Instead of answering the 
question as to whether the police had the relevant legal authority to access the 
defendant's email, the court focused on whether the emails belong to the 
defendants. Now, of course it is entirely relevant to establish who sent and 
received the emails. However, this question should have been dependent upon a 
                                                 
1188  Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General), supra note 64     
1189 Public Prosecutor  v Rabyie Mohamed Hasen, supra note 16; Public Prosecutor v Wegari 
Alemu Kasa, supra note 16      
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determination of the police's legal authority to intercept the communications. As 
a fundamental of the rule of law, it is a prerequisite of criminal proceedings to 
establish at first whether there is sound legal authority for the basis of a 
prosecution. Without such, in theory the defendants could have been talking 
about the most serious of atrocities, yet the evidence would remain inadmissible. 
This state of affairs is commonly known as ‘cleared by technicality'.  
    
In the second case, as shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4, four defendants were charged 
with seeking membership in a terrorist organisation, taking training for the 
purpose of terrorist activities, preparing and publishing the manifesto of a 
terrorist organisation. As with the case of Rabyie discussed above, their email 
communications were printed out and produced before the court. The prosecution 
in this case not only produced the printed out form of the defendants email 
communications, but it also produced the email address of one of the defendants 
as well as his password. The court should have asked the prosecution how they 
managed to access the email, what legal authority they had and whether they had 
obtained a court warrant to intercept them. But as with the other cases discussed 
above, they court in this case did not find it relevant to raise these concerns.   
 
As discussed above, Article 606 (1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code deals with 
violations of the privacy of any communications. Moreover, despite some of the 
defects discussed in this chapter, Article 26 of the FDRE Constitution contains 
similar principles to Article 8 ECHR. However, the reluctance of the courts to 
challenge the prosecution has made these legal bases irrelevant. The point 
highlighted quite clearly in the above cases is the fact that the Ethiopian judiciary 
have been relying, prior to 2009, on intercept evidence in terrorism cases where 
there were no clear laws to govern the practice.  
 
What follows is an attempt to discover whether the EATP has brought with it 
some solutions to rectify this and associated problems related with the 
interception of communication in terrorist cases. 
 
4.6 Intercept Warrant 
 
247 
 
The relevant provision here is Article 14 of the EATP.1190 The said Article states 
that a court of law can issue intercept warrants on the request of the National 
Intelligence and Security Service. According to sub-article 1 of the same Article, 
an intercept warrant allows the holder to do one of the following things: 
 
Intercept or conduct surveillance on telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, 
postal and similar communication of on person suspected of terrorism; enter into 
any premises in secret to enforce the interception; install or remove instruments 
enabling the interception. 
 
This provision raises several issues. The first one being the grounds on which the 
warrant is issued? It is to be recalled from the discussions in the previous 
sections that the US and the UK differ on the grounds for the issuance of an 
intercept warrant. Under UK law, interception could be conducted with or 
without a warrant. There is no need for a warrant if the interception is obtained 
through the consent of both or one of the participants to the communication, or if 
it is obtained through interception conducted by service providers.1191 Apart from 
these exceptions, UK law enforcement officers need to have a warrant issued by 
the Secretary of State to intercept any communication. According to section 5(3) 
of RIPA, the Secretary of State can issue a warrant for one of the following 
reasons: national security; preventing or detecting serious crimes; or safe 
guarding the economic well-being of the country.  
 
However, under US law, all interception warrants are issued by a court, except 
for those warrantless interceptions governed under FISA. 1192   Accordingly, 
issuing a warrant is conditional on the demonstration of ‘probable cause'; that is 
"an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular 
offence ..."1193 In comparison, the UK does not require either probable cause or 
judicial supervision in the execution of intercept warrant.  
                                                 
1190 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 (EATP)      
1191 Section 3 of RIPA      
1192 See  50 U.S.C § 1802 (Electronic surveillance authorization without court order; certification 
by Attorney General; reports to Congressional committees; transmittal under seal; duties and 
compensation of communication common carrier; applications; jurisdiction)        
1193  See 18 U.S.C § 2518 (3)(a)  (Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications)        
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On the other hand, Article 14 of the EATP states that an intercept warrant should 
only be issued by a court. But, the legislation does not specify objective grounds 
which the Ethiopian court must consider when issuing an intercept warrant. 
Article 14(1) (a) EATP appears to suggest that the fact that an individual is a 
terrorist suspect is the only justification needed for an intercept warrant. In 
comparison to the standards required under the UK and the US, the Ethiopian 
requirements fall well short of providing a guarantee against violation of privacy. 
     
The structure of Article 14 of the EATP possesses neither the broad grounds 
specified under section 5(3) of RIPA nor the specific standards mentioned under 
18 U.S.C §2516 and §2518. Moreover, though Article 14 of the EATP resembles 
the US law in view of the fact that an intercept warrant has to be issued by a 
court, unlike the UK law where the Secretary of State holds this power, it does 
not provide judicial supervision in the execution of an issued warrant. 
Furthermore, in the contrast to the UK and the US, Article 14 of the EATP does 
not have a time limit. Under 18 U.S.C §2516 and §2518, an intercept warrant is 
issued for 30 days. Section 9(6) of RIPA provides for an extended period of six 
months. No such time constraint is provided for under Article 14 of the EATP.  
 
Under Article 14 of the EATP, given that any person suspected of terrorism can 
be subjected to secret interception of his communication, a related question arises 
as to what sort of evidence the requesting authority has to or is expected to 
produce in order to persuade a court that the person for whom a warrant 
requested is in fact a terrorist suspect?  
 
A close comparison of Article 14 and Article 19 of the EATP, which deals with 
power of arrest, reveals that the latter Article requires a stricter standard; the 
power of arrest requires reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is 
committing terrorist acts as provided under the EATP1194 Under the EATP, the 
legislature has inserted a lower threshold of ‘being a terrorist suspect' as a ground 
for the issuance of an intercept warrant, while a reasonable suspicion is required 
                                                 
1194 Article 3 of the EATP   
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to issue an arrest warrant. Yet, no justification is given for this difference; the 
difference remains unexplained, and given the former's propensity to violate 
fundamental rights, would appear to require justification. Issuing an intercept 
warrant on what might be an unsubstantiated allegation by the police that a 
person is a terrorist suspect violates a person's fundamental right to privacy.  
 
To make Article 14 of the EATP compliant with international human right 
standards and to put it in a similar footing with that of the UK and the US, which 
have a wealth of experience in the fight against terrorism, it should require the 
applicant to show probable cause, if not, reasonable suspicion that the person to 
be subjected to secret interception is a terrorist suspect. Moreover, Article 14 of 
the EATP should contain a time constraint. Anything between 30 days, which is 
the practice in the US, and between three to six months, the relevant period under 
RIPA, could be used as a standard to modify Article 14 of the EATP. As 
discussed in this chapter, the anti-corruption offences proclamation,1195 which 
sets a maximum of four months for any intercept order, could also taken into 
account.   
 
The absence of a fixed time constraint on an interception warrant, together with 
vagaries within the grounds for issuing intercept warrants are but two serious 
issues that are in need of remedy. One important question remains unanswered, 
though: Under the EATP what is the consequence of intercepting 
communications without a warrant? Do the Ethiopian courts have the power to 
throw the evidence away in such a case? The EATP is silent. Under the Title III 
of the US, law enforcers are allowed to intercept without a warrant under 
exceptional circumstances provided an application is made within 48 hours.1196  
 
The combined reading of section 7(2) and 9(6) (a) of RIPA reveals that senior 
officials could issue an intercept warrant in an urgent case provided the 
"Secretary of State has herself expressly authorised the issuance of the warrant." 
According to section 9(6) (a) of RIPA, the maximum period allowed in case of 
an emergency is five days. As seen above, this is clearly longer than the 48 hour 
                                                 
1195 See Article 46 of the Revised Proclamation (Proclamation No. 434/2005) , supra note 56  
1196  See 18 U.S.C. §2518(7); see also Stevens, G. M. and Doyle, C., supra note 1123     
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limit provided under Title III. Turning to the Ethiopian position, Article 14 of the 
EATP, on the other hand, lacks clarity on the issuance of intercept warrant in 
urgent situations. The EATP does not state whether the National Intelligence and 
Security Service may intercept communications without a warrant in urgent 
cases.  
 
While there is an argument to be made in favour of the active participation of the 
judiciary in the execution of intercepts warrant, this would be a practical 
hindrance to the security services that may need to act in an urgent fashion; delay 
could cost them valuable evidence. Thus, the exceptional circumstance 
provisions discussed in relation to the US and UK are written into legislation for 
good reason. They are designed to accommodate such situations where it is 
impossible to obtain a warrant through the normal procedures. Therefore, Article 
14 of the EATP remains deficient in one important respect; it does not cater for 
the reality of an urgent situation arising demanding the need for swift action.  
 
A comparison of Article 14 and Article 17 of the EATP, which deals with covert 
searches, gives a different insight into the intention of the Ethiopian legislature. 
The later Article states that the police can obtain a covert search warrant from a 
court where they have reasonable grounds to believe that:  
 
A terrorist act has been or is likely to be committed; or a resident or possessor of 
a house to be searched has made preparations or plans to commit a terrorist act; 
and; covert search is essential to prevent or to take action against a terrorist act 
or suspected terrorist activity. 
 
As discussed, the only standard required for the issuance of an interception 
warrant under Article 14 of the EATP is subjective ground i.e. showing the 
Ethiopian court that an individual is a terrorist suspect. Here, section 17 of the 
EATP requires a far stricter standard; one of reasonable grounds to believe. As 
will be discussed in chapter four, reasonable suspicion requires objective facts or 
information or intelligence. The requirement under Article 14 of the EATP - 
being a terrorist suspect - does not require any objective facts.  
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Serious questions must be asked as to why the legislature requires 
unsubstantiated suspicion in the case of Article 14 of the EATP, whereas 
requires ‘reasonable grounds to believe' to issue covert search warrant under 
Article 17. We might well ask what is the notional difference in each case? It 
would seen that both State measures strike at the heart of an individual's freedom 
and liberty, particularly their privacy, yet one requires stronger justification for 
invocation than the other. Indeed, as far as normative argument goes, the 
interception of communications in fact entails a more severe violation of privacy 
than does a covert search; the former is more likely to reveal up-to-date intimate 
personal details in real-time, whereas the latter will at most discover recorded 
personal details, whether out-dated or otherwise.  
 
To conclude, this analysis poses a consolidated argument for the amendment of 
Article 14 of the EATP to include the requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion' or 
‘reasonable grounds to believe' before an intercept warrant is authorised. 
 
4.7 How is the Interception of Communications Defined under Ethiopian 
Law? 
 
Defining interception and its scope is the pre-condition of whether a particular 
act falls within the ambit of the law. Without a clear definition it would be 
difficult to distinguish between surveillance and direct interception. Article 14 of 
the EATP requires a court warrant for both surveillance and interception. But, it 
does not provide the element that helps distinguish between the two; a precise 
definition. The section of the EATP that contains the definitions of terms used in 
the Proclamation fails to provide a clue on how interception is to be understood.  
 
Taking the experience of the UK as a starting point, there is big difference 
between surveillance and interception. First, part two of RIPA deals specifically 
with surveillance. Accordingly, three main types of surveillance are illustrated. 
These are directed surveillance, intrusive surveillance and covert human 
intelligence.1197 Though a detailed discussion on surveillance is beyond the scope 
                                                 
1197  Section 26 of RIPA    
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of this thesis, a close reading of section 26 RIPA et seq show that surveillance 
has a different connotation, legal implication and authorisation process from that 
of interception. The following examples could shed a light on the differences:1198 
 
Covertly recording conversation; CCTV identify those responsible for the 
commission of an offence enabling officers to attend and make arrests; use of 
unmarked helicopters to obtain images identifying vehicles being used in the 
commission of an offence; setting up an observation point in the premises 
opposite a criminal target; the installations of surveillance devices in a target 
object to gather intelligence. 
 
All the above examples do not require the interception of communications, even 
though they all involve the gathering of private information.1199  
 
Another fundamental difference between surveillance and interception in the UK 
is their probative value in criminal proceedings. According to section 17 and 3(2) 
(b) RIPA, surveillance evidence could be used in criminal proceedings. But, by 
virtue of section 17 RIPA, intercept evidence is excluded from legal proceedings 
if it is obtained "through a warrant issued by the Secretary of State." However, 
under Ethiopian law, the legislature has failed to provide a distinction between 
the two means of obtaining personal information. Despite the absence of these 
distinctions, as will be discussed below, by virtue of Article 23 of the EATP, 
there are not any limitations on using intercept evidence in terrorism cases in 
Ethiopia.   
 
As discussed, the UK and the US differ on the meaning and scope of 
interception. Under section 2(2) and 2(3) of RIPA, interception is defined as the 
‘interference', ‘modification', or ‘monitoring' of communications to reveal its 
content by other person other than the participants. According to section 2(7) 
RIPA, ‘interception in the course of its transmission' applies to "both 
communications that are in the process of transmission and those that are being 
                                                 
1198   See Home Office (2010). Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, supra note 886; see 
also Home Office (2010). Covert Human Intelligence Sources, supra note 886    
1199  See McKay, S. (2011), supra note 886,  p. 137-138      
253 
 
stored on the transmission system".1200 Accessing ‘stored communications do not 
necessary require a warrant.1201   
 
However, Section 2(5) RIPA excludes non-content communication from the 
definition of interception in the course of its transmission. These exclusions are 
further elaborated under section 2(9) RIPA. According to 2(9) RIPA, these 
concern non-content data that merely identifies the person, location, apparatus or 
signals used in the communication. This ‘traffic data' does not reveal what has 
been said or written. However, the words ‘interference', ‘modification', and 
‘monitoring' are broad terms that are no further defined under RIPA. 
 
We now turn to whether the Ethiopian legal regime pays attention to the 
distinction between public and private communication systems. From a cursory 
scan of Article 14 of the EATP, it would appear that Ethiopian legislation does 
not pay attention to the distinction. In this case, the EATP resembles Title III as 
it does not make a distinction between private and public systems. In this 
particular instance, the focus of the courts would be on whether the interception 
reveals private matters without the proper procedures.  
 
If the need to interpret communications under Article 14 of the EATP arises, 
Ethiopian courts would struggle to define interception of communication, even 
latest legislation such as the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation (TFOP) does 
not define the legal term.1202According to Article 5 of the TFOP:  
 
Whosoever without the authorisation of the service provider or lawful user, or 
any other competent authority obstructs or interferes with any telecom network, 
service or system; intercepts or illegally obtains access to any telecom system: or 
intercepts, alters, destroys or otherwise damages the contents of telephone calls, 
data, identification code or any other personal information of subscribers 
commits an offence and shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 
to 15 years and with fine from Birr 100.000 to Birr 150.000 
                                                 
1200  Home Office (2007).  Interception of Communications: Code of Practice, supra note 986, p. 
10    
1201 Ibid      
1202 Proclamation 761/2012 on Telecom Fraud Offences  (TFOP)      
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The phrase "without the authorisation of the provider, or lawful user or any other 
competent authority" consists of three elements. The first element concerns an 
interception with the authorisation of service providers. This can be compared to 
section 3 RIPA which it provides the three grounds of lawful warrantless 
interception, one of which refers to any interception by service providers. 
However, according to section 3(3) (b) RIPA, service providers do not have 
outright power to intercept every communication. Their power is limited to 
circumstances where the interception is related to the ‘provision of the service' or 
‘enforcement' of law. A similar protection is provided under Title III.1203 Title III 
is more specific as it covers not only service providers but also their agents, 
employees, and officers. However, RIPA is not clear on whether the same sort of 
specification is implied into section 3.  
 
The EATP, on the other hand, does not attach any condition to the lawful 
interception of communications by service providers, leading to obvious 
questions over the ambit of their power to intercept: Do they need a court 
warrant? Should their power to intercept be restricted to activities related to the 
‘provision of service' or law enforcement? In the absence of a clear law that 
limits the power of service providers, right to privacy of service users cannot be 
protected against unnecessary interference either by the service providers 
themselves or unnecessary interference on behalf of the Ethiopian government.  
This research proposes that the TFOP should be amended to include limitations 
on the power of service providers to intercept communications. There has also to 
be criminal as well as civil liabilities to discourage service providers from getting 
involved in illegal activities. 
 
The second element provided under Article 5 of the TFOP is interception with 
the authorisation of a ‘lawful user.' This is similar to the provision on consented 
interception under section 3 RIPA. Section 3(1) RIPA contains two kinds of 
consent: specific consent or consent based on the reasonable expectation of the 
person conducting the investigation. The consent could be obtained from both or 
                                                 
1203  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)    
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one of the participants. Consent for interceptions in the US is governed by 
Federal and State laws. The Federal law1204 requires single party consent. But, 
with regard to State legislation, some States require two-party consent, while 
others require single party consent.1205 The Ethiopian position on the other hand 
is vague. It is not clear whether implied or specific consent is required under 
Article 5 of the TFOP. Moreover, the law is also vague as to whether it requires 
two-party or one-party consent. It simply says authorisation with the consent of a 
‘lawful user.'  
 
However, the fact that ‘lawful user' is stated in singular tense could be construed 
to indicate that the law requires only single party consent. However, this 
interpretation would be a rather weak one; what is preferable is for the legislation 
to be amended to clarify the situation. But, the essence of the problem, here, is 
the sort of consent law enforcers are expected to get before they intercept any 
communication. Given that Ethiopia looks to the likes of the US and UK as a 
template for much of its legislation, it is curious to see the Ethiopian position on 
this issue lacks so much clarity. Such curiosity would appear to lend weight to 
the supposition that Ethiopia acquiesces in the grey area created when terms lack 
definition; put simply, without a precise definition of what constitutes consent, 
Ethiopian officials are able to flout the most basic of democratic requirements - 
interference with an individual's privacy requires justification. 
 
Moreover, in the US1206 and UK,1207 law enforcement officials do not need a 
warrant to intercept a communication provided there is a consent. However, there 
are clear procedures on approval and implementation of consensual interception. 
To begin with, in the Department of Justice US Attorney's Manual, 9-7.301, 
there is a list of personnel conferred with the power to approve consensual 
                                                 
1204 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c),  and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)       
1205  For instance, Arizona is a "one-party" state, ARS 13-3005.A(1)(2); Pennsylvania requires the 
consent of all parties. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Sec. 5704(4); see American Legal Guide on 
Telephone Recordings at http://www.callcorder.com/phone-recording-law-america.htm#The US 
Federal Law     
1206 See United States Secret Service Directive System: Consensual Interception, at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/social_network/SecretService_ECPA-Consensual-
Interceptions_Manual.pdf     
1207  Section 3(2) of RIPA  
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interception. The same is true with part II of RIPA where senior police officers 
can authorise a consensual interception.  
 
In contrast, Article 5 of the TFOP is silent as to who has the power to approve 
consensual interceptions. Furthermore, because the word ‘consent' is not 
mentioned in the article, it is difficult to talk about consent obtained through 
undue influence and duress. The phrase ‘authorisation of lawful' user cannot be a 
substitute for consensual interception because the former is a broad term 
compared to the latter one. Therefore, the law should be amended to indicate a 
clear requirement of express or implied consent.  
 
The third element under Article 5 of the TFOP is interception with the 
authorisation of ‘any other competent authority.' This is a particularly vague 
phrase which is not properly defined in the Proclamation. It does not give a clear 
indication as to whom these ‘competent authorities' are. To the analytical eye, the 
possibility for abuse is obvious. As discussed, Article 14 of the EATP states that 
the National Intelligence and Secretary Service can obtain a court warrant to 
intercept communications. But, Article 14 of the EATP fails to provide the 
grounds the court should consider to issue an interception warrant. Again, with 
no justificatory requirement, Article 14 of the EATP misses out on a major 
democratic ideal. Moreover, there is not a clear link if the phrase ‘any competent 
authority' under Article 5 of the TFOP is a reference to the authorities mentioned 
under Article 14 of the EATP or to a court of law. 
 
To conclude, the Ethiopian legislature has passed three separate pieces of 
legislation that deal with interception of communication. However, all are riddled 
with vagueness. Contrary to the claim of the Ethiopian government - that the 
EATP is directly transposed from the US and UK - it is not a direct replica of 
those laws. All Proclamations discussed above do not clearly define interception. 
Without a clear definition of the term, it is difficult to know whether some 
activities fall under surveillance, a term which does not necessarily require 
interference with telephone or electronic communications.  
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As discussed, the EATP and the TFOP also do not distinguish between external 
and domestic interception, and content and non-content interception. Unlike 
RIPA, however, Article 5 of the TFOP provides protection to all private and 
public systems by virtue of it banning interferences with "any telephone 
networks, services or systems." This is similar to US law where interception is 
not distinguished based on whether it is privately or publicly owned. The 
standard in the US is whether there is an intrusion into private lives.  
 
Furthermore, the EATP lack clarity on the distinction between warrantless and 
non-warrantless interceptions. Despite Article 5 of the TFOP talking about an 
interception with the "authorisation of service providers or lawful user or any 
other competent authority," it is not clear whether these kinds of interceptions 
require a warrant. Although it resembles section 3 RIPA and Title III1208, in that 
it provides consensual interception by service providers, Article 5 TFOP differs 
from both countries' laws in that the UK and US legislation clearly states that a 
warrant is not required for these sorts of interception.  
 
Due to the novelty of the provisions on interception of communications in 
terrorism cases within the Ethiopian legal system, it is far from wrong to take 
into account the experiences of the UK and US when creating Ethiopia's own 
system of controlling the intercepting of communications. Therefore, any 
consensual interception or interception by service providers should not require a 
warrant from a court. Moreover, the circumstances where service provides are 
allowed to intercept communications should be limited to avoid misuse of the 
power given under Article 5 of the TFOP.   
 
 
4.7.1 Probative value of Intercept Evidence under the EATP 
 
Article 14 of the EATP sets clear guidelines on the persons who can apply to a 
court for an intercept warrant. But the defect with this Article as discussed above 
is that it does not specify the objective grounds for issuing such warrants as this 
                                                 
1208 18 U.S.C §2511(2) for intercept without a warrant through consensual or by service providers 
and other exceptions 
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Article does not require the National Intelligence and Security Service have to 
show ‘probable cause' or ‘reasonable suspicion'. According to Article 14(1) (a) of 
the EATP, the National Intelligence and Security service is only required to show 
that the person is a terrorist suspect. Moreover, Unlike Title III1209, the EATP 
does not give the court the power to supervise the execution of intercept warrant.  
 
With regard to the probative value of intercept evidence, the EATP contains 
some vague provisions. Article 14(2) of the EATP states that information 
obtained through interception should be kept secret. This is a vague provision. Is 
this provision about ‘unauthorised disclosure'? Comparing 14(2) of the EATP to 
the practice in the US, as discussed in the preceding sections, Title III bans 
disclosure of intercept evidence only if it is obtained illegally.1210 However, such 
an issue does not arise in relation to the UK simply because the UK does not 
admit intercept evidence obtained through a warrant in a criminal trial per se. 
Moreover, US law prohibits the interception of oral communications1211 provided 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. But, RIPA does not have a 
corresponding qualification.1212. This puts Article 14(2) of the EATP on the same 
footing as the UK's RIPA legislation; it does not require ‘reasonable expectation 
of privacy.'  
 
Moreover, as held in the US case of Barnicki, Title III is content-neutral because 
it "protects the privacy of wire (electronic) and oral communications" and it:  
 
 … does not distinguish based on the contents of the intercepted conversations 
nor is it justified by reference to the contents of those conversations. To a certain 
extent, the communications at issue are singled out? by virtue of the fact that 
they were illegally intercepted ... by virtue of the source rather than subject 
matter.1213  
 
                                                 
1209  18 U.S.C § 2518 (3)(a)     
1210  See 18 U.S.C. §2515; 18 U.S.C. §2518(7); §2518 (9) and §2518(3); see also section 19 et seq. 
of RIPA for offences of unauthorized disclosure 
1211 See 18U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)      
1212  R v Allsopp and others, supra note 1011     
1213  S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968) cited in  Bartnicki v Vopper, supra note 
1131     
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Even though neither RIPA nor its predecessor declared such purpose plainly, R v 
Effik reached a similar conclusion by declaring that the purpose of the ICA 1985 
in the UK was to enhance public confidence in using public systems. To this 
effect, RIPA could be said content-neutral legislation. But, unlike in R v Effik, 
the US strongly emphasises privacy interests in communication systems due to 
the fact that "the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well 
have a chilling effect on private speech."1214 But, the prohibitions under RIPA 
are not primarily driven by privacy concerns. The concern for privacy is 
outweighed by the need to protect the secrecy of the interception itself.1215 But 
considering Article 23 of the EATP, as discussed below, privacy concerns are 
given little protection in Ethiopia.  
 
A cursory reading of Article 14(2) and the first sentence of sub-section 14(1) of 
the EATP, i.e., issuance of intercept warrant to ‘prevent and control a terrorist 
act', seems to suggest that evidence obtained through intercept warrants would be 
restricted to the prevention and control of a terrorist act. This interpretation 
would be in line with section 17 of RIPA. However, as shown in the pre-2009 
cases above and will be shown below in the case of Elias Kifle, Ethiopia does not 
ban the use of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings. In addition to these 
decisions, Article 14(1) of the EATP is in a direct contrast to Article 23 of the 
EATP. The latter Article enumerates a list of admissible evidence in terrorism 
cases. These include: 
  
Intelligence reports prepared in relation to terrorism, even if the report does not 
disclose the source or the method it was gathered; digital or electronic evidence; 
evidence gathered through interception or surveillance or information obtained 
through interception conducted by foreign law enforcement bodies.  
 
Accordingly, Article 23 of the EATP gives the National Intelligence and Security 
Service unchecked authority to gather evidence by any means and produces it as 
evidence. They are not required to disclose the source or the method through 
which it was obtained. This means even if the evidence is obtained through 
                                                 
1214  Bartnicki v Vopper, supra note 1131     
1215  Gibson, P. (2009). , supra note 1144; see also the Chilcot Review, supra note 806     
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forced confession or torture, or illegal interception, it can be used in criminal 
proceedings provided it is prepared in the form of an intelligence report. Article 
23 of the EATP, therefore, curtails the Ethiopian judiciary's role in excluding 
evidence obtained covertly and illegally. This encourages a practice of 
investigation officers gambling to get evidence at any cost regardless of its 
legality.   
 
Articles 23(3) and 23(4) of the EATP provide two apparently different types of 
admissible evidence. Both state that intercepted evidence and surveillance 
evidence are admissible. As discussed in this chapter, even before the enactment 
of the EATP, these sorts of evidence have played crucial roles in the prosecution 
of terrorist suspects. This is demonstrated in the above Ethiopian court cases.  
 
As discussed, UK made several exceptions to the principle stated under section 
17 of RIPA. These include, among other things, disclosure of intercept evidence 
in camera in cases related with, for instance, control orders; 1216   material 
obtained from a foreign country;1217 a telephone conversation recorded with the 
consent of one of the participants; evidence recorded by a covert listening 
devices rather than a direct interception of communication; and communications 
made to or from one prison or a secret mental health facility.1218  
 
Articles 23(3) and 23(4) of the EATP make clear that all these kinds of evidences 
are admissible in a court of law. But, this Article goes somewhat further than the 
exceptions provided for under section 18 of RIPA. This is due to the fact that 
Articles 23(3) and 23(4) do not make any distinction between intercept evidence 
obtained through a warrant or without a warrant.  
 
As discussed, in the US a court plays crucial role both before and after 
authorisation of interception an order. A judge would not issue an intercept order 
unless the four requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 et seq. are satisfied. There 
is also ex post supervision of the execution of the warrant because the material 
                                                 
1216 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & others, supra note 1116      
1217  See re Hilali  supra note 1052 and Regina v P, supra note 1052     
1218  R v Ian Huntley, supra note 1071     
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must be handed to the judge. He can pass several decisions including the custody 
of evidence by denying the US government the right to get hold of the evidence.  
 
All the above safeguards are absent under section 23 of the EATP. Without these 
procedural safeguards, allowing intercept evidence in criminal proceedings could 
entail a gross violation of privacy.  
 
The case of Public Prosecutor v Elias kifle1219 is an example of how the EATP in 
its current form has failed to provide adequate protection against the violation of 
a person's privacy. As seen from table 2.3 only the case of Public Prosecutor v 
Elias kifle sees the prosecution rely partly on communication materials during 
the prosecution of those individuals after 2009. Some of the evidence against the 
defendants also included e-mails communications and telephone calls. The 
contents of these interceptions, as revealed in court, indicated that the defendants 
were discussing about mobilising people for protests.  
 
The reluctance of the judiciary in the six terrorism cases that predated 2009 to 
challenge the prosecution could possibly, at least in part, be attributed to the 
absence of clear laws on the interception of communication in criminal 
proceedings. The coming into effect of the EATP should have provided the legal 
basis for the courts to reject intercept evidence in contravention of the EATP. 
However, that did not happen in the case of Elias kifle.  There was no indication 
from the prosecution how the email and telephone conversation of the defendants 
were obtained. For this reason, the intercept evidence should have been excluded  
 
Moreover, instead of challenging whether intercept warrant was authorised, on 
what basis it was issued, if any and how long it was authorised, the defence in the 
above case seemed to be caught by surprise when their clients were confronted 
with their own telephone conversations. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
                                                 
1219  See Public prosecutor v Elias kifle, et al , supra note 763     
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Unlike other rights that might be affected by counter-terrorism measures, 
discovering how the right to privacy has been eroded since 9/11 is not an easy 
task. Recent revelations in the West have shown the limit of academic scholars' 
knowledge in relation to the interception of communication. Apart from black 
and white law, knowing what governments are doing behind closed doors, as 
seen recently, remains as obscure as ever. We are told that clandestine 
surveillance practices are no threat to law-abiding citizens. But we are not sure 
how this guarantee could withstand criticism when the targets are head of 
states.1220 
 
In regard to Ethiopia, we can identify two major problems that have effectively 
hindered the desire to strike the balance between the right to privacy, on one 
hand, and the need to investigate and prosecute terrorists by intercepting their 
communications, on the other hand. The first problem is the design of the 
sections of the EATP that deal with interception of communications.  We have 
criticised the EATP for lacking limits on the length of an intercept warrant, the 
absence of objective grounds for issuing intercept warrants; the absence of a 
definition of interception; lack of clarity between surveillance and interception; 
lack of limits on the power of service providers to intercept communications; 
vagueness on consensual interception; the absence of a time limit on intercept 
warrants; and the absence of judicial scrutiny over the execution of intercept 
warrants. 
 
The second major problem is the poor implementation and lack of knowledge on 
the part of those of exercising the provisions of the EATP. Even if the legislature 
is to amend the EATP to address the above concerns, the main criticism should 
have been reserved for the traditional lack of enthusiasm by the judiciary in 
holding the police or the executive to account for illegal eavesdropping. It would 
be disingenuous to assert that the mere fact that intercept evidence has been used 
sparingly in terrorism cases within Ethiopia suggests that the police are not 
involved in widespread illegal interception. On the contrary, the government has 
                                                 
1220  Spegiel (2013). Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, 27 October; see 
also James, B (2013). NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over 
contacts, 25 October, the Guardian     
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been accused of blocking and filtering access to the internet and other electronic 
media outlets run by the opposition.1221 
  
As used to be the case in the UK,1222 open discussion on the power of the police 
or any of security agencies to intercept communications in Ethiopia is still a 
taboo subject. Therefore, the possibility of amending the EATP articles on 
interception to make them more compatible with their original sources - the US 
and UK - would seem to be remote. Perhaps, what might be a more viable 
approach is increasing the awareness of the pubic and, in particular, lawyers as to 
the limits on the ability of the executive to intercept communications. This could 
be done by encouraging Ethiopian legal scholars to write and publish about the 
complex issues of the right to privacy and national security. However, although 
profitable in terms of igniting debate, this approach may suffer from the same 
stifling of dissent. Thus, the government mindset towards constitutional debate 
needs to shift in order to allow the free opinion necessary to furnish the 
development of knowledge. Therefore, in the same way as it strives to discharge 
its obligation to enhance the security of its citizens, the Ethiopian government 
has to refrain from punishing academic works. Unfortunately, the only realistic 
influence able to bear upon a nation's mindset is international pressure and 
involvement; otherwise there is no ‘carrot and stick' mentality for change.  
 
Moreover, the power of the NISS and other organs that participate in the 
interception of communication has to be subject to judicial scrutiny. Until 2013, 
the NISS has remained a shadowy security agency with obscure legal 
personality. A new draft proclamation1223 has now been announced to formally 
organise the NISS into a separate federal government organ. This draft merely 
states that the NISS is to be established with a ‘ministerial status as an 
autonomous federal government office having its own legal personality' and it 
will be ‘accountable to the Prime Minister'. However, how this arrangement will 
                                                 
1221  Reporters without Borders (2012), supra note 478; see also Kaiser, K.  (2012),  supra note 
476     
1222  Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, p.184. For historical development and the influence of 
the Human Rights Act on covert policing in the UK, see also McKay, S. (2011), supra note 886, 
pp. 1-5 (discusses about the  ‘statutory baptism' of different security agencies)     
1223  Draft Bill on National Intelligence And Security Service Re-Establishment Proclamation 
No …/2013       
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effect domestic spying remains unanswered, and, indeed, looks ominous in light 
of the fact that the proclamation fails to provide a supervisory structure for the 
protection of the right to privacy. A ray of hope shines from the proclamation's 
draft status at the time of writing. It would be a great opportunity missed if the 
Ethiopian government failed to include clauses that impose a limitation on the 
powers of the NISS and give greater power to the judiciary to scrutinise and 
reject illegally intercepted evidence. In other words, the Ethiopian government 
could use this as another opportunity to revise articles 14 and 23 of the EATP 
that do not place any limitation on the NISS.  
 
In sum, the combined effect of the above factors may help realise the full extent 
of right to privacy from an Ethiopian perspective.  
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Chapter Five: The Right to Liberty and Anti-Terrorism Laws 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Liberty means different things for different people; its scope varies from country 
to country. The extent to which someone is deprived of their liberty under each 
country's counter-terrorism legislation is also different. This is due in no small 
part to a lack of international consensus on how to deal effectively with terrorism. 
Moreover, the availability of constitutional safeguards against arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty is a crucial factor in determining the extent to which 
counter-terrorism legislation has the potential to impinge upon a citizen's liberty. 
The particular differences that divide the UK, US and Ethiopia are highlighted 
throughout the following chapter.   
 
This chapter begins with general remarks on the constitutional scope of the right 
to liberty. This is followed by critical analysis of the power of arrest on the basis 
of suspicion of terrorism and the length of pre-charge detention in terrorism cases. 
Moreover, this chapter explores whether there is a need for a watered down 
version of the standard of reasonable suspicion in terrorism cases. Furthermore, 
there will be a separate section that explores the quantity and quality of 
information required to effect arrest under Ethiopian law and the length of pre-
charge detention of terrorist suspects in Ethiopia. The last part of this chapter will 
focus on the UK and US pre-charge detention regimes and any lessons Ethiopia 
could learn from them with a view to shortening the 120-days pre-charge 
detention of terrorist suspects currently available.  
 
5.2 The Scope of the Right to Liberty in the UK, US and Ethiopia 
 
Like many other fundamental rights, the right to liberty is not absolute. There are 
circumstances where the right can be lawfully curtailed. Under Article 5 of the 
ECHR, deprivation of liberty simply implies physical restraint. The ECtHR has 
maintained that deprivation of liberty under Article 5 excludes "mere restriction 
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of movement."1224 The distinction between actual deprivation and restriction of 
movement is determined by examining different factors; inter alia, "the type, 
duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measures; the difference 
between the two is merely one of a degree or intensity, and not of nature or 
substance."1225  
  
Moreover, a distinction is also made between deprivation of liberty, freedom of 
movement, and freedom to choose one's residence. The latter two refer to Article 
2 of protocol 4 of the ECHR.1226 Furthermore, the court has continuously held 
that deprivation has an autonomous meaning:1227 "that is, it has a Council of 
Europe-wide meaning for purposes of the Convention, whatever it might or 
might not be thought to mean in any Member State."1228 Because several factors 
are thought to distinguish the two terms, the court acknowledges that 
"deprivation can take several forms other than classic detention in prison."1229 
This includes, among other things, where a person is subjected to confinement 
within a certain place, although not necessarily prison cell, and where their 
movement is severely restricted.1230 
 
In Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom,1231 a protester and a journalist were 
stopped and searched under section 44-45 TA 2000, which notably did not 
require reasonable suspicion to exercise the power. Both applicants complained 
                                                 
1224   Engel et al. v the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, at 58; see also Guzzardi v Italy, 
6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, para.  93    
1225   Ibid ,  para. 59  
1226  Ibid, para 58      
1227  For instance, the principles laid down in Engel et al. v the Netherlands and Guzzardi v Italy 
are reiterated in subsequent cases such as Ashingdane v the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, 
Series A no. 93, para 41     
1228 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others (FC) Session 2006-07 [2007] 
UKHL 45, para.13; see also Council of Europe (2007). Key Concepts of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, pp. 14-18       
1229 Engel et al. v the Netherlands, supra note 1224, para. 58      
1230 In Ashingdane v the United Kingdom (Despite the liberty that he had within the mental 
hospital and despite the fact that he was allowed to leave the hospital not having the involvement 
of somebody, the court stated that there could be deprivation of liberty.) In Guzzardi v Italy, 
supra note 1224, the Court acknowledged that placing someone in isolation in a rural community 
or similar areas could engage Article 5. The contrary reasoning is that the absence of isolation 
would be more likely to be treated as restriction of movement. For the inconsistency of the 
ECtHR interpretation as to what consists of deprivation other than classic detention, see Stone, R. 
(2012). Deprivation of Liberty: the Scope of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. European Human Rights Law Review, 2012 (1). pp. 46-57       
1231 Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, ECHR 2010      
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that the exercise of the power against them violated several fundamental rights 
stipulated under the ECHR, including Article 5. The ECtHR held that: 
 
… although the length of time during which each applicant was stopped and 
search did not in either case exceed 30 minutes, during this period the applicants 
were entirely deprived of any freedom of movement. They were obliged to remain 
where they were and submit to the search and if they had refused they would 
have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and criminal charges. 
This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of Article 5.1232 
 
The ECtHR in Gillan and Quinton, therefore, effectively outlined the conditions 
under which stop and search can amount to deprivation of liberty. This is in fact 
contrary to the position taken by the then House of Lords that ‘relatively brief' 
incidents under section 44-45 do not amount to deprivation of liberty.1233 The 
UK government has now repealed the stop and search powers under TA 
2000.1234 
 
In Austin and Others v United Kingdom,1235 the ECtHR entertained for the first 
time a different issue in regard to the meaning of deprivation of liberty. The main 
issue in this case was whether the use of a police practice, known as 
‘containment' (also called ‘Kettling'), against protesters violated Article 5. In this 
connection, the police have statutory powers 1236  to contain protesters to 
"...prevent an imminent breach of the peace in circumstances where there are no 
other means by which that imminent breach can be obviated."1237 This has been 
                                                 
1232 Ibid, para. 57      
1233  R (on the application of Gillan (FC) and another (FC)) (Appellants) v. Commissioner of 
Police for the Metropolis and another (Respondents) [2006] UKHL 12, para. 25; for further 
discussion on criticisms of the decision of the House of Lords in this particular case, see Edwards, 
R. A. (2008). Stop and Search, Terrorism and the Human Rights Deficit. 37(3) C.L.W.R.  211 
(arguing that ‘the decision of the House of Lords that ss. 44 and 45 are compatible with 
Convention rights was wrong'.)     
1234  See Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011; see also Section 59 Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012     
1235  Austin and others v the United Kingdom, (Applications nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 
41008/09)      
1236  Section 60  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 c. 33     
1237  Susannah Mengesha v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 1695 
(Admin) 2013 WL 2976042      
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controversial in the UK with some reports1238 criticising the tactic, particularly 
after the death of Ian Tomlinson and another tragic incident that led to a woman 
miscarrying.1239 
 
By reiterating previously held principles in Engel v Netherlands 1240  on the 
meaning of deprivation, the ECtHR held that the purpose of the measure in this 
case was to "...isolate and contain a large crowd, in volatile and dangerous 
conditions."1241 Therefore, it held that the practice could not be said to be in 
violation of Article 5.1242  However, in the case of Susannah Mengesha,1243 the 
same police tactics came under the spotlight again. In this case, the judges agreed 
that containment is necessary to prevent imminent breaches of the peace. 
However, requiring protesters to hand over their personal details in lieu of being 
released from a condoned area was found to be straying beyond the bounds of 
permissibility.  
 
Besides the nature of the confinement, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR also states 
that the status of the person might be considered in the determination of loss of 
liberty. For instance, the ECtHR distinguishes between civilians and members of 
the armed forces. 1244  
 
A further point on the scope of liberty under the ECHR is that "though Article 5 
talks of liberty and security, it is limited to deprivation and does not provide 
security and safety of the person i.e. the state does not owe the obligation to 
protect individual from harm."1245 Furthermore, "Article 5 is not engaged by a 
claim of the conditions under which a person is detained." 1246  Therefore, 
                                                 
1238  Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). Adapting to Protest: Inspecting 
policing in the Public Interest, 5 June; see also  Lewsi, P (2009). G20 Police Chiefs Were 
Unclear On Kettling Law, Report Finds, 7 July, the Guardian   
1239  Walker, P. (2009). IPCC Demands Change in Police Tactics after G20 Protests inquiry, 6 
August, Guardian     
1240  Engel et al. v the Netherlands, supra note 1224    
1241  Austin and others v UK, supra note 1235, para. 66    
1242  Austin and others v UK, supra note 1235, para 67      
1243 Susannah Mengesha v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, supra note 1237      
1244 Engel et al. v the Netherlands, supra note 1224      
1245  Foster, S. (2008). Human Rights and Civil Liberties. 2nd edition. (Essex, Pearson Education 
Limited), pp. 221-222; see also Powell, R. L. (2007). The Right to Security of person in 
European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. 6 E.H.R.L.R649     
1246  Ibid, p222    
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according to Winterwerp v Netherlands, "a mental patient's right to treatment 
appropriate to his condition cannot as such be derived from Article 5."1247 
 
Despite the textual construction of Article 5(1) ECHR in absolute terms, the 
subsequent sub-articles clarify a list of exhaustive conditions1248 where the right 
can be limited. Accordingly:   
 
A person can be deprived of his liberty after conviction by a court of law;1249 for 
non-compliance with a court order or to secure non-fulfilment of any obligations 
prescribed by law; 1250 deprivation on reasonable suspicion of committing an 
offence or preventing him from committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so1251 or lawful detention of a minor;1252 detention to prevent the spreading 
of infectious diseases or persons of  unsound mind, alcoholics, or addicts or 
vagrants;1253 deprivation under immigration laws.1254  
 
Moreover, Article 5(2-4) ECHR enumerates the procedural safeguards in cases 
of a deprivation of liberty. These include the right to be informed of the reasons 
for the arrest, prompt judicial intervention, right to bail, and right to habeas 
corpus.  
 
Schedule 1 of the Human Right Act 1998 (HRA) incorporates the same legal 
provisions specified under Article 5 ECHR. Moreover, section 2(1) HRA obliges 
UK courts to take into account the judgement, decision, declaration, or advisory 
opinion of the ECtHR.    
                                                 
1247 Winterwerp v the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, para 51      
1248  See for instance Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, ECHR 2011 (detention 
on security grounds is not one of the permissible grounds under Article 5)    
1249  Article 5(1)(a); see also Weeks v the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114     
1250  Article 5(1)(b)     
1251    Article 5(1)(c); for the definition of reasonable suspicion, see Doorson v the Netherlands, 26 
March 1996, 1996-II; see also  Fox, Campbell and Hartley v the United Kingdom, 30 August 
1990, Series A no. 182(Fox from now on wards); see also Brogan and Others v the United 
Kingdom, 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B; see also  Murray v the United Kingdom, 28 
October 1994, Series A no. 300-A; see also Guzzardi v Italy, supra note 1224 (preventive 
detention for security reasons not allowed)    
1252 Article 5(1)(d); see also Nielsen v Denmark, 28 November 1988, Series A no. 144      
1253 Article 5(1)(e); see also  Winterwerp v the Netherlands, supra note 1247 (stages for detaining 
mentally unsound people)      
1254  Article 5(1)(f); see also Chahal v the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, 1996-V 
(deportation on grounds of national security)     
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On the other hand, the scope of liberty in the US under the due process 
clauses1255 of the US Constitution is broader than Article 5 ECHR. The Fifth 
Amendment states that "no person … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." "This due process clause is the basis for many of the 
rights afforded criminal defendants and procedures followed in criminal 
courts."1256 At the same time the Fourteenth Amendment declares that  
 
… no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment, thus, has both substantive and procedural 
implications. 1257 The clauses have also been expanded to include freedom of 
expression,1258 general right to make contracts,1259 sexual rights,1260 and family 
rights,1261 to mention a few.  
 
Unlike the autonomous definition of liberty under Article 5 ECHR, the scope and 
meaning of the liberty under the above Amendments remain elusive due to the 
absence of an authoritative definition. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that:  
 
... the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning is not an 
unusual or regrettable attribute of Constitutional provisions... when the gloss has 
thus not been fixed but is a function of the process of judgment, the judgment is 
bound to fall differently at different times.1262  
 
                                                 
1255 The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution      
1256  Berman, P and Berman, S. (2011). The Criminal Law Handbook, Know Your Rights, Survive 
the System. 5th edition. (USA,  Nolo), p.354     
1257 For detail discussion on the scope of due process protection, see Snyder v Massachusetts, 29 
U.S. 97 105 (1934)      
1258  N. A. A. C. P. v Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that freedom of association is 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause)      
1259  Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45(1905)      
1260  Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S 558 (2003)     
1261 Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey 509 U.S 833 (1992)      
1262  Rochin v California 342 U.S. 165 (1952)       
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In addition, the US Supreme court has held several times, that "liberty protection 
implies restraints on arbitrary wrongful government actions"1263and guarantees 
"freedom from unreasonable bodily restrains." 1264  In ascertaining whether an 
individual is deprived of his liberty, the US Supreme Court has stated that regard 
must be given both to the "purpose and to the duration of deprivation of physical 
liberty."1265 This is similar to the position taken by the ECtHR in Engel1266 and 
Guzzardi.1267  
 
However, the US Supreme Court has failed to define ‘deprivation of liberty', 
even though it has acknowledged in Zadvidas v Davis that "freedom from 
imprisonment, from government custody, detention or any other forms of 
physical deprivation lies at the heart of liberty."1268 Another striking feature of 
the US Constitution is that it does not have comparable grounds of deprivation 
that are enumerated under Article 5(1) (a-f) ECHR. Furthermore, the above 
Amendments do not deal with the right to security of the person. The Second and 
the Third Amendments cover that right.   
 
The right to liberty is one of the fundamental rights recognized under the Federal 
Democratic Republic Constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution). 
Nevertheless, the FDRE constitution is not the only document that deals with 
liberty. Both the Ethiopian Civil Code and the Ethiopian Criminal Code contain 
provisions that deal with the same right. According to Article 17 of the FDRE 
constitution, "no one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law." This 
provision differs from Article 5 ECHR, as Article 17 of the FDRE constitution 
does not list the grounds of deprivation. This Article simply states that 
deprivation should be "on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures 
as are established by law."  In a similar manner to Article 5(2-5) ECHR, Article 
19 of the FDRE Constitution enumerates the rights of persons arrested, which 
include: 
                                                 
1263 Zinermon v Burch 404 U.S. 113, 125       
1264 Youngberg v Romeo 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)       
1265  United States v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739. 750-751(1987)     
1266   Engel et al. v the Netherlands, supra note 1224    
1267 Guzzardi v Italy, supra note 1224      
1268   Zadvidas v Davis, 533 U.S. 678. (2001)    
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Right to be informed of the reason of arrest; right to remain silent (absent under 
Article 5 ECHR); right to be brought before a court within 48 hours (no such 
limitation under Article 5 ECHR); right to habeas corpus; right not to be 
compelled to make confessions or admissions that could be used against them; 
and right to be released on bail (absent under Article 5 ECHR) 
. 
As discussed, although Article 5 ECHR talks about liberty and security, it is only 
concerned with liberty of persons. In the same manner, the FDRE Constitution 
makes it clear that liberty and security, although inalienable, are two different 
rights by providing for them in separate articles under Article 16 and Article 17. 
In addition, the combined reading of Article 17 and Article 32 of the FDRE 
Constitution, which deal with freedom of movement, demonstrate that 
deprivation of liberty is not the same as restriction of movement under the FDRE 
Constitution. Therefore, according to Ethiopian constitutional exactitudes, liberty 
is restricted to physical restraint.  
 
However, the Ethiopian Civil Code provides a different scope for deprivation. 
Article 2040(1) of this code states that "a person commits an offence where, 
without legal authority, he interferes with the liberty of another person, even for 
a short time and prevents him from moving about as he is entitled to do." The 
word ‘interfere' expands the scope of deprivation beyond ‘classical prison' by 
stretching its scope to include restriction of movements. This is different from 
the scope of deprivation provided under Article 17 and Article 32 FDRE of the 
Constitution.  
 
Moreover, Article 423 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code stipulates that "any public 
servant who, contrary to the law or in disregard of the forms and safeguards 
prescribed by law, arrests, detains, or otherwise deprives another of his freedom 
is subject to punishment." The phrases ‘contrary to law' or ‘in disregard of the 
forms' refer to substantive and procedural requirements, respectively. These 
requirements are dispersedly mentioned in the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code and Civil Procedure Code. The procedural and substantive tests of Article 
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423 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code are tantamount to the lawfulness test of the 
ECtHR, 1269which in turn implies accessibility and foreseeability.  
 
In contrast to the scope of liberty in the US under the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments, liberty in Ethiopia does not imply social, political or other choices. 
Although the word ‘freedom' is frequently mentioned in the FDRE, and in 
Ethiopian Codes, it has yet to be seen if these broad implications could be 
inferred from Article 17 and Article 19 of the FDRE Constitution. 
 
With regard to the remedies for a violation of liberty, the FDRE Constitution 
provides the right to "petition the court to order their physical release where the 
arresting officer fails to bring them before a court within the prescribed time and 
to provide the reasons for their arrest."1270 Moreover, the Ethiopian Civil Code 
lists general civil remedies where a person "without due legal authority ... 
interferes with the liberty of another person."1271  However, the Ethiopian Civil 
Code does not specify the kind of civil remedies available in case of violation of 
liberty.  
 
To conclude, the right to liberty under the FDRE Constitution has limited scope 
compared to the US's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, in a 
similar manner to the US and ECHR, its application is limited to deprivation of 
liberty. It does not cover restriction of movement or security of the person. In 
contrast to Article 5 ECHR, it does not mention the exhaustive grounds where 
deprivation of liberty can be justified. By enumerating general standards on 
procedural and substantive rights, the FDRE Constitution leaves it up to the 
specific laws to list these grounds. 
 
5.3 Arrest on Reasonable Suspicion  
 
                                                 
1269  Paragraph one of Article 5 (deprivation must be ‘in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed by law'); see also Kurt v Turkey, 25 May 1998, 1998-III, para. 123 ("the authors of the 
Convention reinforced the individual's protection against arbitrary deprivation of his or her 
liberty by guaranteeing a corpus of substantive rights which are intended to minimise the risks of 
arbitrariness by allowing the act of deprivation of liberty to be amenable to independent judicial 
scrutiny and by securing the accountability of the authorities for that act.")      
1270  Article 19(4) of the FDRE Constitution     
1271 See articles 2040-2043 of the Ethiopian Civil Code      
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Article 5(1) ECHR enumerates the grounds of arrest. Accordingly, arrest can be 
effected based on reasonable suspicion, to prevent a crime or fleeing. It is the 
view of the ECtHR that the standard of reasonable suspicion can vary between 
Conventional and terrorist crimes.1272 For the reasons that follow, it is submitted 
that there should not be a modified version of the reasonableness test in terrorist 
cases. Before doing so, this section will highlight the background to the 
reasonableness standard in the UK.  
 
When the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours ceased to exist, the 
common law standard of reasonable suspicion became part of the Criminal Law 
Act 1967.1273 In Holgate-Mohammed v Duke, 1274  the House of Lords accepted 
that the arrest of a person so as ‘dispel or confirm a reasonable suspicion' is "well 
established as one of the primary purposes of detention upon arrest".1275 It has 
further elaborated that though the police officer may ‘reasonably suspects an 
individual of having committed an arrestable offence,'1276 it is up to the courts to 
determine whether the grounds considered by the arresting officer are relevant to 
the arrest.1277   
 
There is also a difference between ‘reasonable cause to believe' and ‘reasonable 
cause for suspicion.' Accordingly, it is held that "reasonable cause to believe 
implies a more definite state of knowledge of certain events than "reasonable 
cause for suspicion" which by definition suggests that the state of knowledge 
lacks any basis of proof."1278 
                                                 
1272  Fox v UK, supra note 1251     
1273  Lidstone, K.W., et al.  (1996). The Investigation of Crime: A Guide to Police Powers. (UK, 
Butterworths),  p244. For detail discussion how the standard of reasonable suspicion has 
developed in the UK, see Smith, G. (2002). Reasonable Suspicion: Time for a Re-evaluation? 30 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1     
1274  Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; see also Jason-Lloyd, L. (2005)  Introduction  
to Policing and Police Powers. 2nd edition. (London, Cavendish Publishing Limited), p. 83; see 
also Walker, C. and Starmer, K. (1999), supra note 1078, p. 101 (explaining that "detention for 
the purpose of placing psychological pressure on suspects to provide answers is regarded as 
lawful".)     
1275  Holgate-Mohammed v Duke, supra note 1274     
1276  Holgate-Mohammed v Duke, supra note 1274    
1277  Similar decisions have been made in other cases such as Alanov v Chief Constable of Sussex 
[2012] EWCA Civ 234 para. 25 ("… was there "reasonable cause" for that suspicion. This is a 
purely objective question and is to be determined on the facts as found by the judge (or by the 
jury where there is a jury trial".); see also Castorina v Chief Constable  of Surrey [1988] NLJ Rep 
180 woolf LJ     
1278  Dryburgh v Galt 1981 J.C 6972, para 13     
275 
 
 
Another distinction made is between mere suspicion and reasonable grounds for 
suspicion.1279 For actions against unlawful arrest to succeed, Lord Justice Woolf 
in Castorina suggested cumulative tests:1280 a subjective element that depends on 
the arresting officers officer's ‘state of mind; objective element ‘be determined 
by the judge if necessary on facts found by a jury'.1281  
 
The power of arrest now resides in section 24 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). As amended by section 10 of the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005, section 24 PACE contains cumulative criteria of 
reasonableness and necessity for any lawful arrest.1282  
 
It could be argued that these two criteria under section 24(1-4) and 24(5) PACE 
are similar to Article 5(1) (c) ECHR.1283 However, PACE does not provide an 
autonomous definition of reasonableness; it is instead decided on a case-by-case 
basis. Moreover, according to Code A of PACE, reasonable grounds for 
suspicion can be inferred from objective facts, information or intelligence.1284 
The Code A also states that reasonable suspicion can be inferred in the absence 
of specific information or intelligence when the suspicious behaviour of the 
suspect leads to that conclusion. 1285  The Code A specifically rules out any 
reasonable suspicion based on ‘generalisations or stereotypical images of certain 
groups or categories of people,' or previous criminal history.1286   
                                                 
1279  For ‘definition of "suspicion" and how this differs from “reasonable  grounds for  suspicion" 
in legislation relating to money laundering offences,’ see Harwood, J. (2008). Reasonable 
 Grounds - and a Vague Feeling of Unease. 96(May) T.E.L. & T.J. 15; see also Stone, R. (2005). 
The Law of Entry, Search and Seizure. (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 22 (For instance, 
under UK law with regard to the power of search and entry, it has been stated that "there are no 
hard and fast rules as to what is reasonable; each case must depend on its own circumstances…")       
1280  Castorina v Chief Constable  of Surrey, supra note 1277; see also  Gearey, A., et al (2013). 
The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes, Institutions . 2nd edition. 
(Routledge), p. 311     
1281 See also latest cases such as Alanov v Chief Constable of Sussex, supra note 1277, para. 25       
1282 See Fenwick, H. (2005). Reasonable Suspicion for Arrest Purposes. 44(Spr) S.L. Rev. 4      
1283  Stone, R. (2008). Text Book on Civil Liberties and Human Rights. 7th edition. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press), p107     
1284 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE) Code A: Code of Practice for the 
Exercise by Police officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search, para. 2.2      
1285  Ibid, para 2.3      
1286  Ibid, para 2.2; for detail discussions on reasonable suspicion under  PACE 1984, see Stone, R.  
(2012). Text Book on Civil Liberties and Human Rights. 9th edition. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press), pp. 90-91; see also Stone, R. (2005), supra note 1279,  pp. 21-22      
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We now turn to the question of whether the reasonable suspicion ground of arrest 
applies to terrorism cases in the same way as it applies to conventional criminal 
cases. It will quickly become clear that there seems to be a disparity of approach; 
more specifically, there would appear to be a diluted version of reasonable 
ground of suspicion applied to terrorism cases. The question then transposes into 
analyse of the degree of the disparity between case types. 
 
5.3.1 Brogan, Fox, O'Hara and Murray: a Watered down Version of Reasonable 
Suspicion? 
 
Before the coming into effect of Terrorism Act 2000 (TA), two pieces of 
legislation dealt with arrest on suspicion of committing terrorism offences. The 
first was section 11 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency provisions) Act 1978 
(NIA 1978), which laid down the requirements for a lawful arrest of terrorist 
suspects. In McKee v CCNI, the House of Lords said "the powers of arrest under 
section 11 are not qualified by any word "reasonableness." The suspicion has to 
be honestly held but it need not in addition be a reasonable suspicion."1287 The 
above provision was replaced by section 12(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 1984 (PTA), which requires reasonableness. Lord Steyn in O'Hara v Chief 
Constable for R.U.C assumed that reasonableness under section 12(1) of the 
above Act is different from that of Article 5(1) ECHR in the sense that the latter 
is broader in scope than the former.1288  
 
According to the decision in O'Hara v CCRUC, the narrow reasonable test under 
section 12(1) PTA can be inferred from an "informer tip off or hearsay. 
Information which causes the constable to be suspicious of the individual must 
be in existence to the police officer at the time he makes the arrest." 1289 
                                                 
1287 McKee v Chief Constable for N. Ireland [1984], W.L.R 1358 (McKee v CCNI from this 
onwards), cited in O'Hara v CCRUC, infra note 1283; see also Jackson, D. W. (1997). The United 
Kingdom Confronts the European Convention on Human Rights. (Florida, the University Press of 
Florida), p. 51; see also also Alexander, Y.  and Brenner, E. H (2003). The United Kingdom’s 
Response to Terrorism. (London, Cavendish Publishing Limited), p. 459       
1288  O'Hara v Chief Constable for R.U.C [1997] AC 286 (O'Hara v CCRUC from this onwards) 
see also Alexander, Y.  and Brenner, E. H (2003), supra note 1287, pp. 457 et seq.        
1289 Ibid; the relevant test is now incorporated under section  41 of the Terrorism Act 2000      
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Therefore, it is not reasonable to arrest without a warrant, merely on instructions 
given by a superior or ‘equal ranking officer or junior officers' 1290 , without 
additional facts being disclosed to the arresting officer.1291  
 
The case of Fox, Hartley and Campbell v UK (Fox v UK)1292 is worth looking at 
here.  They were arrested on suspicion of being terrorists under section 11(1) of 
the NIA 1978, but subsequently released without charge. They complained to the 
ECtHR stating that their arrest violated Article 5 of the ECHR because there was 
no reasonable suspicion that they committed any specific offences. Fox v UK 
concluded that there was breach of Article 5 because "the government have not 
provided any further material on which the suspicion against the applicants was 
based."1293   
 
However, in what amounted to a striking acknowledgement from the ECtHR, the 
court also stated that "suspicion justifying terrorist arrests cannot always be 
judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing with 
conventional crime." 1294  The same view is affirmed in the cases of Brogan, 
Murray and O'Hara.1295 The question is: what are the parameters of this watered 
down standard of reasonable suspicion in terrorism cases?  
 
The ECtHR found a breach of Article 5(1) (c) because the UK government did 
not "furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying 
reasonableness." 1296 However, there are apparent contradictions here. On one 
hand, the court acknowledged that "contracting states cannot be asked to 
                                                 
1290 O'Hara v CCRUC, supra note 1288; see also Alexander, Y.  and Brenner, E. H (2003), supra 
note 1287, pp. 457 et seq.         
1291  On the subjective and objective elements of the O'Hara decision, see Hunt, A. (1997). 
Terrorism and Reasonable Suspicion By "Proxy" 113(Oct) L.Q.R. 548-552; see also Ovey, C. and 
Ashworth, A.J. (2002). .Human Rights: Meaning of Reasonable Suspicion.  Crim. L.R. 493; see 
also Arrest: Suspected Persons - Suspected Terrorist Arrested by Constable Acting on 
Instructions of Senior Officer. Crim. L.R. 1997, Jun, 432-434; see also Alexander, Y.  and 
Brenner, E. H (2003), supra note 1287, pp. 457 et seq.         
1292  Fox V UK, supra note 1251     
1293  Fox V UK, supra note 1251, para.35      
1294  Ibid, para. 32     
1295  Brogan v UK, supra note 1251; see also Murray v UK, supra note 1251; O'Hara v the United 
Kingdom, no. 37555/97, ECHR 2001-X     
1296  Fox V UK, supra note 1251, para 34     
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establish reasonableness  ... by disclosing confidential sources."1297 On the other 
hand, it rejected the position of the UK government when trying to rely on secret 
evidence to justify the arrest, saying that the UK failed to ‘furnish at least some 
facts.' What if the arrest was entirely based on secret evidence? How is the 
government supposed to ‘furnish at least some facts?'   
 
What is interesting is that the ECtHR in Fox v UK did not criticise the NIA 1978, 
despite the Act only requiring mere suspicion to justify arrest. Therefore, it 
would be logical to expect a government to provide some facts if and only if the 
domestic legislation is construed in an objective manner. In contrast, it would 
also be inconceivable for the ECtHR to have meant when referring to a different 
standard of reasonableness for terrorist suspects that mere suspicion of terrorism 
would be sufficient; indeed, this would be contrary to Fox. 
 
Although the ECtCH in Fox ruled that the past activities of a suspect could not 
establish reasonable suspicion, it was inconsistent in its approach. The inability 
of the ECtCH to clearly identify the watered down standard of reasonable 
suspicion for terrorist suspects has led the ECtHR to uphold an arrest based on 
past activities or family relationships in the case of Murray. 1298 The ECtHR 
reaffirmed the previously held position that proving reasonable suspicion 
requires a lower threshold than that required to bring a charge or "justify 
conviction."1299  However, the court muddled the standard of reasonableness by 
accepting ‘special exigencies of investigating terrorist crime' 1300  as objective 
grounds to establish reasonableness.     
 
The case of Raissi is worth mentioning here. In Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis v Mohamed Raissi,1301 the wife and brother of Mr. Lotfi Raissi1302 
were arrested "on suspicion of involvement in terrorist attacks in the United 
States." Both brought a court action challenging the legality of the arrest.  While 
                                                 
1297 Ibid      
1298  Murray v UK, supra note 1251     
1299  Ibid, para. 55; the same conclusion is reached in O'Hara v UK, supra note 1295, para. 34   
1300  Murray v UK, supra note 1251, para. 63     
1301  Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v  Mohamed  Raissi (2008) [2008] EWCA Civ 
1237     
1302  Raissi v Secretary of State for Justice  [2008] EWCA  civ 1237     
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evaluating the tests laid down in Castorina, 1303  the lower court rejected the 
argument that "the extreme seriousness of the attacks in America on 9/11"1304 
could establish reasonableness in the absence of objective facts. This seems to be 
a direct rebuttal to the reasoning of the ECtHR which accepted the ‘special 
exigencies of investigating terrorist crime'.1305  
 
In addition, the ECtHR seemed to give the impression that arrest based on facts 
provided by informants is a watered down reasonableness standard. 1306 Lord 
Steyn in O'Hara v CCRUC also accepted facts from informants or tip-offs from 
the public. However, Lord Steyn and the ECtHR are not talking in the same 
language here. Lord Steyn was only affirming that reasonableness could be 
construed from informants or tip-offs without saying that a different standard is 
required for terrorist suspects.  
 
As judges Walsh and Carillo Salcedo point out in their joint dissenting opinion in 
respect of Article 5(1) (c), the ECHR "does not afford to states any margin of 
appreciation. If the concept of margin of appreciation were to be read into Article 
5(1) (c), it would change the whole nature of this all-important provision which 
then become subject to executive policy".1307 Their view is that domestic UK 
legislation should be scrutinised against Article 5(1)(c) ECHR instead of giving 
states an escape route by allowing a watered down standard for terrorism cases.  
 
Judge Loucaides in O'Hara v UK also maintained that the officer arrested the 
applicant because he "was told by a superior officer that the applicant was 
suspected of having been involved in the murder under investigation."1308 This 
justification is equivalent to "legalising a general formula for justifying an 
arbitrary arrest."1309 He did not contend that arrest based on facts supplied by 
informants was against the spirit of Article 5 ECHR. His primary concern was 
                                                 
1303  Castorina v Chief Constable  of Surrey, supra note 1277   
1304  Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Mohamed Raissi, supra note 1301, para. 6     
1305   Murray v UK, supra note 1251, para. 63    
1306    O'Hara v UK, supra note 1295  
1307   Brogan v UK, supra note 1251    
1308   O'Hara v UK, supra note 1295    
1309   Ibid   
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rather to do with the ‘scant' evidence given at domestic courts to justify 
reasonableness.  
 
To conclude, Fox v UK and Murray v UK both show how inconsistent the 
ECtHR is in its approach to the question of reasonableness. In both cases, the UK 
government relied on reliable but confidential information. However, the ECtHR 
reached different conclusions. This research could not find any convincing 
evidence to suggest that the UK government in Murray v UK had provided 
"sufficient facts or information which would provide a plausible and objective 
basis for a suspicion."1310 The only difference between Fox v UK and Murray v 
UK, if any, is that the arresting officers in the latter were "transparently honest 
witnesses."1311 However, this could not be a substitute for, to quote the ECtHR, 
‘sufficient facts or information' required under Article 5. Furthermore, due to the 
inability of the ECtHR to clearly define the watered down standard of 
reasonableness in terrorism cases, it took into account several unrelated matters 
in Murray v UK to define reasonableness: the duration of the arrest; special 
nature of the fight against terrorism; conviction of Murray's brothers in the US; 
and the fact that they were assisted by a trustworthy person in the UK. 
 
5.4 Reasonable Suspicion v. Probable Cause 
 
The Baker Report on extradition treaty between the UK and the US has stated 
that "there is no significant difference between the probable cause test and the 
reasonable suspicion test." 1312  However, compared to the US standard of 
probable cause, it is arguable that the European standard of reasonable suspicion 
demands less of the arresting officer and the level of knowledge required for both 
standards differs to a large degree.. Despite an attempt in Dallison v Caffrey1313 
to mingle reasonable suspicion and probable cause, subsequent decisions in the 
UK have taken a more definitive approach.  
                                                 
1310 Ibid, para. 63      
1311  Murray v UK, supra note 1251, para. 61     
1312  Home Office (2011). A Review of the United Kingdom's Extradition Arrangements, 
Presented to the Home Secretary on 30 September 2011, para 1.21      
1313  Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 ( held that "the test whether there was reasonable and 
probable cause for arrest … is an objective one, namely, whether a reasonable man … believes 
that there was reasonable and probable cause.")       
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The principle in the Fourth Amendment as discussed in this chapter is that the 
police need to get a warrant in order to ‘seize' a person. However, arrest without 
a warrant could be justified if there is probable cause that suggests the 
commission of a crime. It is an established principle in the US that a police 
officer may stop and frisk a suspect based on a reasonable suspicion. The US 
Supreme Court held that the police do not need the strictest standard of probable 
cause under the Fourth Amendment for minor intrusion of privacy on public 
places. 1314  If, for instance, someone "walks past a store window to peer 
inside,"1315 or he made off when he saw a police car,1316 there is reasonable 
suspicion to apply the procedure of stop and frisk.1317 Nevertheless, the police 
need to wait for probable cause before arresting the person. Thus, probable cause 
is not necessarily built upon reasonable suspicion. The US Supreme court tried to 
distinguish the two standards in the following manner:  
 
...reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in 
quantity or content than required to establish probable cause, but also in the 
sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable 
than that is required to show probable cause.1318  
 
Despite the alleged difference both in quantity and quality of the information 
required for both standards, they both require some verifiable facts. In contrast to 
the position of the ECtHR, the US Supreme Court has in Brinegar v. United 
States held that anonymous tip-offs are enough for reasonable suspicion of stop 
and frisk, but not for probable cause in order to affect arrest.1319 Thus, in the US, 
                                                 
1314 Terry v Ohio, supra note 860; see also Illinois v Wardlow, supra note 860.      
1315  Terry v Ohio, supra note 860    
1316    Illinois v Wardlow, supra note 860   
1317  These are similar to the examples provided under Code A: Code of Practice, supra note 1284. 
According to Code A of PACE, the police are allowed to infer reasonable suspicion based on 
suspicious behaviour of a person without any objective facts, information, or intelligence. The 
difference, however, is that while existence of reasonable suspicion is enough to effect arrest in 
the UK, a police officer in the US needs to wait until there is probable cause to arrest the suspect.    
1318  Alabama v White 496 U.S 325 (1990)      
1319  Brinegar v United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). In Brinegar, the US Supreme Court accepted 
the definition of probable cause devised in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, para. 162 
("probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
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a police officer can stop and frisk search a suspect based on reasonable suspicion, 
but the same standard cannot be used to arrest the suspect. Some have 
summarized the differences between the two standards in the following 
manner:1320  
 
Table 4.1: Reasonable Suspicion v.  Probable Cause in the US 
 
Probable Cause  
 
Reasonable Suspicion  
 
Legal definition: Brinegar v United1321 
States 
 
Practical definition: more likely than not.  
      
Sufficient for arrest.                                                                                   
                                                                                  
 
After arrest, officer may search person 
and immediate vicinity. 
 
Sufficient for issuance of warrant.   
 
 
 
 
No good legal definition 
 
 
Practical definition: "less certain than 
probable cause, but more than mere 
suspicion." 
Sufficient for stop and search, but not for 
arrest. 
 
Officer may search a suspect if there is 
fear for officer's safety. 
  
Not sufficient for issuance of warrant.  
 
 
 
        
Besides the above differences, the US Supreme Court has thus far not deviated 
from the standard of probable cause in terrorism cases. In Terry v Ohio, the US 
Supreme Court balanced the interest of the individual's privacy and the police 
officers' safety when it deviated from the Fourth Amendment in a limited 
violation of privacy such as stop and frisk. However, the US Supreme Court 
firmly held that "the Terry cases progeny do not support the application of a 
balancing test so as to hold that "seizure" ... may be justified by mere reasonable 
suspicion."1322 
 
                                                                                                                                    
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed."); see also Spinelli v United States, supra note 860     
1320  Carmen, R. V D. (2009). Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice. (Belmont, Cengage 
Learning, Inc), p86     
1321 Brinegar v. United States, supra note 1319      
1322  Dunaway v New York, 442 U.S 200 (1979)      
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The role of tip-offs in establishing probable cause was also considered in Spinelli 
v United States.1323 The US Supreme Court stated that:  
 
... informant tip off was not sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of 
probable cause'1324 unless it ‘set forth any reason to support the conclusion that 
the informant was "reliable" and ... sufficiently state the underlying 
circumstances from which the informant had concluded the petitioners 
activity.1325  
 
What constitutes reliable information is further discussed in Aguilar v Texas, 
according to which: 
 
The affiant need not disclose the identity of the informant. Moreover, the affidavit 
could be based on hearsay information. But the magistrate must be informed of 
some underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the 
informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information was 
reliable.1326   
 
Therefore, the informant cannot rely on ‘casual rumour or general reputation' to 
tip-off the police. 1327  Lord Steyn did not set out such requirements in his 
statement in O'Hara v CCRUC, although his Lordship did accept that hearsay 
and tip-offs can be used to establish reasonable suspicion. 
 
Although the ECtHR did consider the role of tip offs, it did not touch on the 
issue of the reliability of the ‘tipsters'. The ECtHR in the cases of Fox, Murray, 
Brogan and O'Hara did not request from UK government facts that support the 
proposition that the informants were indeed credible and the information was 
reliable. When the UK government argued that the tip-off was from a reliable 
informant, the ECtHR failed to seize the opportunity to evaluate the credibility 
of the informant and the reliability of the information supplied. Although it was 
                                                 
1323 Spinelli v United States, supra note 860      
1324  Ibid     
1325  Ibid     
1326  Aguilar v Texas, supra note 860 as cited in Spinelli v United States, supra note 860     
1327  Spinelli v United States, supra note 860    
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not specifically discussed, one of the reasons for this reluctance might emanate 
from the fact that illegally obtained evidence is admissible under English 
common law. However, the same is not true in the US. Another possible 
justification could be attributed to the prohibition of disclosure of contents 
interception, and its method of obtaining. Nevertheless, this is less convincing 
justification because ICA 1984, as replaced by RIPA, is concerned with 
interception of communication, not with tip-offs from informants or the public.  
 
Moreover, as the US Supreme Court in Aguilar stated there was no need to 
disclose the identity of the informants. The ECtHR also accepted in Brogan, Fox, 
Murray and O'Hara that member states are not required to disclose sensitive 
information to prove reasonableness of an arrest. As discussed in the preceding 
sections, the dissenting judges in Murray v UK also states that the government 
could prove some evidence to show that the arrest was based on reasonable 
suspicion without jeopardising secret information.  
 
Therefore, a member State government cannot hide behind the veil of secrecy 
and refuse to disclose information which supports or otherwise the credibility 
and reliably of informants. But the ECtHR in general has shown its 
inconsistency in this matter in Fox v UK and Murray v UK.  
 
Whatever the underlying factors might be, the standard of the ECtHR on 
reasonable suspicion is weaker than that of the probable cause test in the US. As 
a result, the test of the ECtHR when justifying arrest in terrorism cases based on 
a watered down version of reasonableness, falls short of the stricter standards 
required under the probable cause test in the Fourth amendment.  
 
If the US Supreme Court rejected deviation from the probable cause standard for 
conventional crimes, one wonders if the court would be willing to consider a 
different test in terrorism cases. The answer is no as the US Supreme Court has 
clearly refused such deviation in terrorism cases in the following situations. In 
United States v United States District Court, (the Keith case) 1328  the US 
                                                 
1328 United States v United States District Court (the Keith case ) 407 U.S. 297 (1972)      
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government attempted to convince the US Supreme Court to deviate from the 
Fourth Amendment standard in national security cases, specifically in spy cases. 
The US government argued that "disclosure to a magistrate of all or even a 
significant portion of the information involved in domestic security surveillance 
would create potential danger to national security." 1329 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that there could be less demanding probable cause in surveillance 
cases. A similar position was reached in the Re Sealed case where the standard of 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) under section 50 U.S.C. 
§1805(a) (3) was considered.1330 The US Supreme Court in this case accepted 
that in intelligence cases, "congress allowed this lesser showing for clandestine 
intelligence cases, but not, notably, for other activities, including terrorism."1331 
 
Therefore, US Supreme Court in the Re Sealed case clearly stated that the FISA 
standard is not applicable in terrorism cases. This marks the major difference 
between the European approach and the US approach.  In the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in Re Sealed case, the less demanding probable cause under 
FISA is not applicable to arrest. Its application is, therefore, limited to mere 
surveillance. As soon as the decision to arrest is made, the stricter standard under 
the Fourth Amendment comes to the fore. This can be further inferred from 
Ashcroft v Al-Kidd.1332 The applicant was detained as a material witness in a 
terrorism case. The Supreme Court referred to earlier cases where the Fourth 
Amendment standards of warrant and probable cause were not required. These 
circumstances apply to cases "where the search or seizure is justified by special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement; such as the need to deter 
drug use in public schools or inspection of fire damaged premises to determine 
the cause."1333  
 
Apart from these limited exceptions, the Supreme Court has rejected any 
departure from the probable cause test.  
 
                                                 
1329 Ibid      
1330 re Sealed Case, supra note 1146      
1331  Ibid    
1332  Ashcroft v Al-Kidd 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011) (citing Indianapolis v Edmond, the Supreme Court 
held that detention under the Fourth Amendment "requires predominantly objective inquiry.")      
1333  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)    
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To conclude, the ECtHR watered down standard of reasonableness gives less 
protection to the right to liberty compared to the much stricter standard of its US 
counterpart.   
 
5.5 The Ethiopian Legal System 
 
Article 49 et seq of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code deals with arrest with 
or without warrant. The general standard under Article 49 Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code is that the police need to obtain an arrest warrant. However, 
there are several exceptions to this general principle. Arrest without a warrant 
can be effected against a person who commits flagrant offences; 1334  who is 
reasonably suspected of having committed or about to commit an offence 
punishable with imprisonment for not less than one year or who is in the act of 
breaching the peace or who is reasonably suspected of having evaded police 
supervision or deserted the armed force or being a dangerous vagrant.1335  
 
Moreover, the same Article also provides that there can be an arrest without 
warrant if a person possesses stolen materials or materials that might be used in 
the commission of a crime. 
 
However, there is neither a provision in the Ethiopian Codes nor any case law 
that defines the general standard of reasonable suspicion under Ethiopian law. 
 
The EATP embodied the same standard of reasonableness as that of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. Articles 16 and 17 of the EATP, which deal 
with sudden searches and covert searches, respectively, require reasonable 
suspicion.  
 
According to Article 16 of the EATP, a ‘sudden search' is authorised when: 
 
                                                 
1334 See Article 50 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. According to Article 19 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, a flagrant offence is an offence "where the offender is found 
committing the offence, attempting to commit the offence or has just committed the offence."      
1335 Article 51 Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
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a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a terrorist act may be committed 
and deems it necessary to make a sudden search in order to prevent the act, with 
the permission of the Director General of the Federal Police or a person 
delegated by him, may stop vehicle and pedestrian in an area and conduct 
sudden search at any time, and seize relevant evidence.   
 
Though a ‘sudden search' is not specifically defined, the last sentence of the 
above article implies that this sort of search could be authorised at any time and 
at any place in order to prevent terrorist act.  A closer look at Article 16 of the 
EATP reveals that reasonable suspicion alone is not enough to carry out a sudden 
search; the police officer must also get the permission of the Director General of 
the Federal Police or their delegate. Article 16 of the EATP further narrows the 
scope of seizure only to material connected with the commission of the suspected 
crime. A question arises as to whether the police are also allowed to seize the 
person as well as the evidence. Although 16 of the EATP is constructed in a 
narrower sense, Articles 50 and 51 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, 
which deal with arrest without warrant, allow the police to seize the person and 
the evidence. A similar interpretation is followed in the UK with the power to 
stop and search under section 43 TA 2000 for people who fall under section 
41.1336  
 
For covert searches, however, Article 17 of the EATP provides that the police 
need a court warrant issued upon showing of a ‘reasonable grounds to believe' 
that "a terrorist act has been or is likely to be committed" or "there are 
preparations or plans to that effect." Although Article 17(3) of the EATP seems 
redundant, being as it covers the same issue dealt with by subsection 2, the latter 
is concerned with preparations within certain premises while the former 
apparently covers preparations of terrorist acts anywhere, including in public 
places, or vehicles.  
 
                                                 
1336 See para. 2.8-2.9 of Code A: Code of Practice, supra note 1284.  It states that the police may 
detain the suspect in order to carry out the search. This brief detention can result into arrest for 
possession of unlawful materials. The same is true with section 43(1) if the person has been , 
after being searched, found in possession of "anything which may constitute evidence that person 
is a terrorist"      
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What is more, reasonableness is required for arrest without a warrant under 
Article 19 of the EATP. But the said Article does not use the same phraseology 
as Article 17 of the EATP. Article 19 presupposes ‘reasonable suspicion', not 
reasonable grounds to believe. The Article states that: "... the police may arrest 
without court warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects to have 
committed or is committing a terrorist act as defined under this proclamation."  
 
The EATP provides a broad definition of terrorism under Article 3, which is not 
fundamentally different from section 1 TA 2000. 1337  However, Article 19 is 
different from section 41 TA 2000; the latter Act does not require the 
commission of specific acts for arrest to take effect and "the police need have no 
particular offence in mind; nor need they worry overmuch about the level of 
involvement of the person arrested."1338 Moreover, in contrast to section 41 TA 
2000, Article 19 of the EATP does not require disclosure to the arrestee of the 
reasons for the arrest.1339  
 
Whether the standard in Article 19 of the EATP requires a lower threshold 
compared to the requirements for covert searches under Article 17 of the EATP 
is uncertain. The parliamentary minutes of the EATP appears not only to fail to 
elaborate on the stipulation of using different phraseology, but also complicates 
the definitions. The Amharic 1340  translations of reasonable suspicions and 
reasonable grounds for suspicion state that "the police needs to hold a genuine 
belief"1341 to conduct sudden or covert searches. But this definition is completely 
different from the English version of Article 16 and 17 of the EATP. This is due 
to the fact that both articles require objective standards, not subjective belief of 
the police officer.  
 
The reason why the Ethiopian legislature has inserted apparently two different 
standards for arrest and sudden searches, on one hand, and covert searches, on 
                                                 
1337 For a detail discussion on the definition of terrorism under TA 2000, see Stone, R. (2006). 
Police Powers and Human Rights in the Context of Terrorism. 48 (4) Managerial Law 384      
1338  Ibid     
1339  For detailed discussions on the extent of disclosure under section 41, see Walker, C. (2011), 
supra note 224, pp. 144-145      
1340 The Ethiopian official language      
1341  Parliamentary minutes, supra note 46, p.17     
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the other hand, is not clear. Does ‘reasonable suspicion' have different 
implications from ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion' or ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe'?  Neither the EATP nor the parliamentary minutes give any clue. The 
parliamentary minutes of the EATP merely state that Article 19 is directly taken 
from section 41 TA 2000. Thus, it might be appropriate to look into the 
legislative background of the TA 2000 in order to decipher the difference, if any, 
between ‘reasonable suspicion', ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion', and 
‘reasonable grounds to believe'.   
 
5.5.1 Legislative Background in the UK  
 
Section 41 TA 2000 requires reasonable suspicion, not reasonable grounds for 
suspicion, to arrest a suspect. However, section 42 TA 2000, which deals with 
searches of premises, requires reasonable grounds for suspicion for a search 
warrant. As discussed above, Fox, O'Hara, Brogan and Murray are some of the 
prominent cases that deal with the issue of reasonableness before the coming into 
effect of the TA 2000. The standard under section 11 of the NIA 1978 was that 
the police could arrest without a warrant "any person suspected of being a 
terrorist. This criterion was not qualified by any words of reasonableness. The 
suspicion has to be honestly held but it need not in addition be a reasonable 
suspicion."1342  
 
On the other hand, section 12 of PTA 1984 allowed arrest without a warrant 
based on ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion.' A similar phraseology can be found 
under section 14 PTA (Temporary Provisions) 1989. The construction of TA 
2000, on the other hand, requires only reasonable suspicion, not reasonable 
grounds for suspicion, that the target is a terrorist suspect. The explanatory notes 
to TA 2000 state that the power of arrest under sections 41-43 are similar to 
section 14 and 15 of the PTA 1989, despite the disparity in their phraseology. 
This indicates that there is no significant difference in meaning between 
‘reasonable suspicion' and ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion.' 
 
                                                 
1342 McKee v CCNI, supra note 1287      
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Paragraph 2.2 of the Code of Practice A1343and UK court cases1344 also use the 
two wordings interchangeably. Without attempting to distinguish between the 
two, the UK courts merely focused on the grounds for the arrest. It could, 
therefore, be concluded that the terms do not have any significant difference in 
meaning in the UK.  
 
However, UK courts also distinguish between ‘reasonable cause to believe' and 
‘reasonable cause for suspicion.' Accordingly, it is held that "reasonable cause to 
believe implies a more definite state of knowledge of certain events than 
"reasonable cause for suspicion" which by definition suggests that the state of 
knowledge lacks any basis of proof."1345 
 
Nevertheless, one wonders why sections 41, 42 and 43 TA 2000 use different 
wordings if they imply the same thing. A related question asks why the UK 
legislature swung back and forth at different times between ‘reasonable 
suspicion' and ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion'.   
 
Taking the practice in the UK as a standard, it might be right to conclude that in 
light of EATP being explicitly stated to be transposed from the UK, it should be 
interpreted in the same manner as its original source. However, many issues are 
not addressed either by the EATP or by the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code.  
 
First, the ECtHR and the House of Lords in O'Hara held that the grounds of 
suspicion could be constructed from hearsay or tip-offs. However, as discussed 
above, the US Supreme Court is sceptical on the use of tip-offs unless the 
‘tipster' is credible and the information is reliable. The European standard is 
more relaxed, as it does not require credibility and reliability. In both in Fox v 
UK and Murray v UK, it was only the government that was arguing that the 
                                                 
1343  Code A: Code of Practice, , supra note 1284     
1344  See for example  Alanov v Chief Constable of Sussex, supra note  1272 ("Although a police 
officer suspected that the appellant was guilty of an alleged offence, objectively that suspicion 
was not based on reasonable grounds."); see also Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
CD [2012] EWHC 3026 (Admin); see also Mossop v Director of Public Prosecutor [2003] 
EWHC 1261 (Admin)     
1345 Dryburgh  v Galt, supra note 1278, para 13       
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confidential information were from credible sources. 1346The ECtHR did not 
force the government to disclose further evidence to support that argument. The 
ECtHR simply accepted that confidential information could be used to justify 
arrest under Article 5 ECHR. The question, then, is which position is Ethiopia 
best to adopt? This is a difficult question to answer as the EATP falls short of 
providing the factors or information required for establishing reasonableness. 
 
With regard to hearsay, the traditional position in Ethiopia was that such 
information could not be used as evidence before a court. 1347  However, the 
parliamentary minutes on the EATP criticised this traditional approach and made 
it clear that hearsay is relevant in criminal litigation in Ethiopia.1348 Taking into 
account Article 263(1) of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code and Article 137(1) 
of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, the drafters of the EATP were right to 
criticise the traditional approach, as both codes clearly allow the testimony of 
witnesses, both their direct and indirect knowledge of facts.  
 
However, the focus of the parliamentary minutes was not on the relevance of 
hearsay in establishing reasonable suspicion. The focus was merely whether 
hearsay would be accepted as evidence before a court. Admission of evidence is 
a different subject matter from establishing reasonable suspicion. Thus, can 
hearsay evidence be relevant to establish the necessary reasonable suspicion for 
the arrest of a terrorist suspect? It could be argued that since hearsay is 
admissible before a court, there is high probability that the same evidence will be 
permitted in the establishment of reasonable suspicion.  
 
However, there are some inherent problems with the use of hearsay or tip-offs 
from the public. In a country where political mistrust is extremely high, and 
joining an opposition party is considered the biggest crime in the country, 
                                                 
1346 For details, see Fox v UK, supra note 1251 and Murray v UK, supra note 1251     
1347 Melin, R. A. (1972). Evidence in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa. HaileSellassie I University), p.213; 
But the courts are not consistent in all cases. See for instance in Public Prosecutor v Amhed 
kemal Abdela  (03139/98) (one of the public prosecutor witnesses testified based on hearsay the 
alleged involvement of the suspect in the preparation of terrorist activities); see also Public 
Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General), supra note 64 ( part of the evidence against 
defendant no.16 was based on hearsay)       
1348 Parliamentary minutes, supra note 46, p. 112; see also Article 23(1) of the EATP which 
clearly refers to hearsay       
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hearsay and tip-offs should be viewed with scepticism. Even members of the 
ruling party that participated in the drafting process of the EATP have raised this 
concern.1349 Therefore, the fact that the law is taken from the UK should not 
mean that the interpretation should be the same as well. This is due to the simple 
fact that the two countries do not have the same political environment.  
 
Second, the principle in the UK is that reasonable suspicion is not enough to 
effect arrest. It must also be necessary.1350 The same principle is espoused in 
Article 5(1) (c) ECHR.1351 However, Ethiopian law does not require the latter 
principle.  
 
Moreover, the traditional approach in the UK is that there could be a question of 
false imprisonment if the police knew that there was no possibility that a charge 
would be brought against the suspect. 1352  Moreover, the ECtHR has 
acknowledged that with regard to terrorism cases "the requirement under the 
ordinary law to bring the person before a court had been made inapplicable."1353 
Thus, for terrorism related cases, the suspect might not be charged at all 
following the initial arrest nor be brought before a court of law. This position is 
reflected under TA 2000.1354   
 
In Ethiopia, the drafters of the EATP did not transpose this position. As a result, 
it is not clear whether the suspect should be charged following arrest. In the cases 
that this research has considered, the Ethiopian courts did not clarify whether 
bringing a charge subsequent to arrest was part of the requirements of the law of 
arrest under the EATP or the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. The police 
                                                 
1349 Parliamentary minutes, supra note 46, p. 113       
1350  See Holgate-Mohammed v Duke, supra note 1274; see also Fenwick, H. (2005), supra note 
1282; see also Stone, R. (2008), supra note 1283, p. 105     
1351 See Belevitskiy v Russia, no. 72967/01, 1 March 2007, para. 82-93 (for legality of detention); 
see also Baranowski v Poland, no. 28358/95, ECHR. 2000-III, para.73 (for accessibility and 
foreseeability of law); see also Arai-Takahashi, Y. (2002), supra note 243      
1352  Stone, R. (2008), supra note 1283, p. 105      
1353  Brogan v UK, supra note 1251, para. 52          
1354  Section 33 of schedule 8 to Terrorism Act 2000 regarding representation and exclusion of the 
arrested person during an application for extension of detention which is different from section 
43 of PACE 1984. At the same time, the position taken in Brogan is different from the position 
taken in Lawless v Ireland (1961) 1 EHHR 1 where arrest under Article 5 1(c) was supposed to 
be accompanied by prompt judicial access.     
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simply arrests and requests for extension at the first appearance, and then begins 
gathering evidence. This is done with little challenge from the judiciary. 
 
As a safeguard against arbitrary arrest, it could be argued that the police should 
not be allowed to arrest in the absence of a possibility of bringing a charge and 
there should be the possibility of bringing false imprisonment charges against the 
police if they did not deem the arrest strictly necessary. However, as a principle, 
the decision to bring a charge is not necessarily linked to the decision to arrest on 
reasonable suspicion. The former decision demands stronger evidence compared 
to the latter. Therefore, arrest based on a reasonable suspicion should not be 
necessarily be followed by a charge unless the police have enough evidence to do 
so.  
 
Third, it is a settled law in the UK that a constable cannot arrest a suspect based 
on orders given because a mere order to arrest does not establish reasonable 
suspicion in and of itself.1355 Before the police exercised their power, they need 
to have objective facts or information, or they need to be briefed regarding the 
suspect and the same briefing must invoke1356 reasonable suspicion in the mind 
of the arresting officer.  
 
However, as discussed in the previous sections, the US position is stricter; 
reasonable suspicion alone is not enough to effect an arrest; indeed, the police 
need to show probable cause. Thus, the proper comparison of the Ethiopian 
counter-terrorism law should be with the UK. Under the EATP, use of the phrase 
‘police' 1357  could refer to a constable or his superior. A question may arise 
whether a constable could arrest based on orders given by his superior. There are 
several terrorism related cases that show police constables acting based on 
                                                 
1355 O'Hara v CCRUC, supra note 1288; on the subjective and objective elements of the O'Hara 
decision, see Hunt, A. (1997), supra note 1291; see also McKee v CCNI, supra note 1287; see 
also Alanov v Chief Constable of Sussex, supra note 1277; in case of searches based on 
instructions given by senior officers, see Mossop v Director of Public Prosecutor [2003] EWHC 
1261 (Admin)       
1356  For difficulties of arrest based on briefings and instructions, see Hunt, A. (1997), supra note 
1291     
1357  See Article 19 of the EATP     
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instructions given by their superiors. 1358 It is a norm in the country that the 
arresting officer is not required to have reasonable suspicion provided their 
superior has it. Thus, the reference to ‘police' under Article 19 of the EATP is 
rather vague and may mean that under Ethiopian law the arresting officer is not 
expected to know the factual basis for the arrest.  
 
For this reason, the Ethiopian definition of reasonableness is similar to Article 5 
ECHR, but completely different from the UK position. As mentioned by Lord 
Steyn in O'Hara, there are two categories of reasonableness: 
 
Where reasonable grounds for suspicion are required in order to justify the 
arrest of someone who turns out to be innocent, the [Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984] requires that the constable personally has reasonable 
grounds for the suspicion, and it would seem to follow that he is not protected if, 
knowing nothing of the case, he acts on orders from another officer who, perhaps, 
does have such grounds. On the other hand, under statutes which require only 
the objective existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion, it is possible that the 
officer need neither have the reasonable grounds nor himself suspect anything; 
he can simply follow orders.1359 
 
Lord Steyn held that the definition of reasonableness under PACE falls into the 
first category. But, turning to the practice in Ethiopia, reasonable grounds for 
suspicion under the Criminal procedure Code and the EATP falls under the 
second category; the arresting officer is not expected to have reasonable grounds 
when making an arrest.   
 
However, it could be also argued that because the provisions on counter-
terrorism are taken from the UK, they should be interpreted in the same manner 
and that the arresting officer should be required to prove that he has reasonable 
suspicion before effecting an arrest. Although this research acknowledges that 
not every interpretation in the UK should be transposed into Ethiopia, not least 
                                                 
1358   All the cases discussed in chapter 2-3, including the arrests after 2009, were executed based 
in instructions given by police superiors.          
1359 Feldman, D. (1993). Civil Liberties & Human Rights in England and Wales. (Michigan, 
Clarendon Press) , p.199, cited in O'Hara v CCRUC, supra note 1288 
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because the two countries do not share the same legal traditions, this could be 
one of the few examples where a provision should be interpreted in accordance 
with its original source. If the arresting officer does not have the necessary 
objective facts, he should face the full force of the law for violating the right to 
liberty. This can serve as deterrence against violating fundamental right to liberty.   
 
To conclude, despite the application of reasonable suspicion as the principal 
standard in regular crimes since 1961, and the inclusion of the same principle in 
subsequent legislation such as the EATP, there are no Ethiopian precedents to 
mention where the scope of this standard has been dealt with. Moreover, as the 
EATP is modelled on UK law, this research argues that the principles of 
interpretation on reasonable suspicion in the UK should be taken into account 
when interpreting Ethiopian legislation.  
 
However, this research does not recommend the watered down standard of 
reasonable suspicion devised by the ECtHR, for it is vague and it would add 
confusion to an already misunderstood concept in Ethiopia.  
 
The ECtHR has never outlined what should be taken into account when applying 
their watered down version of reasonableness; it has been left to domestic courts 
tried their utmost to formulate general guidelines.1360 For this reason, it seems to 
take into account different factors that might not be necessarily important in 
determining reasonableness of an arrest. For instance, in Murray v UK, the 
ECtHR held that:  
 
The length of the deprivation of liberty at risk may also be material to the level of 
suspicion required. The period of detention permitted under the provision by 
virtue of which Mrs Murray was arrested, namely section 14 of the 1978 Act, was 
limited to a maximum of four hours.1361 
 
                                                 
1360 See for instance the three limb test proposed by Woolf LJ in Castorina v Chief Constable  of 
Surrey, supra note 1277      
1361 Murray v UK, supra note 1251, para. 56     
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But the question is how does this factor make a difference to the requirement to 
produce some objective facts that there was a reasonable suspicion whether a 
defendant is detained for two hours, as in the case of Murray v UK, or six days, 
as in the case of Fox v UK1362? The court did not give any further explanation on 
this point.  
 
Moreover, the ECtHR seems to have conveniently acknowledged terrorism as 
possessing such a level of uniqueness that it requires a departure from the strict 
application of objectivity under Article 5 ECHR. However, it is contended that 
there are already plenty of exceptions out there that are applicable to terrorist 
suspects. Therefore, this research holds that there should not be another tier of 
reasonableness applicable to terrorist suspects in Ethiopia.  
 
Finally, by its very nature, the standard of reasonableness amounts to a lower 
threshold than the threshold required to prove beyond reasonable doubt. The 
ECtHR in O'Hara v UK also conceded that the standard is less strict than the 
evidence required to press charges. 1363  In terms of the strength of evidence 
required, the standards can be categorized from the lowest to the highest 
threshold in the following manner:  
 
Bona fide and honest suspicion (subjective test) → reasonable cause (objective 
test) →probable cause (an American standard to effect arrest but stronger than 
the European version of reasonable cause) →evidence required to bring charge 
(facts stronger than objective cause) →proof beyond reasonable doubt (moral 
certainty beyond a certain point). 
 
The question is, therefore, where the watered down standard of reasonableness 
falls within this grander scheme of standards?  
 
5.6 Pre-charge Detention: UK 
 
                                                 
1362 Fox v UK, supra note 1251       
1363 O'Hara v UK, supra note 1295      
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The first question that is often raised with regard to terrorism cases is how long is 
too long when detaining a suspect pre-charge? 28 days; 14 days; 90 days; and in 
extreme cases, such as the Ethiopian position, 120-days, are all instances that 
have been or were put forward as the term for pre-charge detention. The length 
of pre-charge detention has a checkered history in the UK, going up from seven 
to fourteen days and then to twenty-eight days before an unsuccessful attempt by 
former Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP, to scale it up to 90-days.1364  The need 
for 90-days pre-charge detention had some backing from the then Assistant 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Andy Hayman.1365 He was ‘a strong 
advocate' of locking terrorist suspects for 90-days without charge. In fact, the 
ACPO had been a strong advocate of a lengthy detention of terrorist suspects. Its 
former president, Ken Jones, was quoted by The Guardian arguing in favor of 
holding ‘terrorist suspects without charge for 'as long as it takes''.1366 Moreover, 
he advised the Home office that extended period of detention beyond 28-days 
could be needed under some circumstances.1367  
 
Generally, in the UK, a suspect can be detained for up to 36 hours without charge, 
while an additional 60 hours can be granted by the relevant UK court.1368 As 
PACE's application is restricted to conventional crimes, terrorist detention is 
covered by the far-reaching legal regimes of TA 2000, and TA 2006, with   
section 41 of TA 2000 and TA 2006 Act governing the length of pre-charge 
detention. The TA 2000 is also intended to rectify the shortfalls of judicial 
supervision and other safeguards stipulated under schedule 8, which were absent 
in previous Acts.1369 However, the UK government rejected a shorter period of 
pre-charge detention, i.e. 4 days, recommended by Lord Lloyd. The government 
argued that it would be insufficient to complete investigations within 4 days.1370  
 
                                                 
1364  Berman, G. and Horne, A. (2012).  Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorism Cases, Standard notes 
SN/HA/5634.      
1365 See the content of his letter at Home Affairs Committee (2006), Appendix: Police Briefing 
Note, supra note 1100      
1366  Townsend, M. and Doward, J. (2007).  Lock Terror Suspects Up Indefinitely Say Police, 15 
July, the Guardian     
1367 Home office (2007). Options for Pre-Charge Detention In Terrorist Cases, 25 July      
1368  Section 41-44 PACE 1984     
1369  Lloyd, A. J. L. (1996). Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism. (Cm 3420). London, TSO     
1370  Home Office (1998). Legislation against Terrorism: A consultation paper (CM 4178) London: 
Stationery Office, p.36, paras 8.21-8.24    
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The need for extended pre-charge detention was justified by the laborious nature 
of the following factors:  
 
... checking of finger prints;  the completion of forensic tests; finding and 
interviewing witnesses; searching the suspect's home address; conducting search 
of garages; storage facilities and other non-residential premises; checking alibis; 
making and analysing the results of financial and other enquires and putting the 
results of the above to the suspect at interview.1371 
 
However, most of these justifications do not necessarily require excessive pre-
charge detention. The Home Office has failed on numerous occasions to provide 
official data/statistics demonstrating the average time it takes to complete the 
above individual tasks. The Labour government also put forward other 
arguments why 28 days pre-charge detention was necessary. These included:  
 
 ... the number of people who might be engaged in a single terrorist network and 
who are therefore likely to be arrested; the volume of information and modern 
communication/data storage methods which may hold; the need to secure 
evidences from countries overseas given the very significant likelihood that there 
will be overseas aspect to terrorism operations; the requirement to interpret 
multiple languages, etc.1372  
 
However, the number of terrorist arrests under section 41 TA 2000 between 2001 
and 2010 do not support the Labour government's argument. According to these 
statistics, even 14 days pre-charge detention was too excessive.1373 That means 
the introduction of 28 days detention under TA 2006, which was available 
between 25 July 2006 and 25 January 2011, was surplus to requirement. The 
incremental extension of the initial seven days and a total of 28 days were found 
                                                 
1371 Ibid    
1372 Home Office (2011). Review of Counter Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings 
and Recommendations. (cm 8004),  London, TSO, para. 6      
1373  Home Office (2011). Operation of Police Powers Under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
Subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes; and stop and searches; Quarterly updates to 
September 2010      
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to be "neither appropriate, nor necessary."1374 The coalition government further 
conceded that 28 days detention was not needed because;1375  
  
It is not routinely required, as demonstrated by the fact that no one has been 
detained for longer than 14 days since July 2007; it is out of step with other 
Western democracies; it is incompatible with human rights obligations 
(primarily the right to liberty); it has a negative impact on Muslim communities 
in particular and undermines other aspects of the government's counter-
terrorism strategy. 
 
The proposal to reduce the length of pre-charge detention is part of the coalition 
government's promise to "restore the rights of individuals in the face of 
encroaching state power, in keeping with Britain's tradition of freedom and 
fairness"1376  
 
However, as an alternative, the UK government has now put in place an 
alternative, which would effectively restore the 28 days pre-charge detention 
under exceptional circumstances. There are also other alternatives considered and 
discussions on these alternatives follow below. 
 
5.6.1. Contingency Powers as an Alternative to Pre-charge Detention Regime?  
 
The UK government did not feel comfortable with a complete abandonment of 
the 28 day pre-charge detention regime. It wants to preserve the possibility of 
resorting to that maximum period under exceptional circumstances.  
 
Accordingly, the plan is to activate the maximum period, when necessary. There 
will be a sunset clause1377 so that the extended maximum period would be in 
                                                 
1374Ibid       
1375 Home Office (2011). Review of Counter Terrorism and Security Powers, supra note 1367, 
para.4       
1376 The Coalition (2010). Our Programme for Government: Freedom, Fairness and Responsibility, 
May     
1377  For a detail discussion on the relevance of sunset clauses in anti-terrorism laws, see Ip, J. 
(2013) Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation. Public Law 74-99     
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force for a period of three months upon a grant of royal assent.1378 This need for 
contingency powers entails a trade off involving a shortening of the 28 days pre-
charge detention regime, which it concluded was rarely used anyway, while still 
allowing recourse to that length of detention when the circumstances demand 
it.1379  
 
There are some factors that mitigate the need for a pre-charge detention regime 
over 14 days in length. These include: 
 
... the improved relationship between the police and the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS); the CPS's accumulation of a "wealth of experience" in dealing 
with terrorism; the threshold test, enabling earlier charging; improved resources 
being made available for investigations; "lower level" of terrorism offences 
having been introduced such as doing things in preparation to an act of 
terrorism (section 5 of the 2006 Act).1380  
 
Taking into account these factors, some argued against the introduction of 
contingency powers allowing for recourse to the 28-day maximum. They held 
that the only circumstances that required lengthy detention periods are "national 
catastrophes or a serious national state of emergency." 1381  However, Lord 
Macdonald seems to contradict himself. On one hand, during his tenure as 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), his office requested over 14 days pre-
charge detention for 11 suspects, which resulted in eight suspects being charged. 
On the other hand, he argued that the only circumstances that require pre-charge 
detention beyond 14 days are ‘national catastrophes.'  
 
One could easily attack Lord Macdonald's position as there was no national 
catastrophe when the 11 suspects were held beyond 14 days. With the exception 
of Operation Seagram (London and Glasgow bombings, 2007), neither Operation 
                                                 
1378 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary 
Extension) Bills. HL Paper 161/ HC Paper 893. London, TSO, para. 3      
1379  Ibid, par.14      
1380  Ibid, par. 37      
1381 See the argument of Lord Macdonald of River Glaven QC at Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated evidence, 8 June, Q1, 
supra note 1378      
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Overt (Transatlantic liquid bomb plot, 2006) nor Operation Gingerbread (active 
terrorist planning, Manchester arrest, 2006) triggered the sort of emergencies 
envisaged by Lord MacDonald. Moreover, Lord MacDonald conceded that they 
would have managed to deal with the cases within four days if that was the 
maximum. However, the former DPP, Keir Starmer QC, and Deputy Director 
Counter Terrorism Division, Sue Hemming, refute that argument. Both stated 
that "it is absolutely clear that it was genuinely needed"1382 in the above cases. 
 
Despite the conclusion that there was no need for extended detention over 14 
days, extension over 14 days is envisaged only in case of "mass causalities in a 
number of cities" and when the police lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute.1383  
 
However, others have argued that taking the catastrophe test alone is problematic. 
He presented the case of the 7/7, 21/7, and the London-Glasgow bombings. He 
has stated that the cases could easily be categorized into the catastrophe test 
envisaged by Lord Macdonald in light of the fact that the "bombs have actually 
gone off."1384 However, he argued that there was no need to go beyond 14 days 
in the first two cases and it was only in the latter case that detention beyond 14 
days was requested.1385   
 
The above position was also supported by the independent counter-terrorism 
measures reviewer, David Anderson QC, who argued that "one cannot say that 
the nature of the threat simply translates into the number of days you need to 
question somebody or accumulate evidence."1386 
 
However, an absolute refusal to entertain the idea of contingency powers is less 
sustainable for the following reasons.  
 
                                                 
1382  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and 
Associated Evidence, Q 195, supra note 1378     
1383  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, supra note 
1378, par 8-13     
1384  See the views of the DPP, kier Starmer, at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft 
Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 199, supra note 1378     
1385  Ibid    
1386   Ibid   
302 
 
First, the problem with most counter-terrorism legislation is a lack of foresight 
and the inability of the legislature to prepare in advance of a major disaster. The 
current draconian counter-terrorism legislation in the Western world would have 
been unthinkable before 9/11, which radically changed the perception of human 
rights. The legislation came into effect in the grip of strong emotions. This tipped 
the balance towards national security concerns. Now all the dust has settled, the 
balance slowly swings back to the protection of basic rights. This is followed by 
a foul cry over the violation of fundamental rights during the preceding period of 
emotion.  
 
Had there been comprehensive legislation well in advance of a major national 
crisis, such as 9/11 or the 7/7 bombings, governments would have saved 
themselves from passing hasty legislation. One-way of avoiding past mistakes is, 
therefore, having all the necessary powers that enable the police and the 
intelligence community to tackle a serious threat of terrorism. The draft bill is 
therefore a good way of accommodating possible complex terrorism cases that 
require an extended period of detention.  
 
Second, as Lord MacDonald mentioned, there was an attempt to politicize the 
debate on extended detention in 2005. 1387  This could be because people's 
emotions were overwhelmed by the on-going events. In contrast, if members of 
parliament decide issues with a clear state of mind before the eventuation of such 
catastrophes, there will be less scope for politicizing the issue.  
 
Third, past experience tells us that to pass a law during national crisis is more 
likely to risk the erosion of fundamental rights.1388 The expiration of the 28 day 
maximum and the repeal of stop and search under section 44-47 TA 2000 are but 
a few examples why legislation should not be rushed through parliament in time 
of emergency. 
 
                                                 
1387 See the argument of Lord Macdonald of River Glaven QC at Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 1, supra 
note 1378      
1388 See Walker, C. (2011). Militant Speech, supra note 192, p. 1403 (arguing that states should 
"avoid over-reaction to the latest event-the "politics of the last atrocity".)      
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Fourth, a question could be raised as to why it is wrong per se to have 
contingency powers for pre-charge detention. The police did not abuse it while 
the 28-day maximum was in force for 4 and half years. The only argument raised 
against contingency powers being introduced centres on the now often referred to 
fact that the 28 day maximum pre-charge detention regime would be the longest 
of its kind in the democratic world.  
 
However, the above argument lacks substance for a number of reasons. While it 
is true that there is no comparable law in terms of a fixed pre-charge detention in 
other Western countries, such countries have other constitutional procedures that 
enable them to orchestrate pre-charge detention equivalent to, possibly longer 
than, the 28 day maximum intended as a contingency power for the UK. In the 
United States, for instance, law enforcers use the Material Witness Statute 1389  to 
detain a suspect for extended periods. 1390  There is also an option to detain 
suspects via administrative detention powers, 1391  which could in practice be 
longer than the 14 days pre-charge detention currently allowed in the UK. Thus, 
the availability of 28 days pre-charge detention in some exceptional 
circumstances is not as evil as it sounds when compared to the United States. 
Moreover, India, though not a Western democracy, is the world's largest 
democracy. Yet, it provides a lengthy pre-charge detention of 180 days.1392  
 
Therefore, contingency powers providing for a 28-day maximum are far better 
than rushing legislation into force in a time of emergency.   
 
Fifth, the draft contingency powers do not contain as drastic a set of measures as 
are seen in the US, which includes such measures as the secret detention of 
                                                 
1389 18 USC § 3144 (Release or detention of a material witness)      
1390  See Stigall, D. E.,  supra note 1105; see also  Ashcroft v Al-Kidd, supra note 1332     
1391  See section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows administrative detention of terrorist 
suspects from seven days to six months with the possibility of renewing it several times. See also 
18 U.S.C. § 1226a (5-7); 18 U.S.C. § 3144. For administrative detention in the UK, see Spencer, 
J. R. (2010). Telephone-Tap Evidence and Administrative Detention in the UK. In: Wade, M. and 
Maljevic, A. (eds.). A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws 
and  Human Rights Implications. (New York, Springer)       
1392 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008 of India law       
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enemy combatants in Guantanamo bay or other secret locations around the 
world.1393  
 
The combinations of the above factors lead to the conclusion that the existence of 
contingency powers would not entail a grave violation of liberty. 
 
There are now changes brought about by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
(PFA).1394 Accordingly, the 28 day regime would be limited by a three month 
sunset clause, unlike the expired provisions that were renewable annually. In 
addition, whereas under TA 2006 renewal occurred four times, despite that the 
28 day maximum had not been used since July 2007. Under the current proposal, 
extension will be sought if, and only if, the need arises. Part four of the PFA 
contains specific sections that deal with ‘counter-terrorism powers'. The issues 
that are relevant to us in this section are sections 57-58 of the PFA.1395 Section 
57 of the PFA amended the TA 2000 and TA 2006 by reducing the length of pre-
charge detention from 28 days to 14 days.        
 
However, the Secretary of State is also given the power to introduce orders, at 
the request of the Director of Public prosecution (DPP), to extend pre-charge 
detention from 14 days to 28 days by virtue of section 58 of the PFA. 1396 
However, the Home Secretary can only exercise this power if Parliament is not in 
a position to exercise its normal powers. This covers the period when parliament 
is in recess or after recess ‘but the first Queen's Speech of the Parliament has not 
yet taken place'.1397 Moreover, this power is only to be exercised in times of 
emergency. The changes brought about by section 58 are different from what 
Lord Carlile   and others have proposed. For instance, Lord Carlile preferred to: 
 
                                                 
1393See the Military Order November 13. 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism; See also Hamdi v Rumsfeld 316 F.3d 450, 2003 U.S. ( the 
court upheld government action to detain enemy combatants  stating that the President has the 
right to held suspects for extended period)       
1394 Received Royal Assent in may, 2012      
1395 For changes brought by the PFA in regard to stop and search, see a section in this thesis that 
deals with ‘The Scope of the Right to Liberty in the UK' (specifically the changes that are 
brought after  Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, supra note 1231)     
1396  Now schedule 8 para.38 to TA 2000.     
1397    schedule 8 para.38 to TA 2000   
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 "...create a power for a High Court judge to permit, on a day-by-day analysis, a 
person who has been detained for 14 days to be released but on counter-
terrorism bail...That would, therefore, range from a 24-hour curfew - 
realistically, house arrest - to something rather less, for example, not 
communicating with certain named people."1398  
 
It must be stated that the current arrangement under the PFA does actually 
include judicial scrutiny, though not to the level preferred as can be seen. Others, 
such as Lord McDonald "...rejects the option of a further 14 days of strict 
bail...This new restriction would…have been widely regarded as an unwarranted 
form of control order."1399  
 
Moreover, some commentators, although not supporting as a general proposition 
the notion of detention beyond 14 days, have conceded that there should be some 
‘triggers and safeguards' in order to activate a contingency power of pre-charge 
detention in case of emergency. 1400  No such ‘triggers and safeguards' are 
included in the PFA.  
 
5.6.2 A Threshold Test as an Alternative to Pre-charge Detention Regime. 
 
5.6.2.1 General background of the Test 
 
Under normal circumstances, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) applies what 
is known as the ‘full test code' in deciding "whether to prosecute after 
investigation has been completed."1401 The test has two significant elements: the 
evidential test and the public interest test.1402 If there is "sufficient evidence to 
provide a realistic prospect of conviction" and public interest requires 
                                                 
1398 See Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral 
and Associated Evidence, Q 81, supra note 1378      
1399 For details see MacDonald, K D J (2011). Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers: 
A Report by Lord MacDonald of River Glaven QC. Norwich, TSO, p. 4      
1400  For detail discussions, see witness testimony of Professor Clive Walker and Professor Connor 
Gearty at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral 
and Associated Evidence, supra note 1378     
1401  See Code for Crown Prosecutors, February 2010, para. 4.2      
1402   Ibid    
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prosecution, the case should proceed further. Prosecuting terrorist suspects would 
definitely pass the public interest element. However, the first element demands 
the existence of sufficient and reliable evidence. As discussed in chapter three, 
the use of intercept evidence is restricted to prevention and detention of a crime. 
However, the same sort of evidence cannot be used to bring charges in light of its 
current inadmissibility in criminal trials.   
 
The case is likely to be dropped if both elements are absent. The threshold test is, 
therefore, an exception to the ‘full code test' in the sense that the public 
prosecutor will be able to bring charges if the following conditions are met:1403 
 
There is insufficient evidence currently available to apply for full code test; there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that further evidence will become available 
within in a reasonable period; the seriousness of the case justifies the making of 
an immediate charge decision; there are continuing substantial grounds to object 
to bail in accordance with the Bail Act 1976 and in all the circumstances of the 
case an application to withhold bail may be properly be made. 
 
As well as taking into consideration the above conditions, the CPS also has to 
determine whether there are reasonable grounds to substantiate the allegation that 
the person has committed the alleged offences. This evaluation of reasonableness 
is particularly relevant as it gives the chance for third party evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the arrest. This means that the police, the public prosecutor, 
and the UK courts assess the reasonableness of the arrest. In this three tier 
evaluation of reasonableness, the CPS is in a better position to evaluate the initial 
arrest because they have all the evidence before them, unlike the UK courts 
where some of the evidence might be withheld from them.  
 
The decision of the CPS on whether to initiate, decline, or select other charges 
are similar to those enumerated under the Principles of the Federal Prosecution in 
the US.1404 Similar to CPS guidelines, the mere existence of sufficient evidence 
                                                 
1403 Ibid      
1404  United States Department of Justice: USAM 9-27.000 Principles of Federal Prosecution 
(1980)    
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against a suspect is not enough to commence prosecution. Other factors are also 
considered. These include public interest considerations and ‘non-criminal 
alternatives to prosecution'. 1405  However, because the US does not have 
comparable legislation on pre-charge detention; the Principles of the Federal 
Prosecution do not contain equivalent provisions to the threshold test. The focus 
will, therefore, be restricted to the UK.   
 
5.6.2.2 How effective is the Threshold Test in Replacing Extended Pre-charge 
Detention? 
 
As stated in the fourth report of the Home Affairs Select Committee, the test is 
"totally different from the grounds for arrest."1406 In other words, the threshold 
test is completely different from the reasonable suspicion standard required under 
section 41 TA 2000. In this test, the prosecution have evidence that goes beyond 
reasonable suspicion, but "the standard for the final test (the realistic prospect of 
conviction) has not been reached." 1407  Prosecutors apply the test when it is 
believed that additional evidence will come out in due course. Due to this 
speculative nature of the test, it is considered incongruous for most counter-
terrorism investigations.1408 Thus, the threshold test cannot totally replace the 
need for extended pre-charge detention.  
 
The extent of use of the test in terrorist cases in the UK is difficult to ascertain, as 
there is no practice of keeping "specified data about which test was applied in 
every case since the test was introduced."1409 However, in the cases where the 
test has been applied, it raises the question whether the test is used as an 
alternative to pre-charge detention or as an additional legal ploy to further detain 
suspects.  
 
                                                 
1405 Ibid, USAM9-27.220: see also USAM 9-27.230 to 9.27.250     
1406 Home Affairs Committee (2006), supra note 1100, para. 111     
1407 Ibid     
1408  Ibid, para. 112     
1409  See Letter from Sue Hemming, Deputy Director Counter Terrorism Division, Crown 
Prosecution Service, Dated 18 January 2008 at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008). 
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Eighth Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill Ninth 
Report of session 2007-08. Report together with Formal Minutes, and Oral and Written Evidence. 
HL Paper 50 HC 199. London, TSO, Appendix 9     
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In the same year a letter from Sue Hemming, Deputy Director Counter Terrorism 
Division, was submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, it was stated 
that the number of suspects charged based on the full test and the threshold test 
was equal. In both categories of charges, it was revealed that the suspects were 
held over 14 days. This shows that the prosecution was resorting to the threshold 
test after holding the suspect for prolonged periods. Compared to those charged 
based on the full test, those charged based on the threshold test were held for a 
longer period. As stated in Sue Hemming's letter, the four defendants under the 
threshold test were held between 20-27/28 days,1410 while those charged under 
the full code test were held between 15-19/20 days.1411  
 
This raises a question about why it would be necessary to charge early if it does 
not shorten the length of detention. It does not bring any fundamental change in 
the circumstance of the detainees whether they are charged early or after 28 days.  
 
A related argument connected to why the threshold test can be considered a mere 
legal ploy is that there is no disclosure to the detainee or the relevant UK court as 
to which test was applied to charge them. 1412  This by itself reduces greater 
judicial scrutiny and limits the right of the suspect to know the basis of the 
charges against him.1413 As highlighted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
the advantage of disclosing the basis of the charges is that "it provides the 
opportunity for the court to subject the prosecution's time table to independent 
scrutiny and to ensure that the defence is in a better position to challenge the 
basis of the charge."1414 The Joint Committee on Human Rights also criticised 
the test for lacking parliamentary scrutiny, abuse of the test (used at the end of 
the expiry of 28 days in some cases), lack of an independent body that reviews 
the operation of the threshold test in terrorism cases, and the limited role of the 
UK court in setting the time table for the receipt of any additional evidence.1415  
 
                                                 
1410  Ibid     
1411  Ibid     
1412 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Eighth Report), supra note 1409, paras. 80-81     
1413 Ibid      
1414  Ibid      
1415 Ibid      
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With these major defects, it is unlikely that the test will be the best alternative to 
pre-charge detention now that the 28-day maximum has reverted to 14 days. This 
leaves the proposal for contingency powers the only viable option.  
 
Besides the above major problems, some questions need clarification. What 
would happen if, after bringing a charge early, the police and the prosecution fail 
to get hold of the key evidence they are hoping to uncover? It may be, for 
example, a key witness has died or crucial evidence might be lost due to a virus 
attack in relation to electronic evidence. 
  
According to written evidence by Sue Hemming given to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, the prosecutor can decide to discontinue the case during the 
review period if it becomes clear that "the expected evidence is not developing as 
expected or if there is no longer a realistic prospect of conviction." However, the 
first review takes place at the time of the charge.1416 Assuming that the charge 
was brought after 14 days of pre-charge detention, the next review takes place 11 
days after the date of the charge. That means the suspect is held for 25 days 
without knowing whether he is charged based on the full code test or the 
threshold test. This is almost equivalent to the 28-day maximum.  
 
The decision to discontinue a case after such a lengthy detention period amounts 
to a major violation of liberty. While it may be the case that a charge is dropped 
owing to no realistic prospect of conviction, this decision should take place as 
early as possible, not after an excessively long period of pre-charge detention. If 
the suspect is held excessively after being charged with no prospect of release or 
conviction, there could be a challenge under Article 5(3) ECHR for lack of a 
speedy trial. A court case has yet to test the compatibility of the threshold test 
with Article 5(3).  
 
Another issue missed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights is the impact of 
threshold test on total conviction rates since its introduction. The test has been 
applied to terrorism cases since 2005/2006. However, there is a lack of 
                                                 
1416  Ibid, para. 9    
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information on the impact of the test in securing convictions against those 
charged early. In the limited cases mentioned in Sue Hemming's letter, it is stated 
that not a single case had been dropped. However, these cases show only 
suspects who were detained over 14 days. They did not show the success of 
convictions for cases where there was early charge but suspects were detained 
under 14 days.  
 
To conclude, when the CPS resorts to the threshold test, in theory it appears that 
this test would reduce the need for a lengthy pre-charge detention. But, in 
practice, the test does not improve the right to a speedy trial because, as 
evidenced above, it is most often used at the end of the maximum period allowed. 
With pre-charge detention reverting to 14 days, the CPS' code on threshold test is 
not clear on how early the prosecutor should bring a charge. It is not even clear 
whether there is a need for the threshold test per se as the 28 days maximum is 
no longer applicable.  
 
Moreover, the biggest loophole in the threshold test is that the defence might not 
be served for up to six months once the suspect is charged.1417 This is four times 
lengthier than the 42 day time limit for ordinary crimes.1418   
 
5.6.3 Charging Terrorist Suspects for ‘Preparation of Terrorist Acts': as an 
Alternative to a lengthy pre-charge detention? 
 
A proposal to introduce a "...lower level of terrorism offences…such as doing 
things in preparation to an act of terrorism"1419 has been long overdue. It was 
first proposed by Lord Lloyd1420 but was ‘rejected'.1421 
 
                                                 
1417 Home Office (2006). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-
Charge Detention: The Government Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Report from the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, session 2005-06 HL Paper 240, HC 1576. London: Stationery 
Office, para. 130     
1418 Ibid      
1419  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, supra note 
1378, par. 37     
1420  Lloyd, A. J. L. (1996). Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism. (Cm 3420). London, TSO     
1421 Carlile, A. (2010). Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 And Part 1 of 
the Terrorism Act 2006. London: HMSO, para. 138       
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Section 5 TA 2006 outlaws intentional engagement in the preparation of specific 
or general acts of terrorism either as a principal or as an accessory. The 
criminalisation of preparatory terrorist acts is intended to ‘widen the net by 
extending the reach of the law to prior acts'.1422 Section 5 was also distinguished 
from other ‘precursor crimes'1423 in that it requires more than mere possession of 
terrorist materials.1424  
 
However, charging terrorist suspects under section 5 TA 2006 has the potential 
to criminalise "...equivocal or foolish dabbling in the fringes of extremism by 
individuals with neither the intention nor resolve to go further."1425 Despite this, 
recognition of the usefulness of section 5 in reducing the need for lengthy pre-
charge detention has been growing in academic circles.1426  The argument is that 
section 5 "...helps bring early charges at a point where evidence is perhaps less 
certain than for other charges which existed pre-2006." 1427  This strategy of 
‘combating terrorism though pre-emption'1428 is nothing new in the West.  
 
Section 5 TA 2006 has been the ‘one of the commonest charges' in relation to 
terrorism,1429 accounting for 16% of the total terrorist charges since 2001.1430 
The conviction rate in this area rests at 21%,1431 which is the highest compared to 
other terrorist charges.  
 
                                                 
1422 Anderson, D (2013). The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the 
Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 And Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, para. 11.2  
1423 Anderson, D (2012). The Terrorism Acts in 2011, supra note 335, para. 10.5      
1424  R v Roddis [2009] EWCA 58     
1425   Walker, C. (2013). Terrorists on Trial: An Open or Closed Case? In  Cole, D., et al, supra 
note 185    
1426  See witness testimony of Professor Clive Walker and David Anderson, QC at Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated 
Evidence, supra note 1378     
1427  Ibid     
1428  McGarrity, N. and Williams, G. (2010). When Extraordinary Measures Become Normal: Pre-
Emption In Counter-Terrorism Laws. In  Lynch, A., et al (editors). Counter-Terrorism and 
Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11. (Oxon, Routledge), p. 132     
1429 See witness testimony of Professor Clive walker, at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, supra note 1378      
1430 Home office (2012).  Home Office Statistical Bulletin Operation Of Police Powers Under The 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes And Stops And Searches 
(HOSB 11/12), Persons charged by Offence  (Tables 1.03a, b and c)     
1431 Ibid, Persons Convicted by Offence (Tables 1.11a, b and c)      
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However, a question that falls for consideration in terms of our discussion is 
whether section 5 is suitable viable alternative to 28 day pre-charge detention in 
times of exceptional circumstances. David Anderson QC, the government's 
independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, argues that the availability of 
different options, including section 5 TA 2006, ‘do not extinguish the need for 
some sort of contingency'.1432  
 
Considering some of the statistics for the detention of terrorist suspects held for 
more than 14 days becomes relevant as a mechanism to test the utility of section 
5. There were a total of 11 suspects held beyond 14 days between 2006 and 
2007.1433 Four of the terrorist suspects held between 19-28 days were charged 
under section 5 TA 2006.1434 As discussed in the previous sections in this chapter, 
all these arrests were related to Operation Seagram, Operation Overt and 
Operation Gingerbread.  Moreover, of those operations, only Operation Seagram 
triggered exceptional circumstances. However, even in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances and with the availability of section 5 TA 2006, the 
prosecution did not manage to bring charges within 14 days. Therefore, although 
we cannot underrate the utility of section 5, we cannot conclusively say that such 
a provision is the best alternative for the operational gap left in the absence of 28 
days pre-charge detention.       
 
With there apparently being no appetite for ‘holding' charges,1435 and with all the 
practical problems of the threshold test discussed above, the question is what 
would happen if a need for a lengthy detention in complex terrorism cases 
arises. 1436  As discussed, the threshold test cannot be used for difficult and 
complex cases. Having contingency powers of a 28-day maximum remains the 
                                                 
1432  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, supra note 
1378, para. 38     
1433  Home Office (2011). Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
Subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes; and stop and searches; Quarterly update to September 
2010. United Kingdom, 2011, table 1.3       
1434  Berman, G. and Horne, A. (2012), supra note 1364    
1435 Home Office (2006). Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Report, supra note 1417, para. 140. Holding 
charges will be discussed in detail shortly.       
1436  Some of the complex terrorism cases that required extended period of detentions and lengthy 
investigations before arrest was made are mentioned in Home Affairs Committee (2006). 
Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report, supra note 1100, p. 56 et seq.       
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only viable option to compensate for the current operational gap left in the law 
on pre-charge detention.  
 
5.7 Length of Pre-charge Detention in the US 
 
In the US, we do not find a fixed period of detention compared to the UK (14 
days) or in Ethiopia (28-120 days). However, US authorities use measures that 
are ‘rooted in an executive model of counter-terrorism as opposed to a 
legislative one' 1437  that enable them to orchestrate pre-charge detention 
equivalent to, possibly longer than, the 28 day maximum intended as a 
contingency power for the UK via the Protection of Freedom Act 2012. These 
measures are discussed below.  
 
5.7.1 Detention under the Material witness Statute 
 
Detaining people as a material witness has a "widespread existence"1438 in the 
US. The practice "... serves a vital and useful public purpose in the prosecution 
of felony offenses."1439  According to 18 USC § 31441440, US authorities are 
required to obtain a court issued warrant in order to arrest a person as a material 
witness. It must be shown that the material witness has information pertaining 
to ‘criminal proceedings'1441 and that it is ‘impracticable to secure the presence 
of the person by subpoena'1442.   To give an example, a person who is a flight 
risk would be appropriately held under this law. 1443  By holding its 
constitutionality,1444 the US Supreme Court has held that ‘citizens' have a ‘duty 
to disclose knowledge of crime'.1445  
 
                                                 
1437 Roach, K. (2012), supra note 193, p. 165      
1438 State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Antonio Hernandez-Lopez, Joe Edward Ramirez, and Alberto 
Ruiz, Appellants. (206/00-1855. 2002)     
1439  Ibid     
1440  Entitled ‘Release Or Detention of a Material Witness'     
1441  This is interpreted to include testimony before a grand jury' as well as ‘pre-trial' proceedings. 
See United states v Awadallah 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003)     
1442   18 USC § 3144    
1443   Ashcroft v Al-Kidd, supra note 1332   
1444  see Barry v United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 617 (1929     
1445  In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)     
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However, the Material witness Statute does not set a time limit on a person's 
detention under the statute. It simply says that a material witness may not be 
released "...for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness 
can be taken".  The absence of a time limit ‘provides cold comfort'1446 to a 
material witness.  The only superficial time limit available is the requirement to 
provide "...a biweekly report to the court listing each material witness held in 
custody for more than ten days and justifying the continued detention of each 
witness." 1447  Whether this requirement provides an effective check on 
executive zeal is debatable.1448 
  
The absence of a specific time limit on the detention of material witnesses 
seems to have led to its (mis)use as a tool for the detention of several terrorist 
suspects in the aftermath of the 9/11. Although the law is not a counter-
terrorism measure by design, it has been a 'favoured tool'1449 of officials and 
adapted ‘to make it fit a new set of circumstances for which it was not 
designed'.1450 For instance, the statute is one of the instruments that has been 
misused to ‘effectuate preventive detention after 9/11'.1451 
 
The total number of terrorist suspects arrested under this law is not officially 
available. For this reason, our discussion here will be limited to the most high 
profile cases.  
 
The instance of the statute's misuse appeared in 2003 in the case of  
Awadallah.1452 Awadallah was detained for twenty days as a material witness 
based on information gleaned from one of the 9/11 terrorist suspects. However, 
Awadallah was arrested without a warrant, was not informed of his Miranda 
                                                 
1446  United states v Awadallah, supra note 1441     
1447  Ibid     
1448  Stoller, H., et al (2004). Developments in Law and Policy: The Costs of Post-9/11 National 
Security Strategy. 22(1) Yale Law & Policy Review 197; see also Cochran, D. Q. (2010). Material 
Witness Detention in a Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep or Fresh Start? 18 (1) George Mason 
Law Review 1     
1449  Beckman, J.  (2007). Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-
Terrorism. (England, Ashgate Publishing Limited), p.33    
1450  Cochran, D. Q. (2010), supra note 1448     
1451 David, C. (2009). Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War. 
97 California Law Review 693      
1452  United states v Awadallah, supra note 1441     
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rights, nor did the authorities have a warrant to search his home and car.1453 As 
discussed previously in this chapter, the principle in the Fourth Amendment is 
that the police need to obtain a warrant in order to ‘seize' a person. However, 
officials may arrest an individual without a warrant if there is probable cause 
that the individual is committing or is about to commit a crime. Although 
Awadallah was not suspected of in any criminal or terrorist activities, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld his detention by reversing the 
ruling of the US district judge who held that Awadallah was illegally detained 
under the Material Witness Statute.  
 
Another high profile ‘misuse' of the above law was seen in the case of Abdullah 
al-Kidd. 1454  The case was ‘the first' challenging the government's witness 
detention practices to reach the Supreme Court.1455 Al-Kidd was detained for 16 
days as a material witness without being charged or called as a witness. Al-Kidd 
brought a suit against the then US Attorney General, John Ashcroft, for misuse 
if the Material Witness Statue. However, the US Supreme Court dismissed Al-
Kidd's attempt, stating that "...the objectively reasonable arrest and detention of 
a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged 
as unconstitutional on the ground that the arresting authority allegedly had an 
improper motive".1456 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case has generated wide academic 
criticism.1457 For some, the decision is a general reflection of the judiciary's 
attitude to the "...cognitive biases and excessive pressure to defer to the 
                                                 
1453 Ibid      
1454  Ashcroft v Al-Kidd, supra note 1332     
1455  Gouldin, L. P.  (2012). When Deference is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness 
Detentions 49 (3). American Criminal Law Review  1333    
1456  Ashcroft v Al-Kidd, supra note 1332     
1457  See Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law-Arrest and Detention Under The Material Witness 
Statute-Objectively Reasonable Arrest Did Not Violate Fourth Amendment. 81 Miss. L.J. 621; 
see also Gouldin, L. P.  (2012). supra note 1455; see also Oliver, W. (2005). Material Witness 
Detentions After al-Kidd. 1(2). NYU Journal of Law & Liberty; see also Cone, C. (2012).  Text 
and Pretext: The Future of Material Witness Detention after Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd.  62 (2) 
American University Law Review 333     
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executive branch"1458 in terrorism cases after 9/11.  For others, the decision was 
‘a tempest in a teapot'1459 that has been building for some time. 
 
However, there are also other cases where individuals have been arrested in 
connection with specific terrorist attacks but later released without charge. The 
case of Brandon Mayfield is notable. He was arrested as a material witness in 
relation to the 2004 Madrid terrorist bombings. 1460  However, it was later 
discovered that the arrest was a case of mistaken identity.1461 Only in this case 
has the US government apologised to and compensated the victim, despite the 
fact that the number of people detained via the misuse of the law had reached 70 
at one point according to reports.1462 As shown in the table below, the law has 
been arbitrary applied to US and non-US citizens alike.  
 
Table 4.2 Arrest of Material witness by nationality1463 
 
 
                                                 
1458 Gouldin, L. P.  (2012), supra note 1455      
1459  Oliver, W. (2005), supra note 1457   
1460  U.S. Department of Justice (2006). A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield 
Case, Office of the Inspector General Oversight and Review Division, January 2006     
1461 Mnookin, J. L. (2004). The Achilles' Heel of Fingerprints, 29  May, Washington Post      
1462  Barnes, R. (2010). Supreme Court to Decide Whether Ashcroft Can be Sued by Detained 
Citizen, 18 October, Washington Post     
1463   Source:  Human Rights Watch (2005). USA: Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses under 
the Material Witness Law since September 11    
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To sum up, the above cases shows that the law is not used to detain people ‘with 
information about the wrongdoing of others would turn up to testify" but rather 
to ‘hold people themselves suspected of links to terrorism'.1464 Moreover, the 
law is not only used to circumscribe constitutional limitations on detaining 
suspects, but it is also used ‘as information gathering device'1465 in relation to 
terrorism investigation. 
 
5.7.2 Detention under section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001  
 
Besides the above vague application of ordinary US law to terrorism cases, US 
authorities have also utilised other pre-charge detention powers under the US 
Patriot Act. The USA PATRIOT Act contains many provisions that deal with 
different issues.1466 However, the discussion in this section will be limited only 
to the controversial facet of the Patriot Act i.e. the length of detention of 
terrorist suspects.  
 
Section 4121467 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorises the detention of aliens 
who participate in terrorism or pose a threat to national security.1468 Unlike the 
Material Witness Statue, the USA PATRIOT Act sets some controversial time 
limits. Accordingly, the US Attorney General is required to initiate removal 
proceedings or charge the alien with criminal offences within seven days.1469  
However, if the alien is not removed for any reason within 90 days of removal 
order,1470  he could be detained for a further six months.1471 The US Supreme 
                                                 
1464 Liptack, A. (2011). The 9/11 Decade: Criminal Law Changed Surprisingly Little after the 
Attacks. How Law was Enforced is Another Matter, 7 September, the New York Times      
1465 Pallitto, R. M.  and Weaver, W. G. (2007). Presidential Secrecy and the law. (Maryland, 
Johns Hopkins University Press), p.145      
1466 To mention few: surveillance procedures, funding of terrorism and Anti-money-laundering, 
border security, etc. It is generally argued that this Act contains the ‘most intrusive provisions'. 
For further discussion, see   Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, pp.15 and seq.       
1467  Entitled ‘Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists; Habeas Corpus; Judicial Review'; 
now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1226 a.  It is also refereed as Immigration and National 
Authorisation Act section 236A; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3144.      
1468 See 18 U.S.C. § 1226 a (3(b)      
1469  See 18 U.S.C. § 1226 a (5)    
1470  See 8 USC § 1231 - Detention And Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed     
1471  See 18 U.S.C. § 1226 a (60    
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Court in Zadvydas v. Davis1472 has accepted six months as a ‘reasonable' period 
to detain aliens after removal order.1473  
 
There are some problems with the time limit stipulated under the US Patriot Act. 
First, the Act provides the possibility of detaining a suspect anything from 
seven days to nine months (90 days+ 6 months). Moreover, the six month time 
period does not prohibit the possibility of renewing it several times.1474 This in 
effect authorises "...the potential for indefinite detention of these non-citizens 
who have been certified as terrorists." 1475 For instance, in Turkmen v Ashcroft, 
it was revealed that the defendants were held from three to eight months after 
receiving final orders of removal or grants of voluntary departure.1476  
 
The second problem is the flexibility of section 412 of the US Patriot Act, 
which allows the detention of an alien for a further six months if a threat to 
"...the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or 
any person" is perceived.1477 This is potentially contrary to the letter, if not, the 
spirit of US Supreme Court pronunciations on the subject, which hold that 
indefinite detention of immigrants for flawed reasons would be 
unconstitutional. 1478  The inclusion of vague terms such as threat to ‘the 
community or any person' is intended to "...detain aliens without a hearing and 
without a showing that they pose a threat to national security or a flight 
risk".1479  
 
                                                 
1472 Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001)      
1473   For further discussion, see Aleinikoff, T. A.  (2002). Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning 
and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365     
1474  American Civil Liberties Union (2003). The USA PATRIOT Act and Government Actions 
that Threaten Our Civil Liberties, 11 February     
1475  Keith, K. (2004). In the Name of National Security or Insecurity? The Potential Indefinite 
Detention of Noncitizen. 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 405     
1476  See Turkmen v Ashcroft  02-cv-02307 (2002), p. 4; see also Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 
Civ. 2307(JG), 2006 WL 1662663, (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006); see also Turkmen v Ashcroft  
Docket Nos. 06-3745-cv(L);  06-3785-cv(Con);  06-3789-cv(Con);  06-3800-cv(Con);  06-4187-
cv (XAP) (2008).       
1477  See 18 U.S.C. § 1226 a (6)     
1478  Zadvydas v. Davis, supra note 1472 ( though the US Supreme Court has recognised the 
possibility of having  special procedures in relation to  terrorist suspects, it  has generally  
rejected the indefinite detention of ‘aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, 
including tourist visa violations')       
1479  Cole, D. (2002). Enemy Aliens. 54 Stanford Law Review 953; see also Aleinikoff, T. A.  
(2002), supra note 1473     
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Finally, it could be argued that the executive's incongruous approach to 
indefinite detention of aliens is further manifested by the fact that "...no bail is 
available and only a hearing can determine whether the alien qualifies as a 
criminal or terrorist alien."1480 
 
5.7.3 Indefinite Detention of Terrorist Suspects at Guantanamo Bay  
 
Indefinite detention of alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay 
(Guantanamo)1481 is another controversial initiative for the detention of terrorist 
suspects in the US.  The declaration of a ‘Global War on Terror', coupled with 
the full backing of the US Congress to fight it, gave the former Administration 
free rein to use all "necessary and appropriate force" 1482  against the 9/11 
perpetrators. A further Presidential Decree paved the way for the mass detention 
of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo.1483 The US government has used every trick 
in the book since then to deprive the Guantanamo detainees of access to civilian 
courts. The Detainee Treatment Act of 20051484, struck down by the US Supreme 
Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 1485  and the Military Commissions Act of 
2006,1486again rejected by the US Supreme Court in Boumediene v Bush1487 are 
examples. In Hamdan, many of the procedures of the military Commission 
established to try Guantanamo detainees, as established by Military Commission 
Order No. 1, were found to be incompatible with domestic US laws and 
international humanitarian laws.1488 Whereas in Boumediene, the US Supreme 
Court held that striping of detainees right to habeas corpus under the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 was unconstitutional.  
 
                                                 
1480 Siskin, A. (2012).  Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues. (CRS Report 
for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service 7-5700) , 12 January      
1481 For legal advantages of detention at Guantanamo, see Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, 
p. 73       
1482 Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001 (115 STAT. 224 PUBLIC LAW 107-40-SEPT. 
18, 2001)     
1483 Military Order of 13 November 2001, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism 66 F.R. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001)      
1484 See section 1005(e) of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Division A, Title X of the the 
United States Senate Department of Defense Appropriations Act      
1485  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)      
1486  The Military Commissions Act of 2006 ( HR-6166)    
1487  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)      
1488  For further discussion see  Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, pp. 86-88    
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Moreover, President Obama authorised an Executive Order that enables the US 
government to detain Guantanamo detainees indefinitely without trial. 1489 
According to the executive order; 
 
… the Executive Order applies to at least 48 of the 172 detainees...[T]hese 
groups could not be prosecuted in military commissions or in Federal court 
because evidentiary problems would hamper a trial. These detainees remain a 
serious threat and could not be safely repatriated or resettled in a third 
country.1490  
 
In a further exercise of executive power,1491 President Obama has also authorised 
the indefinite detention of ‘American terrorism suspects arrested on US soil'.1492  
 
The conditions and the length of detention at Guantanamo have caused immense 
controversy ranging from the status of these prisoners vis-à-vis international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.1493 Some of the questions raised include: 
whether the US is at war, whether the Genève convention does apply and, 
therefore, whether the detainees are prisoners of war and thus entitled to 
protection under international humanitarian law.1494 
 
Furthermore, accusations relating to the prevalence of torture 1495  and the 
indefinite detention1496 of terrorist suspects have been disregarded by the US. 
                                                 
1489  Executive Order 13567. Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force     
1490  Finn, P. and Kornblut, A. E. (2011). Obama Creates Indefinite Detention System for 
Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. 8 March,  Washington Post     
1491  See section 1021 and 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2011 for 
indefinite detention of US citizens suspected of terrorism     
1492  McGreal, C. (2011).Military Given Go-Ahead to Detain US Terrorist Suspects Without Trial, 
15 December, the Guardian     
1493  Hol, A. M., et al (2005). Security and Civil Liberties: The Case of Terrorism. (Intwerpen, 
Intersentia)     
1494  Pellet, A. (2001). No this is not War! The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal 
Responses. European Journal of International Law, Discussion Forum, 3 October; see also 
Cassesse, A (2001). Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International 
Law.  12 (5) European Journal of International Law 993; see also Aldrich, G. H. (2005). The 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and The Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 A.J.I.L. 891    
1495  Greenberg, K. J. (2006). The Torture Debate in America. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press)     
1496   Steyn, J.  (2004). Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole. 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1    
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The detention of prisoners at Guantanamo has been said to be the most ‘illegal, 
immoral and unjust'1497 counter-terrorism measure that has been, and continues 
to be, implemented by the US Administration since 9/11. Here, measures of 
detention get as close as any country has come to the true meaning of ‘indefinite'; 
prisoners are detained not for days or months, but for years without being 
charged or tried.  
 
What could be concluded from the above discussion is that the practice of 
detention in the US is absolutely longer than the 14 days pre-charge detention 
currently allowed in the UK. Thus, the availability of 28 days pre-charge 
detention in some exceptional circumstances is not as evil as it sounds when 
compared to the US. Moreover, in the next section, we will discuss which of the 
pre-charge detention powers available in the UK and the US are more effective 
in replacing the 120-days pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects in Ethiopia.  
 
 
5.8 Length of Pre-charge Detention in Ethiopia 
5.8.1 Investigative Remand under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code of 
Ethiopia 
 
There is a Constitutional guarantee to the effect of bringing an arrested person 
before a court within 48 hours.1498 The right to habeas corpus is also available 
under Article 19(4) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 177(1) of the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code. As discussed in the preceding sections, the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code also distinguishes between arrests with warrant and 
without warrant. These are covered from Articles 49 to 55 of the code.  
 
Article 59 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code provides three alternatives 
for a judge once the suspect is brought before him. Article 59(1) states that "the 
court before which the arrested person is brought shall decide whether such 
person should be kept in custody or be released on bail." The alternatives 
                                                 
1497 Roberts, R.C. (2007), The American Value of Fear and the Indefinite Detention of Terrorist 
Suspects. 21( 4) Public Affairs Quarterly 405      
1498  Article 19(3) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 29 of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code     
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provided under Article 59(1) (remand for investigation) and Article 59(2) 
(remand for trial) of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code are not the same. 
The former is given when the investigation is not completed and the suspect 
cannot be released on bail, whilst the latter applies when the investigation is 
completed.   
 
Accordingly, the police can apply for the suspect to be remanded during the time 
of the investigation. Once an order for remand for investigation is given, a 
question may arise as to whether the suspect can request a release on bail until 
the investigation is completed. Article 60 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code seems to block such an alternative; the wording of the Article states that 
remanded persons "shall be detained on conditions prescribed by law relating to 
prisons." Thus, once remanded, the suspect will remain under police custody.  
 
Article 59 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, however, does not provide 
for the immediate release of the suspect. The fourth alternative is provided under 
articles 177-179 of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, "where the 
court is satisfied that the restraint is unlawful, it shall order the immediate release 
of the person arrested."1499 But this Article does not specify the circumstances 
which guarantee immediate release for unlawful arrest.  In general, the four 
alternatives under the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code and the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code are; remand for trial, remand for investigation, bail or 
immediate release of the suspect for unlawful arrest.  
 
Contrary to the law, the practice in Ethiopia shows that not all arrestees are 
produced before a court within 48 hours. The following cases from table 2.3 
shows that Ethiopian courts granted remand for investigation even though the 
suspects were brought after 48 hours. 1500 Despite recognition of the right of 
access to a court of law within 48 hours, judges repeatedly fail to refuse remand 
for investigation requested by the police when suspects are brought after the 
                                                 
1499 Article 179 (2) Ethiopian Civil  Procedure Code      
1500  Public Prosecutor v Muhamed Mahemmed Farah, supra note 412 (the defendants in this case 
were detained between 15 and 67 days before they were interrogated by the police after the initial 
arrest. This is against Article 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides for immediate 
interrogation of arrested persons once their address and identity is established. ); see also a 
discussion below in the case of Yohannes Terefe.      
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expiry of the 48 hours time limit. Although the original detention might be lawful, 
the subsequent failure of the police to bring the suspects before a court entails a 
serious violation of liberty.  
 
The very purpose of a court appearance is to examine the adequacy of the 
reasons why the individual is deprived of his liberty in the first place. It also 
gives the arrestee the opportunity to inform a court of any ill treatment during the 
custody. However, it would seem that practice indicates the Ethiopian courts tend 
to grant remand for investigation upon the request of the police without 
questioning the suspect or compelling the police to justify the arrest. In most 
cases, the Ethiopian courts grant remand after a request by the police,1501 so there 
is no opportunity to subject the request for remand to scrutiny.  
 
However, the major defect of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code is the 
amount of time granted for a remand order. Article 59(3) Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code provides that "no remand shall be granted for more than 14 days 
on each occasion." The first problem with this Article stems from a lack of 
judicial intervention once the remand is granted. Even at the initial application, 
the Ethiopian courts do not assess the complexity of the case or why a lengthy 
period is required in the first place or whether there is reasonable suspicion for 
the arrest. Judges appear to show even less enthusiasm towards the kind of 
evidence the police are expected to uncover within 14 days.  
 
When the police return for an extension to their initial request by 14 days, there 
is minimum judicial scrutiny of why the police failed to complete the 
investigation within the first 14 days.1502 Furthermore, Article 59(3) Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code places no limit on the number of occasions the police 
may request for further 14 days.  
 
5.8.2 Investigative Remand for Terrorist Suspects under the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code 
 
                                                 
1501 See the above table      
1502  Ibid     
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Although the 2004 Ethiopian Criminal Code repealed the 1961 Ethiopian Penal 
Code, it does not have specific provisions for terrorism. However, as shown in 
table 4.3 below, there are a number of cases where terrorism has been dealt with 
under the 1961 Code's provisions. As shown below, release of terrorist suspects 
during the first court appearance is very rare. The usual practice is that the 
suspects would appear before an Ethiopian court within 48 hours and the police 
will request additional 14 days, which is the maximum that can be requested at a 
given time, though they can request the maximum period several times at the 
expiry of each period. As indicated in table 4.3, some suspects were bailed but 
only on their second or third appearance. But it was extremely difficult for 
suspects to be bailed during the first court production. 
 
Table 4.3: Terrorist Arrests and Probability of being released conditionally 
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41/1996 4 0 0 0 4 
8705/ 
2003 
2 0 0 0 2 
9832/ 
2003 
2 2 0 0 2 
238/ 
1998 
62 62 0 0 62 
33101/ 
2004 
2 1 0 0 1 
36268/ 
2005 
9 9 0 0 9 
37299/ 
2005 
6 6 0 0 6 
40783/ 
2005 
2 2 0 0 2 
41449/ 
2006 
1 1 0 0 2 
26858/ 
2007 
2 1 0 1 0 
27536/ 
2007 
1 0 0 1 0 
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27720/ 
2007 
1 1 0 0 1 
50798/ 
2008 
10 10 0 0 10 
51539/ 
2008 
1 1 0 0 1 
51550/ 
2007 
9 9 0 0 9 
56118/ 
2007 
1 1 0 0 1 
56550/ 
2007 
8 8 0 0 8 
29574/ 
2008 
2 1 0 0 1 
59989/ 
2008 
15 15 0 0 15 
60086/ 
2008 
8 8 0 0 8 
60575/ 
2008 
4 0 0 4 0 
61663/ 
2008 
1 1 0 0 1 
64246 
/2008 
1 1 0 0 1 
71000/ 
2009 
124 124 0 0 124 
77113/ 
2009 
4 0 0 0 4 
81406/ 
2009 
46 40 6 0 40 
89647/ 
2010 
10 9 1 0 9 
112198/ 
2011 
4 4 0 0 4 
?/2011 5 5 0 0 5 
?/ 
2011  
24 8 0 0 8 
?/ 
2011  
69 69 0 0 69 
?/ 
2011  
20 20 0 0 20 
?/ 
2011  
9 9 0 0 9 
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Similar to other criminal offences, there was minimum judicial scrutiny when the 
police requested additional periods for the investigations. The reluctance of the 
judges to intervene is partially attributable to the wording of Article 59(3) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. This Article only sets the maximum remand 
period of 14 days on each court appearance. The wording of the Article does not 
seem to allow active judicial participation.  
 
Another fascinating result that can be deduced from table 4.3 above is the 
practice of remanding the suspects for trial after the protracted investigation is 
completed. There is a higher percentage of remand for trial than the percentage 
for bail or unconditional release after the completion of the lengthy police 
investigation. Of the 390 arrests made, only 24 suspects were bailed, amounting 
to a mere 6% of the overall total terrorist arrests. The total number of 
unconditional releases after full trial was 58, which is around 14%. That means 
there were around 86% conviction rates of terrorist suspects under the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code. This begs the question whether the EATP was even necessary for 
a country where such high percentages of terrorist arrests led to conviction.  
 
5.8.3 Pre-trial Detention (Investigative Remand) under the EATP 
 
Pre-charge detention is covered by Article 20 of the EATP, which states that 
once a suspect is arrested on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence contrary to the EATP, an Ethiopian court "may give an order to remand 
the suspect for investigation or trial."  
 
The wording of Article 20(1) of the EATP is different from Article 59(1) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code that provides three alternatives i.e. remand 
for trial, remand for investigation or release on bail. Article 20(1) of the EATP 
does not seem to provide bail as an alternative or a right to be released 
unconditionally during the first court appearance. Moreover, the said Article as 
stated above is not clear whether an Ethiopian court can decide between the two 
alternatives on its own initiative or only at the request of the police.  
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Article 20(2) of the EATP talks in terms of a request by the police for sufficient 
time to complete the investigation. Article 20(2) reads as follows: "if the 
investigation is not completed, the investigating police officer may request the 
court for sufficient period to complete the investigation." But it does not say 
anything on whether the police can also request for the suspect to be remanded. 
The police can request the necessary time to complete the investigation without 
actually requesting the suspect to be remanded.  
 
But it makes no sense why the Ethiopian courts would remand the suspect on 
their own initiative without a request by the police. Despite the vagueness of 
Article 20(2), the practice of Article 20 of the EATP shows that the police apply 
for an investigative remand while still holding the suspect in their custody. For 
instance, a well known Ethiopian actor, Debebe Eshetu, was arrested on 
suspicion of being involved in the provision of support to terrorist organisations 
such as Ginbot 7. When he first appeared before the court on the 9th of 
September 2011, the judges failed to question the suspect upon the police's 
request for a 28 days pre-charge detention. Debebe was finally released without 
being charged after a lengthy detention period.1503   
 
In another high profile arrest discussed in chapter three and four, 1504 several 
defendants were charged for various offences under the EATP. As shown in table 
4.3, there were 24 defendants mentioned on the charge sheet. However, 16 of the 
defendants were charged in absentia. For this reason, only eight defendants were 
actually brought before the court. The defendants were remanded several times, 
with one of the defendants, Yohannes Terefe, telling the court that he was 
actually detained for 55 days in isolation before he was even brought before a 
court. Yet, that did not deter the court from remanding him for a further periods    
 
The fate of the defendants in further cases charged under the EATP was the same: 
they were all remanded between 28 and 120 days. As discussed in chapter three 
                                                 
1503 See Zehabesha Amharic newspaper, issue No. 33, p.3; see also Nega, E. (2011). Debebe 
Eshetu's Arrest, supra note 780      
1504  See Anduemlem Arage v Public Prosecutor, supra note 763      
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and four in the case of Elias Kifle,1505 the four defendants charged with him were 
remanded twice.  In the case of Abdiweli Mohammed Ismael,1506 four defendants, 
including two Swedish journalists, were charged under the EATP. The charges 
included, inter alia, rendering support for and participating in terrorist 
organisations. The two Ethiopian defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced 
immediately, having been remanded for 28 days already. However, the two 
Swedish journalists were remanded for a total of 36 days. In general, the police 
were continually granted the minimum 28 days pre-charge while already holding 
the suspects. None of the suspects were released on bail. These are just some 
samples from table 4.3 that show the defendants charged in relation to terrorism 
are seemingly always remanded for at least the minimum term offered under the 
EATP, without being given the opportunity of release on their first court 
appearance.    
 
According to Article 20(3) of the EATP, "each period given to remand the 
suspect for investigation shall be a minimum of 28 days; provided that the total 
time shall not exceed a period of four months." According to this sub-article, 
once the suspect is brought before an Ethiopian court, the minimum remand 
period that can be requested is 28 days. Why the legislature chose to set a 
minimum period instead of fixing the maximum period is very difficult to 
understand.  
 
The primary purposes of lengthy pre-charge detentions of terrorist suspects in the 
UK are:1507 "to uncover admissible evidences sufficient to put before the court; to 
gather background intelligence; to facilitate the carrying out of searches; to deal 
with special problems posed by international terrorism".  
 
However, these justifications are difficult to fit in into Article 20(3) of the EATP 
where suspects can be locked up for a minimum of 28 days without a court 
knowing about the complexity of the case or the kind of evidence the police are 
attempting to uncover.  
                                                 
1505 See the cases of Public Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, et al,  supra note 763  ; see also table 2.3 for 
details of the charges of the cases      
1506  Public Prosecutor v Abdiweli Mohammed Ismael, et al (112198/2011) 
1507  Walker, C. (2009),  supra note 624, pp. 134     
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Moreover, one of the problems in the UK, as stated above, is the international 
nature of the threat and the complexity of sharing intelligence with other 
countries. However, this aspect is almost completely absent in Ethiopia. 
International terrorism is not a threat to the country, as yet. Over thirty years, the 
only notable terrorist case that had international connections was the attempted 
murder of the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.1508 
Neither Al-Qaeda, nor any of the many other international terrorist organisations 
have ever posed a threat to Ethiopia. Most of the proscribed organisations are 
domestic political parties that have fallen out with the Ethiopian 
government.1509Furthermore, due to the poor technological developments in the 
country, investigating terrorism cases is not as complex as in the UK, where the 
police more readily face sophisticated terrorists. This begs the question why the 
country took the drastic measure of introducing a 28-day minimum pre-charge 
detention.   
 
By granting a minimum of 28-day, the police and the Ethiopian courts are just 
guessing at the period that would be required to complete a particular terrorism 
case. Page three of the parliamentary minutes to the EATP states that Article 
20(3) of the EATP is intended to rectify the problems associated with Article 
59(3) of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. The latter Article fixes a 
maximum of 14 days pre-trial detention but there is no limit on the number of 
times the maximum days can be requested. As a result, the police can request 14 
days as many times as they deem necessary. Thus, the EATP attempts to rectify 
that flaw by setting a minimum of 28 days and a maximum of four months pre-
charge detention. But instead it brought the worst form of violation of liberty 
which has no equivalence with any other law in the world.   
 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the UK's 28-day pre-charge detention 
period was widely criticised. However, it was rarely used in practice. That is why 
the UK government reverted to 14 days. It appeared that the EATP on pre-charge 
detention was modelled on the British experience. However, although it might be 
                                                 
1508 Public Prosecutor v Sewfit Hassen Abdul Keni  et, al (?/1997)        
1509  For details, see the discussions on Ginbot 7, Kingit, OLF and ONLF in chapter two         
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inspired by British law, there are no any substantive similarities between the two 
laws. First, the UK's 28-day maximum was renewable every year. The EATP 
does not provide for such a possibility. Second, British law sets a maximum 
period, whereas Ethiopian law sets a 28 day minimum and 120 days maximum. 
This is argued above to be too excessive. As indicated in the table 4.4 below,1510 
it is longer than all reviewed countries, bar India, and is certainly the longest in 
comparison to Western democratic countries. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Length of Pre-charge Detention in Selected Countries 
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Third, the EATP does not provide for a periodic review of the arrest by the 
Ethiopian courts or by high-ranking officers before the first court production. In 
the UK, before a suspect is brought before a court, part II of schedule 8 to TA 
2000 (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and TA 2006), paragraphs 
21-28 provide for review procedures post-arrest but before a court warrant for 
further detention is issued.  
 
                                                 
1510  The lion's share of the data is taken from the following source: Human Rights Watch (2012). 
In the Name of Security: Counter-Terrorism Laws Worldwide since September 11   
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ff6bd302.pdf . But the data for some of the countries is 
taken from their counter-terrorism laws     
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The above paragraphs specify the time interval for review, grounds for continued 
detention, the identity of the reviewing officer, representation during reviews, etc. 
However, the EATP does not provide such review procedures. Although there 
are some similar procedures under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, they 
are not nearly as strict as the schedule 8 procedures. For instance, Article 27 of 
the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code talks about interrogation post-arrest. But 
it does not specify review intervals. Under the TA 2000, the reviews take place at 
intervals of not more than 12 hours before a court-ordered extension is 
granted. 1511  Moreover, the TA 2000 provides for grounds where the review 
procedure can be postponed.1512  
 
The absence of such reviews in Ethiopia is attributed to the fact that the EATP 
and the FDRE constitution demands production of the suspects within 48 hours. 
Once the accusation is read out to the suspect, the next step is rushing him to the 
nearest court. Article 28 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code gives a power 
to the police to release a suspect on bond "where it is doubtful that an offence has 
been committed or that the summoned or arrested person has committed the 
offence complained of."1513 In other words, the police cannot hold the suspect for 
more than 48 hours unless "local circumstances and communications"1514  permit. 
This has been interpreted to refer to the distance of a police station from the 
nearest courts and the availability of courts during bank holidays or weekends.  
 
Therefore, the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code and the EATP should be 
amended to allow for the necessary reviews before a suspect is rushed to a court 
where the Ethiopian court will inevitably find itself in the difficult position of 
granting 28 days minimum without getting all the circumstances of the case. 
Without such amendments, it does not allow for an outcome of Article 28 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, which requires the suspect to be released on 
bond in doubtful circumstances.  
 
                                                 
1511 Para. 21 of schedule 8 to TA 2000      
1512 Para. 22 of schedule 8 to TA  2000    
1513  See section 41 (4) of TA 2000 for comparison     
1514 Article 29 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code; Article 19(2) of the EATP; Article 19(3) 
of the FDRE Constitution; note also  that access to a solicitor or making intimation  may be 
delayed under par 16(4) and (7) and Para 17(3) & (4) of schedule 8 to TA  2000        
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Fourth, neither the EATP nor the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code provide for 
the right to consult a solicitor or to communicate his detention to someone.1515 
The focus is rather on rushing the suspect to a relevant Ethiopian court to meet 
the deadline.  
 
Fifth, under English law, there is no need for the suspect himself to appear before 
a court when an application for extension over 48 hours is made.1516 The police 
may apply for an extension without a personal appearance by the suspect. 
Moreover, the English courts can issue a shorter period of pre-charge detention 
than is requested by the police.1517 Moreover, according to section 23 (4) TA 
2006:   
 
A judicial authority may issue a warrant of further detention in relation to a 
person which specifies a shorter period as the period for which that person's 
further detention is authorised if- 
(a)the application for the warrant is an application for a warrant specifying a 
shorter period; or 
(b)the judicial authority is satisfied that there are circumstances that would make 
it inappropriate for the specified period to be as long as the period of seven 
days…  
 
When the EATP was passed, for some reason the legislature preferred to omit 
section 23(4) of TA 2006 and a similar power is not given to the judiciary under 
the EATP. Although Ethiopian law guarantees a personal appearance within 48 
hours, this right is meaningless because the Ethiopian courts do not have the 
power to issue shorter periods when they believe that issuing longer period is 
inappropriate. This is because section 20(3) of the EATP makes it mandatory for 
the judges to issue a minimum of 28 days. This effectively handicaps the 
judiciary's power to issue shorter pre-charge detention. 
 
                                                 
1515 Para 16(6)-(9) and Para 16(11)-16(19) of schedule 8 to TA 2000       
1516  Para 29-30 and 36 of schedule 8 to TA 2000 do not allow for personal appearance; see also 
the decision of the  ECtHR in Brogan v UK, supra note 1251 (it has stated that with regard to 
terrorism cases ‘the requirement under the ordinary law to bring the person before a court had 
been made inapplicable.)     
1517  See sections 29-36 of schedule 8 to TA 2000     
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Article 20(3) of the EATP is on a direct collision with Article 19(4) of the FDRE 
Constitution, which states that "in determining the additional time necessary for 
investigation, the court shall ensure that the responsible law enforcement 
authorities carry out the investigation respecting the arrested person's right to a 
speedy trial." This part of the FDRE constitution is rendered ineffective, as there 
is no right to a speedy trial if a suspect is to be locked up for a maximum of four 
months without being charged.  As held in the ECtHR case of Winterwerp v the 
Netherlands,1518 the review must not be limited to bare legality of detention but 
"deprivation of liberty … requires a review of lawfulness to be available at 
reasonable intervals." Other cases also affirm the importance of review of the 
original detention. 1519 However, the construction of the EATP in Ethiopia shows 
a distinct lack of similar safeguards at these earlier stages of the case.  
 
Consequently, a court appearance within 48 hours becomes worthless unless a 
judge is empowered to review every aspect of the original detention and is able 
to issue shorter periods of pre-charge detention than is requested. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of this appearance is doubtful if the judges are not interested in 
questioning the suspect and arranging for representation by a solicitor.1520  
 
Sixth, Ethiopian courts do not have access to the information that formed the 
basis of the reasonable suspicion. As held in the ECtHR case of Chahal v 
UK, 1521such a problem engages Article 5(4) ECHR, which states that  
 
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
 
In Ethiopia, Article 19(4) of the FDRE Constitution has the same spirit as Article 
5(4) ECHR, because the former states that:  
 
                                                 
1518  Winterwerp v the Netherlands, supra note 1247     
1519  See X v the United Kingdom, 5 November 198, Series A no. 46     
1520  See the discussion above on Ethiopian cases on terrorism     
1521  Chahal v UK, supra note 1254     
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all persons have an inalienable right to petition the court to order their physical 
release where the arresting police officer or the law enforcer fails to bring them 
before a court within the prescribed time and to provide reasons for their arrest. 
 
Nevertheless, neither the Ethiopian judges nor the police consider it necessary to 
disclose the basis of reasonableness at the first appearance. After the coming into 
effect of the EATP, there were many terrorism related arrests.1522 In most cases, 
the police managed to get the 28 days minimum detention without disclosing the 
basis of the reasonable suspicion for the arrest. This practice is undoubtedly 
against Article 19 (4) of the FDRE Constitution. 
 
Seventh, a major problem of the pre-charge detention in Ethiopia is the absence 
of judicial safeguards. In the UK, a suspect is not entitled to present during the 
hearing to extend pre-charge detention and their solicitors are also excluded from 
obtaining the "information which was seen by the judge."1523 The argument of 
the UK government was that "the suspect is entitled to be legally represented, to 
be present at the open part of the hearing" and "to get extensive information 
provided to him both in writing in advance and during proceedings through 
representations." 1524  However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
rejected the Home Secretary's view by stating that withholding information from 
the defence engages Article 5 ECHR as held in Garcia v Germany. 1525 
Accordingly, "equality of arms is not ensured if counsel is denied access to those 
documents in the investigation file which are essential in order to challenge the 
lawfulness of his client's detention."1526 The Joint Committee on Human Rights 
concluded that suspects are "told very little about the reasons for being detained 
and therefore have very little that they can challenge at an extension hearing."1527  
 
                                                 
1522  Human Rights Watch (2012).  World Report 2012: Ethiopia at http://www.hrw.org/world-
report-2012/ethiopia     
1523  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008).  Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Thirteenth Report): Counter- Terrorism Bill: Thirtieth Report of session 2007-08.  HL 172/HC 
1077. London, TSO,  para. 58     
1524  Ibid, para. 59     
1525  Ibid, para. 60  
1526 Garcia Alva v Germany (2001) 37 EHRR 335, cited in the above report,  para. 39      
1527 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008).  Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Thirteenth Report), supra note 1523, para. 61    
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Although the Joint Committee on Human Rights highlights issues of inadequacy 
within the current arrangements in the UK,1528 UK law on pre-charge detention at 
least permits representation and disclosure of some information to a judge at the 
extension hearing. The EATP, on the other hand, is devoid of even these 
minimum safeguards. The only argument the police present during the extension 
is "we need 28 days extension because the proclamation says so."1529 This is 
similar to the problems reflected in the UK where the police's "understanding and 
experience was that it was enough for them to show that more time was needed 
to convert intelligence to evidence and that the inquiry was being progressed 
diligently and expeditiously."1530 However, as noted by the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, this kind of practice can result in a violation of Article 5 ECHR. 
In the Ethiopian case, allowing pre-charge detention at the request of the police 
without further disclosure to the defence is against Article 19 of the FDRE 
Constitution.  
 
5.9 Alternatives to the Current 120-day pre-charge detention under the 
EATP 
 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the EATP on pre-charge detention is 
excessive. Therefore, the sub-sections below offer some alternatives to shorten 
this excessive pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects.  
5.9.1 Bailing Terrorist Suspects? 
 
The right to bail is one of the rights specifically enumerated under the FDRE 
Constitution. Accordingly, Article 19(6) of the FDRE Constitution states that: 
 
Persons arrested have the right to be released on bail. In exceptional 
circumstances prescribed by law, the court may deny bail or demand adequate 
guarantee for the conditional release of the arrested person. 
                                                 
1528 See Joint Committee on Human Rights (2010). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Seventeenth Report): Bringing Human Rights Back In. Sixteenth Report of session 2009-10. 
Report, together with formal minutes and oral and written evidence. HL Paper 86 HC 111. 
London, TSO, para. 65-80      
1529 See for example Pubic Prosecutor v Andualem Arage, supra note 763       
1530 See Joint Committee on Human Rights (2010). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Seventeenth Report), supra note 1528, para.  71     
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Given that the right to bail is not an unconditional right, there are specific laws 
that govern the conditions under which a person may be granted his freedom 
pending the outcome of a criminal investigation or the conclusion of a verdict 
against him.  
 
These conditions are stated under Articles 63 and 67 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code. The cumulative reading of Articles 28, 63 and 67 of that code 
states that granting bail is the sole authority of the judiciary. The Ethiopian courts 
thus consider both objective and subjective criteria in determining whether a 
person should be released on bail.  
 
For some commentators,1531 Article 63 is considered an objective criteria due to 
the fact that the judge has no option but to evaluate the appropriate law against 
the suspect and decide whether the charge "carries the death penalty, or rigorous 
imprisonment of 15 years or more and where there is no possibility of the person 
in respect of whom the offence was committed dying."1532  
 
The other conditions stipulated under Article 67 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code are considered subjective criteria; 1533  these conditions are 
decided on case-by-case basis. This Article states that bail shall not be granted if: 
 
The applicant is of such nature that it is unlikely that he will comply with the 
conditions laid down in the bail bond; the applicant, if set at liberty, is likely to 
commit other offences; the applicant is likely to interfere with witnesses or 
tamper with the evidence. 
 
However, it would seem that bail is an uncertain area for Ethiopia. The practice 
indicates that the Ethiopian courts are inconsistent in their approach to the law on 
bail.1534  
                                                 
1531Metiku, G.  (2012). The Right to Bail in Cases Involving Sexual Offences Against Children. 
Abyssinia Law, 5 March       
1532  Article 63(1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1533  Metiku, G.  supra note 1531     
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Moreover, the legislature needs to take its fair share of the blame on the 
confusion over bail law as it tends to ‘frequently amend' it.1535 For instance,  
 
when the Anti-Corruption Rules were originally adopted, corruption was a 
bailable offence. By a minor amendment made few days later, corruption became 
a non-bailable offence.  This Rule again was amended after few years in that 
only those corruption offences that are punishable by at least ten years of 
rigorous imprisonment were made non-bailable.1536  
 
This resulted in substantial confusion over the FDRE constitutional principle of 
non-retrospective application of a law1537; the Ethiopian government tried to use 
the non-bailable offences under the ‘Amended Rule' against suspects who were 
already in police custody.1538   
 
This problematic nature of Ethiopian bail law discussed above does not really 
help in trying to understand the provisions that govern terrorist suspects and their 
conditional release on bail. In the same manner as the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code, Article 20 of the EATP gives the Ethiopian courts the power to 
decide whether the arrestee should be remanded for trial or investigation. 
However, unlike the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, the EATP does not 
state the conditions the Ethiopian courts need to consider in bail decisions. It 
simply states that once a person is brought before a court within 48 hours, the 
relevant Ethiopian court "may give an order to remand the suspect for 
investigation or trial."1539 Moreover, Article 20(2) of the EATP states that "the 
investigating officer may request the court for sufficient period to complete the 
investigation."  
 
                                                                                                                                    
1534  Assefa, S. K. (2010). Criminal Procedure Law: Principles, Rules and Practices. (USA, 
Xlibris Corporation,), p.235-244     
1535  Ibid, p. 234       
1536  Ibid     
1537   See Article 5of the Ethiopian Criminal Code for non-retrospective application of a law    
1538   Assefa, S. K. (2010), supra note 1534, p. 127   
1539   Article 20(2)  EATP    
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The EATP is vague on whether bail is allowed for terrorist suspects. Article 20(4) 
of the EATP declares that a "public prosecutor may appeal on bail conditions." 
But there has to be clear law which allows conditional release of terrorist 
suspects. The EATP does not seem to provide that. In such circumstances, how 
the prosecutor could appeal in bail cases remains unclear. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that Article 19(6) of the FDRE constitution, which guarantees 
conditional release of terrorist suspects, should apply to terrorism cases. If so, it 
makes sense to talk about the relevance of Article 20(4) of the EATP. Even 
Article 36(1) the EATP does not render ineffective the application of Article 
19(6) of the FDRE constitution to terrorist suspects. Article 36 (1) of the EATP 
states that "no law, regulation, directive or practice shall, in so far as it is 
inconsistent with this proclamation, be applicable with respect to matters 
provided for by this proclamation." It, therefore, seems possible to apply Article 
19(6) of the FDRE constitution to terrorist suspects.  
 
However, Article 36(2) causes another problem. This sub-article states that the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code and the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code are 
applicable to terrorist suspects in so far as they do not contradict with the EATP. 
As discussed above, the relevant provisions of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code those deal with bail are articles 63 and 67. These provisions do not prohibit 
allowing bail for terrorist suspects provided the applicants meet the conditions 
laid down. In addition, they do not distinguish between persons who are already 
charged and those who are under police investigation. The sticking point under 
the EATP is Article 20(5). It states that "if a terrorism charge is filed in 
accordance with this proclamation, the court shall order the suspect to be 
remanded for trial until the court hears and gives decision on the case."  
 
In other words, once a terrorist suspect is charged, he could no way be released 
on bail.  Article 20(5) effectively renders ineffective the application of articles 63 
and 67 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code and Article 19(6) of the FDRE 
Constitution. Therefore, appeal by a Public Prosecutor based on Article 20(4) of 
the EATP is relevant to bail only before the suspect is charged. If he is charged, 
Article 20(5) of the EATP bars the Ethiopian courts from granting him bail.  
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The denial of bail to terrorist suspects who are already charged is problematic in 
Ethiopia. According to the TA 2000, police officers do not have the power to 
release on bail terrorist suspects who are arrested under section 41.1540 As held in 
Duffy, the main problem with TA 2000 is that it does not have a "provision for 
conditional release on bail within the statutory scheme."1541 
 
 The absence of bail has been criticised by David Anderson, QC as exclusion 
unjustified by any "principled basis". 1542 The arguments provided against the 
prohibition include:1543  
 
Bail is available under PACE to those arrested on suspicion of offences under 
TA 2006; bail is available from the Special Immigration Appeal Commission in 
immigration cases, even when the person subject to deportation is a terrorist 
suspect; and, bail was available prior to TA 2000 from a High Court Judge in 
Northern Ireland in a terrorist case.  
 
David Anderson, QC is not the only person who argues in support of the 
introduction of bail under section 41 TA 2000.1544  
 
As discussed, the EATP, on the other hand, does not give the police the power to 
release terrorist suspects conditionally on bail. But in ordinary crime cases, 
Article 28 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code gives a power to the police 
to release a suspect on bond "where it is doubtful that an offence has been 
committed or that the summoned or arrested person has committed the offence 
                                                 
1540 R (I) v (1) City of Westminster Magistrates' Court (2) Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 
Police (Defendants) & Crown Prosecution Service (Interested Party) [2008] EWHC 2146 
(Admin); see also Emmerson, B. et al. (2012), supra note 920 
, p. 360 ("because Sch. 8 proceedings are not proceedings within in ss.3 or 3A of the Bail Act 
1976, there exists no power vested in the police, or the judge, to grant bail. However … the 
absence of any bail jurisdiction under what was then potentially a 30-day period of incarceration 
has been held not to breach art. 5.")       
1541 Re: Duffy Judicial Review (No. 2) [2011] 2 All ER, 364, para. 31, cited in Emmerson, B. et al. 
(2012), supra note 920, p. 360       
1542  Anderson, D (2012). The Terrorism Acts in 2011,  supra note 335, para. 7.71     
1543 Ibid       
1544  See Walker, C.  (2011), supra note 224; see also Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008).  
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Tenth Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill:  Twentieth 
Report of session 2007-08.  Report together with Formal Minutes and Written Evidence. HL 
Paper 108 HC 554. London, TSO; see also Joint Committee on Human Rights (2010). Counter-
Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Seventeenth Report), supra note 1528, paras 84-94     
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complained of." However, unlike TA 2000, the EATP, specifically Article 20(5), 
contains a novel provision in the sense that once a terrorist suspect is charged, 
there is no possibility of releasing him conditionally on bail.  
 
The ECtHR held that Member States could "justify continued detention provided 
there are relevant and sufficient reasons to show that detention was not 
unreasonably prolonged and contrary to Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) of the 
Convention."1545Despite the difference in the construction, Article 5(3) ECHR 
has a similar message to that of Article 19(6) of the FDRE Constitution. The 
latter article is even more explicit; it clearly talks about the right to be granted 
bail pending trial or the conclusion of an investigation.  In light of the FDRE 
Constitution, Article 20(5) of the EATP violates the right to liberty of terrorist 
suspects because the Ethiopian courts are not considering any ‘sufficient reasons' 
why terrorist suspects charged under the EATP should be detained "until the 
court hears and gives decision on the case."1546  
 
The attitude of Ethiopian courts towards bailing terrorist suspects who are 
already charged could shed light why Article 20(5) of the EATP is contrary to 
the constitutionally guaranteed right to liberty. In one case,1547 nine defendants 
were charged with attacking the political and territorial integrity of the state. 
According to Article 241 of the Ethiopian Criminal code, such terrorist attacks, if 
proved, would entail "rigorous imprisonment from 10 years to 25 years, or in 
case of exceptional gravity, life imprisonment or death." This case came to the 
High Court before the enactment of the EATP. The applicants applied for a bail. 
Because the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code does not automatically rule out 
granting bail to anyone charged with serious criminal offences (except under the 
conditions listed down under Article 63 and Article 67 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code), the Ethiopian court in this case had exhausted all ‘relevant and sufficient' 
grounds before it turned down the application.  
 
                                                 
1545 Wemhoff v Germany (1979-80) 1 EHRR 55 (App No 2122/64), para12       
1546 Article 20(5) of the EATP      
1547  Public Prosecutor v Adam Ahmed et al. (51550/2007)     
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In other cases,1548 defendants were charged with violating Article 238(1) of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code, which states that "whoever conspires to overthrow, 
modify or suspend the Federal or State Constitution" shall be punished with three 
years to life imprisonment depending on the gravity of the case. The defendants' 
application for bail was rejected by the Ethiopian High Court, which was 
appealed. The Ethiopian Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower court 
and granted bail to the applicants. It reasoned that the serious nature of the 
charges filed against the defendants should not be the only reason to deny bail to 
the applicants.  
 
In the opinion of the Ethiopian Supreme Court in the above case, an application 
for bail will be denied only if the two cumulative criteria of Article 63 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code are satisfied. According to that article, a 
charge should not "carry the death penalty or rigorous imprisonment for fifteen 
years or more." In addition, it must be stated that "there is no possibility of the 
person in respect of whom the offence was committed dying." Unless these two 
elements are satisfied, the serious nature of the charges does not preclude courts 
from granting bail to individuals charged with terrorism.     
 
These decisions support the argument that Article 20(5) of the EATP needs to be 
amended. Despite the decision of the Ethiopian Supreme Court in mind, lower 
courts are still inconsistent in their approach to bailing terrorism suspects.1549  
 
To make the provisions of the EATP more compatible with Article 19(6) of the 
FDRE Constitution, Article 20(5) of the EATP should be amended to allow bail 
for terrorist suspects who are charged, unless there is ‘relevant and sufficient' 
reason to take a contrary decision. The conditions laid down under articles 63 
and 67 of the Criminal Procedure code could be considered ‘relevant and 
sufficient' grounds to deny bail. Doing so would lessen the need to detain 
terrorist suspects for up to 120-day under Article 20(3) of the EATP.  
                                                 
1548 Public Prosecutor v Eyob Tilahun, supra note 15; see also Public Prosecutor v Derege Kassa 
Bekele, supra note 15; see also Public Prosecutor v Shimels Degene, supra note 367      
1549  Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General), supra note 64 (in this case, all 
defendants, except those tried in absentia, were denied bail. The courts focused on the seriousness 
of the charges in their decision to deny bail to the suspects.) See also a report by Tamiru Tsige in 
the Ethiopian Reporter,  Sunday 13 November 2011      
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All in all, allowing bail would effectively serve as an alternative to a lengthy pre-
charge detention. Therefore, the Ethiopian legislature has to abandon the current 
120-day pre-charge detention. As an alternative, Article 20(4) and Article 20(5) 
of the EATP need to be amended so that terrorist suspects, whether charged or 
not, should have the right to bail. 
 
5.9.2 Holding Charges? 
 
There is no universal definition of holding charges as it is not common in most 
countries. Some define the term as "a charge generally brought to justify the 
detention of a person suspected of other, usually more serious offences. A 
holding charge is based on (usually lawful) arrests for trivial offences." 1550 
Others define a holding charge as:  
 
... a nominal charge for the purposes of ensuring that a suspect is kept in custody 
or detention; and which may later be replaced by a substantive charge (failing 
which the person concerned must be released as soon as it becomes clear that 
the holding charge cannot be ‘firmed up' or otherwise proceeded with.)1551  
 
Another possible definition provided by others is that:  
 
A holding charge must be something which is a genuine, in-good-faith charge. 
Secondly … it would have to be a charge which was quite serious because it 
would justify pre-trial detention.1552  
 
But the definition of a holding charge might differ from country to country. For 
instance, in Nigeria, the term is generally understood to mean:  
 
                                                 
1550 See Aronson, M. I. and Hunter, J. B.  (1995). Litigation: Evidence and Procedure. (Sydney: 
Butterworths), p.211        
1551  Gibson, B. (2009). The Pocket A-Z of Criminal Justice. (United Kingdom, Waterside Press,), 
p.,36       
1552  See a discussion by Professor Clive Walker at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated evidence, 8 June, Q179, supra note 
1378    
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... a criminal charge that is filed by the police before a Magistrate Court against 
an accused person just for the purpose of securing an order of his remand in 
police custody pending the conclusion of an investigation or a criminal charge 
that is filed against an accused person by the police before a Magistrate court 
that ostensibly has no statutory power to try the offence charged, but makes an 
order, remanding the person in prison custody pending the conclusion of an 
investigation or the arraignment of the person in the High Court.1553   
 
The Nigerian definition bears little resemblance to the other definitions; here, the 
term holding charge is not used to hold a suspect until a more serious charge is 
found. Similarly, its application is different from the practice in other countries, 
like Australia and the US.1554 In both countries, the police bring a lighter charge 
to hold the suspect keeping in mind that if more evidence is unravelled, they are 
obliged to amend the lighter charge with a more serious one.  
 
Moreover, in Australia, "holding charges are used primarily to bypass the 
‘reasonable suspicion' requirement where [the police] cannot be satisfied on a 
more serious offence, but can be satisfied on a lesser offence."1555  In contrast, 
the Nigerian practice seems to suggest that it is used as a form of remand i.e., the 
suspect is not charged earlier nor is the first charge amended at a later stage. As 
defined above, holding charges serve two purposes in Nigeria. One is securing 
the remand of the accused person pending the conclusion of an on-going 
investigation. The other is relieving the need by the police to travel long 
distances to a court that has the jurisdiction to try the accused.1556 Therefore, any 
court that does not have the jurisdiction to try the accused could issue a remand 
order. 
                                                 
1553  Ademeji, A. (2011). Nigeria: Holding Charges and the Country's Laws, 5 January, at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201101060295.html ; see also Nigerian Bar Association, Reform of 
the Holding Charge Practice in Nigeria (Protecting Constitutional rights), 20 May, 2008      
1554  See for instance in R. (on the application of Raissi) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2008] EWCA Civ 72, para. 15 [In this cases, Mr Raissi was on extradition 
proceedings to the US for "failing to disclose prescribed information when renewing his pilot's 
licence." The "counsel for the United States Government referred to the extradition "charges" as 
"holding charges". He indicated that, in due course, Mr Raissi's extradition would be sought in 
respect of a charge of involvement in a conspiracy to murder in relation to the attack on the 
World Trade Centre, his alleged role having been as "lead instructor" of the four pilots who had 
hi-jacked planes for the attack."]     
1555 See Aronson, M. I. and Hunter, J. B., supra note 1550      
1556  Nigerian Bar Association, supra note 1553    
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The US also applies holding charges in a similar manner to Australia. 1557 The 
same practice is absent in the UK. 1558  However, unlike Australia, a holding 
charge in the US is not used to circumvent the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion before an arrest is made because the US requires probable cause to 
make arrest. As discussed in detail in this chapter, if the probable cause 
requirement is not met, the arrest would be unlawful whether the suspect is held 
under a holding charge or normal charge.  
 
No such similar laws or practices can be mentioned under Ethiopian domestic 
law. With the coming into effect of the EATP, it might be appropriate to consider 
the relevance of using a holding charge as an alternative to 120-days pre-charge 
detention.  
 
When the possibility of using holding charges in place of 28 days pre-charge 
detention was considered in the UK, the British Irish Rights Watch (BIRW) 
complained that holding charges "contravene the right to due process, and 
undermine the judicial system."1559 Based on the practice in Northern Ireland, 
BIRW argued that a holding charge could result in the terrorist suspect being 
released on bail if "the time taken to get to trial has been deemed to take too long. 
In some cases this has enabled the suspects to commit further offences."1560  
 
The use of a holding charge as an alternative to pre-charge detention has been 
flatly rejected by the CPS for the following reasons:1561 
 
The problem of finding an appropriate charge, and the potential risk to public 
safety if the charge were minor and the defendant pleaded guilty and were 
released on bail. Holding charges are really an abuse of State power. In theory a 
                                                 
1557 Raissi v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 1554      
1558  See oral evidence by the fomer DPP, Keir Starmer, at Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 236, supra note 
1378 ("We do not use holding charges. That principle does not apply just to terrorism offences 
but to all offences.")     
1559  Memorandum Submitted by BIRW to Home Affairs Committee (2006). Terrorism Detention 
Powers: Fourth Report of session 2005-06, Volume 2     
1560  Ibid     
1561  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2006), Twenty-Fourth Report, supra note 1417, para. 140     
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person could be held on a holding charge for 6 months or a year and then the 
prosecution could offer no evidence, but that would clearly be an abuse. 
 
Due to these and other objections, 1562 it was considered inappropriate to use 
holding charges in lieu of pre-charge detention.   
 
Therefore, considering the problematic nature of holding charges, this thesis does 
not support the introduction of holding charges into Ethiopian legal system. This 
procedure could easily be abused to detain terrorist suspects indefinitely, even 
longer than the 120 days pre-charge detention currently allowed under Ethiopian 
law.   
5.9.3 Post-charge Questioning? 
 
Before discussing whether post-charge question could be considered relevant in 
terrorism cases in Ethiopia, we will first discuss the availability of investigation 
techniques under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. 
 
The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code contains the procedures that need to be 
followed in criminal investigations. These are divided into two parts: crime 
investigation 1563 and the instituting of criminal proceedings. 1564 The first part 
covers the power of the police in regard to criminal investigations. This part 
covers several issues, inter alia, summoning of the accused or suspected 
person,1565 arrest,1566 interrogation,1567 procedures after arrest,1568 and the closure 
of the police investigation file.1569  
 
After an arrest is made, the police are required to establish the identity and 
address of the arrestee and read out the accusation or complaint made against the 
arrestee. Unless it is ‘doubtful' that an offence has been committed or that the 
                                                 
1562 See Home Affairs Committee (2006). Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report, supra note 
1100,  para. 101      
1563  Articles 22-39 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code   
1564  Articles 40-48 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1565  Article 25 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code    
1566  Article 26 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code    
1567  Article 27 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code   
1568  Article 29 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1569  Article 39 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code    
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summoned or arrested person has committed the offence complained of,1570 the 
police must take the arrestee to the next available court within 48 hours. As 
discussed, although the court has several alternatives to make once the accused is 
brought before them, the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code does not allow the 
court to release the accused unconditionally. Therefore, the court could order the 
arrestee to be remanded for 14 days with the possibility of renewing it several 
times.  
 
The second part of the criminal investigation procedure start with the completion 
of the police investigation and reporting of the results of the investigation to the 
public prosecution. The Public Prosecutor can do one of the following things 
after receiving the police report:1571 prosecute the accused on a charge drawn up 
by him; order that a preliminary inquiry be held; order further investigations; or 
refuse to institute proceedings. 
 
The Public Prosecutor is required to institute proceedings unless:1572 
 
1) (a) The public prosecutor is of opinion that there is insufficient evidence to 
justify a conviction;(b) There is no possibility of finding the accused and the case 
is one which may not be tried in his absence;(c) The prosecution is barred by 
limitation or the offence is made the subject of a pardon or amnesty;(d) (1) The 
public prosecutor is instructed not to institute proceedings in the public interest    
by the Minister by order under his hand.(2) On no other grounds may the public 
prosecutor refuse to institute. 
 
So long as the above elements are not satisfied, bringing a charge against the 
accused would be the next step. Once a charge is brought, the next question is 
whether the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure allows the possibility of questioning 
the suspect further to uncover additional evidence. As shown above, the Public 
Prosecutor has four options once the police report is received. If the first option 
                                                 
1570 Article 28 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
1571 Article  38 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1572 See Articles 40 and 42 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
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is taken, i.e. charging the accused, the trial proceedings begin.1573 During the trial, 
a judge can adjourn a case, fix the date and place of trial, issue a warrant for a 
witness or a defendant that has failed to appear, read out the charge to the 
defendant, record any pleas, etc.  
 
However, the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code does not contain a single 
provision concerning the post-charge questioning of an indicted individual. 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter two, because the Ethiopian legal system is 
adversarial in design, the judge plays a passive role during the trial process.  
 
Therefore, post-charge questioning similar to the power available in the UK1574 is 
not relevant in Ethiopia. This thesis does not consider post-charge questioning to 
be a proper alternative to the current pre-charge detention period in Ethiopia in 
view of the increased likelihood of abuse at the hands of the police, this being 
especially poignant in Ethiopia where the independence of the judiciary and the 
legislature is unclear.1575  
 
Even if post-charge questioning is a judiciary controlled process, as it currently 
under section 22 of the Counter-terrorism Act 2008 (CTA), the judiciary in 
Ethiopia does not have extensive powers of scrutiny over any abuse taken place 
in police stations.1576 Additionally, in order to use post charge-questioning as an 
alternative to the lengthy pre-charge detention under the EATP, the police need 
to have some evidence to enable them to bring a charge in the first place. In the 
absence of any evidence to bring charge, this alternative would be less likely to 
guarantee early release of a suspect either conditionally or unconditionally. It 
would also be an abuse of power if the police charge someone when they know 
                                                 
1573 Governed by articles 94- 107 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
1574  See section 22 of Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 c.28 (in force from July 10, 2012); for further 
discussion, see Zander, M (2008). Is Post-Charge Questioning A Step Too Far? 172(44) J.P. 716-
718; see also Walker, C. (2008). Post charge questioning of Suspects.  7 Criminal Law Review 
509-524     
1575 See chapter two for further discussion on the independence of the judiciary and the legislature 
in Ethiopia     
1576  See in the following case, for instance, where the suspects alleged that they were tortured in 
the hands of the police. But the courts failed to scrutinize that allegation: Public Prosecutor v 
Abas Hussein and Kasim Mohammed, supra note 347; see also chapter two for further discussion         
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that there is insufficient evidence to do so but with the hope that the suspect is 
more likely to confess if charged early.1577  
 
There are also some inherent problems with the current design of section 22 CTA 
2008. First, "there is absolute limit of forty-eight hours for any given 
authorisation, though there may be repeated authorisations." 1578  If similar 
legislation is adopted in Ethiopia, these "repeated authorisations" could 
encourage the police to use every means available to get a confession from the 
suspects.  
 
Second, "the wording of section 22 strongly suggests that the application must 
relate only to ‘the offence' which has been charged. If novel offences are 
uncovered, then a further pre-charge arrest would be viable."1579 There might be 
also issue of compatibility with Article 6 of ECHR i.e. right not incriminate 
oneself. 1580  The same compatibility issue under Article 19(2) of the FDRE 
constitution could arise if post-charge questioning is introduced into the 
Ethiopian legal system.  
 
Third, section 22(6) CTA 2008 contains the elements a judge needs to take into 
account before authorising a post-charge questioning of a terrorist suspect. 
However, some of the elements lack clarity. One of these factors is authorisation 
‘in the interest of justice.' But this requirement is defined no where in the 
Counter-terrorism Act 2008  and it is not clear what the judge is supposed to 
consider in deciding whether to allow further questioning of a suspect. A quick 
reference to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, for instance, shows that there are 
some guidelines a judge could take into account in admitting a statement not 
                                                 
1577  This argument is different from Holgate-Mohammed v Duke, supra note 1274, ("The 
interrogation of the subject so as to confirm or dismiss a reasonable suspicion of that person's 
guilt was a legitimate reasons for arrest and the officer was, therefore, entitled to take into 
account the possibility that HM might be more ready to confess at a police station."). The issue in 
this case is not to ‘confirm or dismiss a reasonable suspicion.' The police have gone past that 
stage and there is a pending charge.        
1578  Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 192      
1579  Ibid     
1580  Shannon v the United Kingdom, no. 6563/03, 4 October 2005, para. 42 (" the requirement for 
the applicant to attend an interview with financial investigators and be compelled to answer 
questions in connection with events in respect of which he had already been charged with 
offences was not compatible with his right not to incriminate himself.")      
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made in oral hearings provided "the court is satisfied that it is in the interest of 
justice for it to be admissible."1581 These guidelines are illustrated under section 
114(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Not such non-exhaustive guidelines are 
provided under section 22(6) CTA 2008. 
 
The other element that needs clarification is stipulated under section 22(6(a)) 
CTA 2008. Accordingly, a judge would refuse authorisation unless "what is 
authorised will not interfere unduly with the preparation of the person's defence 
to the charge in question or any other criminal charge." The purpose of 
introducing post-charge questioning in the first place is to gather further evidence 
that might come after a charge.1582 This certainly will "unduly interfere with the 
preparation of the person's defence" particularly ‘If novel offences are 
uncovered'.1583 In this situation, the counsel for the defendant is not sure how 
best to defend the defendant as he might need more time to prepare.  It is not 
clear if a judge would refuse further questioning in that situation.  
 
Due to these practical problems, this research concludes that post-charge 
questing should not be considered an alternative to pre-charge detention under 
Ethiopian law.         
 
5.9.4 The Threshold Test?  
 
As discussed, the threshold test is markedly different from the reasonable 
suspicion test. The requirements of the former are higher than the latter.  At the 
same time, the requirement for the threshold test is lower than the conditions 
needed to use the full code test. Comparing the American standard, the probable 
cause test falls somewhere between reasonable suspicion and threshold test.  
 
As discussed above, under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, one of the 
options a public prosecution could do after receiving the police report is 
                                                 
1581 Section 114 (1)(D) of Criminal Justice Act 2003     
1582  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 42 
Days. HL 23 / HC 156 (Incorporating HC 994-I from Session 2006-07), Second Report of 
Session 2007-08 - Report, Together with Formal Minutes and Appendices.     
1583  Walker, C. (2011), supra note 224, p. 192     
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instituting criminal proceedings by bringing charge against an accused. The form, 
the manner, and the time of instituting a criminal charge is governed under 
articles 108-122 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure. According to article 109 of 
this code, the public prosecutor is required to file a charge ‘within fifteen days of 
the receipt of the police report'. This charge must contain ‘legal and material 
ingredients' 1584  and description of circumstances of the offence. 1585  Once a 
charge is brought, it cannot be changed or altered.  
 
The only case where the prosecution is allowed is to change or alter the charge is 
if he erred in filing a charge. 1586   This covers a situation where a criminal 
proceeding is instituted "on a charge containing essential errors or omissions or 
such errors or omissions that the accused has been or is likely to be misled".1587 
Thus, the public prosecution could not bring lesser charges with the assumption 
that a more serious charge will be followed once more evidence is gathered.  
 
Having said this, the question is whether the threshold test is the best option to 
replace the lengthy pre-charge detention of 120 days in Ethiopia. This research 
discourages any push for the threshold test to be introduced as an alternative.  
 
First, it is acknowledged in the UK that the test does not completely overcome 
the need for pre-charge detention. 1588  Moreover, the UK does not have a 
complete picture of how frequently the test is used in terrorism cases. 1589 A 
conclusion that can be reached from the few cases that came to light is that 
suspects who are charged based on the threshold test were held longer than those 
charged based on the full code test.1590 Thus, being charged early, in anticipation 
of key evidence, did not bring any fundamental change in the circumstances of 
the detainees; they remained in police custody. The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights also criticised the government for failing to disclose to the defence under 
                                                 
1584 Article 111 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
1585 Article 112 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1586 Articles 118-121 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code     
1587 Article 119 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code      
1588 Letter from Sue Hemming, supra note 1409       
1589  Ibid     
1590  Ibid     
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what test a suspect is charged1591, which affects a person's right to know the basis 
of the charge against him. Furthermore, courts do not have the opportunity to 
scrutinise the use of the test in terrorism cases. 
 
For these reasons, it might be argued that the test forms a perfect legal excuse to 
continuously hold terrorist suspects. Thus, for the Ethiopian legislature to 
introduce the threshold test as an appropriate alternative to the 120 day pre-
charge detention currently offered would be to import a test riddled with defects. 
Even if all the defects of the test were rectified, for instance, by increasing 
judicial scrutiny and disclosing the basis of the charge as early as possible, 
dropping a charge after a lengthy detention entails a grave violation of liberty.  
 
Therefore, the test is not suitable for Ethiopia. Even if the EATP is amended and 
the length of pre-charge detention is reverted to 14 days, as is the case for regular 
crimes under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, there is no guarantee that 
law enforcers will not abuse it by charging suspects at the end of the maximum 
pre-charge detention. 
 
5.9.5 Contingency Powers as an Alternative to 120 Days Pre-charge Detention?  
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that Ethiopia's pre-charge detention 
regime detains suspects, or contains the potential to detain suspects, for too long. 
There is no justification for the detention of terrorist suspects for 120 days 
without a trial. Granting bail until completion of a criminal investigation has 
been suggested as one alternative to Article 20(3) of the EATP. Another option 
worth considering is using contingency powers to hold suspects for longer 
periods when exceptional circumstances demand.  
 
The UK government does not want to completely abandon the 28 day pre-charge 
detention. It wants to preserve the possibility of resorting to that maximum 
period under exceptional circumstances. According to the Draft Detention of 
Terrorist Suspects Bill, the plan is to activate the maximum period, if need be. 
                                                 
1591 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008). Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Eighth report), Supra note 1409     
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There will be a sunset clause so that the extended maximum period would be in 
force for a period of three months upon a grant of royal assent.1592 This need for 
contingency powers has come after a suggestion by the Committee on the 
Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers. The Committee's submission 
for a shorter period of detention was driven by the fact that the 28 days pre-
charge detention was rarely used in practice.  Despite opposing arguments to the 
use of such contingency powers, as discussed in this chapter, this thesis argued in 
favour of introducing the powers in lieu of a lengthy pre-charge detention. This is 
due to the fact that having contingency powers in reserve is far better than 
rushing through legislation, which will more than likely play at the boundaries of 
permissible interference with fundamental rights, at a moment of exceptional 
need.  
 
Two problems associated with the above power concern, firstly, the difficulty of 
recalling parliament when it is in recess or when it is dissolved during general 
election1593  and, secondly, undermining the right to a fair trial when a case is 
openly discussed in parliament. 1594  A possible solution proposed to the first 
problem is having:  
 
... a trigger in the legislation itself whereby the Home Secretary could not make 
that order at her absolute discretion but would need to be satisfied, for example, 
that there were compelling reasons of national security and that the investigation 
on its own, or in conjunction with other investigations, was wholly exceptional in 
its scale and complexity, or something along those lines.1595 
 
The absence of ‘triggers‘, particularly the lack of safeguards around those powers 
has too been extensively explored.1596 
                                                 
1592 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, supra note 
1378, para. 3      
1593  Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and 
Associated Evidence, Q 226, supra note 1378     
1594 Ibid, Q218     
1595  See David Anderson's Reply at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft Detention of 
Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 252, supra note 1378     
1596  See a discussion by Professor Clive Walker at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 172 and Q 186, supra 
note 1378     
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The second problem could be solved by having:  
 
... fairly clear ground rules. It would be perfectly possible for the number and 
timing of the arrests and brief circumstances to be discussed in most cases. What 
could not be discussed … is the underlying detail, but as for the number of 
arrests and what people had been arrested for, very often that would be in the 
public domain. If handled carefully, that could be discussed.1597 
 
Others also propose different procedures for introducing the powers under 
exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the merits and limits of using the 
procedures under section 25 TA 2006, and the 2004 Civil Contingency powers 
have been evaluated in detail. 1598  However, a discussion on the Civil 
Contingency Powers is beyond the scope of this thesis.     
 
Having said this, are there any legal or constitutional difficulties in using 
contingency powers under Ethiopian legal systems? It would seem not. To begin 
with, in the FDRE Constitution, Article 17(2) states that "no person may be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, and no person may be detained without a charge or 
conviction against him." Taken literally, the second paragraph of this Article 
seems to suggest that after an initial arrest, a person has either to be charged or 
released. However, this would be a naive interpretation considering that Article 
19(4) of the FDRE Constitution states that "the court may order the arrested 
person to remain in custody or, when requested remand him for a time strictly 
required to carry out the necessary investigation." In light of this article, it is 
difficult to justify how a pre-charge detention period of 120 days under the 
EATP is ‘a time strictly required to carry out the necessary investigation.' Both 
the above articles make Article 20(3) of the EATP unconstitutional.  
 
                                                 
1597  See a discussion by Kier Starmer at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). Draft 
Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q 218, supra note 1378      
1598  See a discussion by Professor Clive Walker at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence, Q171 and Q186, supra 
note 1378     
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The FDRE constitution does not have any articles that deal with using 
contingency powers to arrest criminal suspects. It does, however, have an article 
that deals with powers of arrest under a ‘State of emergency'. According to 
Article 93(4) (c) of the FDRE Constitution, there are only a few fundamental 
rights 1599  that could not be suspended under emergency situations. All other 
rights, including right to liberty, could be suspended. According to Article 93(6) 
(a) of the FDRE Constitution, the State of Emergency Inquiry Board is expected 
to "make public within one month the names of all individuals arrested on 
account of the state of emergency together with the reasons for their arrest." This 
Article only talks about making public the names of people arrested under 
emergency powers. It does not provide the right to court appearance within one 
month and any subsequent public trial or release of those held under police 
custody. The FDRE Constitution does not have any limit on how long people 
could be held under the provisions enacted during a State of emergency.  
 
If Article 20(3), which provides pre-charge detention between 28-day to 120-day, 
of the EATP is abrogated and replaced with 14 days of pre-charge detention as 
required under Article 59(3) of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, would it 
be appropriate to resort to Article 93(6) (a) of the FDRE Constitution to hold 
terrorism suspects for a period longer than 14 days?  
 
The answer to this question is argued to be no. The police can only use Article 93 
of the FDRE Constitution during a State of emergency as declared by The 
Council of Ministers. Moreover, even if a State of emergency is declared due to, 
for example, catastrophic terrorist attack "which endangers the Constitutional 
order and which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement 
agencies,"1600 Article 93 of the FDRE Constitution could not be the appropriate 
remedy for Article 20(3) of the EATP because the FDRE Constitution does not 
put a limit on detaining people during a State of emergency.    
 
                                                 
1599 Theses refer to the following articles of the Constitution: Article 1 (Nomenclature of the 
State); Article 18(Prohibition against Inhuman Treatment); Article 25(Right to Equality); Article 
39(1) and Article 39(2) (Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples)       
1600  Article 93(1)(a) of the FDRE constitution     
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With these difficulties in mind, in the event that Article 20(3) of the EATP was 
to be replaced, how would the police respond to complex terrorism cases that 
require extended periods of investigation? It would not be appropriate to 
recommend that terrorist suspects should be released at the end of 14 days. 
Rather, there should be legislation in place that can be triggered where a lengthy 
period is required to complete an investigation while the suspects are still held in 
custody. As declared by the Ethiopian government, the EATP is inspired by UK 
legislation and other Western legislation. Therefore, it is necessary to take into 
account changes that are taking place in the UK. One of the changes brought 
about by the coalition government is the abandonment of the 28 days pre-charge 
detention, reverting instead to 14 days. In addition, there is a draft bill that deals 
with contingency powers that could be triggered under exceptional 
circumstances.1601 A similar procedure in Ethiopia would be appropriate because 
having all the powers in reserve is necessary to enable the police and the 
intelligence community to tackle complex terrorism cases that require an 
extended period of detention 
 
One of the positive things about the UK as discussed is that contingency powers 
is that the 28 day maximum is to be introduced for shorter periods of three 
months unlike the expired provision that was renewable annually. Also, under 
the current Protection of Freedoms Act 20121602, extension will be sought if and 
only if a need arises. On the other hand, the Ethiopian legislation on pre-charge 
detention is not renewable annually. It is a permanent legislation which can be 
abused easily. By having legislation on contingency powers, and with greater 
scrutiny by the legislature when these powers are triggered, abuse of the 
provisions that deal with pre-charge detention can be minimized. Therefore, 
transposing the contingency powers with a sunset clause into Ethiopian law is 
better than resorting to Article 93 of the FDRE constitution because the said 
Article places no limit on the length of pre-charge or post-charge detention of 
persons held during a State of emergency.  
 
                                                 
1601 See also section 58 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012      
1602 Already discussed in the previous sections     
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However, assuming that the government of Ethiopia is to introduce emergency 
powers by repealing the current pre-charge detention, there seems unsolved 
question of the procedures of introducing these powers. As discussed, section 58 
of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 gives the Secretary of the State the 
power to introduce orders in under certain circumstances. 
 
In Ethiopia, it is the Ministry of Justice 1603  that has similar powers to the 
Secretary of the State for the Home Department. If the British model on draft 
contingency power is to be introduced into the Ethiopia legal system, then it will 
be this very organ that could request parliament to extend the pre-charge 
detention from 14 days to 28 days in exceptional circumstances. The norm under 
the British Law is 4 days.1604 For this reason, it might be difficult to argue that a 
return to 14 days is a return to normality.  
 
But according to Article 59 (3) of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, a 14-
day pre-charge detention has been the norm in the country since 1961. Therefore, 
proposing a 28-day detention in exceptional circumstances has the possibility to 
withstand some criticism. However, with the current Ethiopian government 
dominating parliament with 99% of the seats, it would be a rubber stamp 
procedure to ask parliament to approve the proposed legislation. With such lack 
of proper mechanism for scrutiny by the Ethiopian parliament, the only viable 
option would be to use these exceptional powers of detention through 
supervision by a senior Supreme Court judge. This procedure is different from 
section 58 of the Protection of Freedoms Act which does not seem to include 
judicial scrutiny.  
 
There are some practical reasons why this research has preferred a Supreme 
Court Judge to a High Court Judge. According to Article 31 of the EATP, the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of Ethiopian are entrusted with the 
jurisdiction to entertain terrorism cases. However, some alleged that the 
                                                 
1603 For detail power of the Ministry of Justice, see A Proclamation to Provide for the Definition 
of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia 
(Proclamation No. 691/2010); see also Article 28 (2) the EATP, which requires the Ministry of 
Justice to ‘organize a separate specialized department which follow up terrorism cases'      
1604  See written evidence by Professor Clive Walker at Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, supra note 1378     
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adjudication process in Ethiopia is highly politicized.1605 On top of that most of 
the judges appointed to the High Court are young professionals with little or no 
prior judicial experience.1606 Though there still remains some suspicion on the 
independence of the judges at the Supreme Court, most of them are judges with 
many experiences under their belt to interpret and apply the law correctly. They 
are less likely to be influenced by the police or the prosecutor. Therefore, a 
judiciary controlled process of using contingency powers under exceptional 
circumstances would serve as a promising alternative to 120-day pre-charge 
detention currently in force in Ethiopia. 
 
5.9.6 Charging Terrorist Suspects for ‘Preparation of Terrorist Acts': as an 
Alternative to a lengthy pre-charge detention? 
 
As a principle, preparatory acts are not punishable in Ethiopia. According to 
article 26 (1) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code, acts "which are committed to 
prepare or make possible a crime, particularly by procuring the means or creating 
the conditions for its commission are not punishable". Moreover, and 
consequently, article 39 of that Code, prohibits punishment for a failure to report 
constituting preparatory acts. However, as an exception,   a failure to report 
preparatory acts could be punishable only if they are expressly stated by law.1607 
For instance, preparing for or failing to report the preparation of criminal 
activities that violate articles 241-246 and 252-2581608 of the Ethiopian Criminal 
Code is a serious crime in Ethiopia. As discussed in this thesis, these articles 
have been used against terrorist suspects, although they are not designed 
specifically for that purpose. 
 
Moreover, article 4 of the EATP is also one of the exceptions to the principle 
stated under article 26 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code as it specifically outlawed 
preparatory acts of terrorism. However, unlike section 5 of TA 2006, article 4 has 
                                                 
1605 See chapter 2 on a discussion on ‘Loyalty to the Constitution'     
1606  Ibid     
1607  Article 26(2) of the Ethiopian Criminal Code    
1608  These articles deal  with espionage; material preparation of subversive acts; collaboration 
with the enemy; treason; impairment of the defensive power of the state; attacks on the 
independence of the state; violation of territorial or political sovereignty; attack on the political or 
territorial integrity of the state     
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a far narrower scope in that it only criminalises preparatory acts specifically 
listed under the EATP. Whereas, section 5 (2) TA 2006 bans specific preparatory 
terrorist acts and ‘terrorism generally'.     
 
As can be seen from table 2.3, charges against terrorist suspects for the 
preparation of terrorist activities are one of the frequent charges. This charge was 
mentioned in relation to 18 cases of the (Total) number of cases listed in table 
2.3.1609 Although it has been accepted in the UK that section 5 TA 2006 has 
reduced the need for lengthy detention,1610 neither the provisions of the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code nor article 4 of the EATP have had an effect on the 
length of pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects in Ethiopia. As discussed in 
chapter one, some of the court cases listed in table 2.3 are not replicated in table 
4.3 because of the absence of some pages from the case reports. For this reason, 
we cannot show whether some defendants who were convicted of preparatory 
terrorist activities were remanded or not. However, the following cases1611 from 
table 4.3 shows that charging the defendants for preparatory terrorist acts did not 
have an impact on the length of detention. All of the defendants in these cases 
were held for lengthy periods.      
 
Therefore, although the respective provisions analysed from EATP and the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code in relation to preparatory offences have the design and 
nature in order to be used as an alternative to a lengthy pre-charge detention, 
their effect in this capacity is yet to be realised.   
 
5.9.6 Any Lessons to be taken from the US on Pre-Charge Detention of Terrorist 
Suspect?  
                                                 
1609 Most of the cases are  discussed in detail in chapter two, chapter three, chapter four and in this 
chapter      
1610 Anderson, D (2013). The Terrorism Acts in 2012, supra note 1422; see also see witness 
testimony of Professor Clive Walker and David Anderson, QC at Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2011). Draft Detention of Terrorism Suspects, Oral and Associated Evidence supra note 
1378     
1611 Public Prosecutor v Haile Talisa Daba, supra note 337; Public Prosecutor v Elias Gibril Buru, 
et al, supra note 342; Public Prosecutor v Kemal Abdela, supra note 347; Public Prosecutor v 
Shimels Degene and Dereje Gutema, supra note 367; Public Prosecutor v Samual Goitom, supra 
note 1187; Public Prosecutor v Afera Gidey Kiflu, supra note 383; Public prosecutor v Teshale 
Bekashi, supra note; Public Prosecutor v Tefera Mamo Cherkos (General), supra note 64; Public 
Prosecutor v Elias Kifle, et al, supra note 763  ; Public Prosecutor v Andualem Arage, e al, supra 
note 763  ; Public prosecution v Bekel Gerba, et al (?/2011)     
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Counter-terrorism measures such as those found under section 412 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and indefinite detention of non-citizens at Guantanamo via 
presidential orders are not relevant to Ethiopia. As can be discerned from table 
2.3, and as discussed in chapter two, foreign grown terrorism is not so much of a 
problem in Ethiopia. All but few of the terrorists tried under Ethiopian law are 
nationals of Ethiopia.1612 The US counter-terrorism regime is also morally and 
legally conflicted, having been applied against people of different origins.1613  
Thus, the measures in the US that are applicable to non-citizens cannot be 
considered viable alternatives to the problems discussed in relation to the EATP. 
One prima facie viable alternative to this issue found in the US is the Material 
Witness regime, and we shall now analyse.    
 
The provisions of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code and the EATP do not 
specifically allow mandatory detention of a witness. For instance, article 30 (1) 
of the Ethiopian Criminal procedure Code allows the investigating police officer 
to ‘summon and examine any person likely to give information on any matter 
relating to the offence or the offender'. Moreover, article 30 (2) requires a 
witness to answer all questions put to him unless answering a question has ‘a 
tendency to expose him to a criminal charge'. Similarly, article 22 of the EATP 
allows a police officer to summon and question anyone who has ‘information or 
evidence which…could assist to prevent or investigate terrorism cases'. As can 
be seen, these articles are silent on whether the police are permitted to arrest a 
material witness who is, for instance, a flight risk. Expectedly, the research 
conducted for the benefit of this thesis failed to discover any individual having 
been arrested as a material witness in Ethiopia. 
 
                                                 
1612  See Public Prosecutor v Abdiweli Mohammed Ismael, supra note 1505 (two Swedish 
journalists were tried under the EATP); see Public Prosecutor v Sewfit Hassen Abdul Keni, supra 
not 1508 (This is the only notable terrorist case that had international connections. This was an 
attempted murder of the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa).      
1613  See a discussion in the previous section how president Obama has altered the rules on 
Guantanamo detention by applying them against US citizens. For the long term ‘psychological' 
effect of indefinite detention, see also Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, pp. 115 and seq      
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In addition, although as a general rule it is up to the parties to call their 
witnesses1614 during the preliminary inquiry1615 or during the trial, article 87 of 
the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code states that a "...court may at any time call 
any witness whose testimony it thinks necessary in the interests of justice." If a 
witness refuses to attend, the court can issue a warrant that authorises the police 
to bring the material witness before the court. Moreover, article 90 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code also provides instances where a witness may 
be held in custody. Furthermore, witnesses who have given evidence at a 
preliminary inquiry are required to execute bonds ‘binding themselves' to be in 
attendance before the court and on any date as they shall be summoned to appear.  
If they refuse to do so, they could be held in custody. However, the above 
discussions cover situations after the police investigation is completed.  
 
Having discussed above Ethiopia's current position towards witnesses, and how 
that correlates to the US position, the question that now falls for consideration is 
whether it would be sensible to introduce a new system in Ethiopia that allows 
for the police to hold a material witness in detention as an alternative to 120-days 
pre-charge detention? In answering this question, we have to consider the 
previous criticisms levelled at the US regime, specifically how the regime is 
neither intended for use against terrorists, nor optimally designed for the 
particular time exigencies related to the questioning of a terrorist. In the US this 
has led to what has been described as an ‘abuse' of the material witness regime, 
where suspected terrorists are held rather ironically under the title of ‘material 
witness'. 
 
 However, toleration of the US position is perhaps manageable in light of the 
context of justice system that surrounds these ‘abuses'. Being well grounded on 
fundamental rights and the protection of civil liberties, the US justice system 
might be considered to have sufficient checks and accountability in place to off-
set the injustice currently being felt under the far from ideal Material Witness 
Statute. However, contrarily, the fact that even the relatively simplistic 
                                                 
1614  Article 124 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code    
1615  The Ethiopian Criminal procedure Code allows holding of the preliminary inquiry to 
determine if there is sufficient evidence to set the matter down for trial. It is covered under 
articles 80-93     . 
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determination of remand in Ethiopia is frequently based on insufficient evidence, 
it is clear that Ethiopia has some way to go before such an arbitrary system of 
detention can be tolerated within their legal regime. Simply stated, Ethiopia has 
an embryonic democracy, and therefore it would perhaps be considered 
premature, at best, and irresponsible, at worst, to construct a similar material 
witness regime within Ethiopia.  
 
To conclude, allowing bail, bringing early charges for preparatory terrorist acts 
and having legislation in place with contingency powers that can be triggered in 
complex terrorism cases are the best remedies that would serve as alternatives to 
the 120 days of pre-charge detention currently available in Ethiopia. However, 
for the reasons mentioned above, this thesis does not support using the threshold 
test, holding charges, post-charge questioning or the Material Witness method of 
holding terrorist suspects as preferable alternatives to pre-charge detention in 
Ethiopia.  
 
 
5.10 Conclusions  
 
The criticism of Ethiopia's pre-charge detention is multi-layered. The first is 
manifested by the absence of proper checks and balances. What we have 
uncovered is that the Ethiopian judiciary gives little consideration to the basic 
fact that the right to liberty can be violated where a suspect is detained for as 
little as a few hours, let alone days or months, without sufficient legal 
justification. The reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the investigation of 
terrorist suspects, for example, by asking the police to justify their request for 
lengthy pre-charge detention, has exacerbated the plight of many.  
 
Second, the culture and attitude of members of the Ethiopian parliament has also 
contributed to a weak check on the government. We have seen how in the UK 
and US ‘the struggle between controlling terrorism and maintaining citizen's 
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liberty rights ignited power struggles'1616 not only between the different branches 
of government, but also within the same party.  Indeed, had it not been for the 49 
‘rebel' backbenchers from within the Labour party, the then UK Prime minister, 
Tony Blair, would have achieved a scaling up in the pre-charge detention period 
from 28 to 90 days.1617 The fact that members of the Ethiopian parliament are all 
from the same ruling party should not be an excuse to adopt lengthy detention 
periods. The culture and attitude to speak up for fundamental rights is what is 
lacking in Ethiopia, but which is to be expected from an embryonic democracy. 
 
What might be said to be even more chilling is the unwillingness of members of 
the Ethiopian Parliament to request quarterly or annual reports on the effectives 
of this prolonged detention period, either in terms of the success in bringing more 
prosecutions or its deterrent effect in general. Parliamentary Select Committees, 
such as those in the UK or US Congressional Committees, are unheard of in 
Ethiopia. The presence of similar committees in Ethiopia would have enabled the 
Ethiopian government to glean invaluable information not only on the success of 
the pronged detention periods, but also on the effectiveness of the EATP as a 
whole.   
 
Third, unlike the novel counter-terrorism measures adopted under the EATP that 
significantly curbed freedom of expression and right to privacy, the Ethiopian 
government does not even need to ‘borrow' or ‘learn' from the West in respect of 
counter-terrorism measures that affect liberty. The Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code has always recognised reasonable suspicion as a standard to execute arrest 
without a warrant though it has been completely disregarded by the judiciary. 
What would have been preferable is to provide more guidelines and definitions 
under the EATP. In addition, 14-day pre-charge detention is already the standard 
under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. What the Ethiopian Parliament 
might have done is make a minor modification to the above Code that would 
empower judges to rigorously test the necessity of extending detention beyond 
                                                 
1616 See Donohue, L.K. (2008), supra note 203, pp. 34 and seq.; see also Roach, K. (2012), supra 
note 193, p. 239 (arguing that unlike the US, ‘British approaches to terrorism also meant that the 
courts have played a prominent role in reviewing both laws and executive actions taken to 
prevent terrorism).       
1617  BBC (2005). Blair Defeated over Terror Laws, 9 November    
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the benchmark of 14 days. By so doing, this would inevitable limit the amount of 
times the police could request to extend the 14-day detention. Furthermore, 
similar tests to those of schedule 8 of the TA 2000, which require an arrest to be 
lawful, necessary and that the investigation is conducted expeditiously, are 
absolutely necessary under Article 20 (3) of the EATP. These could help the 
Ethiopian judiciary evaluate each individual case to find out the necessity of 
extending detention and whether the police are acting diligently to bring a charge 
or release the suspects at the earliest possible stage.      
 
Making the above alternations would greatly enhance the Ethiopian approach 
when attempting to strike the proper balance between the need to investigate and 
prosecute terrorists on one hand, and to protect right to liberty, on the other.        
 
Finally, while criticising the EATP for the length of pre-charge detention it 
provides is one thing, finding the rationale for that specific length of time is quite 
another. What could not be established from this research is the justification 
behind the Ethiopian legislature's decision to fix pre-charge detention at 28-days 
minimum and 120-days maximum. We cannot say by analysis, as is the case in 
the US, that ‘a lack of faith in the criminal law'1618 is the precursor for this 
measure. Evidence of the police struggling to complete terrorist investigations 
within the maximum period allowed under the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code is lacking. The terrorism cases we have discussed show this. Pre-charge 
detention within Ethiopia seems to be an entitlement of the police rather than 
justified by genuine need. Furthermore, the decision to adopt such lengthy pre-
charge detention periods has not been promoted by exceptional circumstances 
around the time of their introduction. As discussed, the government has always 
been successful in prosecuting terrorist suspects. Thus, we can safely conclude 
that there is nothing special about investigating terrorism in Ethiopia that 
requires the excessive detention of terrorist suspects.   
 
                                                 
1618 Roach, K. (2012), supra note 193, p. 237     
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Chapter Six: Conclusion  
 
6.1 General Remarks  
 
This thesis has attempted to critically analyse the effect of Ethiopian counter-
terrorism law on the balance between freedom and security, focusing on three 
fundamental rights, and using to the perspective of the UK experience and to a 
lesser extent the approach of the US as yardsticks by which to measure Ethiopia's 
progress. From the outset, it has been stressed that one of the primary focuses of 
this research was to explore the responses of the UK and US to the fight against 
terrorism and to analyse the transposition of these responses into the Ethiopian 
counter-terrorism regime. Acknowledging the difficulty of transposing one legal 
system into another, the thesis has advanced different recommendations in each 
chapter that could help to amend the current design of the EATP, making it more 
compatible with accepted human right standards.       
 
A question might be appropriate here asking whether the EATP is a direct 
replication of Western counter-terrorism measures or has it taken the path of 
‘lesson drawing'. 1619 The answer to this question depends on whether we are 
evaluating the EATP as whole or specific provisions in it. As discussed, the 
absence of clear legal provisions on terrorism was the motivation for enacting the 
EATP. Thus, the transfer of counter-terrorism measures from the West was 
necessitated to a large extent by ‘domestic needs'.1620 But, that's not to say that 
the influence of some Western countries might have played a somewhat lesser 
role in the decision of the Ethiopian legislature. 1621  Similarly, despite their 
insignificant impact domestically, Ethiopia has ratified several international 
instruments on terrorism.1622 Additionally, though not officially recognised by 
the Ethiopian government, it would be inaccurate to suggest that ‘epistemic 
                                                 
1619  Rose, R. (1993), supra note 73     
1620  Ibid, p. 27     
1621 Shinn, D. H.  (2003), supra note 1 (this author was a former American Ambassador to 
Ethiopia); see also Whitaker, B.E (2007).  Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the ‘War on 
Terror' in the Third World.  28 (5) Third World Quarterly 1017 (pointing that "counter-terrorism 
legislation is promoted through several international channels, most notably the United Nations 
counter-terrorism committee, but the USA is clearly seen as the driving force".)      
1622  See footnote 6 and chapter two for  discussions on Algiers Convention and other international 
instruments ratified by Ethiopia     
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communities', 1623  such as the UNTC or the AU, have not have, at least, an 
indirect influence on the decision of the Ethiopian legislature in the construction 
of the country's counter-terrorism legislation. Therefore, it could be said that the 
EATP is a product of both voluntary and involuntary transfer of policy.1624    
 
In relation, then, to the above posed question, the policy transfer mechanism in 
relation to the specific provisions of the EATP shows a mixed picture: some with 
duplication (specially the provisions on encouragement of terrorism and 
proscription of terrorist organisations) and others with major changes. If we 
understand the definition of comparative law to be the study of influences of one 
set of rules over another,1625 we have attempted to show that some articles of the 
EATP are influenced by counter-terrorism legislation in the UK. These include 
the parts of the EATP that deal with inciting terrorism, encouraging terrorism, 
membership in terrorist organisations, and the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion/reasonable grounds for suspicion and reasonable grounds to believe. 
On the other hand, the part of the EATP and the TFOP that deal with interception 
of communications and the probative value of intercept evidence in criminal 
proceedings are taken from the US. But as shown in the preceding chapters, 
many of the ‘transplanted'1626 provisions in the EATP are altered to suit political 
factionalism.1627  
 
6.2 Specific Remarks: Setting a Bad Precedent in the West  
 
The first concluding remark is that the West's less than convincing justification 
for the transgression of fundamental rights in the name of the ‘war on terror' has 
opened a ‘Pandora's Box' of repercussions. The measures taken by the US post-
9/11 and the UN Resolutions that have followed have provided the perfect 
                                                 
1623  Dunlop, C. (2009), supra note 72; see also Dolowitz, D.  and Marsh, D. (2000) , supra note 
67       
1624 Bennett, C. J. (1991), supra note 80, p. 2000; see also Dolowitz, D.  and Marsh, D. (2000). , 
supra note 67, p. 13      
1625  Watson, A. (1978), supra note 88   
1626  Ibid     
1627  Rose, R.  (2004), supra note 76    
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ammunition for some countries to crush dissent by appealing to the same 
counter-terrorist motives used by Western countries when infringing rights.1628 
 
The West has arguably lost leverage over these countries when it comes to the 
enforcement of their observance of fundamental rights when they are perceived 
to themselves be at the fore-front of flouting civil liberties. The US publishes 
annual human rights reports from around the world, yet it continues to deny 
justice to many terrorist suspects who are languishing at Guantanamo.  In the 
years following 9/11, the US has published several reports about human rights 
abuses in Ethiopia. Each time, the Ethiopian government had either reacted 
angrily or mocked the reports. For instance, the 2009 US State Department 
Report on Human rights situations in Ethiopia1629 detailed several human rights 
violations in Ethiopia including the trial of members of opposition political 
parties on terrorism charges. However, the report was described by the Ethiopian 
government as ‘full of lies and loopholes'.1630  
 
Another Report published in 2011 1631  was dismissed as ‘groundless and 
politically motivated', 1632  which was the last time the Ethiopian government 
openly denounced reports on human rights violations complied by the US State 
Department. 1633  What we can conclude from the contempt of the Ethiopian 
government to criticism from the West is that the draconian counter-terrorism 
measures that came into force after 9/11 not only directly weakened human rights 
protections in the West, but also brought about an unintended reputational 
decline. The difficulty is that until the West is perceived to have ‘got its house in 
                                                 
1628 Roach, K. (2012), supra note 193, pp.21 and seq.; see also Whitaker, B.E (2007), supra note 
1616      
1629 US State Department (2010). 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia, 11 
March , at  http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135953.htm      
1630  Voice of America (2010). Ethiopia's PM Says Human Rights Report Opens US To Ridicule, 
18 March     
1631 US State Department (2011). 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia, 8 
April , at  http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154346.htm      
1632   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia (2011). Ethiopia: Statement issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia on the US State Department Human Rights Report 2010,  15 April    
1633 See other reports that were published after 2011 at US State Department (2012). 2011 Human 
Rights Reports: Ethiopia, 24 May, at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186196.htm; see 
also US State Department (2013). 2012 Human Rights Reports: Ethiopia, April 19, at  
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/af/204120.htm      
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order', they lack the credibility in developing nations to pronounce on violations 
of human rights there.     
         
It would be incorrect to criticise the Ethiopian government purely on the basis 
that it decided to transfer counter-terrorism measures from the West. However,  
when many of these measures in the West that were enacted in response to 
emergencies were either abrogated or amended, it has become inexplicable why 
the Ethiopian government felt compelled to adopt legalisation that have severe 
consequences for the fundamental rights recognised under the supreme law of the 
land, i.e. the FDRE Constitution.  
 
Unlike the knee-jerk legislation of the West, the Ethiopian government has had 
plenty of time (between 2001-2009) to learn from the mistakes created by the 
West in responding to terrorism.  The West is gradually retreating from its 9/11 
‘siege mentality'.1634 Moreover, partly under pressure from the public and the 
judiciary and partly due to the failure of the counter-terrorism measures to bring 
about the intended effect, the UK and US have reversed some of their more 
draconian counter-terrorism measures. 1635  There is of course a basic 
understanding that ordinary investigation techniques may, under exceptional 
circumstances, be inadequate to deal with terrorism 1636  but the stubborn 
insistence that civil liberties have to be sacrificed for the sake of national security 
is losing momentum.1637  
                                                 
1634 See Guardian books (2011). 9/11: the Attack on America, introduced by Ed Pilkington; see 
also Sussex, M (2004). Cultures in Conflict? Re-evaluating the ‘Clash of Civilizations' Thesis 
After 9/11 In Shearman, P and Sussex, M. (editors). European Security After 9/11 (England, 
Ashgate), pp. 28 and seq.; see also El Fadle, K. A. (2003). 9/11 and the Muslim Transformation 
in Dudziak, M. L. (editor). September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? (USA, Duke 
University Press), pp. 80 and seq.       
1635  See the preceding chapters on new measures introduced in the UK and the US. Just to 
mention few:  the scrapping of stop and search, reverting pre-charge detention to 14-days and the 
defeat of the US government at the hands of the judiciary for attempting to strip foreign terrorist 
suspects right to  habeas corpus       
1636  Cole, D.  and  Dempsey, J. (2006).  Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Liberties in 
the Name of National Security (New York, The New Press), p. 22 ( pointing that "the fact that 
U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to prevent the September attacks despite various warning 
signs reflected a failure that justifiably prompted a re-evaluation of traditional structures and 
procedures".)     
1637 See for instance, The Coalition (2010)., supra note 1376; see also Walker, C. (2011), supra 
note 224, p. 7 and seq. (arguing that "the ultimate test of success or failure of strategies against 
terrorism is the maintenance of public support while at the same time respecting the fundamental 
values on which legitimacy and consensus cohere".); see also Cole, D.  and  Dempsey, J. (2006), 
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However, these new developments in the West did little to sway the Ethiopian 
government from passing the current legislation. 1638   
 
6.3 The Consequences of Failing to Reconcile Human Rights and Counter-
terrorism Measures in Ethiopia  
 
The second concluding remark we have attempted to demonstrate in the thesis is 
that the terrorist (perceived) threats in Ethiopia are fundamentally different from 
the threats Western countries including the UK and the US have faced since 9/11.  
One important difference is the absence of religious extremism in Ethiopia. 
Another is the blurred distinction between terrorist organizations and political 
organisations.  The adoption of the EATP in 2009 does not recognise these 
realities. As a result, the question of fighting terrorism and enhancing human 
security has lacked a proper balance: protecting human rights in the context of 
counter-terrorism measures has not yet been crystallised in Ethiopia.   
 
As it currently stands, the EATP is disproportionally designed to augment the 
security of the state. This in turn could result in the curtailment of expressions 
that would have been tolerated through the prism of Western standards. 1639 
Therefore, the EATP needs to be reconciled with the FDRE Constitution and 
other international human rights standards adopted by Ethiopia.  
 
Regrettably, the more the pressure is exerted on the opposition by resorting to 
counter-terrorism measures, the faster the opposition is likely to choose a 
different path: allying with groups that advocate violence1640 or with countries 
that are arch enemies of Ethiopia.1641 These are the worrying consequences of 
                                                                                                                                    
supra note 1636;see also Fenwick, H. and Phillipson, G. (2012) UK Counter-terror Law Post-9/11: 
Initial Acceptance of Extraordinary Measures and the Partial Return to Human Rights Norms. In 
Ramraj, V. et al. (eds.). Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press); see also Stoller, H., et al (2004), supra note 1448; see also Gouldin, L. P.  
(2012)., supra note 1455; see also Sussex, M (2004)., supra note 1634      
1638  See the preceding chapters for details     
1639  See chapter three for a comparison of the ECtHR jurisprudence and the Ethiopian courts 
approach to expressions that incite or encourage terrorism.      
1640  Lyons, T. (2007). Conflict-Generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia. 7(4) 
Conflict, security and Development 529         
1641 A leaked telephone conversation has revealed that the leader of Ginbot 7, Dr. Birhanu Nega, 
is receiving direct financial aid from Egypt following the recent spat between the two countries 
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abusing counter-terrorism measures. So the Ethiopian government needs to show 
a political willingness for a change in its attitude by significantly amending the 
EATP based on the recommendations given in the thesis.   
 
More significantly, a political solution, such as opening channels of 
communication and accommodating the grievances of the terrorist organisations 
is the only way forward. There is a possibility as well that, despite their claim to 
the contrary, the organisations labelled as ‘terrorist' could renounce their armed 
rebellion and joint a peaceful political process.  The changes of strategy by OLF 
and ONLF as discussed in chapter two and a failed attempt of Ginbot 7 to talk to 
the Ethiopian Government1642 substantiate this argument. Therefore, terrorism in 
Ethiopia is arguably best solved through political integration, not enacting a 
harsh counter-terrorism regime, such as the EATP which arguably fails to ensure 
the balance between nurturing human rights and securing the country from 
terrorist attacks. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for Further Research  
 
We have attempted to make a significant contribution to the field of knowledge 
by offering contributions towards the practical implication of transferring 
Western counter-terrorism laws. This has been done by developing a new point 
of view for the examination of terrorism and human rights, particularly in 
Ethiopia where issues of human rights are accorded less significance than the 
issues of security and stability. The thesis is also original in that it provided an 
original research with regard to Ethiopian legal system on terrorism and human 
rights for which there has been no comprehensive research or publication to date. 
The general conclusion we have made in this thesis is that the Ethiopian case is 
different from other Western laws because the EATP is not enacted in response 
                                                                                                                                    
over the construction of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. For details see Awramba Times (2013). 
Berhanu Nega Receives Half A Million “Grant” From Egypt to Run Ginbot 7 and ESAT, 20 June; 
see also Stack, L (2013). With Cameras Rolling, Egyptian Politicians Threaten Ethiopia over 
Dam, 6 June, the New York Times; see also Plaut, M (2013). Egypt–Ethiopia Crisis: “No Nile, No 
Egypt,” 11 June, New Statesman      
1642  The attempt of Ginbot 7 to negotiate with the Ethiopian government after the death of the late 
Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, had  been dismissed out of hand. For details, see  Powel, A. 
(2012). Ethiopian Exiles Seek Talks with Government, 23 August, Voice of America       
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to any emergency situation. However, the sweeping measures included in the 
EATP resembles that of Western laws that were enacted post 9/11. Although the 
country was right to pass counter-terrorism legislation, we have attempted to 
shown that the contents of the EATP severely curtail fundamental rights 
recognised under the FDRE Constitution.  
 
However, there are some limitations with this research. First, this research only 
gives us a clue how the changing perception of human rights and terrorism in the 
West since 9/11 is shaping the legal response to terrorism in some part of the 
world.  Therefore, we have to acknowledge that a research on Ethiopia's response 
to terrorism may not represent all developing countries in general or African 
nations in particular. For this reason, the findings of this research would have 
broader implications if any future research is done by looking into the experience 
of other African countries which are in a similar democratic status to Ethiopia.  
 
Moreover, this research only covers counterterrorism measures vis a-vis three 
fundamental rights. Thus, a further research, be it from an Ethiopian context or 
African context,  is required to analyse how 9/11 has affected other fundamental 
rights not discussed in this thesis.  
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